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Russia’s €210 Billion Frozen in Europe: Can the EU Lend It to Ukraine and How Do You Challenge a Freeze in France?

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Russia’s €210 Billion Frozen in Europe: Can the EU Lend It to Ukraine and How Do You Challenge a Freeze in France?

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On 10 September 2026, a cross-party group of Members of the European Parliament wrote to the European Commission demanding that Moscow’s frozen central bank assets be moved into a new EU vehicle and used to keep Ukraine funded. Ukraine says it faces a financial gap of $27 billion to survive the rest of the year. Around €210 billion in Russian central bank reserves sits immobilised in Europe, most of it inside the Belgian depository Euroclear, generating €3 billion to €5 billion in windfall profits every year. The question dominating Brussels this September is brutally simple: can Europe lend money it does not own to a country running out of cash, and who bears the legal risk if Moscow was right to call it theft?

Russia is already suing. The Central Bank of Russia has filed suit against Euroclear in a Moscow court over the loan plan, while Belgium warns that it will be left holding the liability if the structure collapses. France sits in the middle of this fight: French banks apply the freeze every day, the French Treasury grants or refuses the licences that make any movement of frozen funds lawful, and the Paris enforcement courts decide what creditors of sanctioned states can and cannot seize. This article explains the machinery as a French litigator sees it — the freeze, the loan schemes, the Luxembourg challenges and the Paris courtroom — so that listed persons, counterparties and creditors know exactly where they stand.

I. What Did Europe Freeze and What Does Brussels Want to Do With €210 Billion?

A. How Did €210 Billion in Russian Central Bank Assets End Up Frozen in Europe?

In 2022, within days of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the European Union prohibited any transaction relating to the reserves and assets of the Central Bank of Russia. The prohibition did not transfer ownership of a single euro: it froze. Roughly €210 billion in Russian central bank assets held in Europe became untouchable, with about €185 billion of that total sitting in accounts at Euroclear in Brussels. A freeze, in EU sanctions law as in French law, is a prohibition on movement, not a confiscation. The owner remains the owner; the funds simply cannot be moved, transferred, altered, used or accessed.

The French courts have given that definition its sharpest expression in a sanctions case that every Paris practitioner knows. In its judgment of 5 February 2026 concerning the Libyan Investment Authority, the Second Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation restated the EU definition word for word: « gel des fonds », toute action visant à empêcher tout mouvement, transfert, modification, utilisation ou manipulation de fonds ou tout accès à ceux-ci qui aurait pour conséquence une modification de leur volume, de leur montant, de leur localisation, de leur propriété, de leur possession, de leur nature, de leur destination ou toute autre modification qui pourrait en permettre l’utilisation, y compris la gestion de portefeuilles. That ruling, appeal No. X 23-15.936, is published at the Court of Cassation and it governs any frozen asset sitting in France, Russian or otherwise.

Frozen does not mean sterile. Since October 2024, the European Union, acting with the G7, has been transferring the windfall profits generated by the immobilised Russian assets — the interest and returns accruing inside Euroclear — to Ukraine. The principal stays frozen; the profits flow to Kyiv. The Union disbursed a first €3.9 billion payment for drones and air defence in June 2026, followed by €4.6 billion through July, and EU capitals gave the green light in early September for a further €4.7 billion tranche earmarked for Patriot air defence systems. When commentators say Europe is already spending Russia’s money, this is what they mean — and when Moscow cries confiscation, this is the exhibit it points to.

In December 2025, EU governments agreed to immobilise the Russian assets indefinitely, removing the need to renew the freeze by unanimous vote every six months and locking the stock in place while the lawyers argue. That decision is the foundation of everything debated today: as long as the assets are immobilised at EU level, no single member state can quietly release them, and any use of the principal requires a new legal act that survives judicial review in Luxembourg.

