Can USCIS deny an H-1B extension after it approved the same job before? It already can, but today a federal regulation makes it explain why. On October 14, 2026, the Department of Homeland Security published a notice of proposed rulemaking titled Removing Deference to Prior USCIS Determinations of Eligibility that would delete that regulation, 8 CFR 214.1(c)(5). The provision tells U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to defer to its earlier approval when a Form I-129 request involves the same parties and the same underlying facts. According to the notice, written comments were due on or before November 13, 2026. The proposal is not in force: the eCFR version of the regulation, up to date as of November 12, 2026, still contains the deference paragraph.
For an H-1B worker whose authorized stay is running out, or an employer preparing a renewal for an L-1, O-1, TN or E worker, the useful question is not only whether the rule will change. It is what protects a renewal if it does. Federal courts have answered part of that question for years: an earlier approval does not guarantee the next one, but the agency must explain its decision, decide on the record and, in some situations, account for a long pattern of approvals. Below you will find the current federal rule, what DHS proposes, the decisions that matter and the file to build now. The discussion that follows is general in scope: it describes checks useful in comparable situations and makes no findings about any particular employer, worker or petition.
I. Can USCIS deny an H-1B extension it approved before?
A. What federal law says today, and what DHS proposes to remove
The current federal regulation is short. Under 8 CFR 214.1(c)(5), “When adjudicating a request filed on Form I-129 involving the same parties and the same underlying facts, USCIS gives deference to its prior determination of the petitioner’s, applicant’s, or beneficiary’s eligibility.” The same paragraph lists three situations in which USCIS need not defer: a material error in the prior approval, a material change in circumstances or eligibility requirements, or new, material information that adversely impacts eligibility. Paragraph (c)(1) of the same section explains who files on Form I-129 to extend a worker’s stay: petitioners for E-1, E-2, E-3, H-1B, H-1B1, H-2A, H-2B, H-3, L-1, O-1, O-2, P, Q-1, R-1 and TN workers. The deference debate therefore reaches well beyond H-1B specialty occupations, even if H-1B renewals are the cases most people search for.
USCIS guidance adds procedure to that rule. The USCIS Policy Manual, Volume 2, Part A, Chapter 4, marked current as of October 27, 2026, says an officer who decides that deference is not appropriate “must acknowledge the previous approval(s) in the denial, Request for Evidence (RFE), or Notice of Intent to Deny (NOID).” The officer must also articulate the reason for not deferring and give the petitioner an opportunity to respond, and the manual adds: “In all cases, officers must obtain supervisory approval before deviating from a prior approval in their final decision.” The same chapter says officers consider, but do not defer to, earlier eligibility determinations made by U.S. Customs and Border Protection or the Department of State. The manual is agency guidance, not a statute or regulation, but it describes how officers are told to apply the regulation today.
Deference has never meant automatic approval. A federal statute, 8 U.S.C. 1361, places on the person seeking a visa, admission or a claimed nonimmigrant status the burden to establish eligibility. The general federal adjudication rule in 8 CFR 103.2(b)(1) says an applicant or petitioner “must establish that he or she is eligible for the requested benefit at the time of filing the benefit request and must continue to be eligible through adjudication.” DHS relies on both texts in its notice and reads section 1361 as placing the burden on the requester for every immigration benefit. In other words, the deference rule does not shift the legal burden; it sets the officer’s starting point and requires a reason, of a listed kind, before the officer departs from the earlier approval.
The proposal would remove that starting point. The notice states: “This proposal would not prohibit USCIS officers from considering a prior approval where relevant. Rather, it would remove the requirement that officers begin from a position of deference to the prior approval.” DHS also writes that removing deference “does not substantively change eligibility for the requested immigration benefit.” The proposed amendment itself is a single instruction: paragraph (c)(5) of section 214.1 would be removed and reserved. If a final rule adopts that change, the H-1B specialty occupation criteria, the wage and job requirements and the evidence rules would stay where they are; what would change is the officer’s obligation to treat the earlier approval as the default answer.
The notice also recounts the history that explains why employers are watching. According to DHS, USCIS first adopted a deference policy in an April 2004 memorandum, rescinded it in October 2017, reinstated it in the Policy Manual in April 2021 and codified it in a final rule published on December 18, 2024, at 89 FR 103054. DHS now gives three reasons for reversing course: it believes deference effectively shifts the burden from the petitioner to the officer, that it discourages officers from requesting more evidence, and that it weakens program integrity. To support the last point, the notice reports that the combined rate of non-compliance or fraud found during site visits on H-1B extension cases was 22.39 percent for fiscal years 2022 through 2025, compared with 16.77 percent for fiscal years 2018 through 2020, while acknowledging that other factors may have contributed.
