On 8 October 2026, the Council of the European Union decided to prolong individual restrictive measures against those responsible for Russia’s destabilising actions abroad by one year, until 9 October 2027, in light of Russia’s continued and intensified hybrid activities, including Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) against the EU and its member states and partners. The figures give the measure of the regime: 80 individuals and 20 entities are currently listed. Those listed are subject to an asset freeze, and EU citizens and companies are forbidden from making funds, financial assets or economic resources available to them, while listed natural persons also face a travel ban that prohibits them from entering or transiting through EU territories.
For readers in London, New York, Geneva or Dubai who hold assets, accounts or enforcement proceedings in France, this one-year extension is not a routine rollover. France is one of the places where European freezes bite hardest: bank accounts in Paris, real estate on the Riviera, arbitration awards brought for enforcement before the Paris courts. And French judges have spent the last five years building a dense body of case law on exactly what a freeze blocks, who can authorise a release, and what happens to creditors who try to enforce against frozen funds. The Paris Administrative Court of Appeal ruled on 23 May 2025 that an authorisation to release frozen Libyan funds is a mandatory precondition for any enforcement measure, and the Second Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation confirmed the same line on 5 February 2026.
This article explains what the 8 October 2026 extension changes in practice, how a European freeze operates once it reaches French territory, and the two battlefields on which a listed person or an affected third party can fight back: in Luxembourg, against the listing itself, and in Paris, for the release of specific funds. The reasoning follows the texts and the judgments, with the exact references an international practitioner needs to act within the deadlines.
I. The 8 October 2026 Extension: What the Hybrid Sanctions Regime Now Covers
A. Why the Council Extended the Freeze Until 9 October 2027
The framework for restrictive measures in response to Russia’s destabilising actions was set up on 8 October 2024 by Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities, and it targets those engaged in actions and policies attributable to the government of the Russian Federation which undermine the fundamental values of the EU and its member states, their security, stability, independence and integrity, including hybrid activities directed against third countries and international organisations. The 8 October 2026 Council decision prolonging the regime extends it for twelve months. The mechanism is built into the founding act itself: Article 10 of Decision 2024/2643 provides that this Decision shall be kept under constant review and that it shall be renewed or amended, as appropriate, if the Council deems that its objectives have not been met. A prolongation is therefore a fresh legal act, adopted because the Council considers the objectives unmet, and each prolongation restarts the clock for judicial challenge.
The political context stated by the institutions matters because it shapes how courts read the listings. In its conclusions of 18 and 19 June 2026, the European Council condemned all recent hybrid attacks against the Union and its member states and, in light of persistent hybrid campaigns by hostile actors, notably Russia and Belarus, called for increased and urgent efforts to strengthen resilience, enhance preparedness, protect critical infrastructure, and prevent, deter and respond to hybrid attacks. The October prolongation expressly invokes intensified Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference. For a listed person preparing a challenge, this context cuts both ways: it confirms that the Council will defend listings with broad security reasoning, but it also means each statement of reasons must still connect the individual to specific conduct, as the EU courts have required since the Kadi saga.
The listing criteria in Article 1 of Decision 2024/2643 are deliberately wide. Member States must refuse entry or transit to natural persons who are responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefiting from, involved in or facilitating actions attributable to the Russian government which undermine democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, in a Member State, in an international organisation or in a third country. The covered conduct ranges from obstructing elections and facilitating violent demonstrations to silencing critics, information manipulation and interference, sabotage or malicious cyber activities against critical infrastructure including submarine infrastructure, the instrumentalisation of migrants, and the exploitation of armed conflict or instability in third countries. Associated persons and those supporting them can be listed too. Article 2 mirrors this architecture for the financial side: all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by such persons, entities or bodies shall be frozen. Two companion provisions complete the picture for practitioners. Article 7 bars the satisfaction of claims connected with contracts affected by the measures when brought by listed persons or those acting for them, while expressly preserving, in Article 7(3), the right to judicial review of the legality of the non-performance of contractual obligations in accordance with this Decision. Article 8 prohibits participating, knowingly or intentionally, in activities the object or effect of which is to circumvent the prohibitions, including participating without deliberately seeking that effect but while aware of it and accepting the possibility. The practical message for banks, trustees, lawyers and business partners in Paris is blunt: the extension keeps 100 designations alive for another year, and working around them exposes the intermediary as much as the listed person.