France applies this European freeze through its own national machinery, and the French layer matters because it is the one a company or individual actually meets. Under Article L. 562-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code, available on Légifrance, Le ministre chargé de l’économie peut décider, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques belonging to persons designated under Chapter VII resolutions of the United Nations Charter or acts adopted under Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union. The parallel Article L. 562-2, also on Légifrance, gives the Minister for the Economy acting jointly with the Minister of the Interior the same six-month renewable power for terrorism-related freezes: Le ministre chargé de l’économie et le ministre de l’intérieur peuvent décider, conjointement, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques. And Article L. 562-4, published on Légifrance, turns every bank, insurer, notary and company operating in France into an enforcement agent: Sont tenus d’appliquer sans délai les mesures de gel et les interdictions de mise à disposition ou d’utilisation prévues au présent chapitre, and to inform the Minister for the Economy immediately. A French bank that releases frozen funds without a licence commits an offence; a French bank that blocks funds under a live EU listing is performing a legal duty, and no customer claim for breach of contract will survive that duty.

The result is a three-layer wall around the €210 billion: the EU regulation that designates and freezes, the French ministerial and administrative apparatus that executes and licenses, and the criminal prohibition on circumvention that punishes anyone who drills through the wall. Understanding which layer applies to your situation is the whole of the advice that follows.

B. Can the EU Turn Frozen Billions Into a Reparations Loan for Ukraine?

By October 2025, with Ukraine’s financing needs exploding, EU leaders were discussing a €140 billion loan to Kyiv for 2026 and 2027 backed by the frozen Russian assets. The proposed structure was called a reparations loan: Ukraine would receive the money now and would only have to repay it if Russia one day paid war reparations — which, in substance, means Ukraine keeps the money unless Moscow pays for the destruction itself. The design was deliberate. An outright confiscation of central bank reserves would collide head-on with the international law of state immunity; a loan collateralised or repaid from frozen assets looks, to its architects, like a use of the assets without a transfer of title.

Belgium blocked the elegant theory with a practical objection. Euroclear, the Brussels depository holding most of the frozen stock, is a Belgian company subject to Belgian courts. If Russia obtains a Moscow judgment against Euroclear — which is exactly what the Central Bank of Russia is now seeking — and then enforces it against Euroclear assets worldwide, Belgium fears it will be left alone with the bill. Brussels argued the scheme was contrary to international law and exposed the depository to severe Russian legal retaliation and financial risk. When EU leaders failed to agree, a Plan B emerged: a €90 billion fund backed by joint EU borrowing instead of Russian money. That fund was supposed to cover both 2026 and 2027; within months it began to look insufficient, prompting calls for Canada and Japan to step in from 2027 and reviving the frozen-assets debate with a vengeance.

The debate returned in force in recent weeks. Several member states, including Poland, Spain, the Netherlands and Sweden, together with Members of the European Parliament, called on the Commission to revisit the use of the Central Bank of Russia’s assets. In August 2026, three former senior officials proposed in the German press transferring the frozen accounts from Euroclear to a new EU instrument that would act as custodian and shoulder all legal obligations toward the Central Bank of Russia, shielding Belgium from standalone liability. On 10 September 2026, the cross-party MEP letter put the legal hook on the table: The immobilised Russian accounts should be transferred to a new EU instrument acting as a custodian and shouldering all legal obligations to the Central Bank of Russia. This is a decision that can be taken under Article 122(1) TFEU and must be considered urgently. Article 122(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union allows the Council, on a Commission proposal, to decide measures appropriate to the economic situation in a spirit of solidarity — the same emergency basis once used for pandemic-era instruments.

Two rival claimants complicate the picture. Under a 28-point peace plan developed in 2025 without Ukrainian or European participation, Washington proposed that $100 billion of the frozen assets be invested in Ukraine’s reconstruction under American control, with half the profits flowing to the United States and the remainder funding joint Russian-American projects. Last week, the American president added that Europeans should repay all United States aid granted to Ukraine under the previous administration. Using the assets now would give Kyiv a lifeline, but it would also remove the single largest piece of leverage Europe holds for any future negotiation — and hand Moscow and Washington a grievance in return.

