On Monday 15 September 2026, the European Union’s Russia sanctions were supposed to roll over for another six months. They did not. Ambassadors of the 27 Member States met, failed to agree, and instead pushed the deadline back by one week, to midnight on 22 September 2026. Some 3,000 individuals and companies listed under the EU’s individual sanctions regime went to bed that night with their funds still frozen, but with the legal basis for that freeze hanging on a seven-day political truce. Behind the deadlock stand two names that every sanctions lawyer in Paris knows by heart: Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman. Slovakia is demanding that both men be taken off the EU list, and France, according to reporting by Politico relayed on 19 September 2026, has backed the removal of Mr Usmanov. For anyone holding a frozen bank account in France, for any creditor chasing assets in Paris, and for any compliance officer wondering what to do during a week when the sanctions could technically lapse, this article explains what happened in Brussels, what French law requires right now, and what the two opposite courtroom fates of Mr Usmanov and Mr Fridman in Luxembourg teach about getting off the list.
I. EU Russia Sanctions Almost Expired on 15 September: Inside the Seven-Day Extension to 22 September
A. Why 27 capitals failed to agree: Usmanov, Fridman and the unanimity lock
The EU’s individual sanctions against Russia, adopted under Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, must be renewed by unanimous agreement of all 27 Member States, as the specialist press recalled again this year: sanctions must be approved by all 27 member states, which gives every capital a veto over the whole package. That veto was used. According to Politico reporting relayed on 19 September 2026 and citing EU sources, Slovakia demanded that two wealthy Russian businessmen, Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman, be removed from the EU sanctions list before it would agree to the rollover. France, the same reporting says, has backed Mr Usmanov’s removal from the list. A French diplomat is quoted as explaining that Paris had its own national security considerations regarding Mr Usmanov and intended to respond positively to requests from international partners who had approached France on the matter. Other Member States were unwilling to consider the requests, particularly amid an intensification of Russian missile and drone attacks against civilian targets in Ukraine, with one unnamed diplomat telling Politico that the proposal was difficult to reconcile with growing hybrid threats and Russian drone activity close to Poland’s border.
The numbers at stake are large. The September reporting puts the regime at around 3,000 individuals and companies subject to asset freezes. When the Council last renewed the individual listings in March 2026, the package covered the persons and entities linked to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as announced in the Council press release of 14 March 2026. The one-week extension was confirmed by sanctions monitors on 16 September 2026: the EU extended the deadline to renew the financial sanctions on persons and entities designated under Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, the text that the EU renews every six months. Ambassadors therefore agreed to extend the deadline by one week to give Member States more time, with the new deadline set at midnight on 22 September. Readers who want the background on that expiry mechanics can also read our earlier analysis of what the 22 September expiry means for banks and frozen accounts in France.
Two points matter for practitioners. First, a technical rollover of a few days does not suspend the freeze: EU restrictive measures remain in force until a new expiry date is set, and French banks, notaries and insurers keep applying them without interruption, as French law obliges them to do. Second, delisting demands made in the Council chamber do not delist anyone by themselves. Removing Mr Usmanov or Mr Fridman requires a new unanimous Council act amending the list annexes; until that act is adopted and published in the Official Journal, every listing stays fully effective, and every circumvention remains punishable. The week of 15 to 22 September is therefore not a sanctions holiday. It is a week of maximum legal risk, because some operators wrongly assume that a missed deadline means the freeze has lapsed.
B. Six months or twelve: the renewal-length fight behind the one-week bridge
The Member States are also divided over the length of the proposed extension. Since 2014, the measures have traditionally been renewed for either six or 12 months, while Slovakia is reportedly unwilling to support a one-year extension, according to the same September reporting. The length of the renewal is not a technical detail. A twelve-month extension would lock the listings, including any contested names, in place for a full year and deprive delisting bargains of their leverage. A six-month extension preserves the six-monthly unanimity ritual, and with it the next opportunity for a capital to demand a name in exchange for its vote. That is exactly what happened in March 2026, when Budapest and Bratislava sought the removal of Mr Usmanov and Mr Fridman, although both ultimately remained on the sanctions list, as three EU diplomats told Euractiv at the time.
