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Nicaragua v. Germany at the ICJ: Could France Face The Hague Over Arms Exports to Israel?

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Nicaragua v. Germany at the ICJ: Could France Face The Hague Over Arms Exports to Israel?

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From 7 to 10 September 2026, the International Court of Justice in The Hague held public hearings on the preliminary objections raised by Germany in the case brought by Nicaragua over German support for Israel in Gaza. The case is called Alleged Breaches of Certain International Obligations in respect of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Nicaragua v. Germany), and it accuses Berlin of facilitating genocide by exporting arms to Israel and cutting funds to the United Nations relief agency for Palestinian refugees. The hearings closed on 10 September, and the judges will now decide whether the case proceeds to the merits. For readers in France, the obvious next question is uncomfortable: if Germany must answer in The Hague for its export licences, could France be next? According to European Union export data published on 29 April 2026, France granted some 362 million euros of arms-export licences to Israel in 2024, more than any other EU Member State, ahead of Germany with 169 million. This article explains what Nicaragua actually argues, what the Court already decided in April 2024, which European rules govern these licences, and, above all, what French administrative judges do when they are asked to suspend an arms export to Israel. The answer, given in three recent decisions of the Conseil d’Etat, is strict, and it differs sharply from the answer given across the border in the Netherlands.

I. Nicaragua v. Germany: Why the ICJ Hearings of 7-10 September 2026 Matter Beyond Berlin

A. What Nicaragua Accuses Germany of: Complicity, Prevention and the UNRWA Funds

On 1 March 2024, Nicaragua filed an application against Germany before the International Court of Justice for alleged violations of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948 and of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols, in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, in particular the Gaza Strip. Nicaragua argues that every contracting party to the Genocide Convention has a duty to do everything possible to prevent genocide, and that since October 2023 there has been a recognised risk of genocide against the Palestinian people, directed first of all against the population of Gaza. In its words, by providing political, financial and military support to Israel and by defunding the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, Germany is facilitating the commission of genocide and, in any case, has failed in its obligation to do everything possible to prevent it. Nicaragua founds jurisdiction on the declarations by which both States accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36, paragraph 2, of its Statute, and on Article IX of the Genocide Convention.

The legal architecture of that claim rests on three short treaty sentences that every international lawyer knows by heart. Article I of the Genocide Convention provides that the Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish. Article II defines genocide as any of five acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm, deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction, imposing measures intended to prevent births, and forcibly transferring children. Article III then lists the punishable acts, and its subparagraph (e) names complicity in genocide, while Article IV adds that persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals. The second pillar is Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, under which the High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances. Nicaragua reads these two pillars together: a State that arms a belligerent while international courts and United Nations bodies document mass civilian killing is not merely watching, it is helping, and it is breaching its own duty to ensure respect.

Nicaragua had asked the Court to indicate provisional measures, and the Order of 30 April 2024 is the reason the case is still alive and was heard on the merits of jurisdiction this September. In that order the Court declined to indicate provisional measures, holding that based on the factual information and legal arguments presented by the Parties, the Court concludes that, at present, the circumstances are not such as to require the exercise of its power under Article 41 of the Statute to indicate provisional measures. Germany had supplied detailed information on the sharp reduction of its military exports to Israel after October 2023 and on its funding position: the Court noted that Germany stated it had supported initiatives aimed at funding the work of the relief agency, in particular through the payment of 50 million euros by the European Union to UNRWA on 1 March 2024, as well as providing financial and material support to other organisations operating in the Gaza Strip. But Berlin had also asked for much more, namely the removal of the case from the Court’s List for manifest lack of jurisdiction, and on that point it lost: there being no manifest lack of jurisdiction, the Court cannot accede to Germany’s request. That single sentence kept Nicaragua’s claim alive for two more years and led directly to the September 2026 hearings, announced in Press Release No. 2026/21 of 31 July 2026, which scheduled public sittings from Monday 7 to Thursday 10 September 2026 on Germany’s preliminary objections. The objections phase is technically narrow, since it tests jurisdiction and admissibility rather than guilt, yet politically it is the whole case in miniature: Germany argues the Court should not judge its foreign policy at all, while Nicaragua argues that the Genocide Convention was written precisely so that no foreign policy escapes it. Whatever the bench decides in the coming months, the legal theory tested in that courtroom applies word for word to every other European arms exporter, including the largest of them.

