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E1 Settlement Tenders: Can French Companies Still Supply, Finance or Buy from West Bank Projects?

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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E1 Settlement Tenders: Can French Companies Still Supply, Finance or Buy from West Bank Projects?

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European governments have renewed their warning over Israel’s E1 settlement project, a plan whose construction footprint would cut across the most sensitive corridor east of Jerusalem. The immediate question for a French company is not only political: can it bid for the works, supply equipment, arrange finance, buy products linked to a settlement or continue a contract already signed? The answer is more precise than either “everything is prohibited” or “nothing can happen until a sanctions regulation is adopted.” France has published an express warning to businesses about legal, economic and reputational risks connected with economic and financial activity in settlements. International law, the Court of Justice of the European Union’s rules on origin and labelling, French corporate vigilance duties and ordinary civil and criminal liability then determine the risk created by the concrete transaction. A French or European company should therefore treat an E1 file as a documented human-rights and supply-chain decision, not as an ordinary overseas procurement project.

I. What does the E1 warning mean for French and European businesses?

A. Why does E1 create international-law exposure without automatically creating a French criminal offence?

The news matters because E1 is not being discussed as an ordinary housing development. Recent reporting has described European pressure on Israel over settlement expansion in the West Bank, including a joint political warning involving France and other European partners. The 21 August 2026 report by Le Monde places that renewed pressure in the context of an Israeli call for tenders and the wider acceleration of settlement construction.

France had already published an unusually direct business-facing position. Its official guidance on French businesses operating in settlements warns companies, subsidiaries and French citizens about the legal, economic and reputational risks of economic and financial activity in Israeli settlements in the West Bank. The same guidance identifies financial transactions, investment, procurement, supplies and other economic activities that take place in settlements or benefit settlements. It also recalls the risk of disputes involving land, water, minerals and other natural resources, and the possibility that businesses may appear in an international database relating to economic activity in the occupied territories.

The statement is important, but it is not itself a criminal conviction or a French asset-freeze regulation. It is governmental risk guidance. A company that ignores it does not automatically become guilty merely because a payment, delivery or tender is connected in some way with Israel. The legal question is what the company knew, what it supplied, who benefited, where the activity occurred, whether the contract concerns settlement infrastructure, and whether the transaction contributes to conduct prohibited by a rule that applies to the company or its officers.

The international-law background is nevertheless serious. In its 19 July 2024 advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice examined Israel’s prolonged occupation, settlement policy, annexation-related measures, the use of land and natural resources, and the consequences for the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination. The Court’s official summary states that Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and the associated regime, have been established and maintained in violation of international law. The opinion is advisory rather than a damages judgment against a private French company. It still supplies an authoritative legal assessment that governments, courts, regulators, investors and compliance teams cannot responsibly treat as irrelevant.

The same opinion separates two questions that are often collapsed in public debate. First, what duties bind the occupying Power and what conduct is unlawful in the occupied territory? Second, what legal consequences follow for other states and for actors that maintain or assist the situation? That distinction matters to a French company. A business does not become the occupying Power by signing a contract. It may, however, face scrutiny if its services, financing, construction work, data, insurance, logistics or raw materials materially support an identified settlement project or the exploitation of occupied land and resources.

The Court of Justice has already shown how European law translates territorial status into a concrete business rule. In Case C-386/08, Brita GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen, judgment of 25 February 2010, the Court held that products made in the West Bank did not qualify for the preferential customs treatment reserved for products originating in Israel under the EC–Israel Association Agreement. The decision was not a general embargo. It was a refusal to treat a settlement-made product as an Israeli-origin product for preferential tariff purposes. That is a useful warning against imprecise compliance: the legal result depends on the rule and the transaction.

The same precision appears in Case C-363/18, Organisation juive européenne and Vignoble Psagot, judgment of 12 November 2019. The Grand Chamber held that food originating in territories occupied by Israel must state the territory of origin and, where the food comes from an Israeli settlement, indicate that provenance. A food importer cannot replace a required territorial description with a label that suggests the goods simply originate in Israel. The ruling concerns consumer information, not every construction service or financial product, but it demonstrates that European law already refuses to erase the legal distinction between Israel and occupied territory.

For a French company, the practical conclusion is therefore two-sided. International-law findings and official French warnings create a high-risk factual context. They do not, without more, substitute for a French or European measure that specifically prohibits a transaction. The company must identify the applicable rule instead of making a political label do the work of legal analysis. The risk increases when the transaction is direct, indispensable to construction, connected with land or natural resources, concealed by inaccurate origin information, or knowingly structured to bypass a restriction.

