On 30 November 2026, Trial Chamber III of the International Criminal Court will open the trial of former Philippine President Rodrigo Roa Duterte on three counts of crimes against humanity. Eight weeks before that date, the Chamber issued a revealing case-management decision: on 2 October 2026, it admitted the prior recorded testimony of a protected witness known as P-1100 under Rule 68(3) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, cut the Prosecution’s requested supplementary questioning from two hours to one, admitted five associated exhibits, threw out four others, and warned the Prosecution against piling up evidence of marginal relevance. The ruling condenses everything that makes ICC trials different from national criminal trials: witnesses heard in writing before they ever take the stand, strict judicial control of the evidence file, and a constant balancing of expedition against the rights of an 81-year-old accused who only made his first in-person appearance in The Hague on 16 September 2026. For readers facing the ICC machinery — suspects, witnesses, families, or counsel in a requested state — the Duterte calendar is a masterclass in how fast an international file moves once a warrant is unsealed: arrest warrant issued as secret on 7 March 2025, surrender eleven days later, confirmation of charges within fourteen months, trial within twenty. This analysis reconstructs that chain from the Court’s own records, explains the 2 October ruling piece by piece, and sets out what France would do with a file like this, because French law contains a complete and little-known ICC surrender procedure, from the 24-hour presentment to the Paris investigating chamber, alongside a universal-jurisdiction regime for crimes against humanity committed abroad.
I. When does the Duterte ICC trial start and what did the judges decide on 2 October 2026?
A. From the secret warrant of 7 March 2025 to the trial opening of 30 November 2026: the complete timeline
The public record of the case of The Prosecutor v. Rodrigo Roa Duterte, published by the Court itself, allows a precise reconstruction. The arrest warrant against Mr Duterte was issued under seal on 7 March 2025, made public on 11 March 2025, and executed the next day, when Mr Duterte was surrendered to the International Criminal Court. He had been arrested in Manila on his return from Hong Kong and flown to The Hague via Dubai within roughly twenty-four hours, one of the fastest executions of an ICC warrant against a former head of state in the Court’s history. The initial appearance took place on 14 March 2025, with the suspect appearing by video link as authorised by the Chamber.
What followed illustrates the rhythm of ICC pre-trial proceedings. The confirmation hearing had first been scheduled for 23 September 2025, but on 8 September 2025 Pre-Trial Chamber I postponed it after the Defence requested an indefinite adjournment, arguing that Mr Duterte was not fit to stand trial. The Chamber ordered a medical assessment by a panel of three independent experts. On 26 January 2026, Pre-Trial Chamber I found Mr Duterte fit to take part in the pre-trial proceedings and rejected the indefinite adjournment sought by the Defence, holding that he could effectively exercise his procedural rights. The confirmation hearing then took place from 23 to 27 February 2026, and on 23 April 2026 Pre-Trial Chamber I unanimously confirmed all three counts of crimes against humanity brought by the Prosecutor. On 27 May 2026, Trial Chamber III — Presiding Judge Joanna Korner, Judge Keebong Paek and Judge Nicolas Guillou — set the trial calendar: the opening of the trial is scheduled for 30 November 2026
Two recent milestones complete the picture. On 16 September 2026, during the third status conference, Mr Duterte made his first in-person appearance before the Court, ending eighteen months of video-link participation. Then, on 29 and 30 September 2026, the Chamber rejected a Defence request for expert verification of open-source evidence, while days earlier, on 26 September, the Defence had asked the Court to cap the case file at 10,000 items, pointing to a 978 percent surge in disclosed evidence. It is against this background — a defence complaining of evidentiary flood and a prosecution pressing for written testimony — that the 2 October 2026 decision on witness P-1100 must be read.
The charges themselves concern the alleged killing of thousands of suspected drug dealers and users, first during Mr Duterte’s years as mayor of Davao City and then during his presidency from 2016 to 2022, in the campaign commonly called the war on drugs. The Prosecution characterises these acts as murder and related crimes committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population. The Defence disputes the characterisation, the scale of the figures advanced, and the Court’s jurisdiction over events in a state that withdrew from the Rome Statute in 2019 — a jurisdictional objection the Appeals Chamber had already settled against the suspect’s position on 6 March 2026, clearing the path to confirmation. Every element remains alleged until judgment: the presumption of innocence applies in full, and nothing in this article prejudges the outcome of the trial.
B. The 2 October 2026 ruling on witness P-1100: written testimony admitted, questioning halved, exhibits sorted, prosecution warned
The 15-page public redacted decision of 2 October 2026, reported in detail by ABS-CBN News on 3 October, rules on a Prosecution request to introduce the prior recorded testimony of a witness designated P-1100 under Rule 68(3) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. According to the Prosecution, the witness’s evidence contains critical details of an alleged policy of neutralising suspected criminals through violent crimes including murder, and of the modus operandi of the group known as the Davao Death Squad. The Defence objected, contesting the temporal scope and the nature of the material. The Chamber sided with the Prosecution on admissibility, finding the substance of that evidence and the reports the witness produced relevant to the background and context of the case.
