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DNO Yemen: the CJEU Lets EU Sanctions Block Arbitration Payouts – What Changes for Enforcement in France

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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DNO Yemen: the CJEU Lets EU Sanctions Block Arbitration Payouts – What Changes for Enforcement in France

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On 15 October 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union answered a question no enforcement judge in Europe could keep avoiding: when an arbitration award orders you to pay damages to a foreign ministry or a state-owned company, and EU sanctions target the armed movement that claims to control that state, whether paying the award amounts to illegally financing the sanctioned movement. The case, C-842/24 DNO Yemen, came to Luxembourg on a reference from the French Cour de cassation, and it rewrites the practical playbook for every arbitration award enforced in France against the background of EU restrictive measures. The Court held that paying a non-listed public entity to enforce an award may constitute indirectly making funds available to listed persons where those persons claim the power to control the recipient and are actually in a position to obtain the funds, that the prohibition bites where objective evidence shows a sufficiently significant risk, and that no presumption of control applies – the national judge must decide on specific, precise and consistent indicia, with the burden shifting to the payee once a prima facie risk is shown. For companies owed money by states, for debtors ordered to pay state entities, and for counsel bringing or resisting exequatur before the Paris courts, this ruling changes what evidence to gather, what safeguards to demand, and when payment itself becomes the violation.

I. How French judges enforce arbitration awards when EU sanctions hang over the creditor

The short answer after 15 October 2026 is yes, but only after a concrete risk analysis that the debtor can force and the creditor must be ready to rebut. Understanding why requires walking through the Paris proceedings that produced the reference, because the French annulment mechanism of article 1520 of the Code of Civil Procedure is now the procedural vehicle through which EU sanctions enter French arbitration litigation.

A. How an ICC award seated in Paris ended up before the CJEU

The dispute grew out of oil and gas production-sharing agreements between, on one side, the Ministry of Oil and Minerals of the Republic of Yemen and the Yemen Oil and Gas Corporation (YOGC), a company wholly owned by the Yemeni state, and on the other side DNO Yemen AS, Petrolin Trading, MOE Oil & Gas Yemen and Dove Energy, with an ICC arbitration clause. After the Houthi movement seized Sana’a in 2014-2015 and two rival governmental structures emerged, the private operators tried to withdraw from the agreements; the Ministry and YOGC denied that right and commenced ICC arbitration seated in Paris in 2015. By an award dated July 2019, the tribunal ordered DNO, Petrolin and MOE to pay damages, as the Court’s own statement of facts records (see the judgment on EUR-Lex).

The award debtors turned to the Paris cour d’appel to have the award set aside, arguing that enforcement would breach EU sanctions because YOGC was believed to be under Houthi control and payment could indirectly place funds at the disposal of persons listed in Annex I of Council Regulation (EU) No 1352/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Yemen. By judgment of 5 October 2021 the Paris court dismissed the challenge: it held that indirect making available required proof that the Ministry and YOGC were indeed acting ‘on behalf, under the control, or on the instructions’ of listed persons and intended to use the funds for those persons’ benefit – a test the evidence before it did not meet. Meanwhile the award creditors moved elsewhere: on 30 March 2022 the Ministry applied to the Oslo District Court for enforcement, the Norwegian courts declared the award enforceable and dismissed DNO’s appeals, and on 4 December 2023 DNO paid the net amount due solely to the Ministry, YOGC having transferred all of its rights under the award to the Ministry by letter of 13 October 2022 – all as recorded in the CJEU’s statement of facts. The French annulment appeal nevertheless continued to the Cour de cassation, which stayed the pourvoi and referred three questions to Luxembourg. That reference is Cour de cassation, First Civil Chamber, 27 November 2024, pourvoi No 22-13.596, and the CJEU received it on 6 December 2024, as the judgment’s opening recital confirms (see the full judgment on EUR-Lex and the case file on Curia).

