On 1 October 2026, federal agents arrested Greg Lui, a 38-year-old San Gabriel businessman also known as Yiu Kong Lui, on a three-count indictment returned two days earlier in the Central District of California. According to the Department of Justice press release published that day, Lui owns Earthmade Computer Inc., a closely held technology company based in the City of Industry, and used it to buy and send more than $300 million worth of export-controlled high-end computer servers, fitted with United States-manufactured graphics processing units built for what the indictment calls Super Intelligence applications, to China without the licences required by the Department of Commerce. The alleged route ran through Malaysia and Singapore: servers were shipped from Los Angeles to Kuala Lumpur on paperwork describing permissible end users, then re-exported to China, while two Malaysia-based shipment companies paid Earthmade more than $176 million between January and October 2024. Lui faces one count of conspiracy to violate the Export Control Reform Act and the Export Administration Regulations, one count of outbound smuggling, and one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, carrying maximum penalties of twenty, ten, and twenty years in prison respectively. Every charge remains an allegation, and Lui is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The analysis that follows is general in scope: it describes the legal checks and defences useful in any comparable cross-border export-control file and states no finding about Earthmade Computer Inc. or Mr Lui, whose liability only a court can determine.
I. $300M of AI Servers Diverted to China: How the California Export-Control Case Was Built
A. How Do Export-Controlled Servers Reach China Through Malaysia and Singapore?
According to the indictment summarised by the Department of Justice on 1 October 2026, the scheme ran from 2023 to 2024 and relied on three building blocks that recur in almost every technology-diversion file: false end-user paperwork presented to American manufacturers, freight forwarders moving the goods to third countries where no licence was needed, and re-export from those countries to the true destination. In January 2024, Lui allegedly emailed a co-conspirator about a Malaysian transshipment company wishing to purchase 70 servers fitted with export-restricted graphics processors, attaching an export compliance form showing that the Malaysian company knew American law restricted the sale, transshipment, or export of those servers. Later that month, Lui allegedly submitted a purchase order to an American manufacturer for 27 of those servers for approximately $7,614,000, caused them to be shipped from Los Angeles to Kuala Lumpur, and let the packing list describe 27 servers with controlled graphics processors that could not lawfully be sent to China without a licence. In March 2024, a co-conspirator allegedly emailed a Malaysian government official confirming that those 27 servers had in fact been transshipped to a China-based buyer. Prosecutors present this paper trail as proof of knowledge: the compliance form, the packing list, and the transshipment confirmation each show that the participants knew the true end users were in China and that the regulations barred the export. Assistant Attorney General for National Security John A. Eisenberg framed the stakes bluntly in the press release, calling this technology the defining technology of the era and promising to protect the American advantage in the chips that power it from illegal diversion. First Assistant United States Attorney Bill Essayli added that the defendant allegedly used false paperwork and shipments through third countries to smuggle the servers, while the Federal Bureau of Investigation stated that Lui allegedly sold the Chinese government hundreds of millions of dollars of American technology in clear violation of export control laws. The defence side of such a file typically attacks each block in turn: whether the servers as configured actually fell within a controlled classification, whether the accused knew the re-export destination, and whether the Malaysian intermediaries acted on their own account. None of those questions has been tested at trial, and the indictment is merely an allegation. But the structure of the file already illustrates why diversion cases are document cases first and technology cases second: emails, purchase orders, packing lists, and payment flows do most of the prosecution work before any expert explains what a graphics processor can do.
