The search “donald trump immigration ban review” took off after a one-line order. On November 13, 2026, the Supreme Court of the United States granted the federal government’s petition in Mullin v. Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services, No. 26-239, “limited to Questions 1 and 2 presented by the petition,” according to the Court’s miscellaneous order of November 13, 2026. The case concerns Proclamation 10888, which President Donald Trump signed on January 20, 2025 and which was published in the Federal Register on January 29, 2025. The Proclamation suspends the entry of people it describes as engaged in an invasion across the southern border and restricts their access to parts of federal immigration law, including the asylum statute.
For a person who has already crossed the border, or for a relative trying to help, the useful question is not who will win in Washington. It is what applies today, while the Justices decide. The court papers read for this article give a fairly precise answer. Two lower federal courts held the Proclamation and its implementing guidance unlawful in important respects, but the asylum restrictions have not been lifted while the case continues. According to the government’s own petition, the appeals court agreed to hold back its mandate, and the earlier partial stay therefore remains in place. Protection against being sent back to persecution or torture rests on separate federal rules, and where a person stands when asking for protection now matters a great deal. The discussion that follows is general in scope: it describes checks useful in comparable situations and makes no findings about any individual’s case or about how the Supreme Court will rule.
I. What did the Supreme Court agree to review, and what is still in force?
A. The November 13, 2026 order and the questions the Justices will answer
The Supreme Court’s docket for No. 26-239 shows a short and fast path. The government’s petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on August 24, 2026. The organizations and individuals who won in the lower courts filed their brief in opposition on September 23, 2026, along with several amicus briefs, and the government replied on October 6, 2026. The case was distributed for the Justices’ conference of November 13, 2026, and the docket entry for that day records that the petition was granted, limited to Questions 1 and 2. When this article was written, the docket did not list an argument date. Anyone following the case can check that page for the briefing schedule, the argument date and, eventually, the decision.
The Court’s Questions Presented report sets out what the Justices agreed to decide. The first question asks whether Proclamation 10888 and its implementing guidance, which suspended the entry of certain noncitizens and cut off their access to statutory provisions that would allow them to remain, including asylum, are lawful. The second asks “Whether 8 U.S.C. 1252(f)(1) bars the classwide relief entered by the district court.” A third question in the petition, about whether the certified class satisfies Article III and Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, was not included in the grant. The same report identifies the decision under review as 174 F.4th 81, the published opinion of the federal court of appeals in Washington, D.C. In practical terms, the Supreme Court will decide two things: whether this kind of proclamation can shut people out of the asylum system and the statute’s removal procedures, and whether lower courts may protect a whole class of people at once, rather than one person at a time.
The Proclamation itself is short. Section 1 suspends the entry of noncitizens “engaged in the invasion across the southern border” on or after January 20, 2025. Section 2 states that those people “are restricted from invoking provisions of the INA that would permit their continued presence in the United States,” naming the asylum statute among them. Section 3 suspends entry for anyone who fails, before entering, to provide officials with sufficient medical information and reliable criminal history and background information, and restricts their access to the same provisions. Section 4 invokes the President’s constitutional powers to suspend physical entry, and Section 5 directs the Secretary of Homeland Security, with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, to “repel, repatriate, or remove” covered noncitizens. Each of these measures lasts “until I issue a finding that the invasion at the southern border has ceased.” Nothing in the text sets a fixed end date, which is one reason the litigation matters so much to people who are already in the country.
The main statutory authority the Proclamation invokes is 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), a federal provision that allows the President, whenever he finds that the entry of any noncitizens “would be detrimental to the interests of the United States,” to “suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants” for as long as he deems necessary, or to impose restrictions on entry. The Proclamation also relies on the companion travel-control provision in section 215(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The fight in No. 26-239 is not about whether the President may suspend entry in general. It is about whether that power reaches people who are already on U.S. soil, and whether it can override the statute’s procedures for removing them and the protections Congress built into those procedures.
The government starts from a strong precedent. In Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667 (2018), the Supreme Court of the United States decided on June 26, 2018 that a proclamation restricting the entry of nationals of several countries fell within the President’s authority, explaining that Section 1182(f) “exudes deference to the President in every clause.” The Court read the statute as entrusting the President with the decisions whether and when to suspend entry, whose entry to suspend, for how long and on what conditions. For someone tracking the new case, the useful lesson is that the entry-suspension power itself is broad, so the real dispute in the asylum case is what that power may do to people who are already inside the United States. The Proclamation quotes this very passage of Trump v. Hawaii, which shows how central the 2018 decision is to the government’s position.