B. What a European Freeze Means in Practice for Assets Held in France
EU freezing regulations apply directly in France, but it is French domestic law that organises enforcement, designates the competent authority, and punishes violations. The backbone is Chapter II of Title VI of the Monetary and Financial Code, starting with Article L.562-3, under which the minister for the economy may order, for six months renewable, the freezing of funds and economic resources belonging to, possessed, held or controlled by persons designated under Chapter VII resolutions of the United Nations or acts adopted under Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union or Article 75 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The definitions in Article L.562-1 align French concepts of funds and resources with the European regulations, so that a bank compliance officer in Paris works with a single vocabulary from the Official Journal to the domestic statute.
The enforcement duty is sweeping. Under Article L.562-4, all natural persons on national territory and the entities listed in Article L.561-2, as well as any legal person established under French law or carrying out operations in France, are required to apply freeze measures and making-available prohibitions without delay and to inform the minister for the economy immediately. The obligation follows French companies abroad, including branches and other forms of establishment, and catches foreign companies for their activities in France. The mirror prohibition is in Article L.562-5: the persons bound by Article L.562-4 are forbidden from making available, directly or indirectly, or using funds or economic resources for the benefit of persons whose assets are frozen. Banks must therefore freeze first and ask questions later, then report. The reporting channel is detailed in Article R.562-3, which requires informing the minister for the economy of frozen funds, of any credit to a frozen account, and of any operation suspected of breaching a freeze or a making-available ban, as well as of the implementation of any release authorisation. Regulated entities must also maintain internal organisations capable of applying freezes without delay, with trained staff and adequate resources, under Article R.562-1. For an international client discovering that a Paris account is blocked, this architecture explains the first shock: the bank had no discretion, the freeze was automatic, and the file is already with the Directorate General of the Treasury.
Evading a freeze is a criminal offence in France, and the courts apply it. Article L.574-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code punishes with the penalties of Article L.542-1 of the Customs Code any bound person, manager or employee, and any person subject to a freeze or prohibition measure, who evades the resulting obligations or obstructs their implementation. On 29 November 2023, the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation, appeal No. 22-85.867, ruled on exactly this offence. Two men, respectively president and secretary of associations dissolved in March 2019 as vectors of hateful ideology and apology of terrorism, had their bank assets frozen by four joint orders of the finance and interior ministers taken under Article L.562-2 for successive six-month periods between 2 October 2018 and 18 April 2021. Convicted by the criminal court for evading counter-terrorism asset freezes, they saw one appeal rejected outright while the other obtained only a partial cassation limited to confiscation and the customs fine, with all other provisions expressly maintained, as the published decision records. The lesson for anyone tempted to move funds through intermediaries after the October 2026 extension is clear: French criminal courts treat evasion as a serious standalone offence, investigated by customs officers whose competence the Court of Cassation upheld, and Article 8 of Decision 2024/2643 adds a European circumvention prohibition on top of the domestic one.
Creditors face a different wall. A freeze is not a seizure: it immobilises without transferring, and it does not create any priority among creditors. The Assemblée plénière of the Court of Cassation confronted the collision between enforcement and European freezes on 10 July 2020 in the Bank Sepah case, appeals No. 18-18.542 and 18-21.814, by staying proceedings and referring questions to the Court of Justice, asking in substance whether the Iranian sanctions regulations must be interpreted as precluding, without prior authorisation from the competent national authority, enforcement steps over frozen assets such as judicial securities or protective seizures under the French Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures, in the terms published by the Court. The answer came on 11 November 2021 in case C-340/20: the freezing mechanism precludes protective measures conferring on the creditor a right to be paid by priority over other creditors being taken over frozen funds without prior authorisation, even where such measures do not remove assets from the debtor’s estate, because the importance of the objectives pursued by a restrictive-measures act is capable of justifying negative consequences, even considerable ones, for affected creditors. Any creditor holding a judgment or an arbitral award against a frozen debtor in France must therefore secure the administrative release authorisation before enforcing, not after.