B. What Prison Sentence Does Smuggling AI Chips to China Carry in the United States?
The three counts announced on 1 October 2026 stack into a formidable sentencing exposure that shapes every strategic choice from detention to plea negotiation. If convicted of all charges, the press release states, Lui could face a maximum penalty of twenty years in prison on the conspiracy count, a maximum penalty of twenty years in prison on the money laundering count, and a maximum penalty of ten years in prison on the smuggling count. Those are statutory maximums, not predicted sentences: the actual sentence in the federal system turns on the advisory guidelines, where the loss amount, the national-security enhancement for export-control offences, and the defendant’s role produce an offence level that often exceeds what the public expects from a first-time economic offender. The money laundering conspiracy count matters beyond its twenty-year ceiling because it unlocks the forfeiture machinery. Assistant United States Attorney Alexander Su is assigned to the civil and criminal forfeitures of the seized property, which means the government will seek to take the alleged $176 million in Malaysian payments and any assets traceable to them, and the defence will have to litigate the money trail asset by asset. The investigating team itself signals how seriously Washington takes diversion files: the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security Office of Export Enforcement, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation worked the case jointly, with trial counsel from the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section prosecuting alongside the Central District of California. That composition tells international readers something practical. Diversion is investigated as counterintelligence, not as a routine customs fraud, which means search warrants, compelled testimony, and cooperating intermediaries arrive earlier and with greater force than in an ordinary smuggling file. Lui was expected to make his initial appearance and be arraigned on the afternoon of his arrest, opening the sequence of detention argument, discovery, and motion practice. For anyone watching from Paris, the American lesson is that the file is built backwards from the money: the $176 million received from two Malaysian shipment companies is the thread investigators pull to reach the purchase orders, the freight forwarders, and ultimately the end users in China. Any defence in any jurisdiction must therefore start with the payments, because the payments decide which assets survive and which disappear into forfeiture.
II. Prosecuted in France Instead: What a Paris Court Would Do With an Identical Diversion File
A. Can France Prosecute Unauthorised Exports of Dual-Use Goods and How?
A diversion scheme run from French territory would meet a layered enforcement system in which European Union law sets the prohibition and French criminal law supplies the punishment. At the European level, Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of 20 May 2021 establishes the Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit, and transfer of dual-use items, and its core rule is direct: An authorisation shall be required for the export of dual-use items listed in Annex I. The same article adds a warning that exporters often discover too late: Pursuant to Article 4, 5, 9 or 10, an authorisation may also be required for the export to all or certain destinations of certain dual-use items not listed in Annex I. High-performance graphics processors and the servers containing them sit squarely in the categories the Union controls toward military end users in embargoed or sensitive destinations, and the catch-all provisions allow the competent authority to impose a licence requirement even on unlisted items once the authority informs the exporter of the proliferation risk. In France, the competent authority for dual-use licences is the dual-use goods service operating under the Ministry for the Economy, and exporting without the required authorisation exposes the exporter to the criminal provisions of the Customs Code. The Cour de cassation restated that architecture on 11 February 2026 in ruling number 24-20.992, recalling that Selon l’article 414 du même code, dans sa version en vigueur du 1er janvier 2017 au 20 juillet 2023, les faits de contrebande ainsi que les faits d’importation ou d’exportation sans déclaration, lorsque ces infractions se rapportent à des marchandises de la catégorie de celles qui sont prohibées au sens de ce code ou aux produits du tabac manufacturé, étaient réprimés d’une peine d’emprisonnement de trois ans, and that Selon l’article 414-2 du même code, dans sa rédaction issue de l’ordonnance n° 2019-963 du 18 septembre 2019, est réprimé d’une peine de cinq ans d’emprisonnement, lorsqu’il est commis intentionnellement et qu’il se rapporte à des marchandises qui ne sont pas mentionnées à l’article 414, tout fait de contrebande ainsi que tout fait d’importation ou d’exportation de marchandises sans déclaration. False end-user certificates and misdeclared consignees, the exact paperwork technique alleged in California, have a precise French classification too: the same ruling recalls the former article 426, under which false declarations of the kind, value, origin, real consignee, or real consignor of goods, committed with false or inaccurate invoices, certificates, or documents, were deemed importation or exportation without declaration of prohibited goods. The investigative powers behind these offences are unusually broad. The Court recalled in the same decision that Selon l’article 64 du code des douanes, pour la recherche et la constatation des délits douaniers visés aux articles 414 à 429 et 459, les agents des douanes habilités à cet effet par le ministre chargé des douanes peuvent procéder à des visites en tous lieux, même privés, où les marchandises et documents se rapportant à ces délits ainsi que les biens et avoirs en provenant directement ou indirectement sont susceptibles d’être détenus ou d’être accessibles ou disponibles, with each visit authorised by order of the liberty and custody judge. A French exporter moving controlled servers through third countries would therefore face dawn searches of offices and homes, seizure of documents and computer data, and customs detention of suspect shipments, all before the criminal court ever sees the file. The corporate dimension completes the exposure. Article 121-2 of the Criminal Code provides that Les personnes morales, à l’exclusion de l’Etat, sont responsables pénalement, selon les distinctions des articles 121-4 à 121-7, des infractions commises, pour leur compte, par leurs organes ou représentants, and that La responsabilité pénale des personnes morales n’exclut pas celle des personnes physiques auteurs ou complices des mêmes faits. A company structured like the one described in the American press release could thus be prosecuted in France alongside its manager, with fines, confiscation, and bans on public procurement or on the activity itself. Readers exposed to Union sanctions practice will recognise the parallel with the litigation over frozen listings, where the same Paris practitioners who challenge an EU sanctions listing or a frozen account from France also handle the customs and dual-use files that sanctions generate.
B. How Does France Punish Money Laundering and Seize the Proceeds of a Diversion Scheme?
Once the servers move, the money moves, and French law treats the money as a second offence with its own penalties, its own presumptions, and its own confiscation logic. Article 324-1 of the Criminal Code defines the offence in terms every export-control file will meet: Le blanchiment est le fait de faciliter, par tout moyen, la justification mensongère de l’origine des biens ou des revenus de l’auteur d’un crime ou d’un délit ayant procuré à celui-ci un profit direct ou indirect. The same article adds the form most relevant to transshipment payments: Constitue également un blanchiment le fait d’apporter un concours à une opération de placement, de dissimulation ou de conversion du produit direct ou indirect d’un crime ou d’un délit, punishable by cinq ans d’emprisonnement et de 375 000 euros d’amende. Where the laundering is habitual, uses the facilities of a professional activity, or is committed by an organised gang, article 324-2 raises the ceiling sharply: Le blanchiment est puni de dix ans d’emprisonnement et de 750 000 euros d’amende : 1° Lorsqu’il est commis de façon habituelle ou en utilisant les facilités que procure l’exercice d’une activité professionnelle ; 2° Lorsqu’il est commis en bande organisée. A technology company allegedly channelling more than $176 million through foreign intermediaries over ten months would face the aggravated analysis at once: habitual conduct, professional facilities, and concerted action are the three triggers prosecutors test first. The Cour de cassation confirmed on 11 September 2019 in ruling number 18-83.484 that a money laundering conviction carrying one year of suspended imprisonment and a 375,000 euro fine survives review where the courts properly characterise assistance with an operation placing, concealing, or converting the proceeds of an offence, rejecting the convicted person’s appeal in full. But the Court polices the boundary between suspicious money and proven laundering with equal firmness. On 25 June 2025, in ruling number 24-85.882, it quashed a Rennes appeal decision that had inferred laundering from the mere manner in which cash was carried, holding that si l’article 324-1-1 du code pénal prévoit que, pour l’application de l’article 324-1 du même code, les biens ou revenus sont présumés être le produit direct ou indirect d’un crime ou d’un délit dès lors que les conditions matérielles, juridiques ou financières de l’opération de placement, de dissimulation ou de conversion ne peuvent avoir d’autre justification que de dissimuler l’origine ou le bénéficiaire effectif de ces biens ou revenus, cette présomption ne peut jouer que s’il est préalablement caractérisé une telle opération, and that En l’espèce, le seul fait de transporter deux liasses de billets, l’une au fond d’un sac et l’autre dans une poche de manteau, emballées dans de la cellophane transparente, ne constituait pas une opération de dissimulation. For the defence, that ruling is the shield against lazy inferences: unusual