B. What do French rules already require in contracts, supply chains and public tenders?

The first French tool is corporate vigilance. The current version of Article L. 225-102-1 of the French Commercial Code requires companies above the statutory employee thresholds to establish and implement a vigilance plan. The official text says that the company “établit et met en œuvre de manière effective un plan de vigilance” and that the plan must contain reasonable measures to identify risks and prevent serious harm to human rights, fundamental freedoms, health, safety and the environment arising from the company, controlled entities, established commercial relationships, subcontractors and suppliers.

An E1 project can therefore raise a vigilance question even where the French company never owns land in the West Bank. A major group that supplies cement, engineering, project-management software, security equipment, transport, insurance, architecture, earth-moving services or financing may need to map the relationship between its service and the settlement activity. The key issue is not whether the company has used the words “settlement” in an internal document. It is whether the company’s risk mapping, supplier review, alert mechanism and mitigation measures address the foreseeable human-rights and territorial risks attached to the relationship.

That duty is not a universal prohibition on trading with every Israeli customer. It is a process duty with potential litigation consequences. A company that has credible information about a settlement-linked project, receives an official warning, fails to investigate, and then continues to provide a material service may have a weaker position if an interested person later seeks an injunction or damages. A company that documents the geography, ownership, end use, contractual chain, alternatives and response to alerts is in a different evidentiary position.

Ordinary French contract law also becomes operational. Under Article 1103 of the Civil Code, “Les contrats légalement formés tiennent lieu de loi à ceux qui les ont faits.” A signed contract cannot be abandoned casually because a political controversy has appeared. The parties must inspect the termination clause, force-majeure wording, change-in-law provision, compliance representations, audit rights, payment obligations and dispute-resolution clause. At the same time, the binding force of a contract does not require a company to perform an act that would breach a mandatory rule or to continue a service after a newly verified legal prohibition.

Information before contracting is equally important. Article 1112-1 of the Civil Code provides that “Celle des parties qui connaît une information dont l’importance est déterminante pour le consentement de l’autre doit l’en informer” when the other party legitimately does not know it or relies on its co-contractor. The rule does not turn every geopolitical fact into a duty to disclose. It does make it dangerous to give a false or incomplete answer about the location of works, the identity of the beneficiary, the origin of goods, the use of land, a permit, a tender or a known restriction when that information is decisive for the other party’s consent.

For public procurement, the starting point is narrower than a general ethical exclusion. Article L. 2141-1 of the Public Procurement Code begins: “Sont exclues de la procédure de passation des marchés les personnes qui ont fait l’objet d’une condamnation définitive” for a list of specified offences and equivalent offences. A company is not automatically barred from every French public tender merely because it has been criticised for a settlement-related activity. A final criminal conviction, a specific sanction, an applicable procurement condition or a proven breach of mandatory law may change the analysis; a newspaper headline alone does not.

That distinction should not be mistaken for comfort. Public buyers can still define lawful technical requirements, verify origin, require compliance information, apply exclusion grounds that actually fit the statutory text, and assess a tender under public-order and contract-performance rules. A company that cannot explain its supply chain, the destination of equipment or the identity of the ultimate beneficiary may lose a tender on evidence and credibility even where no automatic exclusion applies. The correct file should therefore distinguish three questions: is the bidder legally eligible, is the proposed performance lawful, and can the bidder prove that the performance will not support an identified settlement project?

Finally, European consumer and customs law creates a separate compliance path. Brita and Psagot do not ban all imports from the West Bank. They require customs and labelling consequences based on origin and provenance. A French importer should not use a commercial description that hides the occupied territory or the settlement provenance of food covered by Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011. For other products, the importer should determine the relevant customs preference, origin rule, sector regulation and contractual representation. A broad internal slogan such as “Israeli product” is not a substitute for a traceable origin analysis.

II. Can a French company supply, finance or buy from a settlement-linked project?

A. When can participation become a legal exposure rather than a political controversy?

The most useful risk test is factual. A transaction sits at the lower end of the risk spectrum when it concerns ordinary, lawful activity in Israel, has no connection with an occupied territory, has a transparent end use, contains accurate origin information and is supported by a documented screening process. The risk rises when a French company is asked to build a road, housing block, utility connection or security system inside a settlement; provide a loan or guarantee dedicated to the project; insure a contractor; supply machinery whose only credible purpose is the works; acquire land or resources for the project; or conceal the settlement’s role from a bank, investor, purchaser or regulator.

The question is not answered by the company’s label for itself. Calling a contract “commercial,” “humanitarian,” “dual use” or “routine maintenance” does not resolve the underlying facts. A maintenance contract may preserve essential civilian services, or it may extend and entrench an unlawful settlement infrastructure. A software licence may be neutral, or it may be configured exclusively for land administration and forced displacement. A bank may provide general services, or it may structure finance whose proceeds are ring-fenced for construction. The legal analysis must examine necessity, contribution, knowledge, alternatives and the actual beneficiary.

