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Elizabeth Holmes: What Can Defrauded Investors Still Recover After the Theranos Fraud Conviction?

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Elizabeth Holmes: What Can Defrauded Investors Still Recover After the Theranos Fraud Conviction?

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Renewed public attention on Elizabeth Holmes has a precise legal anchor. On December 22, 2025, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued an amended opinion that left every central piece of the Theranos prosecution in place: the fraud convictions of Elizabeth Holmes, the fraud convictions of Ramesh Balwani, their prison sentences, and a restitution order of $452 million owed jointly and severally to fourteen victims. The panel had first ruled on February 24, 2025, and the amended December decision confirms the outcome after further review. For American readers following the story, the important question is no longer whether the government proved investor fraud at trial. A jury already answered that question count by count, and a federal appeals court has now sustained the answer twice.

According to the opinion, Holmes was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud against investors and three counts of wire fraud tied to specific investor victims, while the jury acquitted her on the patient-related counts. The district court then ordered Holmes and Balwani jointly and severally liable for $452 million in restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, including $397 million for twelve investors identified at sentencing and $54.5 million for two additional victims, Safeway and Walgreens. The discussion that follows is general in scope: it describes checks useful in comparable situations and makes no findings about any person’s or company’s situation. It explains how federal criminal restitution works once a fraud conviction is affirmed, where the limits sit, and which documents and deadlines a person in a comparable investor-fraud situation should verify without delay.

I. What the jury and the appeals court decided

A. The investor-fraud convictions were affirmed on appeal

The Third Superseding Indictment charged Holmes and Balwani with conspiracy to commit wire fraud against investors from 2010 to 2015 as Count 1, six wire fraud counts involving investors who invested in Theranos in 2013 and 2014 as Counts 3 through 8, conspiracy to commit wire fraud against patients as Count 2, and patient wire fraud as Counts 9 through 12. During the trial, the government dismissed Count 9. The jury acquitted Holmes on the patient-related counts, conspiracy Count 2 and wire fraud Counts 10 through 12. The jury convicted Holmes of four investor-related counts: the investor-related conspiracy charged in Count 1 and wire fraud relating to three investor victims in Counts 6 through 8. That split verdict matters for anyone reading the case as precedent. The government had to prove each count separately, and the counts it could not prove produced acquittals even as the investor counts produced convictions.

The wire fraud statute behind those counts punishes anyone who, having devised a scheme to defraud, uses “any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme” in interstate or foreign commerce. Anyone convicted “shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.” That twenty-year maximum per count is what gives federal investor-fraud prosecutions their weight, and it is the provision under which the Theranos investor counts were charged. Readers can consult the current text of 18 U.S.C. section 1343 on wire fraud to confirm the elements and the penalty. The conspiracy count rested on the separate federal rule that punishes agreements to commit an offense against the United States when at least one conspirator takes an overt step toward the goal, a rule readers can verify in 18 U.S.C. section 371 on conspiracy.

In United States v. Holmes, No. 22-10312 (9th Cir. Dec. 22, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in an amended opinion by Judge Nguyen joined by Judges Schroeder and Nelson, affirmed the convictions and the sentences after argument held June 11, 2024 in San Francisco, in an appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Judge Edward J. Davila presiding, D.C. No. 5:18-cr-00258. The same amended opinion affirmed the related restitution appeals, and the case now stands at the post-appeal stage with the convictions and the $452 million joint-and-several restitution order affirmed. The panel’s summary states the result directly: it affirmed the convictions on numerous fraud charges, the sentences, and the district court’s $452 million restitution order in a case in which the defendants defrauded investors about the achievements of the company’s blood-testing technology. The practical application for a reader is straightforward: once a federal appeals court sustains investor-fraud convictions after full briefing and argument, later challenges to the same trial record face a steep climb, and attention shifts from guilt to the financial consequences, which is where restitution law takes over.

Appeals in federal fraud cases rarely revisit what the jury believed. The appeals court reviews legal rulings, evidentiary decisions, and the sufficiency of the evidence, and evidentiary errors lead to reversal only when they likely affected the verdict. In the Theranos appeal, the panel worked through challenges to expert testimony about the accuracy and reliability of the blood-testing devices, to the testimony of former employees describing similar problems with the technology, and to the district court’s handling of loss and victim issues, and it found no error warranting reversal. Multiple former employees had reported the same technological problems, so the challenged testimony was cumulative rather than decisive, and the district court’s factual findings at sentencing were not clearly erroneous. For a reader, the lesson is that a well-documented trial record with corroboration across witnesses is difficult to undo on appeal, which is why the amended December 2025 decision reads as confirmation rather than surprise.

B. The $452 million restitution order was affirmed in full

Restitution in federal fraud cases is not discretionary. The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act provides that when sentencing a covered defendant, the court must order restitution “in addition to or in lieu of, any other penalty authorized by law,” so that the defendant makes restitution to the victim of the offense or, if the victim is deceased, to the victim’s estate.” That command, which readers can verify in 18 U.S.C. section 3663A on mandatory restitution, is why the financial component of the Theranos case was never an afterthought. Fraud offenses are among the covered crimes, so once the convictions stood, the district court had to quantify what the victims lost and order repayment.

