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France Extends Its 10% Foreign-Investment Screen to Overseas-Listed Companies

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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France Extends Its 10% Foreign-Investment Screen to Overseas-Listed Companies

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France has widened one of Europe’s most consequential foreign-investment controls. A decree published on 2 August 2026 now makes the French screening regime expressly relevant when a French company carries out its regulated-market listing outside the European Union and a non-EU investor crosses the 10% voting-rights threshold. The headline is easy to misread: the 10% trigger is not a brand-new concept, but the market perimeter has been extended and specified. That change matters for acquisitions, strategic minority investments, activist campaigns, consortium arrangements and transactions whose French nexus is hidden behind an overseas quotation.

The practical question for an investor is not simply whether the target is incorporated in France. It is whether the transaction reaches a protected French activity, whether the buyer is legally foreign, whether the voting-rights threshold or another control event is crossed, and whether the relevant listing is on a market now captured by the implementing rules. The answer can determine whether a deal is signed, notified, authorised, conditioned or unenforceable. It can also affect the timetable of a public-company transaction long before closing.

This analysis explains the new perimeter from a French and European procedural perspective. It distinguishes the legal trigger from the political risk, maps the two filing routes, and sets out what a non-EU buyer should do before acquiring shares or voting rights. The central sources are the Decree no. 2026-718 of 30 July 2026, the accompanying order of 30 July 2026, and the relevant provisions of the French Monetary and Financial Code.

I. What does France’s new 10% foreign-investment screen change for overseas-listed companies?

A. Which non-EU acquisitions now enter the French authorisation perimeter?

The starting point is Article L. 151-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code. Its operative sentence is direct: “Sont soumis à autorisation préalable du ministre chargé de l’économie les investissements étrangers dans une activité en France.” In English, a foreign investment in an activity in France requires prior authorisation from the minister responsible for the economy when the protected statutory conditions are met. The same provision covers activities that affect public order, public security or national defence, and activities involving goods, products or services essential to those interests. The official text is available in the current Article L. 151-3.

That wording creates three questions. First, is there an investment? Second, is the investor foreign? Third, does the target conduct a protected activity in France? The 2026 decree does not eliminate those questions. It changes the practical answer to the first question for French companies whose shares are traded on a regulated market outside the European Union. A buyer cannot assume that an overseas quotation places a French strategic company outside the French regime.

Article R. 151-1 supplies a broad investor perimeter. It expressly includes “Toute entité de droit étranger”, or any entity governed by foreign law. It also reaches a French-law entity controlled by one or more persons or entities that fall within the foreign-investor definition. The control analysis therefore has to move through the acquisition chain. A Luxembourg acquisition vehicle, a United States fund, a Singapore holding company and a French subsidiary controlled by a non-EU parent can all raise different versions of the same question.

The relevant statutory definition is not limited to a purchase of 100% of the shares. Under Article R. 151-1, the investor perimeter includes a foreign natural person, a foreign-law entity and a French-law entity controlled by foreign interests. The rule also follows the chain of control. A transaction team should therefore identify the ultimate controlling persons and public bodies, not stop at the name printed on the term sheet.

Article R. 151-2 then lists the events that can constitute a foreign investment. They include taking control, acquiring all or part of a branch of activity, acquiring more than 25% of the voting rights, and “franchir, directement ou indirectement, seul ou de concert, le seuil de 10 % de détention des droits de vote d’une société de droit français dont les actions sont admises aux négociations sur un marché réglementé.” The 10% event is therefore a voting-rights trigger, not merely an economic ownership test. The wording also captures direct or indirect action and concerted conduct. It is reproduced in the official Article R. 151-2 text.

The 2026 development concerns the words “marché réglementé”. The decree’s explanatory provisions state that its purpose is to define the procedure for investments in French companies whose shares are admitted to trading on a foreign market by non-European investors. It updates the regulatory architecture rather than replacing the entire French screening statute. The official government announcement describes the concrete effect: a non-EU investor reaching 10% in a sensitive French company listed in France or abroad may need the authorisation of the Minister for the Economy.