Legal experts warn of three concrete risks that no political communiqué can wish away. First, litigation: Russia will sue wherever it can — Moscow against Euroclear today, potentially investment arbitration or friendly jurisdictions tomorrow — and any EU vehicle will inherit the defendant seat. Second, monetary stability: central banks around the world hold reserves in euros on the assumption that sovereign assets are untouchable; a confiscation, however dressed, teaches them otherwise. Third, reciprocity: European sovereign and commercial assets in Russia and allied jurisdictions become hostages the moment Europe crosses the line from freezing to taking. The Commission’s lawyers know the difference between immobilisation, use of windfall profits, collateralisation and confiscation, and each step up that ladder multiplies the exposure. What Brussels decides this autumn will be litigated in Luxembourg, and possibly in Paris, for a decade.

II. Can You Challenge the Freeze or Seize Frozen Assets Before the French Courts?

A. How Do You Contest an EU Listing or a French Freeze Order in Practice?

The first question clients ask in Paris is the simplest: my accounts are blocked, what do I file and where? The answer depends on which layer froze you. If your name appears in an annex to Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 or the Russia sectoral regulations, the listing is an EU act and the annulment action belongs in Luxembourg before the General Court, within two months of notification or publication. If you are hit by a French national freeze order under Article L. 562-2 or L. 562-3, the challenge runs through the French administrative courts against the ministerial decision. Confusing the two routes wastes the two-month Luxembourg deadline, which is the most common and most expensive mistake in this field.

Luxembourg will annul a listing, but only for defects it can verify on the file before it. On 16 September 2026, the General Court issued two same-day judgments that Paris sanctions lawyers now cite as a pair: it dismissed every plea in Trotsenko v Council, upholding the listing of a businessman presented as a leading operator in coal, energy and infrastructure even after a claimed divestment, while in Gagarina v Council it annulled the March 2025 and September 2025 maintenance acts against singer Polina Gagarina because the Council had recycled stale concert evidence. Our analysis of that split, published here, draws the operational lesson: sectoral revenue reasoning survives a paper divestment, while a listing renewed on unchanged facts dies. A second companion ruling on Roman Abramovich’s listing, analysed here, confirms that Luxembourg tests each maintenance act against fresh evidence. Anyone considering an action should read those three decisions before spending a euro on fees.

Ownership and control is the battlefield where most individual cases are won or lost. The Council presumes that a person who owns or controls more than 50 percent of an entity controls its funds, and it freezes the entity on that basis; conversely, it treats assets held through family members, trusts and nominees as the listed person’s own where control is shown. In June 2026, the Court of Justice clarified the ownership and control criteria for the Russia asset-freeze measures in the trusts context, confirming that trust structures do not shield assets where effective control is established. Our companion guide on rebutting the 50 percent control presumption sets out the documentary programme that actually moves a file: audited divestment deeds, resignation records, bank mandates withdrawn, trustee independence proven by conduct rather than paper. Assertions do not rebut presumptions; contemporaneous documents do.

In France, the parallel track is the Treasury licence. The Directorate General of the Treasury is the competent national authority for authorising the release of frozen funds for basic needs, legal fees, asset maintenance and, where the regulation allows, satisfaction of pre-designation contractual obligations. The Court of Cassation made the hierarchy brutally clear in the Libyan Investment Authority case decided 5 February 2026: il découle du principe de primauté du droit de l’Union sur le droit national que l’autorisation administrative doit précéder celle du juge de l’exécution, so that an enforcement judge who authorised a seizure over frozen funds without the creditor showing Treasury authorisation would violate Regulation (EU) 2016/44. In that case the Paris enforcement judge had first authorised a garnishment at Société Générale over sums held for the Libyan Investment Authority, retracted it, and the Court of Cassation upheld the retraction: la cour d’appel a exactement déduit qu’en l’absence d’autorisation délivrée par la direction générale du Trésor, le juge de l’exécution ne pouvait autoriser la société [T] à pratiquer une mesure de saisie-attribution sur les biens gelés. File the Treasury request first, frame it inside the exact derogation paragraph of the applicable regulation, and only then approach the judge. Reversing the order loses the case.