According to the amended opinion, the district court found that the twelve investors induced by the fraud to invest in Theranos were victims under the Act, and that the property each victim lost was the money each invested in exchange for ownership shares. The court credited the amounts Theranos had already paid to three investors in civil settlements, but it rejected the argument that the residual value of the Theranos shares counted as property returned within the meaning of the statute. The court held Holmes and Balwani jointly and severally liable for $452 million, including $397 million for the twelve victims identified at sentencing and $54.5 million for two other victims, Safeway and Walgreens. Joint and several liability means each defendant owes the entire amount until the victims are made whole once; it does not entitle victims to collect the same loss twice, which is why the credit for civil settlements already paid reduced the balance instead of stacking on top of it.

The appeals court sustained that entire structure. It held that the investors’ inability to resell their shares justified awarding the full value of each investment as restitution, because that amount made each victim whole, even though the same reasoning does not automatically control how loss is calculated for sentencing, where the focus is the defendant’s conduct rather than the victim’s recovery. The court therefore affirmed the district court’s restitution order in its entirety. The application for a reader comparing any investor-fraud situation is concrete: when fraud induces an investment and the resulting shares cannot realistically be resold, courts can measure restitution by the full amount invested, subtract sums already paid back through settlements, and hold co-defendants jointly responsible for the remainder.

The opinion also draws a line that victims and defendants alike often blur: the loss figure used to set a prison sentence is not the same question as the restitution figure used to repay victims. Sentencing loss under the Guidelines focuses on the defendant’s conduct and is punitive in purpose, while restitution focuses on making the victim whole. The panel explained that the investors’ inability to resell their shares justified awarding the full investment as restitution even though a different analysis could apply when measuring loss for punishment, citing appellate decisions that separate the two inquiries. That separation matters practically. A defendant can face a long prison term driven by an intended-loss calculation and simultaneously owe a restitution order driven by actual victims’ out-of-pocket losses, and a victory on one measure does not automatically move the other. Anyone reading a fraud sentence should therefore ask two distinct questions: what punishment did the court impose, and what repayment did it order, because each follows its own rules and its own appellate path.

II. What this means for getting money back

A. How federal restitution works after a fraud conviction is affirmed

Three features of the federal scheme determine what victims actually receive. First, restitution is ordered in the full amount of each victim’s losses as determined by the court and without consideration of the economic circumstances of the defendant. That sentence, taken from 18 U.S.C. section 3664 on restitution procedure, surprises many readers. A defendant’s inability to pay today does not reduce the amount owed. It may affect the payment schedule the judge sets, but the obligation itself reflects the loss, not the bank account. Second, disputes about the amount are resolved by the judge under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard: “Any dispute as to the proper amount or type of restitution shall be resolved by the court by the preponderance of the evidence.” With the government bearing the burden of proving the loss and the defendant bearing the burden of proving personal financial resources. Third, the process starts with information gathering, because for restitution orders under the title, the court orders the probation officer to prepare a presentence report “or in a separate report, as the court may direct,” pulling together information sufficient for the court to set the order. Victims therefore have an interest in making sure the probation office and the prosecution have their documented figures before sentencing, not after.

The Supreme Court’s framework for measuring that loss still shapes every later dispute. In Robers v. United States, 572 U.S. 639 (2014), the Supreme Court of the United States, decided May 5, 2014, explained that the disputed phrase “refers to the property the banks lost, namely, the money they lent to Robers, and not to the collateral the banks received, namely, the two houses.” The practical application is that money a victim parted with because of fraud is the starting measure, and later events count against that measure only when they genuinely return the lost property to the victim, such as resale proceeds that actually come back. The Ninth Circuit applied exactly that logic in United States v. Holmes, Nos. 22-10312 and 23-1040 (9th Cir. Dec. 22, 2025), when it treated the full invested sums as the loss and refused to treat unsellable shares as returned value, which confirms that the Robers distinction between lost money and retained paper remains the working rule in investor-fraud restitution. A 2025 Sixth Circuit decision applied the same distinction again: in United States v. Cross, No. 25-5276 (6th Cir. 2025) (unpublished), the court cited Robers v. United States, 572 U.S. 639, 640-41 (2014), for the rule that when the property is money secured by real estate, it counts as returned when the victim sells the property, not when the victim takes title, while affirming the denial of an offset to a defendant who claimed he had already repaid the victim bank. Robers is invoked here for the Supreme Court definition of returned property, not as a guarantee that later courts value every unsold asset the same way in investor cases.