The agency’s own estimates give a sense of scale. DHS counts an annual average of 208,429 Form I-129 petitions eligible for deference over fiscal years 2022 through 2025, about 30 percent of all I-129 filings. Using a comparison of periods with and without deference, it estimates that removing the rule would raise the RFE rate by 2.9 percentage points, or about 6,044 additional RFEs a year, and it reports that, over fiscal years 2022 through 2025, the average of median processing times was 76 days for petitions with an RFE and 12 days for petitions without one, a difference of 64 days. DHS also states that its analysis of denial rates found no corresponding change. The agency considered keeping deference as a discretionary option, so that USCIS “may give deference in its discretion,” and rejected that alternative as likely to create confusion. Those figures are DHS projections in a proposal, not findings by a court, but they tell employers where to expect friction: more evidence requests, and more time.
B. What federal courts say when USCIS changes its mind about the same job
The leading appellate decision on renewals is Royal Siam Corp. v. Chertoff, 484 F.3d 139 (1st Cir. 2007), decided on April 27, 2007, by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. On a 1999 petition filed by the predecessor in interest of a restaurant company in Carolina, Puerto Rico, the agency had approved H-1B status for a restaurant manager; when the company sought renewal in 2002, the agency denied the petition. After the district court sent the case back for a fuller explanation in light of the 1999 approval, the agency explained that it regarded the 1999 approval as erroneous because the position, as described, did not qualify as a specialty occupation. The First Circuit affirmed and wrote: “The mere fact that the agency, by mistake or oversight, approved a specialty occupation visa petition on one occasion does not create an automatic entitlement to the approval of a subsequent petition for renewal of that visa.” It also rejected an estoppel argument, explaining that estoppel will rarely be invoked against the federal government and finding no affirmative government misconduct. The opinion is just as instructive for what it did not decide: the petitioners invoked the principle that an agency’s unexplained departure from a prior course of action may raise arbitrariness concerns, and the court answered that it was not dealing with an unexplained departure, because the agency had laid out its reasons on remand. For a renewal today, the lesson is that a prior approval is evidence to put in front of the officer, not a shield that ends the inquiry.
That reading of Royal Siam was repeated recently. In American Hospital Association v. Kennedy, No. 25-2236 (1st Cir. Jan. 7, 2026), the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied the federal government’s request for a stay in a challenge to a federal drug-discount program, not an immigration case. Addressing the government’s reliance on Royal Siam for the standard of review of informal adjudications, the court wrote that “that case, however, does not suggest that an agency need not explain an informal adjudication,” and it pointed back to the passage in which the 2007 panel found a closely reasoned agency judgment. The same order recalls that when a prior policy has engendered serious reliance interests, an agency adopting a new policy must assess those interests and weigh them against competing concerns. That later order shows Royal Siam still being read in the First Circuit as a case about explained decisions, not unexplained ones.
The D.C. Circuit went further in Fogo de Chao (Holdings) Inc. v. Department of Homeland Security, 769 F.3d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 2014), decided on October 21, 2014, by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. The case concerned an L-1B petition for a Brazilian churrasqueiro chef. According to the opinion, the company asserted that 251 of its earlier petitions for such chefs had been approved from 1997 to 2006, and the agency dismissed any factually similar approvals as “material and gross error.” The court quoted Royal Siam but added that “it may be that a pattern of visa grants of sufficient magnitude could obligate the agency to provide a” reasoned explanation for treating similar situations differently. It did not resolve that question, because the company had not introduced evidence corroborating that the earlier petitions were factually equivalent, and it noted that the service centers that granted the earlier petitions lacked authority to bind the agency. The company still obtained relief on other grounds, over a dissent by Judge Kavanaugh: the court reversed and remanded with instructions to vacate the Appeals Office decision, finding its categorical rule against culturally acquired knowledge insufficiently reasoned and one factual finding unsupported by substantial evidence. If you rely on earlier approvals, put copies of the approved petitions and their evidence in the record and show, point by point, that the facts match.
Fogo de Chao is still cited in the D.C. Circuit, in particular for its standard on claims that an agency prejudged a matter. In Sprint Corp. v. Federal Communications Commission, No. 24-1224 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 15, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit relied on Fogo de Chao to hold that an agency decisionmaker is deemed to have prejudged a case “only where he has demonstrably made up his mind about important and specific factual questions and is impervious to contrary evidence,” and it found that statements by two commissioners did not meet that high burden. For an H-1B employer, general statements about tougher enforcement will rarely be enough to show that an officer prejudged a particular petition.
