On September 16, 2026, Rodrigo Duterte walked into a courtroom in The Hague and sat before the judges of the International Criminal Court. It was the first time the 81-year-old former Philippine president had appeared in person since his dramatic transfer to the Netherlands eighteen months earlier. He remained silent while the judges reviewed his health, the disclosure of evidence and the timetable of a trial now set to open on November 30, 2026. For an international audience, the scene raises a question that goes far beyond one man: how does an international arrest warrant actually travel from The Hague to a national airport tarmac, and what would happen if the same request landed in France? This article answers both questions. The first part retraces how a “war on drugs” that killed thousands became three counts of crimes against humanity confirmed against a former head of state, and why the Court kept jurisdiction even after the Philippines walked out of the Rome Statute system. The second part switches to the French lawyer’s desk in Paris: the exact procedural track that applies when the ICC asks France to arrest and hand over a suspect, the deadlines, the judges involved, and the remedies left to the defence. The Duterte case is now the clearest live demonstration of that machinery, and its next act begins on November 30.
I. How did Rodrigo Duterte end up facing trial at the ICC?
A. From the “war on drugs” to three confirmed counts of crimes against humanity
Prosecutors accuse Duterte, who was arrested and transferred to The Hague-based court in March 2025, of creating, funding and arming death squads that targeted drug users and dealers. That single sentence, reported from The Hague by international correspondents, condenses almost a decade of alleged violence into the legal theory the ICC will test at trial. Duterte denies the charges, saying he only ordered police to act in self-defence as part of his anti-drug offensive. The Trial Chamber will now decide which version the evidence supports, under the exacting standard of international criminal proof.
The charges cover Duterte’s alleged role in at least 76 murders between 2013 and 2018, when he was mayor of the southern city of Davao, and later as president from 2016 to 2022. Those 76 named killings are the counts the Prosecution chose to pursue, but they sit inside a far larger alleged death toll. Philippine police say 6,200 suspects were killed in anti-drug operations, while rights groups and independent monitors put the real figure far higher, counting the victims of unidentified gunmen widely described as operating with official tolerance. The gap between the 76 charged murders and the thousands of alleged killings is not an accident: international prosecutors typically charge a representative sample of incidents they believe they can prove to the criminal standard, rather than every death linked to a campaign. Readers should therefore understand the November trial as a test of a pattern, not a full accounting of every victim.
The procedural road to trial has been unusually fast by ICC standards, and every milestone is documented in the Court’s own press releases. Following a request by the Office of the Prosecutor, the warrant of arrest against Mr Duterte was issued by Pre-Trial Chamber I as “Secret” on 7 March 2025 and reclassified as “Public” on 11 March 2025. On 12 March 2025, Mr Duterte was surrendered to the ICC. The secrecy sequence matters: a sealed warrant lets national authorities prepare an arrest without tipping off the suspect, and the reclassification to public marks the moment the detention becomes visible to the world. Duterte was stopped in Manila and flown to the Netherlands within days, a transfer speed that surprised even seasoned Court observers.
The initial appearance of Mr Duterte took place on 14 March 2025, two days after his surrender. At that hearing the judges verified his identity, confirmed that he understood the nature of the charges, and set the calendar for the confirmation stage. The confirmation of charges hearing took place from 23 to 27 February 2026 before Pre-Trial Chamber I. Confirmation is the filter between accusation and trial: the judges test whether the Prosecution’s evidence discloses substantial grounds to believe the suspect committed the charged crimes. On 23 April 2026, Pre-Trial Chamber I unanimously confirmed all the charges comprised of three counts of crimes against humanity brought by the Prosecution against Mr Duterte and committed him to trial before a Trial Chamber. On 24 April 2026, the ICC Presidency constituted Trial Chamber III, to be in charge of the Duterte case. Then, on 27 May 2026, Trial Chamber III scheduled the opening of the trial in the case of The Prosecutor v. Rodrigo Roa Duterte for 30 November 2026. The Chamber noted the respective submissions by the Prosecution, the Defence and the Legal Representatives of Victims, as well as the necessary time for the disclosure of evidence and other materials. Trial Chamber III is composed of Presiding Judge Joanna Korner, Judge Keebong Paek and Judge Nicolas Guillou, a bench combining common-law and civil-law experience, including a French judge.
