On 16 July 2026, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court unanimously confirmed all charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes against Khaled Mohamed Ali El Hishri and committed him to trial. Days later the ICC Presidency constituted Trial Chamber VII, and the trial is scheduled to open on 4 May 2027: the first trial ever held for crimes committed in Libya, fifteen years after the Security Council referred the situation to the Prosecutor. The road from a Berlin street arrest in July 2025 to a Hague courtroom runs through one of the least understood enforcement machines in international law: the ICC surrender procedure, executed not by international police but by national judges applying national statutes. Germany arrested; Germany surrendered; the Court will now try.
For an international audience, the French angle is the one that matters most in practice. France is where ICC fugitives transit, hide and are arrested most often in continental Europe after Germany, and Paris is where the Cour de cassation wrote, in 2011, the controlling French precedent on surrendering a suspect to the ICC. Had El Hishri landed at Roissy instead of living in Berlin, the prosecutor general near the Paris cour d’appel, the Paris chambre de l’instruction and possibly the Cour de cassation would have decided his fate within weeks, under a procedure deliberately faster and narrower than extradition. This article explains both halves of the story: what the El Hishri case is about and where it stands on the road to the May 2027 trial; then, step by step, what French law and French courts do when the ICC asks France to arrest and surrender a suspect found on French soil.
I. From a Berlin Arrest to a Confirmed Trial: How the First Libya Case Reached The Hague’s Trial Chambers
A. Mitiga Prison, the Sealed Warrant and the German Arrest: What El Hishri Is Accused Of
Khaled Mohamed Ali El Hishri, also known as Al-Buti, is accused as a senior member of the Special Deterrence Force for Combatting Terrorism and Organised Crime, the powerful Tripoli militia known as Al-Radaa or SDF/RADA, which operated detention sites in western Libya including Mitiga Prison. According to the ICC case page, the Prosecutor applied for a warrant of arrest on 3 April 2025, and Pre-Trial Chamber I issued it under seal on 10 July 2025, reclassifying it as public on 31 July 2025. The legal threshold the judges applied at that stage is the one set by article 58(1) of the Rome Statute, under which the Pre-Trial Chamber issues a warrant where reasonable grounds support the allegation and arrest appears necessary to secure appearance, protect the investigation or prevent further crimes. That reasonable-grounds standard is deliberately lower than the trial standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt; it is a filter for arrest, not a preview of conviction, and defence teams that confuse the two misread every ICC confirmation decision that follows.
The charges themselves describe a system, not an isolated excess. The confirmed counts allege torture, cruel treatment, imprisonment, outrages upon personal dignity and other inhumane acts; rape, attempted rape and other forms of sexual violence; murder and attempted murder; enslavement; and persecution — seventeen counts in total, qualified both as crimes against humanity and as war crimes, allegedly committed at Mitiga Prison and within the Mitiga compound in Tripoli between 1 May 2014 and 30 June 2020, in a section of the prison where women and young children were detained. The date range matters far beyond the courtroom: it spans the collapse of central authority in Libya, the entrenchment of militia-run detention, and the well-documented involvement of European migration-control funding in the Libyan detention economy, which is why this trial will be watched in Paris and Brussels as much as in Tripoli. Civil society organisations that follow the case, including the International Federation for Human Rights in its statement of 3 December 2025 by the International Federation for Human Rights, welcomed the surrender as the first time a Libya suspect had been brought before the Court since the investigation opened on the 2011 United Nations Security Council referral. That referral, resolution 1970, is what gives the Court jurisdiction over crimes on Libyan territory even though Libya is not a State Party to the Rome Statute — a jurisdictional architecture entirely different from the Philippines or Ukraine situations, and one that makes State cooperation under Chapter VII legally mandatory rather than voluntary.
