On 23 September 2026, the General Court of the European Union annulled the acts keeping former Russian senator Oleg Tkach on the EU sanctions lists for Ukraine. The judgment in Tkach v Council (T-584/24) struck down both the September 2024 and the September 2025 relistings, only days after the Council had once again rolled the lists over. For anyone living under an EU listing today — a frozen bank account in Paris, a blocked securities portfolio, a business paralysed by over-compliant counterparties — the ruling is the most useful development of the autumn. It shows, on a live file, that Council relistings can still be beaten in Luxembourg, and it arrives at a moment when the Court is sorting winners from losers with unusual clarity: while individual challenges founded on stale or copy-pasted reasons succeed, actions brought by large state-linked groups keep failing. This article explains what the Court decided, the three litigation routes that actually win annulment cases, and the concrete playbook for attacking a listing and recovering the use of frozen assets from France.
I. The Tkach annulment: what the General Court decided on 23 September 2026
A. A former senator delisted: the facts, the criterion and the acts annulled
Oleg Polikarpovich Tkach sat in the Federation Council of Russia from 2004 to 2022 and was first placed on the EU sanctions lists on 9 March 2022, in the first wave of listings that followed the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Two sanctions-monitoring outlets reported the outcome within days of delivery: EU Law Live recorded that the Fourth Chamber of the General Court, after a hearing held on 25 February 2026, annulled the Council acts of September 2024 and September 2025 insofar as they maintained Mr Tkach on the Ukraine lists, while the Global Sanctions service of Maya Lester KC and Michael O’Kane confirmed on 28 September 2026 that the Court had annulled the September 2024 and September 2025 relistings under Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 in case T-584/24. The full text of the judgment had not yet appeared on the Court’s public register at the time of writing, and the analysis below therefore distinguishes carefully between what the two reports establish and what follows from the settled framework the Luxembourg courts apply to every relisting.
The listing criterion at stake is the central individual criterion of the Ukraine regime. Article 2(1)(a) of Decision 2014/145/CFSP and Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 cover persons identified by the Council as responsible for, supporting or implementing actions which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. The base texts, still in force as amended, put it in these terms. Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP (CELEX:32014D0145) provides in Article 2(1) for the freezing of all funds and economic resources of individuals responsible for actions undermining Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, and of associated persons, entities and bodies listed in the Annex. Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 (CELEX:32014R0269) mirrors the mechanism on the economic side: Article 2 bars making any funds or economic resources available, directly or indirectly, to listed persons and their associates, and Article 3(1) defines who goes into Annex I — individuals identified by the Council as responsible for such actions, plus associated persons, entities and bodies.
According to EU Law Live’s report, the September 2024 acts maintaining Mr Tkach relied on his past vote ratifying treaties connected with the invasion, even though he had left the Federation Council in 2022. That pattern — a relisting grounded in a historical act, recycled from one rollover to the next without fresh material showing a present link to the criterion — is exactly what the General Court has been striking down across the recent case law. The Council reviews the Ukraine lists at regular intervals, in practice every six months around March and September, and each maintenance act is a new legal decision that must be justified on its own date. A vote cast years earlier, a mandate that ended in 2022, a function that no longer exists: none of these can mechanically support a 2024 or 2025 maintenance unless the Council explains, with evidence current at the review date, why the person still meets the criterion today. Practitioners should read Tkach as the latest confirmation that the Court takes that temporal requirement seriously, and that former office-holders whose file consists only of their past status now hold some of the strongest annulment cases on the docket. Readers who want the broader picture of how delistings interact with the Council’s practice of extending the regime as a whole will find it in our analysis of the EU delisting of sanctioned businessmen while the sanctions framework itself is extended.
Two cautions are in order before drawing wider lessons. First, the Council can appeal a General Court annulment to the Court of Justice within two months and ten days, and it routinely does so in sanctions cases, which means the delisting only becomes definitive once the appeal window closes without an appeal or the appeal is dismissed. Second, annulment of the 2024 and 2025 acts does not erase the earlier listing years and does not by itself award damages; it removes the legal basis of the current freeze and forces the Council either to let the person off the list or to adopt a genuinely fresh act supported by genuinely fresh reasons. Both points shape litigation tactics, examined in Part II.
B. Why Luxembourg annuls relistings: reasons, evidence and rights of the defence
The Tkach reports do not yet disclose which plea carried the day, but the General Court’s sanctions case law leaves only a small number of realistic candidates, and every listed person should test their own file against each of them. The first is the duty to state reasons. Since the Grand Chamber’s 2008 Kadi ruling (Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, paragraph 336), the rule has been fixed: judicial review must be capable of reaching the lawfulness of the grounds on which a name is kept on the list, and that effectiveness obliges the authority to communicate those grounds to the person concerned when the listing is decided or at least as swiftly as possible afterwards, so the person can exercise the right of action within the prescribed periods. A statement of reasons that merely recites the criterion, or that pastes in a biography without connecting it to present conduct, fails this test. The Council must individualise: what did this person do, when, and why does that conduct still satisfy the criterion on the review date.