For readers in France, the French Criminal Code offers the closest domestic mirror of what “crimes against humanity” means in this case. French law provides that “Constitue également un crime contre l’humanité et est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité l’un des actes ci-après commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique” (article 212-1 of the Code pénal), listing murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment and torture among the covered acts. The ICC’s own definition follows the same architecture: a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, pursuant to a State or organizational policy. The Prosecution’s allegation that Duterte built, financed and armed death squads is precisely an attempt to prove that policy element. The companion French definition of genocide, which requires a plan “tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux” (article 211-1 of the Code pénal), is not charged here, and the distinction matters: the Duterte case is about crimes against humanity, not genocide, and conflating the two would misstate the trial’s stakes.
B. Why the Court kept jurisdiction after the Philippines walked out
The most common objection to the Duterte prosecution is also the easiest to state: the Philippines withdrew from the International Criminal Court in 2019, so how can judges in The Hague try a Filipino former president? The answer lies in the withdrawal mechanics of the Rome Statute itself, and it carries a lesson for every State tempted to leave the system when an investigation approaches its leadership. Withdrawal takes effect one year after notification and does not discharge the departing State from obligations arising while it was a party, including cooperation with investigations into crimes committed during the period of membership. The alleged murders charged against Duterte span 2013 to 2018, entirely within the window when the Philippines was a State Party. The Court’s jurisdiction therefore attached to those facts before the withdrawal letter was ever sent, and the departure could not retroactively strip it away.
This is the point international lawyers call the “jurisdiction freeze”: the Court keeps the cases that matured while the State was inside. The Philippines’ exit, announced in 2018 and effective in 2019, followed the Prosecutor’s preliminary examination of the drug-war killings, a sequence the judges read as confirmation that the situation was already under the Court’s cognizance. Whatever view one takes of Manila’s politics, the legal consequence is settled for this case: the charges were confirmed, the trial is scheduled, and no pending challenge to jurisdiction stands in the way of the November 30 opening.
The September 16, 2026 session illustrated a second pillar of ICC procedure that foreign observers often misunderstand: fitness to stand trial. The 81-year-old remained silent during Wednesday’s session, which covered his health, evidence disclosure and the timetable of the trial due to open on November 30. He had missed earlier hearings on medical grounds, with his lawyers saying cognitive decline has left him unfit to take part. In a filing dated the day before the hearing, the defence said serious memory loss leaves him unable to absorb new information or reliably recall the past, citing tests in an unpublished report by three medical experts according to which Duterte believes the year is 2007 or 2008, believes that he is 84 or 85, and could not name the sitting president of the United States. In January, however, judges ruled that he was healthy enough to stand trial and requested that he be present for proceedings. That January ruling is the controlling judicial finding unless fresh expert evidence persuades the Chamber otherwise, and the September session’s in-person attendance, after months of remote or excused appearances, signals that the Chamber intends to keep the trial on schedule. Defence teams at international courts routinely litigate fitness; what is notable here is that the litigation failed to delay the calendar.
A third feature of the September session deserves attention from victims and their counsel: the Chamber noted the respective submissions by the Prosecution, the Defence and the Legal Representatives of Victims. Victim participation is one of the ICC’s signature innovations compared with ad hoc tribunals. Thousands of alleged drug-war victims have applied to participate through common legal representatives, and their lawyers will be heard at trial alongside the two parties. For families following the case from the Philippines, Europe or North America, this means the November proceedings will not be a duel between the Prosecutor and one defendant; a third voice, speaking for the dead and the bereaved, has formal standing in the courtroom.