A recent district court decision shows what happens when an agency departs from a prior approval without explaining the legal basis. In OuroArte Jewelry International LLC v. Noem, No. 23-3285 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2025), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania reviewed USCIS’s second denial of an L-1A extension petition. According to the opinion, USCIS had granted the executive a one-year new-office L-1A approval on April 29, 2020; the company then sought an extension, which USCIS denied, reopened and denied again. The court held the denial arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. It found that the decision cited a regulation that does not exist, focused on new-office requirements rather than extension requirements and, even accepting the government’s explanation at oral argument, that “the USCIS decision fails to explain a legal basis for not deferring to its prior approval” of the earlier petition. The court observed that USCIS had listed three Policy Manual scenarios for not deferring without citing legal support, and that it may be appropriate for USCIS not to defer so long as the agency’s path can reasonably be discerned. It vacated the decision, remanded the case to USCIS and declined to order approval of the petition. A denial that ignores a prior approval, or departs from it without a stated legal reason, can be vacated, but the usual result is a new decision by USCIS rather than a court-ordered approval.
Read together, these federal decisions give a consistent answer to the reader’s question. USCIS can deny a renewal it approved before, with or without a deference regulation. What courts have policed is the explanation: whether the agency identified the reason it departed from the earlier result, whether that reason is supported by the record, and whether the petitioner actually put the earlier approvals and their facts before the agency. Removing 8 CFR 214.1(c)(5) would remove the regulatory list of permitted reasons and the default in the petitioner’s favor; it would not remove the federal requirement of reasoned decision-making that these courts enforced.
II. What should employers and H-1B workers do while the rule is only proposed?
A. A proposed rule changes nothing until DHS publishes a final rule
The federal Administrative Procedure Act sets the path DHS must follow before the proposal can bind anyone. Under 5 U.S.C. 553, a general notice of proposed rulemaking is published in the Federal Register, interested persons receive an opportunity to submit written data, views or arguments, and the agency must incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose. The same section requires publication of a substantive rule “not less than 30 days before its effective date,” subject to exceptions listed in the statute, including a rule that relieves a restriction and an effective date otherwise provided by the agency for good cause found and published with the rule. DHS used the notice-and-comment route here, with comments due November 13, 2026. The next legally significant document, if there is one, will be a final rule in the Federal Register that states its effective date.
Courts treat a proposal as what it is. In Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, 788 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. 2015), decided on June 9, 2015, by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, a coal company and several states asked the court to stop the Environmental Protection Agency from finalizing a proposed rule on power plant emissions. The court refused, stating that “a proposed rule is just a proposal,” and held that proposed rules meet neither requirement for final agency action: they are not the consummation of the agency’s decision-making process, and they do not determine rights or obligations or impose legal consequences. The court added that the costs parties incur in preparing for an anticipated rule have never justified judicial review of a proposal. Until a final rule is published and takes effect, 8 CFR 214.1(c)(5) remains the regulation USCIS must apply, and the proposal by itself does not change the obligations it imposes on officers.
The Supreme Court has cited Murray Energy since. In Ohio v. EPA, No. 23A349 (June 27, 2024), the Supreme Court of the United States, granting stays of a federal implementation plan under the Clean Air Act, cited In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330, 335 (D.C. Cir. 2015), in a footnote listing examples of courts approaching such applications like any other stay request. The Supreme Court’s citation used the D.C. Circuit decision for a procedural point about stays; it did not question the proposed-rule holding. That observed citation is not a complete citator check, but it confirms that the D.C. Circuit opinion remains part of the case law federal courts cite on review of agency action.
The practical consequence for a pending case is straightforward. A petition adjudicated before any final rule takes effect is governed by the regulation in force, and an officer who declines to defer must still fit the decision within one of the three listed exceptions and explain it, as the Policy Manual requires. The notice does not contain a transition provision addressing petitions pending on the date a final rule might take effect: the proposed regulatory text only removes and reserves paragraph (c)(5). How a final rule treats pending filings, if it addresses them, will depend on its text. Check the Federal Register and the eCFR rather than secondary summaries before relying on any date.
The timing risk that matters most for workers is the federal 240-day rule. Under 8 CFR 274a.12(b)(20), workers in listed classes, including H-1, L-1 and O-1, whose status has expired but on whose behalf an application for an extension of stay was timely filed “are authorized to continue employment with the same employer for a period not to exceed 240 days beginning on the date of the expiration of the authorized period of stay.” The same paragraph provides that if the application is denied within that period, the employment authorization under the paragraph terminates automatically upon notification of the denial. DHS itself cites this provision in its notice when it discusses longer processing. If more RFEs lengthen adjudication, as DHS projects, the 240 days become the real calendar for the worker and the employer, so file early and complete.