The broader package context makes the unanimity fight sharper. The bloc’s 20th sanctions package remains blocked: AP reported that EU foreign ministers failed on Monday to adopt new sanctions after objections from Hungary, with foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas calling the outcome a setback the bloc did not want to send, and Hungary’s Viktor Orban and Slovakia’s Robert Fico want Kyiv to reopen the Druzhba pipeline, which carries Russian oil to the two landlocked countries via Ukraine, before greenlighting new measures, Euractiv reported. The Commission had pitched the package with a ban on providing maritime services such as insurance to Russian oil tankers and measures targeting the shadow fleet. None of that moves while the renewal itself is hostage to individual delisting demands. For French businesses, the lesson is plain: each six-month renewal is a political negotiation in which individual names are bargaining chips, and the list you check today may not be the list in force next week. Compliance screening must therefore be dated, sourced to the Official Journal consolidated version, and re-run after every Council decision, including short technical rollovers that quietly keep old listings alive or suddenly drop a name.
II. Frozen Account in France During the Truce Week: Banks, Courts and the Road to Delisting
A. What French banks and listed persons must do while Brussels negotiates
French law leaves no room for a wait-and-see attitude during the truce week. Where an EU restrictive measure freezes funds, every person on French territory must apply it immediately, and the criminal courts punish circumvention severely, including through accounts opened abroad. Three provisions of the Code monétaire et financier frame the whole situation. First, Article L. 562-3 of the Code monétaire et financier provides, in its wording in force: “Le ministre chargé de l’économie peut décider, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques : 1° Qui appartiennent à, sont possédés, détenus ou contrôlés par des personnes physiques ou morales, ou toute autre entité qui commettent, tentent de commettre, facilitent ou financent des actions sanctionnées ou prohibées par les résolutions adoptées dans le cadre du chapitre VII de la charte des Nations unies ou les actes pris en application de l’article 29 du traité sur l’Union européenne ou de l’article 75 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne, y participent ou qui sont désignées sur le fondement de ces résolutions ou ces actes ; 2° Qui appartiennent à, sont possédés, détenus ou contrôlés par des personnes morales ou toute autre entité elles-mêmes détenues ou contrôlées par les personnes mentionnées au 1° ou agissant sciemment pour le compte ou sur instructions de celles-ci.” In other words, both UN Chapter VII resolutions and EU Article 29 acts, which include the Russia decisions, feed directly into the French freezing machinery.
Second, Article L. 562-4 of the same Code states: “Sont tenus d’appliquer sans délai les mesures de gel et les interdictions de mise à disposition ou d’utilisation prévues au présent chapitre et aux articles L. 712-4 et L. 712-10 et d’en informer immédiatement le ministre chargé de l’économie : 1° Toute personne physique, ressortissante nationale ou ressortissante étrangère se trouvant sur le territoire national ; 2° Les personnes mentionnées à l’article L. 561-2 ainsi que toute autre personne morale constituée ou établie selon le droit national ou réalisant une opération sur le territoire national, dans le cadre de son activité”. A French bank that holds an account in the name of a listed person must therefore keep the freeze applied through 22 September and beyond, inform the Minister for the Economy, and refuse any release without an administrative authorization. A bank that releases funds during the truce week on the theory that the sanctions have lapsed exposes its officers to prosecution.
Third, circumvention is a criminal offence. Article L. 574-3 of the Code monétaire et financier provides: “Est puni des peines prévues au 1 de l’ article L. 542-1 du code des douanes le fait, pour les personnes mentionnés à l’ article L. 562-4 , leurs dirigeants ou leurs préposés et, pour les personnes faisant l’objet d’une mesure de gel ou d’interdiction prise en application du chapitre II du titre VI du présent livre, de se soustraire aux obligations en résultant ou de faire obstacle à sa mise en oeuvre.” The Cour de cassation gave this text its full force in a leading judgment, Criminal Chamber, 29 November 2023, appeal No. 22-85.867, published in the Bulletin. The case concerned the president and the secretary of two associations dissolved in March 2019, whose bank assets had been frozen by four joint ministerial orders taken between 2 October 2018 and 18 April 2021. Each man had opened an account with a German neo-bank on 7 and 10 April 2019, just after the first freeze expired, and used those foreign accounts mostly during the freeze periods. The Court of Appeal of Douai convicted them of evading the freeze, and the Cour de cassation upheld the guilty verdicts, quashing the Douai ruling only on the customs fine and confiscation imposed on one of the defendants.