Finally, the Duterte precedent radiates beyond Manila. Sitting and former officials across several regions now face the same combination the Prosecutor assembled here: a sealed warrant, a swift national arrest, and a surrender executed before political allies could organize resistance. The prosecution has signalled in its public statements after the recent hearings that it will rely on the paper trail of orders, funding and public incitement to prove the policy element of crimes against humanity. Courtroom rhetoric is not evidence, and the Chamber will judge on the record alone. Every government watching from abroad, including in Europe, should read that confidence as a warning about the evidentiary value of televised threats and official kill tallies.
II. What would happen if the ICC asked France to arrest and surrender a suspect?
A. Arrest, twenty-four hours and the Paris judges: the French surrender track
France is a founding supporter of the ICC, and French domestic law converts the duty to cooperate into a precise judicial assembly line. The starting principle is codified at the head of the relevant title of the Code of Criminal Procedure: “Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre.” (article 627 of the Code de procédure pénale). Cooperation is therefore not a diplomatic favour; it is a statutory obligation implemented by named magistrates under fixed deadlines. Anyone present on French soil under an ICC warrant, whether a former president in transit at Roissy, a militia leader living quietly in the provinces, or a businessman visiting Paris, enters this track the moment French police execute the request.
The track begins with the arrest request itself. French law provides that “Les demandes d’arrestation aux fins de remise délivrées par la Cour pénale internationale sont adressées, en original et accompagnées de toutes pièces justificatives, aux autorités compétentes en vertu de l’article 87 du statut” (article 627-4 of the Code de procédure pénale), which verify formal regularity and transmit the request to the prosecutor general at the Paris Court of Appeal while putting it into execution across the entire national territory. In urgent cases the request may even be sent directly, by any means, to the territorially competent public prosecutor. The vocabulary matters: French law speaks of “remise” (surrender), not extradition. Surrender to the ICC follows its own title of the Code and escapes several classic extradition defences, a structural choice the drafters made deliberately to honour the Rome Statute.
Once arrested, the suspect’s first protection is speed. French procedure commands that “Toute personne appréhendée en vertu d’une demande d’arrestation aux fins de remise doit être déférée dans les vingt-quatre heures au procureur de la République territorialement compétent.” (article 627-5 of the Code de procédure pénale). Within that twenty-four-hour window the custody safeguards of articles 63-1 to 63-7 apply: notification of rights, access to counsel, medical examination. After verifying identity, the prosecutor informs the person, in a language she understands, that an ICC arrest-and-surrender request targets her and that she will appear within a maximum of five days before the prosecutor general at the Paris Court of Appeal. This is the moment a defence lawyer must be ready: the file moves to Paris immediately, and the arguments that can still stop or delay surrender narrow quickly.
The decisive hearing belongs to the investigating chamber of the Paris Court of Appeal. The test that chamber applies is strikingly narrow compared with extradition litigation: “Lorsque la chambre de l’instruction constate qu’il n’y a pas d’erreur évidente, elle ordonne la remise de la personne réclamée et, si celle-ci est libre, son incarcération à cette fin.” (article 627-8 of the Code de procédure pénale). Any other question raised before the chamber is referred to the ICC itself for disposition. The chamber rules within fifteen days of the person’s appearance, and on appeal the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation decides within two months of receiving the file. Defence counsel should grasp what this means in practice: the Paris judges do not retry the ICC’s case, do not weigh the evidence of guilt, and do not second-guess the Prosecutor’s selection of charges. They check for obvious error, typically mistaken identity or a manifestly irregular warrant, and everything substantive belongs to The Hague. A Duterte-type suspect arrested in France would therefore face a fast, largely formal Paris phase, with the real battle reserved for the confirmation and trial stages described in Part I.