The deepest precedent on how French courts handle a listed bank’s own challenge remains the Bank Sepah saga. The Iranian bank, designated under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1747 (2007) — the Court recalled that the Council a identifié la société Bank Sepah (la banque Sepah) comme faisant partie des « entités concourant au programme nucléaire ou de missiles balistiques » de l’Iran auxquelles devait s’appliquer la mesure de gel des avoirs — fought its creditors through the Paris courts for years. On 10 July 2020, the Court of Cassation sitting in plenary assembly, appeals Nos. B 18-18.542 and G 18-21.814, stayed proceedings and referred questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union on the interplay between the EU freeze and creditors’ enforcement rights. The full ruling is published at the Court of Cassation. The lesson for Russian-asset files is direct: when a French enforcement measure meets an EU freeze, the Paris judge does not improvise — the judge applies the regulation, seeks the Treasury authorisation, and where the regulation is ambiguous, asks Luxembourg.

B. Can a Creditor Seize Frozen Russian State Assets Before a French Court?

Creditors holding judgments or arbitral awards against Russia — from Yukos-era awards to more recent commercial and treaty claims — regularly ask whether the €210 billion immobilised in Europe, or the smaller pool of Russian state-linked funds sitting in Paris banks, can be seized in France. The short answer is that two cumulative walls protect sovereign assets in France, and a creditor must climb both: the immunity wall and the freeze wall. Clearing one while ignoring the other produces exactly the kind of annulled seizure the Court of Cassation has been striking down for a decade.

The immunity wall is statutory since the 2016 reform. Article L. 111-1-1 of the Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures, on Légifrance, states the rule: Des mesures conservatoires ou des mesures d’exécution forcée ne peuvent être mises en œuvre sur un bien appartenant à un Etat étranger que sur autorisation préalable du juge par ordonnance rendue sur requête. No prior judicial authorisation, no valid measure — the seizure is void from the start. Article L. 111-1-2, on Légifrance, then lists the only three doors through the wall: L’Etat concerné a expressément consenti à l’application d’une telle mesure, or the state earmarked the asset for the claim, or a judgment or award was rendered against the state and the targeted asset is specifically used for non-public commercial purposes with a link to the entity sued. Central bank reserves used for sovereign monetary functions do not pass the third door. And Article L. 111-1-3, on Légifrance, locks diplomatic property absolutely: Des mesures conservatoires ou des mesures d’exécution forcée ne peuvent être mises en œuvre sur les biens, y compris les comptes bancaires, utilisés ou destinés à être utilisés dans l’exercice des fonctions de la mission diplomatique des Etats étrangers ou de leurs postes consulaires, de leurs missions spéciales ou de leurs missions auprès des organisations internationales qu’en cas de renonciation expresse et spéciale des Etats concernés.

The Court of Cassation polices these doors strictly, and its Congo and Iraq rulings are the ones Paris judges quote back at creditors. In the Commisimpex litigation against the Republic of Congo, decided 12 May 2021, appeal No. A 19-13.853, published here, the First Civil Chamber framed the analysis through les règles du droit international coutumier relatives aux immunités d’exécution des États et des personnes publiques étrangères, and upheld the finding that a exactement retenu que l’insaisissabilité édictée par l’article L. 153-1 du code monétaire et financier n’apportait pas, au regard du but poursuivi, une atteinte disproportionnée aux droits garantis par les textes conventionnels précités. Immunity, in other words, limits the right of access to a court without violating it, provided the limitation stays within generally recognised international law. In the Rasheed Bank case decided 3 November 2021, appeal No. F 19-25.404, published here — where the Iraqi bank challenged a Paris Court of Appeal ruling in its dispute with Citibank, the bank having formé le pourvoi n° F 19-25.404 contre l’arrêt rendu le 17 octobre 2019 par la cour d’appel de Paris — the same chamber confirmed the protective approach to state-linked bank accounts. A creditor reading these decisions understands the message: French courts will not turn immunity into an empty word to satisfy an award, however legitimate the underlying claim.