Three holdings of that judgment matter directly for listed persons tempted to move money during the sanctions truce. The Court first recalled, in its judgment of 29 November 2023, the legal definition of freezing: “selon le 5° de l’article L. 562-1 du code monétaire et financier, le gel des fonds est défini comme toute action tendant à empêcher un changement de leur volume, montant, localisation, propriété, possession, nature, destination ou toute autre modification qui pourrait permettre leur utilisation, notamment la gestion de portefeuille.” It drew the consequence: “Il résulte donc de l’article L. 574-3 du même code une obligation pour les personnes faisant l’objet d’une mesure de gel de s’abstenir de tout acte visant à se soustraire ou à faire obstacle à une telle action.” Then came the decisive factual assessment: “le seul fait que la cour d’appel ait retenu que les prévenus avaient ouvert des comptes dans une banque étrangère, juste après la fin de la première période de gel, afin de pouvoir disposer ensuite de leurs avoirs pendant la période de gel suivante, caractérise leur soustraction à la mesure de gel, la loi n’exigeant en outre aucune dissimulation ou manoeuvre.” Finally, the Court closed the foreign-account loophole: “il ne saurait être déduit de ce que les établissements financiers étrangers n’étaient pas soumis à l’obligation d’appliquer les mesures de gel avant le 6 novembre 2020 que les personnes dont les avoirs avaient alors été gelés pouvaient, sans se rendre coupable du délit prévu par l’article L. 574-3, contourner ces mesures de gel en utilisant un compte bancaire au sein d’un tel établissement.” (The full set of definitions sits in Article L. 562-1 of the Code monétaire et financier.) Transposed to the Russia sanctions, the message is blunt: opening an account outside France, or moving funds during a renewal gap, in order to enjoy frozen assets while listed, is precisely the evasion the criminal law punishes, with no need for the prosecution to prove concealment or trickery.
French law does, however, offer one lawful safety valve for daily life. Article L. 562-11 of the Code monétaire et financier provides: “Le ministre chargé de l’économie peut autoriser le déblocage et la mise à disposition d’une partie des fonds ou ressources économiques faisant l’objet d’une mesure de gel en vertu des articles L. 562-3 , L. 562-3-1 , L. 712-4 ou L. 712-10 ou d’un acte pris en application de l’article 29 du traité sur l’Union européenne ou de l’article 75 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne, si leur utilisation est compatible avec la sauvegarde de l’ordre public et avec les décisions et les actes à l’origine de la décision de gel.” In practice, a listed person residing in France applies to the Directorate General of the Treasury for a basic-needs authorization covering rent, food, medical care, insurance and legal fees, with supporting documents. The authorization route, not self-help through a foreign account, is the only safe path, and the Cour de cassation itself noted in the 2023 case that the defendants knew they could seek such a Treasury authorization and had even used it, which made their parallel foreign-account scheme look deliberate.
B. Usmanov lost, Fridman won: two Luxembourg rulings that shape every Paris strategy
Slovakia’s demand pairs two men whose courtroom fortunes could hardly be more different, and the contrast dictates litigation strategy. Mr Fridman won a spectacular annulment. By judgments of 10 April 2024 in Cases T-301/22 (Aven v Council) and T-304/22 (Fridman v Council), the General Court of the European Union annulled both the initial listing acts and the acts maintaining the two businessmen on the restrictive-measures lists for the period from 28 February 2022 to 15 March 2023. The Court’s press release explains that, in the judges’ view, none of the reasons given in the initial listing acts was sufficiently substantiated, so keeping the two men on the lists was unjustified, and that for the maintaining acts the Council had produced no evidence beyond what it had already relied on in the initial acts. The release adds the nuance that decided the case: the press release adds the nuance that decided the case: closeness to Mr Putin or his circle may show proximity, but it does not prove support for the policies undermining Ukraine, nor material and financial backing for the decision-makers behind the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine. Proximity to power, in short, is not a listing reason; support for the sanctioned policies must be shown with evidence, and re-listing someone on a copy-pasted file violates the duty to state reasons.
Mr Usmanov, by contrast, lost. The General Court gave judgment on 7 February 2024 in Case T-237/22, Usmanov v Council (ECLI:EU:T:2024:56), examining pleas built on Article 2(1)(a) of Decision 2014/145/CFSP and Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, the statement of reasons, error of assessment, rights of the defence, and the right to property, and the action failed: Mr Usmanov stayed on the list. That is precisely why the current Council bargaining matters so much to him. A man who could not win in court may still be removed by politics, if Slovakia holds its veto and France maintains the support for his delisting reported this week. Conversely, Mr Fridman’s court victory did not end his problems either: the annulment covered only the period from February 2022 to March 2023, and the Council re-listed him on fresh grounds for subsequent periods, which is why Slovakia is now asking for his removal as part of the renewal deal. The Luxembourg lesson for Paris practitioners is therefore double. First, sue each listing period separately and on time, within the two-month time limit, attacking the sufficiency of the evidence for that period, because a 2024 annulment does not vaccinate later acts. Second, run the political and judicial tracks in parallel: Council delisting ends the freeze for the future, while only a court annulment can declare a past listing unlawful and open the road to damages.