B. How to build an extension file that does not depend on deference
Start with the evidence the federal regulation already requires. Under 8 CFR 214.1(c)(6), a request to extend or amend stay on Form I-129 must include evidence that the worker maintained the previously accorded status before the request was filed, and the regulation gives examples: copies of paystubs, W-2 forms, quarterly wage reports, tax returns, contracts and work orders. Collect those records for the whole period since the last approval, not only the most recent months. Gaps in pay, unexplained changes of worksite or duties, or a mismatch between the wage paid and the wage stated in the earlier petition are the kinds of facts that can turn an extension into an RFE.
Next, put the earlier approval and its foundation in the record. Fogo de Chao shows why: the D.C. Circuit could not evaluate the claim of inconsistent treatment because the company never placed evidence of the earlier petitions before the agency. Include the approval notice, the prior petition’s description of the position, the evidence that established the specialty occupation or other classification, and a short comparison showing that the same employer, the same worker and the same job remain at issue. Under the current regulation, that comparison is what triggers deference; without the regulation, it becomes ordinary evidence that the officer must weigh, and the same document then serves a different purpose.
Disclose changes rather than hoping they go unnoticed. A material change in circumstances is one of the three exceptions written into 8 CFR 214.1(c)(5), so a changed job, a new client site or a reorganization is a reason to explain the facts and the legal fit, not to rely on the earlier approval. The Policy Manual gives an example of new material information an officer may use, such as publicly available information that a petitioner has recently gone out of business, and says officers should not defer when there are indicators of potential fraud or willful misrepresentation. An extension built on candid, current facts is the one that remains approvable whichever version of the rule applies on the day of decision.
Know the response windows before an RFE arrives. Under 8 CFR 103.2(b)(8)(iv), an RFE or a notice of intent to deny must state the deadline for response, “but in no case shall the maximum response period provided in a request for evidence exceed twelve weeks, nor shall the maximum response time provided in a notice of intent to deny exceed thirty days.” The same paragraph states: “Additional time to respond to a request for evidence or notice of intent to deny may not be granted.” Prepare the core of a response, including the prior approval comparison and the maintenance-of-status records, before filing, so the actual RFE period can be spent on the specific question the officer raises.
Use the federal rules on the record. Under 8 CFR 103.2(b)(16)(i), if an adverse decision will be based on derogatory information considered by USCIS of which the petitioner is unaware, the petitioner must be advised and offered an opportunity to rebut it before the decision, subject to the exceptions in that paragraph. Under 8 CFR 103.2(b)(16)(ii), a determination of statutory eligibility must be based only on information in the record of proceeding disclosed to the petitioner, again subject to a listed exception. When an RFE or NOID cites a site visit, a public report or a change in the business, respond to that specific information with documents, and make sure your response becomes part of the record that a later reviewer will see.
Plan for an adverse outcome without overstating the remedies. The federal regulation at 8 CFR 214.1(c)(7) states: “The denial of an extension or amendment of stay request may not be appealed.” The Policy Manual also describes “split” decisions, in which USCIS approves the petition for the classification but denies the extension of stay, for instance because of inadmissibility factors or a failure to maintain status. When a denial is reviewed in federal court under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A) directs the court to hold unlawful and set aside agency action found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, and to review the whole record or the parts cited by a party. The decisions discussed above show the range: an explained denial on a sound record was upheld in Royal Siam, while unexplained or unsupported reasoning led to vacatur and remand in Fogo de Chao and OuroArte. Remand means a new agency decision, not a guaranteed approval, so the 240-day calendar and the worker’s status planning must run in parallel with any challenge.
Finally, keep the employer’s and the worker’s planning aligned. The worker’s ability to keep working under the 240-day rule depends on a timely extension filing with the same employer, and the employer’s ability to answer an RFE depends on records the worker may also hold, such as pay records and tax documents. A short internal timeline, starting several months before the authorized stay ends, should list when the file will be assembled, who signs the comparison with the earlier approval, and what the fallback is if an RFE arrives close to the 240-day limit. None of those steps depends on the outcome of the rulemaking, which is exactly why they are worth doing now.
Conclusion
Under current federal law, USCIS can deny an H-1B or other Form I-129 extension that it approved before, but 8 CFR 214.1(c)(5) makes it start from the earlier approval and depart only for a material error, a material change or new adverse information, with an explanation. DHS has proposed to remove that rule; until a final rule is published and takes effect, the regulation still governs, and a proposal binds no one. Whatever happens next, federal courts will continue to require reasoned decisions on the record, and they will look first at what the petitioner actually put before the agency. The surest protection is therefore a complete extension file: proof of maintained status, the earlier approval with a point-by-point comparison, candid explanations of any change, a response plan for the RFE and NOID windows, and a calendar built around the 240-day limit.