The arrest itself is the part of the story European lawyers should study most closely. El Hishri was arrested in Berlin on 16 July 2025 by the German authorities pursuant to the ICC warrant, barely two weeks after it was issued, and surrendered to the Court on 1 December 2025, making his initial appearance before Pre-Trial Chamber I on 3 December 2025. No dramatic extraction, no diplomatic crisis: a quiet European arrest, a judicial surrender, a first appearance within forty-eight hours of transfer. That ordinariness is the point. The Rome Statute’s cooperation regime, set out in Part 9, works when States Parties treat ICC warrants the way they treat their own judges’ orders. Article 86 of the Rome Statute imposes on States Parties a general duty of full cooperation with the Court, and article 89(1) converts that promise into an arrest duty, requiring States Parties to comply with ICC requests for arrest and surrender in accordance with the Statute and their national procedure. Germany complied. The contrast with States that did not — Italy’s failure to surrender Osama Elmasry Njeem in January 2025 after his arrest on an ICC warrant, formally confirmed by ICC judges as a breach of Rome Statute obligations — is now the textbook illustration, in every European foreign ministry, of the difference between a State that executes warrants and a State that explains itself afterwards.
B. The 16 July 2026 Confirmation of Charges and the Road to the 4 May 2027 Trial
The confirmation of charges hearing ran from 19 to 21 May 2026, with the Prosecutor, the common legal representatives of victims, and the defence presenting oral submissions over three days. On 16 July 2026, Pre-Trial Chamber I unanimously confirmed all charges and committed El Hishri to trial — unanimity being a signal practitioners read carefully, because a divided confirmation bench often foreshadows the fault lines of the trial itself. The ICC Presidency constituted Trial Chamber VII on 20 July 2026, and the trial is scheduled to open on 4 May 2027, with status conferences now setting the calendar, the disclosure timetable, victim participation modalities, and the language regime of the proceedings. For readers unfamiliar with ICC procedure, the confirmation stage deserves a clear explanation, because it has no equivalent in French criminal procedure and is constantly misreported as a “mini-trial”. It is not. Confirmation asks only whether sufficient evidence exists to establish substantial grounds to believe the person committed the charged crimes — a threshold above the “reasonable grounds” of the arrest warrant but below “beyond reasonable doubt”. Charges can be confirmed in full, declined, adjourned for further evidence, or amended; here they were confirmed in full, which means the Prosecutor’s case survived adversarial testing with victims participating, and the trial will address all seventeen counts.
Three features of the coming trial will shape its legal and political significance. First, it is the Libya situation’s first trial: every prior Libya suspect — from Saif Gaddafi to the fugitive commanders of 2011 — remained at large, died, or saw proceedings stall, so the Court’s credibility in the situation depends disproportionately on this single courtroom. Second, the charges foreground sexual and gender-based crimes and crimes against detained migrants, including enslavement, which forces the Trial Chamber to apply the Rome Statute’s most modern provisions on facts drawn from a detention system partly financed, indirectly, by European policies — expect interveners, amicus briefs, and intense press coverage of every evidentiary ruling on chain-of-command evidence inside a militia that was simultaneously a counter-terrorism partner, a prison operator, and an alleged criminal enterprise. Third, the defence will almost certainly litigate admissibility and complementarity: Libya lodged an article 12(3) declaration in May 2025 accepting ICC jurisdiction until the end of 2027, while asserting its own willingness to prosecute, and the interplay between that declaration, the Security Council referral, and any Libyan national proceedings will generate the kind of jurisdictional argument that delays trials by months and defines them in the law reports. None of this affects the presumption of innocence, which the Chamber will recall at every stage; but it explains why States, NGOs, and counsel across Europe have already staffed this trial as the ICC’s most consequential new courtroom in years.
The timeline also carries a warning for suspects still at large. Between the sealed warrant of 10 July 2025 and the Berlin arrest of 16 July 2025, barely any time elapsed for flight — and the warrant had been requested as early as April. The modern ICC practice of sealed warrants, coordinated, low-visibility arrests by cooperative States Parties, and rapid transfer to The Hague compresses the window in which a suspect can organise evasion, asylum shopping, or political protection. That is precisely where France enters the picture: the next fugitive may surface at Roissy, in Calais, or in a Paris préfecture queue rather than in Berlin, and what happens in the following ninety-six hours is governed not by The Hague but by the Paris palais de justice.