That precedent is still in active use, but its limits are contested. In Mullin v. Doe, No. 25-1083 (June 25, 2026), a challenge to the termination of Temporary Protected Status for Syria and Haiti, the Supreme Court of the United States cited Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667, when describing the government’s request for the deferential Hawaii test, and recorded the opposing argument that the Hawaii standard applies only to people seeking to enter the country, not to those already here. The Court left that question open, writing that “We need not resolve this debate.” The observed citation is useful for readers in a narrow way: as of June 25, 2026, the Supreme Court had not decided whether Hawaii’s deference extends from people outside the border to people already inside it.
B. What the D.C. Circuit decided, and what the stay leaves in place
The decision under review is Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services v. Mullin, No. 25-5243 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 24, 2026). In that opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed a district court judgment in a class action brought by thirteen individuals and three nonprofit organizations. The opinion states that the challengers did not contest the Proclamation’s authority to suspend entry; the case addressed only whether that authority also covers removals using new procedures that replace the ones in the Immigration and Nationality Act. The court concluded that “The Proclamation and Guidance are thus unlawful to the extent that they circumvent the INA’s removal procedures and cast aside federal laws affording individuals the right to apply and be considered for asylum or withholding of removal protections.” Judge Walker concurred in part and dissented in part. The case now stands at this stage: certiorari granted on November 13, 2026, limited to Questions 1 and 2, with no argument held and no Supreme Court decision yet.
The reasoning matters because it tells a reader which protections were at stake. The D.C. Circuit explained that federal law allows removal of a noncitizen through two procedures only: regular removal proceedings before an immigration judge, or expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). According to the opinion, the Department of Homeland Security implemented the Proclamation through emails, a memorandum and training materials, referred to as the Guidance, which told officers that people crossing between ports of entry on the southern land border were not permitted to apply for asylum, and which created summary “Direct Repatriation” and a separate form of “Expedited Removal” outside the statutory process. The opinion also describes instructions not to use the forms that normally ask about fear of return, and to refer only people who spontaneously expressed fear for a screening limited to the Convention Against Torture, under a demanding standard and without review by an immigration judge. The court held that Section 1182(f) speaks of suspending entry, not of removal, and that it does not let the Executive replace the removal procedures Congress wrote.
On asylum, the court relied on the text of 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1), which provides that any noncitizen “who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States,” whether or not at a designated port of arrival and irrespective of status, may apply for asylum. The statute lists only a few exceptions to the right to apply: a safe third country agreement, the one-year filing rule, and a prior denial. The D.C. Circuit reasoned that a categorical, advance denial of asylum to a whole population cannot be squared with the individualized process the statute requires, and that even if the Executive could adopt new bars, Section 1158(b)(2)(C) allows the Attorney General to “by regulation establish additional limitations and conditions, consistent with this section.” The court emphasized that the Guidance was not adopted through notice-and-comment rulemaking. In his partial dissent, Judge Walker took the opposite view on this point: because asylum is discretionary, he reasoned, the Executive had already exercised that discretion to deny all such applications and could therefore foreclose the application process as futile.
On the protections that are mandatory rather than discretionary, the panel was much closer to unanimity. Federal law, at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A), provides that the Attorney General “may not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in that country” because of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion. A separate federal regime implements the Convention Against Torture. The majority held that the Proclamation and Guidance could not suspend these protections. Judge Walker, in the part of his opinion where he agreed with the majority, wrote that the Executive cannot remove people to countries where they will be persecuted and that the Proclamation and Guidance cannot strip away the mandatory procedures that protect against that removal. His disagreement concerned standing for the broad class, asylum, and the limit on class-wide injunctions.
What is in force today depends on the stay history, and here the government’s petition is the most precise source. According to the government’s petition filed on August 24, 2026, the court of appeals in August 2025 “stayed the judgment with respect to the preclusion of asylum claims, but denied a stay as to the preclusion of withholding and CAT claims, as well as the immediate repatriation of aliens without invoking expedited removal or Section 240 removal procedures.” The petition adds that, after denying rehearing en banc on July 23, 2026, the court of appeals granted the government’s unopposed motion to stay issuance of its mandate pending the Supreme Court’s review, on July 27, 2026, and that “Accordingly, the partial stay remains in place.” In plain terms, as the government describes it, the asylum restrictions continue to operate during the appeal, while the parts of the judgment protecting withholding of removal, Convention Against Torture claims and the statutory removal procedures were not paused by that stay order.