Two refinements complete the picture. First, the surrender track also runs against persons already prosecuted or convicted in France on other counts: “Les dispositions des articles 627-4 à 627-10 sont également applicables si la personne réclamée est poursuivie ou condamnée en France pour d’autres chefs que ceux visés par la demande de la Cour pénale internationale.” (article 627-11 of the Code de procédure pénale), although such a detainee cannot claim release under the interim-liberty provisions while the ICC track runs, and the ICC proceedings suspend limitation periods for the French case. Second, a suspect who consents can be surrendered on a fast track even before the formal request arrives: “La personne qui a fait l’objet d’une arrestation provisoire dans les conditions prévues à l’article 92 du statut peut, si elle y consent, être remise à la Cour pénale internationale avant que les autorités compétentes en vertu de l’article 87 du statut aient été saisies d’une demande formelle de remise de la part de la juridiction internationale.” (article 627-14 of the Code de procédure pénale), with the Paris investigating chamber recording consent after informing the person of the right to a formal procedure. Provisional arrest under article 92 of the Statute is the ICC equivalent of the emergency flag that precedes a full Red Notice file, and French law gives it immediate effect.
Behind the arrest track sits the broader machinery of mutual assistance, which is how ICC evidence requests, witness summons and asset freezes circulate through France. Incoming ICC assistance requests travel “en original ou en copie certifiée conforme accompagnées de toutes pièces justificatives” to the anti-terrorism prosecutor in Paris (article 627-1 of the Code de procédure pénale), who processes them, including in emergencies by direct transmission. They are then executed, as the case may be, by the anti-terrorism prosecutor or by the Paris investigating judge, acting across the whole national territory, in the presence where applicable of the ICC Prosecutor or her representative (article 627-2 of the Code de procédure pénale). Protective measures requested under article 93(1)(k) of the Statute are ordered on French territory, with Treasury advances, by the same anti-terrorism prosecutor, for a maximum of two years renewable at the Court’s request (article 627-3 of the Code de procédure pénale). The concentration of these powers in Paris, around the Parquet national antiterroriste and the Paris investigating judges, explains why ICC files in France move through a small circle of highly experienced magistrates.
B. Trial in The Hague, victims at the table, and what France does after surrender
Suppose the Paris phase ends with a surrender order, as it does in the large majority of ICC cases worldwide. What happens next concerns suspects, victims and States alike, and France remains involved long after the aircraft leaves French airspace. Understanding this downstream map is essential for any defence team, because decisions taken in Paris constrain what can still be argued in The Hague, and for any victim, because French territory can be the place where evidence is gathered, assets are frozen and, eventually, sentences or reparations are enforced.
At trial, the Duterte calendar now controls everything. Before the opening of the trial, the Chamber will address all pending matters and adopt the procedures necessary to facilitate the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings, in the Court’s own words. Pending matters in late 2026 include the defence fitness challenge, disputes over disclosure of prosecution evidence, the modalities of victim participation, and language and protective arrangements for witnesses. The November 30 opening is a firm date, but international trials rarely run as a single continuous hearing: expect alternating blocks of prosecution evidence, defence evidence, victim representations and judicial deliberation stretching across much of 2027. Detailed practical information for the trial proceedings, including webstreaming links and possible attendance, will be circulated closer to the trial date, and the hearings are in principle public, a transparency guarantee that distinguishes the ICC from many national security trials.
Victims hold a formal seat that French readers will recognize from the partie civile tradition, adapted to the international scale. The Chamber’s express reference to the Legal Representatives of Victims confirms that admitted victims participate through counsel, make opening and closing submissions, question witnesses on permitted points, and claim reparations if convictions follow. For the drug-war bereaved, many of whom live in the Philippines under the same authorities accused of the killings, French and European NGOs play a relay role: documenting cases, funding representation, and securing protective measures. France’s cooperation title covers exactly this interface, from the execution of ICC evidence requests on French soil to the protection of witnesses present in France. A victim residing in France who suffered in a situation under ICC investigation can therefore find in Paris both the ICC cooperation magistrates and the French universal-jurisdiction framework.