II. How to Challenge a Listing or Unfreeze Assets: the Remedies That Work
A. Attacking the Listing Itself Before the EU Courts in Luxembourg
The first battlefield is the validity of the listing, and European law gives listed persons real weapons. Since the Kadi judgments, the rule is settled: the Courts of the European Union must ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all European Union acts in the light of fundamental rights, including where such acts implement Security Council resolutions, as the Grand Chamber recalled in Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P, Commission and Others v Kadi, 18 July 2013. Effectiveness of judicial review means, in the Court’s own words, that the competent European Union authority is bound to communicate the grounds for the contested listing decision to the person concerned and to provide that person with the opportunity to be heard in that regard. A listing whose statement of reasons is vague, outdated, or disconnected from the person’s actual conduct is therefore vulnerable, and the Council knows it: this is why recent practice shows delistings alongside extensions, with the broader Russia framework itself illustrating that a prolonged regime and individual removals can coexist, a dynamic analysed in this firm’s review of how sanctions interact with arbitration awards enforced in France.
Jurisdiction is not in doubt, even though sanctions originate in foreign and security policy. In Case C-72/15, Rosneft, Grand Chamber, 28 March 2017, the Court held that the Court of Justice of the European Union has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings, under Article 267 TFEU, on the validity of an act adopted on the basis of provisions relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy, such as the Russia restrictive-measures decisions, provided the request relates to monitoring compliance with Article 40 TEU or to reviewing the legality of restrictive measures against natural or legal persons. Combined with Article 275 TFEU, this means the General Court hears direct actions for annulment of listings, and national courts such as those in Paris can refer validity questions to Luxembourg. For hybrid-regime listings under Decision 2024/2643, which rest on conduct assessments like disinformation or support activities rather than on criminal convictions, the Rosneft opening is strategically important: a French court seized of a release or enforcement dispute can question the validity of the underlying listing itself.
In practice, a challenge runs on two tracks. The administrative track is a reasoned request to the Council for re-examination, invoking new facts, the end of the conduct alleged, factual errors in the statement of reasons, or disproportionality, and demanding disclosure of the grounds and an opportunity to be heard before the next review. The judicial track is an action for annulment before the General Court under Article 263 TFEU, which must be instituted within two months of the publication of the measure, or of its notification to the plaintiff, or, in the absence thereof, of the day on which it came to the knowledge of the latter. Because the 8 October 2026 prolongation is itself a reviewable act that keeps each of the 100 designations alive until 9 October 2027, it opens a fresh two-month window to contest the continued listing, including on the ground that the Council merely rolled the designation over without verifying that the conditions are still met. Interim relief suspending the freeze pending judgment is theoretically available but granted only on urgency and a prima facie case, so experienced counsel file the annulment action first and treat suspension as a bonus, never as the plan. Evidence is everything: proof that the alleged functions ended, that shareholdings were divested, that the person resigned from the entities cited, or that the statement of reasons recycles press allegations without individualised findings.
B. Seeking Release of Frozen Funds Through the French Authorities and Courts
The second battlefield is Paris, and its leading recent authority is the judgment of the Paris Administrative Court of Appeal of 23 May 2025, No. 23PA02683, a textbook illustration of how French judges handle frozen funds. A Kuwaiti company held an arbitral award of 936,940,000 US dollars plus 4 percent interest against the Libyan government, declared enforceable in France in 2013 and confirmed on appeal and before the Court of Cassation in 2016. Trying to enforce against funds held in a Societe Generale account by the Libyan Investment Authority, frozen under the Libya sanctions regime established by UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) and implemented by Council Regulation (EU) 204/2011, later replaced by Regulation (EU) 2016/44 of 18 January 2016, it asked the Directorate General of the Treasury to release the funds. The refusal of 17 January 2020, confirmed on administrative appeals on 30 July 2020 and upheld by the Paris Administrative Tribunal on 14 April 2023, went to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed the entire claim in the decision published on Legifrance.