The second route is manifest error of assessment on the facts. The Court does not retake the Council’s political decisions, but it verifies whether the evidence on which the Council relied is factually accurate, reliable and consistent, and whether it is capable of supporting the conclusion drawn. Files built on press cuttings that do not say what the summary claims, on functions the person no longer holds, or on reasoning that contradicts the Council’s own earlier assessments are vulnerable here. Former parliamentarians and former office-holders score their best results on this ground, because the Council often proves the past very well and the present not at all. The third route combines the rights of the defence with proportionality and the right to property. Article 14(2) of Regulation No 269/2014 requires the Council to communicate the decision and the statement of reasons to the person concerned, directly where the address is known or through a published notice, with an opportunity to submit observations. Article 14(3) adds that where observations are submitted or substantial new evidence is presented, the Council must review its decision and inform the person accordingly. A listed person who submits detailed observations with supporting documents, and receives a maintenance act that does not engage with them, arrives before the General Court with a file the judges know how to read.
Behind these three routes sits the Charter guarantee. Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union guarantees everyone whose rights under EU law have been violated an effective remedy before a tribunal. The plea is not decorative: the Court has repeatedly held that restrictive measures, because they freeze property for indefinite renewable periods, demand a particularly rigorous review of their factual basis. Add the structural safeguard of Article 14(4) of the Regulation — the Annex I list must be reviewed at regular intervals and at least every twelve months — and the architecture becomes clear. Listing is not a sentence; it is a precautionary measure that must be re-justified, on current material, at every review. When the Council treats the review as a rubber stamp, the General Court treats the maintenance as unlawful. That is the deeper lesson of the September 2026 litigation season, of which Tkach is the sharpest example to date.
II. Listed or frozen: the concrete playbook from France
A. Attacking the EU listing in Luxembourg: deadlines, actions and authorisations
The direct action for annulment before the General Court is the principal weapon, and it runs on a short fuse. Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union allows any natural or legal person to challenge acts of which they are the addressee or which concern them directly and individually, as well as regulatory acts of direct concern involving no implementing measures. Listed persons satisfy standing automatically, since each maintenance regulation names them individually in Annex I. The time limit is strict: two months from publication of the act, its notification to the applicant or, failing that, the day the applicant learned of it. In practice, each six-monthly maintenance restarts the clock, so a person listed for years without acting can still challenge the latest maintenance — but only the latest one, and only within its two-month window, extended by the ten-day distance period for Luxembourg proceedings. Missing the window for the September acts means waiting for the March rollover, months of continued freeze with no judicial control in the meantime.
Two procedural points decide many cases before the merits are even reached. First, the action for annulment has no suspensive effect: proceedings before the EU courts do not suspend the freeze, although the Court may order a stay of execution where circumstances so require (Article 278 TFEU). The freeze therefore continues during the proceedings, which typically last eighteen months to two years, unless the applicant obtains interim relief by demonstrating urgency and a prima facie case — a demanding but not impossible application where, for example, the freeze threatens the survival of an operating business. Second, the plea of illegality under Article 277 TFEU allows a party, in proceedings calling a general Union act into question, to rely on the Article 263 grounds to invoke the inapplicability of that act even after the direct-action deadline has expired. Competent counsel pleads it systematically as a fallback. And where the listing sits on a CFSP Decision rather than a Regulation, Article 275 TFEU confirms the Court’s jurisdiction over actions reviewing the lawfulness of Council decisions imposing restrictive measures on individuals and entities — restrictive measures against named persons are precisely the carve-out the Treaty preserves for judicial review.
Alongside the court action runs the administrative track, which costs nothing and should never be neglected. Every listed person may file observations with the Council under Article 14(2) and (3), attach fresh evidence — resignation letters, sale deeds for divested holdings, proof that a function ended, audit reports — and demand a review. The Council must answer, and its answer becomes exhibit number one before the General Court. A parallel request for authorisation to release frozen funds for basic needs, legal fees, or pre-listing contractual payments can also be filed with the competent national authority, in France the Directorate General of the Treasury. Article 6(1) of Regulation No 269/2014 expressly allows Member State authorities, for payments due under pre-listing contracts or obligations, to authorise the release of frozen funds on conditions they deem appropriate. Legal fees for the annulment action itself, paradoxically frozen along with everything else, are routinely covered through this channel once the Treasury is satisfied of the paperwork. The sequence that wins is therefore: observations immediately, authorisation requests in parallel, annulment action within the two-month window against each maintenance, and interim relief where the economics demand it.