II. Arrested on French Soil on an ICC Warrant: the Paris Surrender Procedure Step by Step
A. Surrender Is Not Extradition: 24 Hours, Five Days, Eight Days and the “Erreur Évidente” Test
The single most important sentence a lawyer can say to a client arrested in France on an ICC warrant is this: you are not in extradition proceedings. Surrender — remise — to the ICC is a distinct procedure, faster, narrower, and far less open to substantive defences than extradition to a foreign State. France gave itself the machinery through the law of 26 February 2002 inserting articles 627 to 627-20 into the Code of Criminal Procedure, a transposition the Cour de cassation retraced in its Mbarushimana ruling (pourvoi no. 10-87.760), and the general principle is stated in article 627 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: “Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre.” Every step that follows flows from that cooperation duty, combined with article 89 of the Statute, and every French court that has applied it has stressed that the requested State performs only minimal review.
The procedure runs on a clock that leaves no room for improvisation. Article 627-4 provides that “Les demandes d’arrestation aux fins de remise délivrées par la Cour pénale internationale sont adressées, en original et accompagnées de toutes pièces justificatives, aux autorités compétentes en vertu de l’article 87 du statut qui, après s’être assurées de leur régularité formelle, les transmettent au procureur général près la cour d’appel de Paris et, dans le même temps, les mettent à exécution dans toute l’étendue du territoire de la République.” Paris has exclusive jurisdiction: wherever in France the arrest occurs, the file goes to the Paris prosecutor general. In emergencies the request can even be sent directly to the territorially competent prosecutor “par tout moyen” — the drafters anticipated the airport tarmac scenario. Once arrested, article 627-5 commands that “Toute personne appréhendée en vertu d’une demande d’arrestation aux fins de remise doit être déférée dans les vingt-quatre heures au procureur de la République territorialement compétent”, with the safeguards of police custody, information in a language the person understands, and immediate access to counsel of choice or court-appointed counsel. If the prosecutor does not release the person, a liberty and custody judge orders detention. Transfer to the Paris jurisdiction follows under article 627-6: “Le transfèrement doit avoir lieu dans un délai maximum de cinq jours à compter de sa présentation au procureur de la République, faute de quoi la personne réclamée est immédiatement libérée” — release being the sanction for delay, subject only to insurmountable circumstances — and the Paris prosecutor general then notifies the person of the surrender request and the charges, in a language they understand, receiving their statement with counsel present.
The decisive hearing comes before the chambre de l’instruction of the Paris cour d’appel, which is “immédiatement saisie” and hears the person within eight days of presentation to the prosecutor general, under article 627-7: “La personne réclamée comparaît devant elle dans un délai de huit jours à compter de sa présentation au procureur général.” The hearing and the ruling are public unless publicity would harm the proceedings, third-party interests, or personal dignity. Then comes the ruling rule that defence lawyers must internalise before promising anything: article 627-8 provides that “Lorsque la chambre de l’instruction constate qu’il n’y a pas d’erreur évidente, elle ordonne la remise de la personne réclamée et, si celle-ci est libre, son incarcération à cette fin. Toute autre question soumise à la chambre de l’instruction est renvoyée à la Cour pénale internationale qui lui donne les suites utiles.” No manifest error on identity — surrender ordered. Every other argument goes to The Hague. The chamber rules within fifteen days of appearance, and on appeal the criminal chamber of the Cour de cassation decides within two months of receiving the file. From arrest to final French decision, the realistic horizon is measured in weeks, not the months or years of classic extradition litigation.