B. The 362 Million Euro Question: Which EU State Licensed the Most Arms to Israel in 2024

The uncomfortable ranking comes from the European Union’s own export-control reporting. Under Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, which harmonises the rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment, each Member State must assess every licence against eight criteria, and the data are consolidated each year. According to the 2024 figures published at the end of April 2026, France granted some 362 million euros of arms-export licences to Israel in 2024, ahead of Germany with 169 million, Greece with 114 million, Romania with 103 million, the Czech Republic with 35 million and Finland with 17 million. France therefore licensed more than twice the German volume in the very year covered by Nicaragua’s allegations. Drilling into the French figure, most licences covered parts and military software, but there were also 122 million euros of ammunition and 18 million of bombs, torpedoes, rockets, missiles and other explosive devices. The German licences included 48 million of armoured vehicles, 37 million of ammunition and 13 million of bombs. These are licence values, not confirmed deliveries, and officials in Paris stress that components for re-export systems and defensive equipment dominate the French total, yet the legal question does not turn on product categories alone. It turns on the risk test that every Member State accepted in 2008.

That test is written in unusually blunt language. Criterion Two of the Common Position, on respect for human rights and international humanitarian law in the country of final destination, provides that Member States shall deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used for internal repression, and that they shall exercise special caution and vigilance, on a case-by-case basis, to countries where serious violations of human rights have been established by the competent bodies of the United Nations, the European Union or the Council of Europe. The same criterion then adds the sentence that dominates every Gaza-related file: Member States shall deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used in the commission of serious violations of international humanitarian law. Criterion Three completes the screen by requiring refusal of licences for equipment which would provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in the country of final destination. An international reader should understand what this means in practice: the European standard is not proof that French shells killed civilians in Gaza, it is a clear risk assessed before the licence is granted, in light of findings by United Nations bodies. Since late 2023, United Nations commissions, the General Assembly, the Human Rights Council and three sets of ICJ provisional-measures orders in the South Africa v. Israel case have documented exactly the kind of findings that trigger special caution. The gap between that European paper standard and the French courtroom reality is where this story moves from The Hague to Paris.

France implements the Common Position through a national prior-authorisation regime. Article L. 2335-2 of the Defence Code provides that exportation without prior authorisation of war materials and assimilated materials to States outside the European Union is prohibited, and that the administrative authority defines the list of controlled materials and the exemptions. Article L. 2335-3 organises that authorisation as an export licence granted by the administrative authority in three forms: general export licences, global export licences notified to the exporter for identified recipients over a fixed period without quantity or value limits, and individual export licences notified for one or more shipments to a stated recipient, all of which may carry conditions or restrictions on end use. In practice the decision is taken at the highest executive level after examination by the interministerial commission for the study of war-material exports, whose deliberations and opinions are covered by defence secrecy. That combination, a statute that grants the licence, an executive that decides it, and a secrecy stamp that hides the reasoning, explains why every attempt to bring French licences before a judge crashes into the same wall, and why the wall has a name in French public law.

II. Can French Courts Suspend an Arms Export Licence to Israel?

A. The Government-Act Shield: Why Paris Judges Refuse General Suspension Orders

The leading answer was given on the merits of admissibility in the Yemen litigation. By a letter of 1 March 2018, the association Action Securite Ethique Republicaines (ASER) asked the Prime Minister to suspend without delay all prior export authorisations for war materials to Saudi Arabia, and then challenged the implied refusal before the Paris administrative tribunal, which ruled on 8 July 2019, before the Conseil d’Etat decided the joined appeals on 27 January 2023. In decision No. 436098, the Conseil d’Etat held that the implied refusal opposed to this request of general scope is not detachable from the conduct of France’s international relations, adding that no European argument could usefully be raised against that characterisation, and it concluded that without any need to refer a preliminary question to the Court of Justice of the European Union or to grant the request for declassification and communication of certain documents, the applicant associations are not founded in seeking annulment of the orders under appeal, so that the appeals of the association ACAT and of the association ASER and others are rejected. The formula matters enormously for any Gaza file: a demand for the general suspension of licences to a belligerent is treated as inseparable from foreign policy itself, which places it beyond the reach of the administrative judge, and the secrecy covering the licences and the commission’s opinions is not even examined because the case never gets past the threshold. A lawyer reading this decision understands the practical lesson at once: never ask the French judge to stop all exports to Israel, because that request will be qualified as a general measure of foreign relations and rejected as non-detachable.