Rule 68(3) is one of the most distinctive tools of international criminal procedure, and it deserves an explanation for readers trained in national systems. It allows a Trial Chamber to admit previously recorded testimony — a written statement, an audio or video recording, a transcript — without requiring the witness to repeat everything orally, on three cumulative conditions: the witness is present before the Chamber, does not object to the introduction of the statement, and the parties, including the Defence, have a full opportunity to examine the witness in court. As the Chamber recalled, written testimony complements rather than replaces oral evidence, and the Defence will have full opportunity to examine the witness in court on any aspect of his account. The ruling is therefore conditional: it stands only if P-1100 appears in person and consents to the use of his statement. For defence teams, the lesson is practical and immediate: a Rule 68(3) admission shifts the battle from blocking the statement to preparing a focused cross-examination, because the Chamber will hold the Defence to its promise of a full opportunity to question.
On the modalities, the Chamber cut the Prosecution down. The Prosecution had asked for two hours of supplementary examination of the witness; the judges found the two-hour request excessive in light of the nature and content of the evidence and ordered the Prosecution to streamline its questioning so as to complete its examination within one hour. The same sorting logic applied to the associated materials: five items were admitted, notably formal reports directly authored by the witness, while four other items were rejected because the witness had not meaningfully used or explained them in his statement. And the Chamber added an explicit warning for the rest of the trial, cautioning the Prosecution against tendering repetitive materials or items of such limited relevance as to be nearly irrelevant. Read together with the Defence’s complaint about a 978 percent surge in disclosed evidence, the message is unmistakable: Trial Chamber III intends to run a tight trial, and volume will not substitute for relevance.
For observers of international justice, the ruling also signals how the November trial will be conducted. Expect short, surgical witness examinations, heavy reliance on written statements under Rule 68, and judges who prune exhibits in real time. For the victims participating in the proceedings and for the public in the Philippines, it means the trial should move faster than the marathon proceedings of earlier ICC cases — and that the decisive moments will often be the live cross-examinations of witnesses like P-1100, not the reading of statements into the record.
II. Can France arrest and surrender a suspect to the ICC, and can French courts try crimes against humanity committed abroad?
A. How France executes an ICC arrest-and-surrender request: Paris, 24 hours, five days and the investigating chamber
France is a State Party to the Rome Statute, and it has translated that commitment into a self-contained surrender procedure in the Code of Criminal Procedure — a procedure far more centralised and faster than ordinary extradition. Its founding provision states that “Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre”, and the scheme applies to any person prosecuted before the International Criminal Court for genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes within the meaning of the Statute. The contrast with classic extradition is structural: there is no government decree phase, no political discretion to refuse on opportunity grounds, and the entire judicial track runs through Paris.
When the ICC issues a request for arrest with a view to surrender, the request, in original and with all supporting documents, is sent to the French authorities competent under article 87 of the Statute, which check its formal regularity and forward it to the prosecutor general at the Paris Court of Appeal while executing it across the whole national territory. As the Code provides, “Les demandes d’arrestation aux fins de remise délivrées par la Cour pénale internationale sont adressées, en original et accompagnées de toutes pièces justificatives, aux autorités compétentes en vertu de l’article 87 du statut” and transmitted “au procureur général près la cour d’appel de Paris”. In urgent cases the request may go directly, by any means, to the territorially competent public prosecutor. Any person arrested in France on that basis benefits from immediate safeguards: “Toute personne appréhendée en vertu d’une demande d’arrestation aux fins de remise doit être déférée dans les vingt-quatre heures au procureur de la République territorialement compétent”, who verifies identity, notifies the person in a language they understand of the surrender request and of the forthcoming hearing, and informs them that “elle pourra être assistée par un avocat de son choix ou, à défaut, par un avocat commis d’office”, with an immediate confidential interview — the full text of these 24-hour guarantees being recorded in a report sent straight to Paris.
The person must then appear within a maximum of five days before the prosecutor general at the Paris Court of Appeal, and transfer to the Paris remand prison must occur within five days of presentment, failing which “la personne réclamée est immédiatement libérée sur décision du président de la chambre de l’instruction de la cour d’appel de Paris, à moins que le transfèrement ait été retardé par des circonstances insurmontables” — the strict time-limit regime of the transfer provision, which also requires the prosecutor general to notify the person, in a language they understand, of the arrest request and the charges against them. Release pending surrender is possible but narrowly framed: it “peut être demandée à tout moment à la chambre de l’instruction de la cour d’appel de Paris qui procède conformément à l’article 59 du statut”, by public reasoned decision applying the Statute’s own criteria — the mechanism of interim release under article 59. And France also enforces ICC protective measures over assets: “L’exécution sur le territoire français des mesures conservatoires mentionnées au k du paragraphe 1 de l’article 93 du statut est ordonnée” by the anti-terrorism prosecutor, for a maximum of two years renewable at the Court’s request, under the provision on protective measures.