The class matters too. The D.C. Circuit’s opinion explains that the August 2025 stay panel narrowed the class to people present in the United States while the Proclamation or its implementation is in effect, who are not statutorily ineligible for all of asylum, withholding of removal and Convention Against Torture protection, and who, absent the Proclamation, would seek one of those protections. The court of appeals affirmed class certification as clarified in that way. Question 2 asks whether federal law forbids this kind of class-wide relief. The statute in issue, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), provides that no court other than the Supreme Court may enjoin or restrain the operation of certain removal provisions, “other than with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated.” The D.C. Circuit held that this limit did not affect the district court’s vacatur of the Guidance under the Administrative Procedure Act. If the Supreme Court disagrees, the text of the statute itself still leaves room for a court to act with respect to an individual person against whom removal proceedings have been initiated, which is why individual case papers remain important whatever happens to the class.
II. What should a person seeking protection, or a relative, check while the case is pending?
A. Where you are, and when you arrived, decide which rules apply
The first check is geographic, and the Supreme Court settled it this year in a separate case. In Mullin v. Al Otro Lado, No. 25-5 (June 25, 2026), the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that a noncitizen standing in Mexico who tries and fails to enter does not arrive in the United States. In the Court’s words, an alien “arrives in the United States” only when he crosses the border. The case arose from the metering policy that limited how many people border officials would process at ports of entry each day, and the Court concluded that the federal statute “neither entitles such an alien to apply for asylum nor requires an immigration officer to inspect him.” For someone waiting on the Mexican side of a port of entry, this ruling means the statutory right to apply for asylum and the officer’s duty to inspect begin only after the person is in the United States. The Court also observed that “Entry at an improper location is a crime,” so the decision is not an invitation to cross elsewhere; it explains why the timing and place of an encounter with U.S. officials carry legal weight.
The same territorial logic runs through an older precedent. In Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993), the Supreme Court of the United States decided on June 21, 1993 that neither the withholding-of-deportation provision then found in § 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act nor Article 33 of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees “applies to action taken by the Coast Guard on the high seas.” The Court also described Section 1182(f) as granting the President ample power to prevent migrants from reaching U.S. shores. Read alongside the current statute, Sale means that the protections against return at issue there were held not to reach people intercepted outside U.S. territory, so the exact place where a person was stopped, and whether that place was inside the United States, should be written down precisely. That reasoning remains current: in Mullin v. Al Otro Lado, No. 25-5 (June 25, 2026), the Supreme Court of the United States relied on Sale, 509 U.S. 155, to reject the argument that turning people away at ports of entry violated Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, because people standing in Mexico are outside U.S. territory.
Once a person is in the United States, the asylum statute’s own time limit applies. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), the right to apply does not apply unless the person shows by clear and convincing evidence that the application was filed “within 1 year after the date of the alien’s arrival in the United States.” The same federal statute, in Section 1158(a)(2)(D), allows a late application to be considered if the person shows changed circumstances that materially affect eligibility, or extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay, and Section 1158(a)(2)(E) states that the one-year rule and the safe third country rule do not apply to an unaccompanied child as defined by federal law. None of the statutes or opinions read for this article says that the pending Supreme Court case pauses the one-year period, and none decides whether being blocked by the Proclamation counts as an extraordinary circumstance. A careful reader should therefore treat the arrival date as fixed and keep evidence of it: travel records, the date and place of any encounter with border officials, and any document received at that time.
A second statutory bar deserves attention for the same reason. Section 1158(a)(2)(C) provides that the right to apply does not apply to a person who previously applied for asylum and had that application denied, again subject to the changed or extraordinary circumstances provision. Someone who has already been through a process, in the United States or at the border, should find out exactly what happened in that process: whether an application was filed, whether it was decided, and what kind of decision was issued. The distinction between a decision on an asylum application and a summary return without any application can matter later, and the paperwork is usually the only reliable way to tell the two apart.
The other geographic point concerns people who are already inside the country and were never encountered at the border. The Proclamation is written in terms of entry on or after January 20, 2025, and the class described by the D.C. Circuit is limited to people present in the United States while the Proclamation or its implementation is in effect. Whether a particular person is covered depends on facts: the date of entry, the manner of entry, whether the person presented documents, and whether the person is statutorily ineligible for every form of protection. Those facts should be assembled before anyone assumes that the Proclamation does, or does not, apply. The answer may also change after the Supreme Court rules on Question 1, which is why it is wise to keep the evidence rather than a conclusion drawn from it.