French criminal law sets a demanding threshold for complicity. Article 121-7 of the Criminal Code states: “Est complice d’un crime ou d’un délit la personne qui sciemment, par aide ou assistance, en a facilité la préparation ou la consommation.” The word “sciemment” is decisive. A company is not criminally complicit merely because a customer later uses an ordinary product in a controversial location. The prosecution would need to establish an underlying crime or offence, a qualifying act of assistance or instigation, and the required knowledge. Evidence of a direct project mandate, repeated warnings, dedicated financing, false paperwork or deliberate circumvention can matter greatly.

That threshold should not be read as a safe harbour for careless conduct. Civil liability can arise on a different basis. Article 1240 of the Civil Code provides: “Tout fait quelconque de l’homme, qui cause à autrui un dommage, oblige celui par la faute duquel il est arrivé à le réparer.” A claimant would still need to prove a fault, damage and a causal link. The provision does not make a French supplier liable for every political or international-law violation committed by a customer. It does mean that inaccurate disclosures, negligent screening, a knowingly misleading contractual structure or a failure to respond to a material alert can become part of a civil claim.

The French jurisdictional gateway for the most serious international crimes is also specific. Article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that French courts may prosecute and judge a person suspected of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and related offences committed abroad, subject to the conditions set out in the provision. The text requires, among other things, a sufficient connection with France and coordination with the International Criminal Court and other possible jurisdictions. This is not a general offence of “doing business with a settlement.” It is a reminder that a person who knowingly assists conduct falling within an international-crimes investigation may face a different legal environment from a company that simply made an unconnected sale.

Sanctions must also be identified rather than assumed. Article L. 562-2 of the Monetary and Financial Code, for example, says that the French ministers responsible for the economy and the interior “peuvent décider, conjointement, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques” in the terrorism-related situations defined by the article. That provision does not turn the ICJ advisory opinion into a settlement freeze. Its value in this analysis is structural: a French freeze requires a legal mechanism, a competent authority and conditions that fit the text. The same discipline applies when a company asks whether an EU or French restrictive measure actually covers a named person, entity, sector or activity.

There is a second distinction between legal exposure and commercial exposure. The French government’s guidance warns that businesses may face economic and reputational risks and may be identified in an international database. A database entry is not equivalent to a conviction. It can nevertheless affect bank onboarding, insurance, public tenders, investment committees, due-diligence questionnaires, auditor review and future litigation. A board that treats those consequences as mere public relations may fail to document a decision that had foreseeable financial effects.

The location of the beneficiary matters as much as the location of the seller. Supplying a French intermediary does not end the analysis if the intermediary is a conduit for an E1 contractor. Financing a parent company does not end the analysis if the funds are contractually earmarked for settlement infrastructure. Purchasing a product in Europe does not end the analysis if its origin or extraction from occupied land is disguised. Conversely, not every connection to Israel or the West Bank proves a settlement link. The responsible approach is to identify the specific chain and stop making assumptions where the chain cannot be verified.

B. What should executives do before signing, paying or continuing the contract?

A French company considering an E1-linked opportunity should create a decision file that can be read by a judge, regulator, bank, auditor or shareholder who was not in the original meeting. The file should record the date of the information, the exact project and parcel, the contracting parties, the ultimate beneficiary, the nature of the works, the route of goods and money, the applicable permits, the origin evidence, the human-rights alerts, the advice received and the reasons for the decision. A short conclusion without the underlying documents will not show that the risk was actually assessed.