French readers should note the procedural frame, because it determines where sanctions arguments can be raised. In France, an international award is enforceable only after exequatur: article 1516 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that “La sentence arbitrale n’est susceptible d’exécution forcée qu’en vertu d’une ordonnance d’exequatur émanant du tribunal judiciaire dans le ressort duquel elle été rendue ou du tribunal judiciaire de Paris lorsqu’elle a été rendue à l’étranger.” Annulment, in turn, is available only on closed grounds, the relevant one being that “La reconnaissance ou l’exécution de la sentence est contraire à l’ordre public international” under article 1520, 5°. For awards rendered abroad, the same filter operates at the recognition stage: article 1514 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that “Les sentences arbitrales sont reconnues ou exécutées en France si leur existence est établie par celui qui s’en prévaut et si cette reconnaissance ou cette exécution n’est pas manifestement contraire à l’ordre public international.” EU sanctions, as measures protecting the fundamental interests of the Union, feed directly into that international public policy ground – which is exactly the channel the award debtors used in Paris and the channel the Cour de cassation kept open by referring the interpretation of the Regulation to the CJEU under Article 267 TFEU.

The three questions the Cour de cassation put, visible in the operative part of its 27 November 2024 ruling, were these. First: L’article 2.2 du règlement (UE) n° 1352/2014 du Conseil du 18 décembre 2014 concernant des mesures restrictives eu égard à la situation au Yémen doit-il être interprété, à la lumière des lignes directrices publiées par le Conseil, mises à jour le 4 mai 2018, en ce sens que la mise à disposition indirecte peut s’entendre de la mise des fonds à la disposition d’entités publiques non visées par les mesures restrictives, s’il est établi que les personnes visées par ces mesures exercent, au sein de ces entités, une influence concurrente de celle du Gouvernement légitime non visé par ces mesures. The second question asks in substance whether the recipient entities are then presumed to be controlled by the listed persons, whether that presumption admits contrary proof, and what role the legitimate government’s non-cooperation with the listed persons plays. The third question is framed as follows: Lorsque les éléments produits devant le juge national ne permettent pas d’apprécier si l’influence déterminante au sein de l’entité à la disposition de laquelle sont mis les fonds appartient au Gouvernement légitime ou aux personnes visées par les sanctions, le simple risque raisonnable que ces dernières bénéficient finalement de tout ou partie de ces fonds est-il suffisant pour appliquer les sanctions. Those questions, reproduced word for word from the referral, set the entire agenda for the 15 October 2026 answers.

B. What the CJEU decided on 15 October 2026 about paying a non-listed state entity

The Fifth Chamber’s operative part gives three answers, and each one matters operationally. First, Article 2(2) of Regulation No 1352/2014 must be interpreted as meaning that making funds available to a public entity not listed in Annex I to that regulation, in order to enforce an arbitration award, may constitute making funds indirectly available to persons, entities or bodies listed in that annex where those persons, entities or bodies, without exercising the power to control or instruct that entity, claim to have such power, as does the legitimate Government of the Republic of Yemen, provided that they are in a position actually to obtain those funds. In plain terms: competing claims of control are enough to trigger the analysis, and actual exercise of control need not be proved – what counts is whether the listed persons are in a position actually to get the money. That displaces the stricter Paris test of October 2021, which had demanded proof of actual instruction plus intended benefit, and it aligns the enforcement judge’s inquiry with a forward-looking risk question rather than a backward-looking control finding.

Second, the prohibition applies where it can be established, on the basis of objective material evidence, that there is a risk that those persons, entities or bodies will benefit from all or part of the funds intended for an entity not listed in that annex, on the condition that the probability of that risk materialising is sufficiently significant to justify that prohibition, taking into account all the circumstances of the particular case, including relevant factors capable of impeding actions by those persons, entities or bodies. Two qualifiers do heavy work here. The risk must rest on objective material evidence, not conjecture: the Court recalls that the application of Article 2(2) of Regulation No 1352/2014 may not be based on mere conjecture. It requires that there be objective material evidence relating to the means which the persons, entities or bodies concerned have at their disposal for obtaining those funds. And the probability must be sufficiently significant in light of all circumstances, including safeguards capable of blocking access. Mere theoretical exposure does not trigger the ban; a documented, significant risk does.