B. Asking for protection clearly, and keeping a record of what happened
The second check is procedural: what a person says to an officer and what the officer must do next. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), when an immigration officer determines that a covered arriving noncitizen is inadmissible for lack of valid documents or for misrepresentation, the officer “shall order the alien removed from the United States without further hearing or review unless the alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum under section 1158 of this title or a fear of persecution.” If the person does express that intention or fear, the officer must refer the person for an interview by an asylum officer. The statute defines a credible fear of persecution as a “significant possibility” that the person could establish eligibility for asylum, and a person found to have a credible fear is held for further consideration of the application.
The federal regulation that implements this process is more concrete still. Under 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4), if a person subject to expedited removal indicates an intention to apply for asylum or expresses a fear of persecution, torture or return, the inspecting officer “shall not proceed further with removal of the alien until the alien has been referred for an interview by an asylum officer,” must record that the person expressed the intention or fear, and must provide the written disclosure on Form M-444 describing the credible fear interview. The D.C. Circuit’s opinion describes Guidance instructing officers not to use these forms and not to ask fear questions. According to the government’s petition, the court of appeals did not stay the district court’s judgment as to withholding and Convention Against Torture claims or as to removals outside the statutory procedures. The practical consequence is simple: a person who fears return should say so plainly, as early as possible, and should ask for and keep every paper handed over.
The reason statutory procedures carry so much weight at the border comes from another Supreme Court precedent. In Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020), the Supreme Court of the United States decided on June 25, 2020 that limits on habeas review in expedited removal did not violate the Suspension Clause or the Due Process Clause as applied to an asylum seeker caught just after crossing. The Court wrote that the respondent “was apprehended just 25 yards from the border” and that “He therefore has no entitlement to procedural rights other than those afforded by statute.” For someone stopped shortly after crossing, this means the procedures written into federal statutes and regulations, not broader constitutional claims, are usually the main protection, which is exactly why the statutory question now before the Supreme Court matters so much.
The D.C. Circuit read that precedent as cutting both ways. In Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services v. Mullin, No. 25-5243 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 24, 2026), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, deciding on April 24, 2026, cited Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, and observed: “But, as the Supreme Court has recognized, that limitation does not allow the Executive to remove individuals in violation of procedures Congress has guaranteed to them by statute.” The D.C. Circuit used Thuraissigiam to explain that the entry fiction limits constitutional claims at the border but does not let the Executive remove people in violation of procedures Congress guaranteed by statute. That observed citation shows how the 2020 decision is being applied in the very case the Supreme Court has now agreed to review.
Records are where these rules become usable. A person who was processed at the border, or a relative helping that person, should try to keep a complete set of documents and dates: any notice or order received, including a Notice to Alien Ordered Removed or an expedited removal order if one was issued; any Form M-444; any record of a fear screening, and whether it was limited to the Convention Against Torture; any immigration court notice; the dates and places of each encounter; and identity and travel documents. The D.C. Circuit’s opinion notes the government’s own position that its two summary pathways differed in that one produced a removal order and the other did not, and that the consequences of each can differ. Knowing which one, if any, was used is a factual question that only the papers can answer.
Family members trying to help someone in custody face a related practical problem: they often know only fragments of what happened. It helps to write down, as soon as possible, what the person said about the encounter, in that person’s own words, together with the date it was said. If the person later receives written decisions, the dates on those documents can be compared with that account. Where the person was returned without any written order, the absence of paperwork is itself a fact worth recording, along with the time, place and agency involved, because the D.C. Circuit’s description of the Guidance shows that the type of procedure used is often the key question.
The last check is to follow the case itself rather than headlines about it. If the Supreme Court affirms on Question 1, the judgment the D.C. Circuit approved would be expected to take effect once the court of appeals’ mandate issues. If it reverses, the asylum restrictions the government describes as still in place could continue, and the scope of the remaining protections would depend on what the Court says about withholding of removal, the Convention Against Torture and the statutory removal procedures. If the Court rules that Section 1252(f)(1) limits class-wide relief, individual proceedings would become even more important. Nothing in the order of November 13, 2026 predicts the result, and reading the Court’s eventual opinion, rather than summaries of it, will be the only reliable way to know which of these paths applies.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s grant of review does not change the law by itself. It sets up a decision on two questions: whether a presidential proclamation can close the asylum system and bypass the statute’s removal procedures for people already in the country, and whether lower federal courts may grant that protection to an entire class. Until the Court rules, the court papers describe a split arrangement in which the asylum restrictions continue while the mandatory protections against return to persecution or torture, and the statutory removal procedures, were not covered by the stay. For anyone affected, three facts carry the most weight: whether and when the person was inside the United States, whether a fear of return was clearly stated and recorded, and what written decisions exist. Those facts will matter under any outcome, and keeping them accurate is the most useful step available while the case is pending.