Applied to a Duterte-type file, the French lessons are concrete. First, speed: a suspect located in France on an ICC warrant would be before a prosecutor within 24 hours and in Paris within days, with no ministerial filter — the very compression seen in the March 2025 Manila-to-The Hague transfer, but routinised by statute. Second, language and counsel rights are front-loaded, not deferred: notification in a understood language, counsel of choice or court-appointed, immediate interview. Third, the Paris investigating chamber, not the executive, controls liberty, by reference to the Rome Statute itself. Fourth, counsel should calendar the fitness question early: the Duterte file shows that a contested medical-fitness claim bought a four-month postponement and a three-expert panel before the 26 January 2026 ruling — a procedural lever that exists in every ICC-bound file and must be prepared with independent medical evidence, not bare assertions. Readers should note that these Code provisions currently carry a deferred-repeal flag linked to the forthcoming recodification of criminal procedure, while remaining fully in force on the date of writing; counsel must always check the version in force on the day of arrest. France’s broader ICC cooperation record — including the surrender mechanics examined when ICC-related files reach Paris — is part of the same logic examined in our analysis of the ICC arrest warrants against the Taliban leadership and France’s surrender framework.
B. Could French courts themselves prosecute crimes against humanity committed abroad? The universal-jurisdiction answer
Cooperation with The Hague is only half of the French picture. The other half is France’s own power to prosecute the gravest international crimes, even committed abroad by foreigners against foreigners — universal jurisdiction, fenced with conditions that every practitioner must know. The substantive definitions sit in the Criminal Code. Genocide is defined as acts “en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux”, punishable by life imprisonment under the genocide provision. Crimes against humanity are defined in matching terms: “Constitue également un crime contre l’humanité et est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité l’un des actes ci-après commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique” — wilful killing, extermination, torture, persecution, enforced disappearance and the other listed acts — under the crimes-against-humanity provision. The vocabulary matters: French law, like the Rome Statute, requires a concerted plan and a widespread or systematic attack, which is precisely why the ICC Prosecution in the Duterte case labours to characterise individual killings as the execution of an alleged policy rather than as ordinary homicides.
The jurisdictional key is the Code of Criminal Procedure: outside the ICC-cooperation track, “peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger” genocide, other crimes against humanity, or war crimes — the opening words of the universal-jurisdiction provision. But the power is conditional, and the conditions are cumulative in practice: the suspect must have their habitual residence in France, assessed through a sufficient connecting link such as the duration and reasons of presence, the demonstrated will to settle, and family, social or material ties; the acts must be punishable where committed or the suspect must be a national of a state party framework engaging jurisdiction; and, crucially, the prosecution can generally only be initiated by the anti-terrorism prosecutor’s office, with the well-known subsidiarity check — no competing prosecution before the ICC or a competent national court. In plain terms: France can try a foreign crimes-against-humanity suspect found on its soil, but the file must pass through the specialised prosecutor, survive the habitual-residence test, and yield to The Hague or to a willing national jurisdiction where complementarity so requires.
That is why a Duterte-type suspect who set foot in France would face two parallel French doors, not one: the surrender door to The Hague under the Paris-centred procedure, and the domestic-prosecution door under universal jurisdiction — with the ICC door normally taking precedence where the Court has already issued a warrant and the suspect is in custody, exactly as complementarity intends. Defence strategy in such a file therefore runs on three clocks at once: challenging the surrender before the Paris investigating chamber within days, contesting fitness and admissibility before the ICC within weeks, and preparing the Rule 68 and exhibit battles for a trial that, as the 2 October 2026 ruling shows, rewards lean, relevant evidence and punishes floods of paper. The same three-clock discipline applies, on a smaller scale, to witnesses: a protected witness residing in France can be heard under ICC protective measures enforced through French mutual-assistance channels, while retaining independent standing to seek protective status domestically.
Conclusion
On 30 November 2026, the International Criminal Court will open only its second trial of a former head of state, and the first centred on an anti-drug campaign charged as crimes against humanity. The 2 October 2026 decision on witness P-1100 — written testimony admitted under Rule 68(3) subject to live appearance and consent, supplementary questioning halved to one hour, five exhibits kept, four discarded, and a formal warning against repetitive or near-irrelevant filings — tells the world how Presiding Judge Korner intends to conduct it: fast, pruned, and centred on live cross-examination. From the secret warrant of 7 March 2025 to the unanimous confirmation of three counts on 23 April 2026 and the first in-person appearance on 16 September 2026, the Duterte file demonstrates the ICC’s full procedural arc in twenty months — arrest, surrender, fitness litigation, confirmation, trial preparation — with each stage generating defence rights that must be exercised on short deadlines. France’s contribution to that arc is written into its codes: a 24-hour, five-day, Paris-centred surrender machine for ICC warrants, and a conditional universal jurisdiction allowing French courts to try genocide and crimes against humanity committed abroad where the suspect resides in France and no competent court acts. No official source records any accident, intrusion or established damage beyond the charges as confirmed, no liability is established before judgment, and only the Trial Chamber will decide guilt or innocence after hearing the evidence. For suspects, witnesses and counsel navigating an ICC file with a French connection — arrest on French soil, assets in France, residence, or testimony to give — the weeks before 30 November are the time to map the procedure, secure independent counsel in both jurisdictions, and prepare evidence that is relevant rather than voluminous, because The Hague in 2026 rewards precision and sanctions excess.