  1. Map the geography. Obtain the project coordinates, tender documents, planning references, land-use description and end-use statement. “Jerusalem,” “West Bank,” “Area C,” “E1” and “Israel” are not interchangeable compliance labels. If the counterparty refuses to provide a location that is necessary to understand the service, treat the refusal as a material red flag.
  2. Identify the beneficiary and the contribution. Trace the contracting party, parent, public authority, developer, subcontractor, lender, insurer and end user. Describe what the French company contributes: construction, design, transport, machinery, data, security, professional services, payment, credit or insurance. The more indispensable and project-specific the contribution, the less persuasive a generic “we only supplied a product” explanation becomes.
  3. Check the chain of land and resources. Ask whether the project depends on land acquisition, expropriation, demolition, water, minerals, agricultural production, roads or other resources whose legal status is disputed. Preserve the answers and the source documents. The French foreign ministry specifically warns of disputes involving land, water, minerals and other resources in settlement-related activity.
  4. Separate origin, provenance and destination. For food, apply the Psagot rule and verify the territory and settlement provenance required by EU consumer law. For other goods, verify customs origin, preferential treatment, export controls, product rules and contractual statements. Do not allow an invoice, certificate or marketing label to collapse a settlement origin into a generic Israeli origin.
  5. Test the contractual exit. Review compliance warranties, audit rights, information duties, change-in-law clauses, sanctions clauses, termination for illegality, suspension rights, escrow arrangements and dispute resolution. Article 1103 protects a lawful bargain; it does not excuse a breach of a mandatory rule. A properly drafted information and suspension mechanism can prevent the company from discovering the legal issue only after a payment has cleared.
  6. Escalate a serious alert. The board or designated committee should receive a written assessment when the project is inside a settlement, directly benefits settlement expansion, depends on occupied resources, or has been the subject of an official warning. A vigilance-plan company should connect the decision to its risk map, supplier evaluation, alert mechanism and mitigation measures under Article L. 225-102-1.
  7. Choose a documented outcome. The outcome may be refusal, suspension while information is obtained, redesign of the service so that it does not support the project, continuation of a genuinely independent civilian service with safeguards, or withdrawal under the contract. “Continue as before” is also a decision and should state why the facts do not create a prohibited or unacceptable risk.

Executives should also distinguish a transaction that is merely unpopular from one that is legally impossible. An internal policy may be stricter than the minimum legal rule. A bank, insurer or public buyer may apply risk criteria that a private supplier is not legally required to adopt. A company may decide that the reputational and financing cost is too high even when no prosecution is likely. That is legitimate risk management, provided that communications do not falsely claim that French law has imposed a blanket prohibition if it has not.

Where a contract is already running, the first step is evidence preservation, not an abrupt public accusation. Preserve tenders, maps, invoices, bills of lading, origin certificates, meeting notes, compliance questionnaires, emails, legal opinions and payment records. Ask targeted questions through the contractual channel. If the counterparty’s answers change, record the change. A suspension may be safer than termination when the facts are incomplete; termination may be necessary when continued performance would knowingly support a prohibited act or expose the company to a serious and unmanageable risk.

The company should not overread Article 689-11 or Article 121-7. Neither provision creates an automatic offence from a commercial relationship, and neither permits a company to disregard a genuine warning. The right legal question is whether the known contribution could be characterised as knowing assistance to a specific offence, whether a person involved has a sufficient connection with France, and whether the conduct is already being examined by the ICC or another competent jurisdiction. Those are evidence questions, not slogans.

In cross-border finance, ask the bank and insurer to identify the precise source of any refusal: French law, an EU regulation, a United Nations measure, a United States restriction, a correspondent-bank policy, a contractual risk rule or an internal risk appetite decision. The legal remedy and the negotiation strategy differ. A foreign designation or political statement may justify enhanced diligence without automatically freezing a French account. A binding European measure may require an immediate hold. A vague “compliance issue” should not replace a written explanation in a transaction of this magnitude.

For a French subsidiary of an international group, the analysis must be coordinated but not outsourced. Group policy may be stricter, and the parent may have information that the French entity does not. The French board should still document the local law, the local contract, the local public-law consequences and the local evidence. A group instruction to continue cannot answer a French court’s question about what the French entity knew and did. Conversely, a local refusal should be communicated accurately so that the group does not send the same goods through another affiliate.

Finally, a company that decides not to participate should communicate with restraint. It can state that it has reviewed the project, applied its contractual and human-rights procedures, and will not bid, supply or finance the identified activity. It should avoid making unsupported allegations about individuals or declaring that every Israeli customer, every West Bank transaction or every product is unlawful. Precision protects the company’s credibility and keeps the focus on the concrete E1 risk the evidence actually establishes.

Conclusion

The E1 project has moved the settlement issue from diplomatic language into a direct business decision. France’s official guidance already identifies transactions, investment, procurement, supplies and other economic activities that occur in or benefit settlements as carrying legal, economic and reputational risks. The ICJ advisory opinion and the CJEU’s Brita and Psagot rulings provide the international and European context; French law supplies the practical tests for vigilance, contract information, civil fault, complicity, criminal jurisdiction and procurement eligibility.

There is no responsible shortcut. A French company should not claim that every E1-related transaction is automatically a French crime, but it should also not treat the absence of a blanket embargo as permission to proceed without investigation. The decisive questions are the project’s location, the company’s contribution, the beneficiary, the resources involved, the information available, the accuracy of the paperwork and the safeguards adopted before performance. If those facts cannot be verified, the commercially and legally defensible decision is to pause the transaction and obtain a documented cross-border assessment.

📄 Official circular