This is why the legal headline should be stated carefully. France has not suddenly invented a universal prohibition on every 10% investment. The protected-activity condition remains essential. Nor does every non-EU purchase of a French listed company require a full substantive review. But an overseas listing can no longer be treated as a safe harbour where the target is French and the activity is within the national-security, public-order or strategic sectors identified by the Code.

The decree adds an express market framework through the implementing order of 30 July 2026. The order refers to European Economic Area markets identified through the applicable European framework and to equivalent third-country markets under the financial-markets rules. It also identifies important non-EU venues, including the London Stock Exchange in the United Kingdom, SIX Swiss Exchange, Toronto Stock Exchange, Singapore Exchange, Japan Exchange and Korea Exchange. The transaction question becomes concrete: where exactly are the target’s shares admitted to trading, and is that venue within the regulatory list in force on the transaction date?

The date matters. The decree says it does not apply to investments made during the ten working days following publication and provides that it applies from the eleventh working day. That transitional rule is not a drafting detail. It affects a transaction that was signed, notified, settled or otherwise completed around the changeover. Deal counsel should preserve a dated record of the investment act, not just the signing date, and should test the applicable version of the Code and the market list against that chronology.

B. Why the market-list extension matters to cross-border deal teams

The first consequence is visibility. A French strategic company can have an ordinary-looking foreign quotation while its operations remain deeply connected to French defence, cybersecurity, dual-use technology, telecommunications, space, transport, public health, food security or critical raw materials. Article R. 151-3 lists the protected activities. It covers, among other areas, weapons and dual-use goods, classified defence information, information-system security, defence contracts, cryptology, interception technologies, electronic communications, space operations, health, food security, the press and essential raw materials. The full list is set out in Article R. 151-3.

The second consequence is that a minority transaction can be strategically significant even when the investor has no plan to take control. A 10% voting-rights position may support board influence, an activist campaign, a blocking coalition, access to sensitive information or a later offer. The French screen is designed to identify that point before the investor becomes entrenched. A fund that describes its investment as passive should still review voting agreements, shareholder coordination, board rights, information rights and derivatives that could change the real position.

The third consequence is the need to separate economic exposure from voting rights. The statutory trigger is framed around voting rights, while the transaction may include swaps, options, depositary arrangements, concert-party agreements or instruments that are not immediately recorded in the shareholder register. A buyer should ask whether a derivative or agreement produces an indirect crossing, whether several entities act together, and whether the target’s articles or the applicable market law alter the practical voting position. A clean cap-table percentage is not always the end of the analysis.

The fourth consequence is that the French test can operate before a conventional acquisition agreement exists. A person considering an investment may ask the minister whether the target’s activity falls within the protected perimeter. Article R. 151-4 creates that preliminary mechanism, subject to the target’s consent. In a competitive process, the question can be used to reduce uncertainty before the buyer commits to a price, but the request itself requires disciplined handling of confidentiality, target cooperation and the identity of the intended investor.

The fifth consequence is that a French corporate structure does not automatically provide a European exemption. Articles R. 151-1 and R. 151-2 contain exemptions and special rules for investors established in the European Union or the European Economic Area and for certain control chains. Those exemptions are fact-sensitive. A French subsidiary owned through an EU company may still need a control analysis if the ultimate control sits outside the relevant European perimeter. The compliance file should show the chain rather than merely assert that the immediate purchaser is European.

A useful judicial reference is the Conseil d’État judgment of 3 April 2020, no. 422580, available on Légifrance. The court examined the information required in an application involving an investment fund and explained that “il incombe au demandeur d’indiquer l’identité du gestionnaire du fonds” in the circumstances at issue. The decision is a reminder that the French administration looks through the transaction vehicle to understand who manages and controls the investment. A fund’s internal complexity is not, by itself, a reason to leave the control chain unexplained.