Third, there is no presumption of control: the listed persons are not to be presumed to control a public entity to which funds have been made available in order to enforce an arbitration award where those persons, entities or bodies, without exercising the power to control or instruct that public entity, claim, as does the legitimate Government of the Republic of Yemen, such control over that public entity. The Court assigns the assessment to the national judge on the basis of a sufficiently specific, precise and consistent set of indicia, expressly invoking its Anbouba case law on sanctions evidence. It adds a sting for award creditors leaning on a legitimate government: the lack of cooperation by the legitimate Government of the Republic of Yemen with those persons, entities or bodies cannot be sufficient to exclude such a risk, as that government and the public entity concerned must show that they have taken specific measures which are actually capable of preventing that risk from materialising. A bare statement that the recognised government does not cooperate with the sanctioned movement proves nothing; what is needed is demonstrable ring-fencing – segregated accounts, payment channels outside the reach of the listed persons, verifiable disbursement controls.

The judgment also settles the burden of proof in a way practitioners must memorise. The evidence produced by the party asserting breach must therefore constitute a sufficiently specific, precise and consistent set of indicia indicating, prima facie, that there is a non-negligible likelihood of that risk materialising. It is only in that situation that it will be for the beneficiaries of those sums to produce evidence permitting that risk to be excluded to the requisite legal standard. So the sequence is two-stage: the resisting debtor first puts forward a concrete, consistent evidentiary package showing a non-negligible likelihood of diversion; only then does the creditor have to prove, to the applicable standard, that the risk is excluded. And where the file leaves serious doubts without permitting a definitive assessment, the Court’s logic points toward protective restraint – the Advocate General’s March 2026 Opinion had already pushed in that direction by accepting that a reasonable risk of benefit suffices to engage Article 2(2) and by placing the rebuttal burden on the payee. Companies that treated sanctions objections as speculative makeweights will need to recalibrate: a well-documented risk file now genuinely shifts the evidentiary burden onto the party waiting to be paid.

One more holding deserves emphasis because it travels beyond Yemen. The Court’s reading of “indirectly making available” is expressly general: the prohibition catches payments to non-listed intermediaries wherever listed persons are positioned to capture the funds, and the judgment cites the Kadi and Timchenko lineage on effective judicial review and evidence standards. The reasoning therefore informs every EU sanctions regime with an equivalent direct-or-indirect provision – including the Russia and Belarus measures most relevant to enforcement litigation in France, on which this firm has already analysed how holders and creditors can act on frozen Russian assets in France. The Yemen facts are unusual, with two competing governments, but the test – objective evidence, sufficiently significant probability, no presumption either way, creditor-side proof of effective safeguards – is now the common grammar of sanctions objections to enforcement across regimes.

II. Ordered to pay or waiting to be paid: enforcing or resisting enforcement in France after DNO Yemen

The ruling lands in a French procedural landscape that international parties sometimes misunderstand. Exequatur before the Tribunal judiciaire de Paris is granted on a non-adversarial application, annulment goes to the Paris cour d’appel on closed grounds, state assets enjoy a reinforced immunity regime, and sanctions compliance is policed alongside – by banks that will freeze first and ask later. The CJEU has now told each actor in that chain what is expected of them, and the practical consequences split cleanly between debtors seeking to resist and creditors seeking to be paid.