Three holdings of that judgment govern every release file in France. First, competence: it follows from Articles L.562-3 and L.562-11 of the Monetary and Financial Code that only the minister for the economy may decide freezes resulting from a United Nations resolution or an act under Article 75 TFEU and authorise the release of frozen funds, so the interior minister was put out of the case. A request sent to the wrong authority is a request lost. Second, sequencing: the Court held that the release authorisation that may be granted by the Director General of the Treasury is necessarily a mandatory precondition for implementing any forced enforcement measure, including seizures for payment. Enforcement first, authorisation later is legally impossible. Third, substance: Article 11(2) of Regulation 2016/44 allows release only where a payment is due under a contract concluded or an obligation incurred by the designated person before designation, where the payment breaches neither the freeze nor benefits a covered entity, and where the Sanctions Committee was notified ten working days in advance. Because the investment authority had never signed the 2006 tourism contract, had been expressly cleared in the 2013 award, and owed the claimant nothing, the derogation failed, and the Court added that the authority’s qualification as an emanation of the Libyan State by the civil enforcement courts had no bearing on decisions taken under the European regulation, which pursue different objectives. Creditors should read this twice: winning the immunity battle before the enforcement judge does not win the sanctions battle before the Treasury.
The civil courts march in step. On 5 February 2026, the Second Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation, appeal No. 23-15.936, rejected the appeal brought by the same Kuwaiti company against the Paris Court of Appeal’s judgment of 2 February 2023 in its dispute with the Libyan Investment Authority, closing the civil enforcement route consistently with the administrative courts, as the published rejection shows. On the national-freeze side, the Paris Administrative Court of Appeal confirmed the administration’s margin on renewals: on 17 May 2023, ruling on a six-month ministerial freeze renewed against an individual, it set aside the tribunal judgment that had annulled the order and rejected the individual’s claim with costs consequences for him, in the published judgment. A renewal stands where the statutory conditions continue to be met, and the freeze, once renewed across successive semesters, can immobilise assets for years while the listed person exhausts remedies.
The operational checklist for anyone affected by the extended hybrid regime therefore runs as follows. Identify the exact legal basis of the freeze: a European listing under Decision 2024/2643 and its implementing regulation, a national order under Article L.562-3, or both, because the competent authority and the derogations differ. Apply for a tailored release authorisation: under Article L.562-11, the minister for the economy may authorise the release of part of frozen funds where their use is compatible with public order and with the decisions and acts behind the freeze, at his initiative or on request by any targeted person or any third party able to claim an interest, and the European regulations contain parallel humanitarian, legal-fees and pre-existing-contract exceptions implemented through the Treasury. Challenge a refusal before the Paris Administrative Tribunal, then the Paris Administrative Court of Appeal, attacking competence, reasoning and proportionality, and request a preliminary reference to Luxembourg where the validity of the European act is genuinely doubtful. And while the file is pending, move nothing: as the 2023 criminal judgment recalls, evasion turns a financial problem into a criminal one.
Conclusion
The Council’s 8 October 2026 decision keeps the hybrid sanctions machine running until 9 October 2027, with 100 designations, an asset freeze, a travel ban, a no-claims rule and a circumvention prohibition that together close nearly every informal exit. But a prolonged regime is not an unchallengeable one. Each renewal is a reviewable act: in Luxembourg, the Kadi and Rosneft case law guarantees full review, reasons and a hearing, and the two-month annulment window reopened by the October prolongation rewards those who document change rather than those who protest in general terms. In Paris, the Treasury holds the keys to any release, the administrative courts control its refusals strictly but upheld them where the derogation conditions failed, and the criminal courts punish evasion severely. For listed persons, creditors and intermediaries with a French nexus, the method is therefore fixed: diagnose the legal basis within days, file the release request and the Luxembourg action within weeks, and enforce nothing without the prior authorisation the courts unanimously require.