That French fallback framework matters because the ICC does not exhaust criminal accountability. Beyond the cases governed by the ICC cooperation title, French courts may prosecute and try any person suspected of having committed abroad genocide as defined in the French Criminal Code or other crimes against humanity defined therein (article 689-11 of the Code de procédure pénale), under conditions refined by statute and case law, including the habitual residence of the suspect in France for certain configurations. This is France’s universal-jurisdiction door: when the ICC cannot or does not act, and when the suspect is reachable by French justice, Paris can open its own investigation for the gravest international crimes, applying the French definitions of articles 211-1 and 212-1 quoted in Part I. The Duterte case itself will be tried in The Hague, not Paris, but the same French provisions stand ready for lower-level perpetrators, accomplices or financiers who travel through France while the principals face the ICC. Defence counsel advising internationally mobile clients should map both doors at once: surrender to The Hague under articles 627-4 and following, and direct French prosecution under article 689-11.
Enforcement closes the loop. ICC sentences are served in States that volunteer to receive convicts, fines and forfeitures are collected through national cooperation, and reparations flow through the Trust Fund for Victims or directly to designated victims. French law anticipates the financial side: an enforcement authorization issued by the criminal court entails, as decided by the ICC, transfer of fine proceeds and confiscated property or their sale value to the Court or to the victims’ fund, and such assets may also be allocated to victims where the Court so decides and designates them (article 627-17 of the Code de procédure pénale), with disputes over allocation referred back to the ICC. Asset tracing therefore belongs at the very start of any ICC-related defence or victim strategy in France: bank accounts in Paris, real estate on the Riviera, corporate holdings routed through French entities can all become the material substrate of an ICC forfeiture or reparation order executed by a Paris court.
One practical instrument deserves a final word because it is the tool the public knows best: the Interpol Red Notice. A Red Notice is a request to law enforcement worldwide to locate and provisionally arrest a person pending extradition, surrender, or similar legal action, in Interpol’s own standing description of the instrument. In ICC practice the Court’s warrant travels through national police channels, and a Red Notice diffusion can be the reason a suspect is stopped at a border post far from both The Hague and the crime scene. France hosts Interpol’s General Secretariat in Lyon and treats incoming Red Notices as operational alerts to be converted, where the legal conditions are met, into national arrest measures under the applicable title: classic extradition for bilateral requests, the ICC surrender track of articles 627-4 and following for Court requests. Anyone who learns that a Red Notice names them and who transits through France should therefore seek counsel before travelling, because the twenty-four-hour clock of article 627-5 starts at apprehension, not at some later convenient moment.
Conclusion
The Duterte case has moved from headline to courtroom calendar. A sealed warrant in March 2025, a surrender within days, confirmed charges in April 2026, a first in-person appearance on September 16, 2026, and a trial opening on November 30, 2026: the sequence demonstrates an international justice system that, whatever its critics say about selectivity and pace, can bring a former head of state to the dock. The fitness dispute, the victim applications and the disclosure battles of the coming weeks will shape the trial, but they have not stopped it. For the Philippines’ bereaved families, the promise of a public trial, streamed from The Hague with victims’ counsel at the table, is the closest thing to an accounting they have ever been offered.
For readers with ties to France, the lesson is procedural and immediate. French law answers ICC requests through a dedicated, Paris-centred, deadline-driven track: formal request, nationwide execution, presentation within twenty-four hours, a Paris hearing within days, an “obvious error” review within fifteen days, cassation review within two months. It is faster and narrower than extradition, and it leaves the substance to The Hague. Whether you are a witness, a victim seeking to participate, a company asked to freeze assets, or a person who fears an international warrant, the correct reflex is the same: have the file assessed early, in Paris, by counsel who reads both the Rome Statute and the French cooperation title together. November 30 will arrive quickly, and the Court’s next sealed warrant may already be moving through the same channels.