B. Defending frozen assets in France: banks, the national register and the French courts
An EU listing bites in France through French hands, and French law organises the bite in detail. Article L. 562-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code provides: “Le ministre chargé de l’économie peut décider, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques” of persons designated under Chapter VII UN resolutions or acts adopted under Article 29 TEU or Article 75 TFEU, and of persons designated on the basis of those acts (Article L. 562-3, Code monétaire et financier, Légifrance). The domestic terrorism-freeze twin, Article L. 562-2, uses the same six-month renewable format for persons who commit, attempt, facilitate or finance acts of terrorism (Article L. 562-2, Code monétaire et financier, Légifrance), and newer provisions extend the mechanism to interference operations (Article L. 562-2-1, Légifrance) while Article L. 562-3-1 organises the underlying lists (Légifrance). For banks, insurers, notaries and every professional subject to anti-money-laundering duties listed in Article L. 561-2 (Légifrance), the obligation is immediate and uncompromising. Article L. 562-4 states: “Sont tenus d’appliquer sans délai les mesures de gel et les interdictions de mise à disposition ou d’utilisation prévues au présent chapitre et aux articles L. 712-4 et L. 712-10 et d’en informer immédiatement le ministre chargé de l’économie”, a duty imposed on every individual on national territory and on the professionals of Article L. 561-2 as well as any legal person operating in France, for French companies including for their activities abroad through branches or free provision of services (Article L. 562-4, Code monétaire et financier, Légifrance). Article L. 562-5 completes the wall: “Il est interdit aux personnes mentionnées à l’article L. 562-4 de mettre à disposition directement ou indirectement, ou d’utiliser des fonds ou ressources économiques au profit des personnes dont les fonds et ressources économiques font l’objet d’une mesure de gel” (Article L. 562-5, Code monétaire et financier, Légifrance). Internal procedures must be designed to apply freezes without delay (Article R. 562-1, Légifrance), and a national register of frozen persons is kept by the Minister for the Economy: “Il est créé un registre national des personnes faisant l’objet d’une mesure de gel en application des dispositions du présent chapitre” (Article R. 562-2, Légifrance).
In practice, the freeze arrives as a letter from the bank, a blocked transfer, a notary refusing to complete a sale — and the first reflex must be verification, not resignation. Over-compliance is endemic: institutions freeze the wrong person on a name match, extend the freeze to non-listed family companies, or refuse transactions that an authorisation would have covered. The file to assemble starts with the exact listing entry in the EU Official Journal, the French register entry, and the bank’s freeze notice, so that counsel can check identity, scope and date. Where the measure applied in France is a national implementing order rather than the direct effect of the EU Regulation, the French administrative courts offer a genuine second front. The Paris Administrative Court of Appeal confirmed this on 17 May 2023 in a case where the Paris Administrative Court had annulled a 17 January 2020 freeze order against Ms E. The Court of Appeal held that while an initial freeze may lawfully be ordered without prior adversarial procedure — because warning the person would let assets vanish and “priverait de ce fait cette mesure de tout effet utile” — “il en va différemment lors du renouvellement de la mesure initiale qui doit, en principe, être précédée d’une procédure contradictoire, permettant à la personne intéressée d’être informée de la mesure qu’il est envisagé de prendre, ainsi que des motifs sur lesquels elle se fonde, et de bénéficier d’un délai suffisant pour présenter ses observations.” In that case the administration had sent the invitation to comment by international registered letter to an address in Syria, not to the address the person had declared in Greece, and the Court concluded: “le ministre chargé de l’économie n’est pas fondé à se plaindre de ce que, par le jugement attaqué, le tribunal administratif de Paris a annulé l’arrêté du 17 janvier 2020”, rejecting the Minister’s appeal outright: “Article 1er : La requête du ministre de l’économie, des finances et de la souveraineté industrielle et numérique est rejetée” (CAA Paris, 3rd chamber, 17 May 2023, No 22PA03393, Légifrance, confirming TA Paris 17 June 2022 No 2002319/4-3). The precedent matters far beyond terrorism files: every six-month national renewal taken without a proper invitation to comment, at the right address, with the stated grounds and time to reply, carries the same defect.
The French track and the Luxembourg track therefore reinforce each other, and the chronology decides everything. File observations in Luxembourg at once, because the Council’s silence or boilerplate reply feeds the annulment plea. Challenge each EU maintenance within its two-month window, because only the latest act is attackable. In France, demand the bank’s legal basis in writing, apply to the Treasury for release authorisations for living costs, legal fees and pre-listing debts, and refer any national renewal order to the administrative court within its own two-month limit where the adversarial procedure was skipped or botched. Keep in mind that Regulation No 269/2014 itself orders Member States to lay down effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for infringements, so counterparties that help move frozen value expose themselves to criminal risk — the playbook is about lawful release channels, never circumvention. Handled in that order, a listing that looked like a life sentence becomes what the Tkach judgment of 23 September 2026 shows it can be: a renewable administrative measure that falls as soon as the Council can no longer justify it with current, individualised, communicated reasons.
Conclusion
The General Court’s annulment of Oleg Tkach’s 2024 and 2025 relistings, delivered on 23 September 2026 in case T-584/24, is the clearest signal of the season for anyone under EU restrictive measures: maintenance acts are judged on the evidence of the day, not on the biography of the decade, and copy-pasted historical reasons do not survive review. The winning method combines the Luxembourg action for annulment within its two-month window, serious observations filed with the Council under Article 14, authorisation requests for frozen funds under Article 6, and, in France, rigorous control of the banks’ freeze decisions and of national renewal orders before the administrative courts, following the Paris 2023 precedent on the adversarial procedure. Each new six-month rollover reopens the deadlines — and each rollover maintained without fresh reasons reopens the same vulnerability the General Court has just punished once more.