The Gaza war has already tested whether the emergency judge would do better, and the answer, given on 6 January 2026, was no. On 19 December 2025, a company specialised in humanitarian risk analysis, EvidenceBank, filed an application under the emergency fundamental-freedoms procedure of Article L. 521-2 of the Administrative Justice Code, under which, when urgency justifies it, the interim-relief judge may order all measures necessary to safeguard a fundamental freedom to which a public-law body has caused a serious and manifestly unlawful interference, ruling within forty-eight hours, asking the Conseil d’Etat to order the State to improve humanitarian access to Gaza, to suspend conservatively all authorisations for the export, transit or material support of arms and military technology to Israel, to disclose all assessments and exchanges on the humanitarian situation and on export decisions, and to commission an internal consistency audit. By Order No. 510900 of 6 January 2026, the interim-relief judge threw the case out without hearing or inquiry under the screening power of Article L. 522-3, which allows rejection by reasoned order where the application manifestly falls outside the jurisdiction of the administrative courts, is inadmissible or is ill-founded, holding that such conclusions have a general scope exceeding the powers of the interim-relief judge and are not detachable from the conduct of France’s international relations, so that it is manifest that the application must be rejected in all its conclusions, under the procedure of Article L. 522-3. Two features of this order deserve attention from foreign observers. First, the judge did not deny the humanitarian catastrophe or rule that arms exports are lawful; he ruled that a court order to suspend them all is not a judicial act but a foreign-policy act. Second, the rejection came through the triage procedure, which means no adversarial hearing, no expert evidence on the clear-risk test, and no disclosure of a single licence file. For campaigners, the message of January 2026 is brutal in its simplicity: the emergency route that protects every other fundamental freedom in France within forty-eight hours stops at the gates of the arms-export office.

This shield is not absolute, and understanding its exact edges is the core of the French lawyer’s craft. The non-detachability reasoning covers general demands addressed to the Government as conductor of foreign relations, not necessarily a targeted challenge to one individual licence granted to one exporter for one identified recipient, which Article L. 2335-3 itself frames as a notifiable administrative decision. French administrative courts routinely review individual export decisions in other sectors, and nothing in the 2023 or 2026 rulings says that a company whose individual licence is refused, or a competitor harmed by a licence granted, would be turned away. The difficulty is standing and secrecy, not jurisdiction in principle: associations struggle to show a direct interest against a licence they cannot see, and the documents that would prove the clear risk are classified. That is why the third French decision in the series matters as much as the two rejections, because it locks the evidentiary door.

B. The Dutch Counter-Example and the Narrow Paths Still Open in France

Across the border, judges facing the same European test reached the opposite outcome. After a district court in 2023 dismissed a challenge to the Dutch licence for the export and transit of F-35 fighter-jet parts to Israel, holding that the licensing decision was a political act of foreign policy subject to only marginal judicial review, the Hague Court of Appeal reversed course on 12 February 2024. The appeal court found that there is a clear risk that serious violations of international law are committed with the F-35s, and, invoking the Netherlands’ commitments under export-control and humanitarian-law instruments, ordered the State to cease all actual export and transit of F-35 parts to Israel. The Dutch government sought cassation, a second enforcement action followed in June 2024, and on 3 October 2025 the Dutch Supreme Court required the minister to perform a fresh reassessment of the F-35 licence, keeping the file under judicial supervision rather than closing it. The contrast with Paris is instructive rather than copyable: Dutch associations sued in civil court under tort and reasonableness doctrines with a visible licence and a visible weapon system, while French associations sue in administrative court against invisible general authorisations wrapped in defence secrecy. The European clear-risk standard is identical on both sides of the border; the procedural key that opens the courtroom door is not.