The controlling precedent remains the Cour de cassation’s ruling of 4 January 2011 in the Mbarushimana case (pourvoi no. 10-87.760, ECLI:FR:CCASS:2011:CR00077), which rejected the appeal against the Paris chambre de l’instruction’s order surrendering Callixte Mbarushimana to the ICC on the warrant of 28 September 2010. Three holdings from that decision govern every French ICC surrender file to this day. First, jurisdiction and regularity: the Paris chambre de l’instruction acts “en tant qu’autorité judiciaire de l’Etat de rétention”, seized through both the emergency and the ordinary diplomatic channels, on the original warrant, the supporting statutory extracts, the Registrar’s request, and the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision — a checklist counsel should verify document by document, because formal irregularity is one of the only French-level defences with any record of success. Second, and most quoted: “l’autorité judiciaire de l’Etat de rétention, saisie précisément d’une demande d’arrestation et de remise n’est pas, contrairement aux termes du mémoire, saisie d’une demande d’extradition et n’a pas à vérifier que les exigences de la procédure d’extradition” are met — no double criminality analysis, no sentencing-quantum review, no weighing of the evidence. Third, the standard of review: “l’Etat requis ne peut que se limiter à un contrôle a minima du respect des dispositions du Statut”, and challenges based on competing German proceedings or double jeopardy fail because “l’examen et le respect de la règle non bis in idem étant, en application de l’article 20 du Statut, de la compétence exclusive de la Cour pénale internationale”. In short: identity check in Paris, everything else in The Hague. Any lawyer who tells an ICC suspect’s family that the Paris courts will re-examine the merits has not read Mbarushimana.
That does not mean the French hearing is theatre. Counsel can and should test the formal file — original warrant, Registrar’s request, identity, language of notification, custody time limits, the twenty-four-hour presentation, the five-day transfer, the eight-day hearing — because a missed deadline can mean release, and because the observations filed in Paris become the first building blocks of the admissibility and abuse-of-process arguments later raised before the ICC itself. Counsel should also prepare, from day one, the two tracks that run in parallel with surrender: the asylum track, where refugee status under the 1951 Geneva Convention can complicate but essentially never blocks ICC surrender, a point the Mbarushimana defence raised and lost; and the interim-release track before the ICC once transferred, where article 60 of the Statute governs detention pending trial under a completely different logic from French détention provisoire. The families who cope best with these cases are those told the truth early: the Paris phase is short, formal, and almost always ends in surrender, so resources should be concentrated on The Hague — counsel before the ICC, disclosure, victims’ participation, and, where available, admissibility challenges under article 19 of the Statute.
B. When France Prosecutes Instead of Surrendering: Universal Jurisdiction and the Germany-Italy Contrast
Surrender is only one branch of the alternative. The other is prosecution in France itself — and here French law offers the ICC system something Germany’s surrender and Italy’s refusal both illustrate from opposite sides: a national courtroom capable of trying international crimes when the suspect is on French soil. Outside the ICC-cooperation framework, article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes : 1° Le crime de génocide défini au chapitre Ier du sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre II du code pénal ; 2° Les autres crimes contre l’humanité définis au chapitre II du même sous-titre Ier ; 3° Les crimes et les délits de guerre définis aux articles 461-1 à 461-31 du même code”, on condition that the suspect has their habitual residence in France — residence being assessed through concrete ties such as the duration of presence, its conditions and reasons, the demonstrated wish to settle or remain, and family, social, material or professional links — and with prosecution exercisable only at the request of the public prosecutor. The Mbarushimana ruling itself recalled in passing that French courts enjoy universal jurisdiction over ICC-type crimes committed abroad by persons habitually resident in France. In practice this is the statute under which France has tried Rwandan genocide cases before the Paris cour d’assises — the Pascal Simbikangwa, Octavien Ngenzi, Tito Barahira, Claude Muhayimana and Sosthène Munyemana trials — and under which Syrian and Liberian files, including the landmark Kunti Kamara conviction for torture and crimes against humanity, have moved from complaint to verdict.