A. How an award debtor can resist payment on EU sanctions grounds

Start with the correct procedural door. A debtor that simply refuses to pay exposes itself to enforcement and to interest; the sanction argument must be converted into litigation. Against a Paris-seated award, the route is the action for annulment on the ground that recognition or enforcement would be contrary to international public policy, since EU restrictive measures form part of that public policy. The DNO Yemen debtors did exactly that before the Paris cour d’appel, and although their 2021 challenge failed on the evidence, the Cour de cassation kept the question alive instead of closing it – a reminder that the Court of Cassation treats the sanctions-public-policy articulation as a serious question of EU law rather than a dilatory plea. Debtors facing awards in favour of entities linked, even indirectly, to sanctioned regimes should therefore build the annulment file early, before enforcement bites, and mirror the CJEU’s two-stage structure: first, assemble the objective material evidence of diversion risk; second, be ready to show why the creditor’s safeguards are cosmetic.

What counts as objective material evidence after 15 October 2026 is now settled. The judgment demands a sufficiently specific, precise and consistent set of indicia relating to the means available to the listed persons for obtaining the funds. Concretely, counsel should document who physically controls the territory where the recipient entity operates, who appoints or pays its officers, through which banks and correspondents the funds would transit, whether listed persons have historically intercepted comparable revenue streams, and whether the recipient’s accounts are commingled with structures the sanctioned movement administers. Press reports alone will rarely suffice; the file should combine official designations, UN Panel of Experts findings where they exist, corporate and banking records, witness material on the chain of custody of funds, and expert evidence on the recipient jurisdiction’s payment plumbing. The Paris court’s 2021 demand for proof of actual instruction is gone as the governing standard, but it is replaced by something almost as demanding in practice: conjecture is expressly insufficient, and a vague invocation of country risk will not shift the burden. The indicia must be specific to the funds at issue, precise about the capture mechanism, and consistent across sources.

Timing and forum discipline matter as much as substance. Because French exequatur is non-adversarial at first instance, a debtor that waits for the bailiff learns of enforcement when accounts are already frozen; raising the sanctions analysis at the annulment stage or by way of defence to enforcement requires the evidence to be ready before the award creditor moves. Against a foreign award, the remedy against the exequatur order itself is an appeal: article 1525 of the Code of Civil Procedure states that “La décision qui statue sur une demande de reconnaissance ou d’exequatur d’une sentence arbitrale rendue à l’étranger est susceptible d’appel” and that “L’appel est formé dans le délai d’un mois à compter de la signification de la décision.” Even a contractual waiver of annulment does not close every door: article 1522 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that “Par convention spéciale, les parties peuvent à tout moment renoncer expressément au recours en annulation.” In that case, the parties may still appeal the exequatur order on one of the grounds listed in article 1520 – so the international public policy channel for sanctions objections survives waiver at the enforcement stage. Multijurisdictional debtors should also coordinate: in DNO Yemen, Norwegian enforcement proceeded in parallel and payment occurred in December 2023 while the French annulment reference was still pending, which shows that winning time in one forum does not stop enforcement in another. A debtor that wants the CJEU test applied consistently should seek stays or protective filings in each enforcement forum, put banks on notice with the documented risk file so that compliance departments pause rather than process, and consider offering payment into escrow or a blocked account pending the judge’s assessment – a gesture that both demonstrates good faith and deprives the creditor of the argument that resistance is merely tactical. None of this guarantees success, and counsel should say so plainly: the Court refused any presumption, the probability must be sufficiently significant, and a debtor whose file amounts to atmosphere will lose and pay costs.

B. How an award creditor can still get paid when the debtor cries sanctions

Creditors – ministries, state companies, private assignees of state claims – face the mirror-image task: proving a negative, namely that listed persons cannot capture the funds, to the requisite legal standard once the debtor has shown a prima facie non-negligible risk. The judgment tells them exactly what persuades: specific measures actually capable of preventing materialisation of the risk. Abstract non-cooperation with the sanctioned movement is declared insufficient as a matter of law. What is needed is an auditable payment architecture presented to the judge before enforcement is authorised or the annulment plea decided.