payment routes through third-country intermediaries do not prove laundering unless the prosecution first characterises a concrete placement, concealment, or conversion operation. For the prosecution, the same ruling is a roadmap: document the operation, then let the presumption work. The fine itself follows the proceeds. On 11 September 2019, in ruling number 18-81.040, the Court held in a partial cassation that l’assiette de l’amende ainsi définie ne peut être calculée qu’en prenant pour base le montant du produit direct ou indirect de l’infraction d’origine, adding that le produit de la fraude fiscale est constitué de l’économie qu’elle a permis de réaliser et dont le montant est équivalent à celui des impôts éludés. Transposed to a diversion file, the base for the laundering fine is the direct or indirect product of the predicate customs offence, which focuses the battle on tracing: which transfers represent the product of unlicensed exports and which reflect lawful business. Confiscation runs on a parallel track with its own customs rules. On 7 September 2022, in ruling number 21-85.236 concerning an export without declaration of prohibited goods, the criminal chamber held that l’article 414, alinéa 1, du code des douanes autorise la confiscation du produit direct ou indirect de l’infraction douanière, peu important que l’arrêt qualifie à tort cette mesure de peine complémentaire, and that le prononcé, par le juge correctionnel, de la confiscation douanière prévue à l’article 414 du code des douanes en répression des infractions de contrebande ou d’importation ou d’exportation sans déclaration de marchandises prohibées est soumis aux dispositions spécifiques de l’article 369 du code des douanes et échappe, par conséquent, aux prescriptions des articles 485 du code de procédure pénale et 132-1 du code pénal. The practical message for anyone holding funds downstream of a suspect export chain is stark: the product of the customs offence can be confiscated even where the judgment mislabels the measure, and the customs confiscation procedure follows its own article 369 track rather than the general criminal rules. Combined with the American forfeiture proceedings already assigned to a dedicated prosecutor in California, a mirror file in Paris would squeeze the same money from both ends, with each jurisdiction seizing what it can reach and litigating the rest through mutual legal assistance. Early advice therefore concentrates on three defences: contest the controlled classification of the goods, demand that the prosecution characterise a precise laundering operation before any presumption applies, and trace each euro to separate lawful revenue from the alleged product of the offence, because confiscation and the fine both live or die on that tracing.
Conclusion
The 1 October 2026 arrest compresses the whole grammar of technology diversion into a single file: controlled servers, false end-user paperwork, freight forwarders, third-country transshipment, nine-figure payments from foreign intermediaries, and a money laundering count that turns the proceeds into a second prosecution. The charges remain allegations to be tested at trial, and the presumption of innocence applies in full. But the structural lessons are already fixed for any exporter, investor, or adviser operating between the United States, Europe, and Asia. First, diversion files are document files: emails, purchase orders, packing lists, compliance forms, and payment records decide the outcome before any expert testifies about computing power, which means record-keeping and end-user verification are the first line of defence. Second, the licence question must be asked before shipment, not after seizure, because both the American regulations and the European catch-all provisions punish exports made without authorisation where the destination and end use required one, and ignorance of the re-export rarely survives a paper trail showing knowledge. Third, the money is a separate battlefield: laundering charges, aggravated where professional facilities or organised action are involved, carry their own prison terms and fines, presumptions apply only once a concrete placement, concealment, or conversion operation is characterised, and both the fine and confiscation are measured against the traced product of the predicate offence. Fourth, the company itself is exposed alongside its managers, since corporate criminal liability attaches to offences committed on the company’s behalf by its organs or representatives. For anyone who discovers a suspect transfer in their own supply chain, the immediate steps are practical: freeze further shipments to the intermediary, preserve every document, commission an independent classification of the goods, verify end users through the competent licensing authority, and instruct counsel in each affected jurisdiction before investigators arrive, because customs search powers reach homes and servers at dawn and forfeiture moves faster than the trial. Cross-border technology trade remains lawful and welcome; it simply requires licences where licences are due, and the price of treating that requirement as paperwork is now written in indictments on both sides of the Atlantic.