The Cour de cassation, sitting in Assemblée plénière on 12 May 2023 (pourvoi no. 22-82.468, ECLI:FR:CCASS:2023:PL90669, rejet), ruled, in the Syrian torture file: “Il s’en déduit que le cas de compétence universelle de l’article 689-2 précité est limité aux tortures imputées à un agent de la fonction publique ou une personne agissant à titre officiel ou à son instigation ou avec son consentement exprès ou tacite”, but “Cependant, la notion de personne ayant agi à titre officiel, au sens du renvoi fait par le texte national à la Convention précitée, doit être comprise comme visant également une personne agissant pour le compte ou au nom d’une entité non gouvernementale, lorsque celle-ci occupe un territoire et exerce une autorité quasi gouvernementale sur ce territoire”. Read that holding with Mitiga in mind: a militia that runs prisons, checkpoints and a counter-terrorism apparatus across part of a fragmented State is exactly the kind of entity exercising quasi-governmental authority the Assemblée plénière had in view. Had an El Hishri-type suspect settled in Saint-Denis rather than Berlin, and had no ICC warrant yet existed, the Paris pôle crimes contre l’humanité could have opened a file on the basis of habitual residence alone — and once an ICC warrant and surrender request arrived, the complementarity dance between the national investigation and the Hague proceedings would have begun, with admissibility ultimately for the ICC to decide under articles 17 to 20 of the Statute.
This is where the Germany-Italy contrast becomes the practical lesson of 2025-2026 for every European practitioner. Germany arrested on 16 July 2025 and surrendered on 1 December 2025: the warrant lived less than five months before producing a detainee in The Hague, and the confirmation-to-trial sequence then ran like clockwork — May hearing, July confirmation, trial chamber within days, trial date within a year. Italy, confronted with an ICC warrant against a Libyan suspect arrested on its soil in January 2025, released and repatriated the man instead of surrendering him, and the Court formally found a breach of cooperation obligations — the finding now cited in every training course on what article 86 and article 89 actually cost when ignored. France’s record sits firmly on the German side of that line: the Mbarushimana surrender of 2011, executed through the Paris chambre de l’instruction and upheld by the Cour de cassation, remains the proof that the French 627-series procedure delivers transfer within weeks when the file is formally in order. For suspects, the conclusion is uncomfortable but clear: among the three large continental States most likely to be the place of arrest, none currently offers a realistic litigation path to defeat surrender on the merits at the national stage. The fights that matter — admissibility, gravity, confirmation, disclosure, witness protection, victim participation — all happen in The Hague, and the competent response to an arrest in Paris, Berlin or Rome is to secure immediate specialist counsel, preserve every procedural irregularity in writing, and prepare the Hague phase from the first night in custody.
One final French specificity deserves emphasis for the international reader, because it surprises even experienced extradition lawyers: the French surrender judge does not ask whether the facts are punishable under French law, does not compare penalties, and does not second-guess the ICC’s jurisdiction — all of which a French extradition judge would examine in a classic extradition to a third State. The 2011 precedent says so explicitly, the 627-series texts confirm it structurally, and the two-month cassation deadline in article 627-8 makes the point institutionally: France designed ICC surrender as an act of jurisdictional hospitality, not as a second trial. That design is also France’s answer to the criticism that international justice is slow: from a Berlin-style arrest to a Hague courtroom in under five months, from confirmation to a trial date within a year — the El Hishri case shows the machine working at something close to its design speed. When Trial Chamber VII opens the first Libya trial on 4 May 2027, the empty chair that matters will be that of every suspect still counting on the indifference of States. After El Hishri, that bet looks harder to sustain than at any point since 2011.
Conclusion
The El Hishri case condenses fifteen years of Libya accountability into a single docket: a Security Council referral from 2011, a militia prison system documented over a decade, a sealed warrant in July 2025, a quiet Berlin arrest days later, a December surrender, a unanimous confirmation of all seventeen counts in July 2026, and now a trial chamber, a calendar, and an opening date of 4 May 2027. Its significance extends beyond Libya: it demonstrates that the ICC cooperation regime functions when a State Party treats an ICC warrant as an order rather than a suggestion, and it sets the standard against which every future European arrest — including any future arrest on French soil — will be measured. For anyone who may one day receive the 24-hour presentation notice of article 627-5 in a French commissariat, the lessons are threefold and non-negotiable: Paris decides only identity and formal regularity, on a timetable of days; the substantive battle belongs exclusively to The Hague, where admissibility, confirmation and trial require specialised ICC counsel engaged immediately; and France’s alternative — prosecution before its own courts under universal jurisdiction, as clarified by the Assemblée plénière in 2023 — means that defeating surrender is never the same as defeating justice. The first Libya trial is coming. The only remaining question is how many more dockets will follow it.