In practice, that architecture has several layers. First, designate a receiving account in a jurisdiction and a bank outside the listed persons’ reach, with contractual prohibitions on onward transfer to designated persons and a documented compliance chain the bank has accepted in writing – because in real enforcement, the paying bank’s sanctions filter is often the first judge, and a file the bank cannot clear never reaches the court. Second, structure disbursement so that funds are applied to verified third-party obligations (contractors, lenders, humanitarian or reconstruction expenditure with named beneficiaries) rather than pooled into general treasury accounts in contested territory. Third, produce governance evidence: board minutes, appointment decrees from the recognised government, audits, and attestations from the account-holding bank that no listed person holds signing authority or beneficial access. Fourth, where the recipient operates in territory partly administered by the sanctioned movement, commission independent monitoring of the payment corridor and file the monitor’s reports. Each layer answers one limb of the CJEU test: objective evidence of capture means is met with objective evidence of capture prevention, assessed across all the circumstances including factors capable of impeding the listed persons’ actions.

Creditors enforcing against state-linked debtors in France should also keep the immunity hurdle in view, because sanctions arguments frequently arrive together with immunity pleas. Article L.111-1-2 of the Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures provides that conservatory or enforcement measures against property belonging to a foreign state may be authorised by the judge only if one of three conditions is met: express consent of the state, earmarking of the asset for the claim at issue, or a judgment or award rendered against the state with the asset specifically used or intended for non-public commercial purposes and linked to the entity proceeded against. No enforcement step against state property can begin without a judge: article L.111-1-1 of the Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures requires prior judicial authorization for any enforcement step against foreign state property: “sur autorisation préalable du juge par ordonnance rendue sur requête.” Diplomatic assets go further and are virtually untouchable: under article L.111-1-3 of the same Code, enforcement against property used for diplomatic missions is possible only “qu’en cas de renonciation expresse et spéciale des Etats concernés.” An award creditor must therefore identify commercial-use assets with a link to the debtor entity – a discipline entirely separate from sanctions clearance, and one that must be satisfied cumulatively with it. Before the Paris enforcement judge, the winning file after DNO Yemen proves three things at once: a valid title with exequatur, an attachable commercial asset outside immunity, and a sanctions-clean payment path documented by specific measures. Miss any one of the three and enforcement stalls.

Two Paris-specific reflexes complete the picture. First, bring the sanctions file to the exequatur stage voluntarily rather than waiting for annulment: although the application is non-adversarial, nothing prevents a creditor from annexing the compliance architecture and inviting the judge to record it, which frames any later annulment debate and reassures the banking chain. Second, remember that the Cour de cassation has not yet ruled on the merits after the CJEU answers – the case returns to Paris, and the First Civil Chamber will apply the sufficiently-significant-risk test to the Yemen facts, including the intervening Norwegian payment and assignment. Until that final French ruling, every new file is litigated under the CJEU framework without a domestic template, which is precisely when experienced Paris enforcement counsel earns its fee: the test is uniform across the Union, but the indicia, the standard of proof in practice, and the judge’s appetite for escrow solutions remain distinctly French.

Conclusion

The 15 October 2026 DNO Yemen judgment does not make arbitration awards against state-linked creditors unenforceable, and it does not give debtors a sanctions veto. It does something more precise and more demanding: it converts sanctions objections from political rhetoric into an evidence-driven risk test administered by the enforcement judge. No presumption of control helps either side; the debtor must produce objective, specific, precise and consistent indicia of a sufficiently significant diversion risk, and the creditor must then prove, by specific measures actually capable of preventing capture, that the risk is excluded. For awards touching Yemen, Russia, Belarus, or any regime under EU restrictive measures, the lesson for Paris litigation is immediate: build the payment file before the enforcement file, document the capture mechanism or the capture prevention with equal rigour, and litigate through article 1520’s public policy ground with the CJEU’s vocabulary. The Cour de cassation’s forthcoming application of the ruling to the Yemen facts will supply the first French template – but the framework binds from 15 October 2026, and enforcement strategy in France should already speak its language.

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