The freeze wall then finishes what immunity starts. Even where a creditor identifies a genuinely commercial asset of the Russian state sitting with a Paris bank — the rare file where the immunity doors might open — the EU freeze prohibits any movement of the funds, and the February 2026 Libyan Investment Authority ruling requires Treasury authorisation before any enforcement judge may act. The regulation’s annex VI mechanism, which the Court quoted — tous les fonds et ressources économiques qui appartiennent aux entités énumérées à l’annexe VI, parmi lesquelles figure la LIA, ou que celles-ci avaient en leur possession, détenaient ou contrôlaient à la date du 16 septembre 2011 et qui se trouvaient en dehors de Libye à cette date, restent gelés — has its direct equivalent in the Russia regulations’ annexes. A saisie-attribution served on frozen funds without the derogation authorisation is not merely ineffective; it is unlawful under EU law, and the judge who grants it violates the regulation.

Does Moscow’s lawsuit against Euroclear change anything for a Paris file? Not directly, but it signals where the next pressure will land. A Moscow judgment condemning Euroclear cannot be enforced in France against frozen Russian assets without passing the French exequatur filter, the EU freeze and the immunity statutes — three successive refusals in the making. Its real function is leverage: raising the cost for Belgium, complicating the custodian-vehicle project, and giving Russia a retaliation asset if Europe moves from immobilisation to appropriation. Creditors should watch that litigation as a thermometer, not as a door.

The practical sequence for anyone holding a claim against frozen Russian-linked assets in France is therefore fixed: verify the live annex entry and the exact regulation derogation before anything else; apply to the Directorate General of the Treasury with a complete evidentiary file; seek the enforcement judge’s prior authorisation under Article L. 111-1-1 only once the administrative path is documented; and expect the immunity analysis under Article L. 111-1-2 to defeat any attempt against central bank reserves or diplomatic accounts. Skip a step and the seizure dies. Respect the sequence and, at minimum, the file survives to be argued on its merits — which, against a sovereign defendant, is already half the battle.

Conclusion

Europe has frozen €210 billion it does not own, spent the profits, and promised Ukraine a loan secured by assets it cannot lawfully give away without paying a legal price. The September 2026 push for a custodian vehicle under Article 122 TFEU, the €90 billion borrowing fund already straining, the Moscow lawsuit against Euroclear and the American claim on $100 billion of the stock all point to the same autumn: the political decision will come first and the litigation will last a decade. Immobilisation was the easy part because every capital agreed not to move. Everything after immobilisation — profits, loans, collateral, confiscation — divides owners, custodians, beneficiaries and courts.

France will be one of the courtrooms where that decade is argued. The French statutes give no shortcut: ministerial freezes last six months and renew, banks must block without delay, sovereign assets need a judge’s prior order plus one of three narrow doors, diplomatic property needs an express and special waiver, and frozen funds need the Treasury before the judge. The Court of Cassation has said each of those propositions in terms, from the 2020 plenary reference in Bank Sepah to the February 2026 Libyan Investment Authority ruling that put the Treasury first. Listed persons should challenge live acts in Luxembourg on fresh evidence, counterparties should license before they move, and creditors should stop serving seizures on frozen central bank money as if the freeze were decoration. In Paris, procedure is substance — and the file that respects the sequence is the file that survives.

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