There are also boundaries on what restitution can include. In Lagos v. United States, 584 U.S. 577 (2018), the Supreme Court of the United States, decided May 29, 2018, held that “The words “investigation” and “proceedings” in subsection (b)(4) of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act are limited to government investigations and criminal proceedings”, which do not extend to private investigations or civil and bankruptcy matters. The application is that a victim’s own privately funded investigation costs and expenses tied to civil or bankruptcy cases fall outside the expenses the Act allows, while participation in the government’s criminal investigation can qualify. Lagos is cited here only for its comparative limit on investigation-cost recovery under the MVRA, not as a promise about how a court will treat any particular expense claim today. Readers sometimes assume every dollar spent chasing a fraud is recoverable through restitution; Lagos is the decision that says otherwise, and it should discipline expectations before anyone spends further sums assuming reimbursement.

B. Checks to run in a comparable investor-fraud situation

Criminal restitution and civil recovery run on separate tracks, and confusing them is the most common and most expensive mistake a defrauded investor can make. A restitution order belongs to the criminal case. It is entered by the sentencing judge, in the full amount of the loss the court finds, and it lasts as a court order regardless of headlines about appeals, transfers, or release dates. A civil claim belongs to a different lawsuit, with different plaintiffs, different burdens, and its own filing deadlines that vary with the claim and the jurisdiction. Nothing in a criminal affirmance extends a civil deadline or files a civil case for the victim. Anyone comparing a personal situation to a celebrated prosecution should therefore verify, at the same time, whether a criminal order already covers the loss and whether a separate civil deadline is running elsewhere. Asking about both tracks early costs little; discovering the civil track after its deadline has passed can cost everything.

Start with the paper that controls the criminal track. Obtain the judgment and the restitution order or the sentencing minutes that state the amount, the payees, and whether liability is joint and several. Confirm that the person or entity holding the loss is actually named as a victim for the counts of conviction, because restitution follows the offense of conviction, not the broader story of everything that went wrong around a company. Where co-defendants were held jointly and severally liable, understand what that means in practice: the victims are entitled to be made whole once, and payment by one defendant reduces what remains, so monitoring collections across all defendants matters more than monitoring any single one. Keep every document that proves the amount invested, the date and channel of each transfer, any shares or statements received, and every dollar already returned through settlements, repurchases, or distributions, because credits for sums already paid directly reduce the recoverable balance, as the settlement credits in the Theranos case illustrate in general terms.

Next, test collectability with the same discipline the statute applies. An order for the full amount is not a finding that the money is available. Where the conduct spanned years and the proceeds were spent, distributed, or dissipated, even a large headline figure can translate into modest periodic payments over a long period. That possibility should shape decisions about parallel civil litigation, where different defendants, including professionals and entities with deeper resources, may be available under different legal theories, but also where litigation costs, proof burdens, and time limits differ completely from the criminal process. Before spending on private investigators or parallel proceedings, weigh the Lagos boundary described above: money spent on a private investigation and on civil or bankruptcy matters does not convert into criminal restitution, so those outlays must be justified, if at all, by the expected civil return rather than by any assumption of reimbursement through the criminal order.

Finally, protect the record that supports any claim. Preserve account statements, subscription and offering documents, wire confirmations, correspondence promoting the investment, board and financial materials received, tax records reflecting any write-offs or recoveries, and notes of oral representations with dates and participants. Do not alter, backdate, or selectively discard documents, and do not sign releases or settlement paperwork without understanding how a general release interacts with restitution credits and with pending claims. Where an investment came through a fund, a retirement account, or an intermediary, identify the legal holder of the claim early, because the person who wired the money is not always the person entitled to collect. These are checks, not outcomes: only a court applying the governing law to the specific facts can decide what anyone recovers, and that determination turns on the counts of conviction, the victims the court recognized, and the evidence of loss the record contains.

The split verdict carries one more lesson for victims. Because restitution follows the counts of conviction, losses tied to conduct the jury rejected or to counts the government dismissed may sit outside the criminal order altogether. Holmes was acquitted on the patient-related counts, so any harm flowing from that alleged conduct was not part of the affirmed convictions and could not anchor restitution in this case. The same boundary applies in every fraud prosecution: the criminal order compensates the victims of the offenses proved, not everyone who ever lost money around the same company. That is why the civil track exists as a complement rather than a duplicate. Different claims, different defendants, and different proof rules can reach losses the criminal case never covered, but they must be pursued deliberately and within their own time limits, with full awareness that a celebrated conviction neither files those claims nor pauses their clocks.

Conclusion

Federal law treats investor fraud as a crime first and a debt second. A jury decides each count on its own evidence, and an acquittal on one set of counts does not undermine convictions on another. Once convictions stand, restitution is mandatory rather than optional, measured by the full loss the court finds, reduced by sums already returned, and allocated among defendants as the order provides. Supreme Court decisions then police the boundaries: lost money is measured by what the victim parted with, not by collateral retained, and only government investigation costs, not private ones, fit the expenses provision. For anyone in a comparable position, the useful response mirrors that structure. Secure the judgment and the restitution order, confirm victim status for the counts of conviction, document every dollar invested and every dollar already recovered, test collectability before spending further, and track civil deadlines on their own independent clock. Headline figures describe what a court ordered; careful verification determines what a victim receives.

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