In France, that door is currently the secrecy wall, and the Conseil d’Etat reinforced it on 1 December 2025. The European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, Amnesty International France and Disclose had asked the Paris tribunal, then Montreuil after transfer, to annul the implied refusal of the Minister for the Economy to disclose administrative documents on exports of war materials to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt; the tribunal rejected the claim on 19 July 2024, and the associations appealed to the Conseil d’Etat in September and December 2024 and September 2025. By decision No. 498014, the Conseil d’Etat held that the appeal of the associations European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, Amnesty International France and Disclose is rejected, recalling in its reasoning the criminal prohibition of disclosure of secret information by its depositary. The practical consequence is a closed evidentiary circuit: the licences are secret, the commission’s opinions are secret, the refusal to disclose is lawful, and the judge who could assess the clear risk never sees the file. Anyone building a French case must therefore work with open sources, which is why the European Union’s consolidated figures, the United Nations findings, parliamentary questions, customs data and investigative reporting by outlets such as Disclose carry decisive weight in French pleadings today. The 362-million-euro figure is not decorative; in a system where the State discloses nothing, it is often the only hard number the claimant can put before the court.

Two narrow paths remain, and honest advice requires pricing each of them. The first is the targeted administrative challenge: instead of demanding the suspension of all exports, attack one identifiable decision, such as an individual licence whose existence is proven by open sources, a transit authorisation through a French port or airport, or a customs decision, and frame the plea around a manifest error of assessment under Criterion Two of the Common Position, which has direct effect in the domestic order as a binding European act implemented by Articles L. 2335-2 and L. 2335-3. Standing remains the obstacle, since the claimant must show a sufficient interest, but victims with a documented personal link, French residents harmed by the conflict, humanitarian organisations with a statutory purpose covering the protection of civilians, and, paradoxically, economic operators affected by a licensing decision have stronger cards than a general-interest petition. The second path is criminal: Article 121-7 of the Penal Code punishes as an accomplice the person who knowingly, by aid or assistance, facilitated the preparation or consummation of a crime or an offence, and complaints for complicity in war crimes or crimes against humanity can be filed with the specialised war-crimes unit of the Paris judicial court, which holds nationwide jurisdiction over such cases. The criminal route faces its own steep slope, since the prosecution must establish a principal punishable act, knowledge, and French jurisdiction over extraterritorial facts, and the Paris prosecutor retains full discretion to dismiss, yet it escapes the government-act shield entirely, because no criminal judge has ever accepted that foreign policy authorises complicity in an international crime. Neither path promises speed, and neither reproduces the Dutch injunction, but both keep the file alive, preserve evidence, and feed the international proceedings in which France’s licences are increasingly discussed, from The Hague to Brussels.

Conclusion

The hearings of 7 to 10 September 2026 did not put France on trial, and no judgment from The Hague will suspend a single French licence. But they moved the legal question one step closer to Paris. Germany’s preliminary objections will succeed or fail on jurisdiction and admissibility, yet the underlying theory, that arming a State engaged in a plausibly genocidal campaign breaches the duties to prevent genocide and to ensure respect for humanitarian law, is a theory about every supplier, and the European Union’s own data make France the largest licenser in the room. French courts, for their part, have now spoken three times with one voice: general suspension demands are non-detachable from foreign relations and will be rejected without a hearing, the files that would allow a targeted challenge are protected by defence secrecy, and the refusal to disclose them is lawful. That triple lock is coherent, it is grounded in decisions anyone can read, and it is increasingly lonely in Europe, as the Dutch F-35 saga demonstrates. For victims, journalists, and companies exposed to this trade, the lesson of September 2026 is therefore practical rather than rhetorical: document the licence, identify the decision, quantify the risk with United Nations and European sources, and choose the narrow procedural door, administrative or criminal, that no government-act reasoning can close. The Hague will decide Germany’s objections in the coming months; Paris will decide, file by file, whether its own clear-risk test means what it says.

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