While the diplomats bargain, creditors and counterparties in France face a mirror-image trap: they cannot seize what the freeze immobilizes without the Treasury’s prior blessing. The Cour de cassation settled the point this year in Second Civil Chamber, 5 February 2026, appeal No. 23-15.936, a dispute between a Kuwaiti company holding an arbitral award against Libya, already declared enforceable in France, and the Libyan Investment Authority, whose funds at Société Générale were frozen under Council Regulation (EU) No 2016/44 on Libya. The Paris enforcement judge had annulled the garnishment, and the Cour de cassation rejected the creditor’s appeal. Its reasoning, stated in general terms that apply to frozen Russian assets exactly as they applied to frozen Libyan assets, deserves full quotation: “que ne peut être diligentée, sur des fonds ou des ressources économiques gelés, aucune mesure d’exécution qui aurait pour effet, non seulement de les faire sortir du patrimoine du débiteur, mais aussi de conférer au créancier poursuivant un simple droit de préférence, sans une autorisation préalable du directeur du Trésor, autorité nationale désignée en application de l’article 11, § 2, du règlement.” The Court drew the procedural consequence: “Il en découle qu’à défaut d’autorisation préalable du directeur du Trésor, aucune mesure de saisie-attribution, laquelle emporte, à concurrence des sommes pour lesquelles elle est pratiquée, attribution immédiate au profit du saisissant de la créance saisie disponible entre les mains du tiers et de ses accessoires, ne peut être autorisée ou validée par le juge de l’exécution, saisi sur requête en application de l’article L. 111-1-1 du code des procédures civiles d’exécution, sur des fonds ou ressources économiques faisant l’objet d’une mesure de gel des avoirs en exécution du règlement n° 2016/44.”
The same judgment answers the objection that the judge’s own authorization should suffice. French law since the so-called Sapin 2 Act requires prior judicial authorization for enforcement against foreign-State property, and Article L. 111-1-1 of the Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures states: “Des mesures conservatoires ou des mesures d’exécution forcée ne peuvent être mises en œuvre sur un bien appartenant à un Etat étranger que sur autorisation préalable du juge par ordonnance rendue sur requête.” But the Cour de cassation held that this judicial authorization does not replace the administrative one. In the Court’s ruling on appeal No. 23-15.936: “il découle du principe de primauté du droit de l’Union sur le droit national que l’autorisation administrative doit précéder celle du juge de l’exécution et que le juge de l’exécution violerait le règlement n° 2016/44 s’il autorisait une mesure sur des fonds gelés sans que le créancier ne justifie d’une autorisation de l’autorité nationale compétente.” For a creditor eyeing frozen Russian funds in a Paris bank during the truce week, the order of battle is therefore fixed: first the Directorate General of the Treasury, and only then the enforcement judge. A garnishment served without the Treasury’s prior authorization is not merely ineffective; it is void, and the debtor’s bank is entitled, indeed obliged, to disregard it.
Conclusion
The seven-day truce that runs to midnight on 22 September 2026 changes nothing on the ground in France and everything in the negotiation room in Brussels. On the ground, the freezes apply without interruption: banks must keep them, listed persons must live with them or seek a Treasury derogation, creditors must obtain the Treasury’s prior authorization before any enforcement judge can help them, and anyone who routes frozen money through a foreign account commits the criminal offence of evasion, with no need to prove concealment. In the negotiation room, two names decide whether 3,000 listings roll over for six months or twelve, or collapse into crisis: a man who lost in Luxembourg and may win in the Council, and a man who won in Luxembourg and is still listed. If you are directly concerned, use this week wisely. Listed persons should have their Luxembourg annulment actions and their French Treasury derogation files ready before the new Council act hardens the list for another semester. Creditors should file complete Treasury authorization requests now, so that their enforcement judge can act the moment the legal window opens. And every compliance team should re-screen its books against the Official Journal the morning after the Council decides, because in EU sanctions law, as this week proves again, the list is never finished until all 27 capitals say so.