The sixth consequence is political timing. The official government announcement presents the extension as a protection of sensitive French companies listed on foreign regulated markets. That language signals how the administration may view a transaction involving defence capacity, advanced technology, infrastructure or a strategic supply chain. The legal test remains the Code, but the buyer’s industrial plan, governance promises, technology-access arrangements and relationship with a foreign public body may become material to the minister’s assessment.

The seventh consequence is media and disclosure risk. An overseas-listed French target may be subject to the disclosure rules of the foreign venue, while its French screening file is confidential. A public announcement that says “regulatory clearance is not required” without documenting the French analysis can create a contradiction between market messaging and the French legal position. The safer approach is to define the French screening conclusion, its assumptions and its disclosure wording together.

For international investors, the business lesson is straightforward: do not use the listing venue as a proxy for the legal location of the protected activity. Map the operational activity, the French entity, the voting rights, the investor chain and the market list. The new decree makes that mapping more important because a transaction that once appeared to sit outside the listed-company route may now fall inside it.

II. How should a non-EU buyer secure clearance without losing the deal timetable?

A. Which filing route, documents and deadlines apply?

The first route is the dedicated listed-company notification mechanism. Article R. 151-5 provides that, for an operation crossing the 10% voting-rights threshold in a listed French company, a prior notification may allow the investor to benefit from an authorisation exemption if the minister does not oppose it within the statutory period. The official Article R. 151-5 should be read with the current decree and order, because the market definition and the effective date are central to the route.

This route is not a licence to close first and explain later. The notification must be made before the investment event, and the buyer should treat the ten-working-day period as a regulatory standstill for the relevant threshold crossing. “Sauf opposition du ministre” is the key concept: the absence of opposition can produce the statutory exemption, but only if the transaction actually satisfies the route. If the activity, investor, market or acquisition structure is outside the conditions, silence cannot cure the mistake.

The second route is a full authorisation application. It is appropriate where the target’s activity is clearly sensitive, where the transaction includes control or more than 25% of voting rights, where the 10% notification conditions are uncertain, or where the investor wants a formal decision before a complex closing. Under Article R. 151-6, the minister has an initial period of thirty working days to respond. If a further examination is needed, the process can continue for an additional forty-five working days. Silence at the end of the statutory procedure is treated as a rejection, not as a clearance.

Those periods should be built into the acquisition agreement. A buyer can make signing conditional on the preliminary activity analysis, make closing conditional on the notification or authorisation outcome, and allocate responsibility for information requests. The agreement should also address long-stop dates, cooperation obligations, remedies if the minister imposes conditions, and the possibility that the investment will need to be adjusted to remain within the notified structure.

The file should be prepared as an operational document, not a marketing summary. It should identify the investor, the ultimate control chain, the target and each relevant French activity, the percentage and type of voting rights, the market on which the shares trade, the acquisition instruments, the financing, the industrial plan and the effect on French strategic interests. The team should explain whether the investment changes governance, access to technology, production capacity, data, defence supply, research, critical inputs or continuity of service.

The minister can ask a preliminary question about the activity. That may be helpful when the target has several business lines, some of which are ordinary and others potentially protected. The request should identify the activity precisely. “Technology company” is too broad; “supplier of cryptographic modules used in a French defence communication network” is closer to the factual level required for a meaningful answer. The target’s consent and the confidentiality arrangements should be negotiated early.

The European framework matters as well. Regulation (EU) 2019/452 establishes a framework for screening foreign direct investments into the Union, but it does not replace France’s national authorisation regime. The French administration can cooperate with other Member States and the European Commission while maintaining its own decision. The transaction timetable therefore needs room for both the French file and any broader European information exchange. A buyer should not assume that a clearance in another Member State substitutes for the French minister’s decision.

The information burden can be tested against the Conseil d’État’s reasoning in judgment no. 422580. If an investment fund is involved, the French administration needs a coherent explanation of the manager, the controlling persons and any public-body connection relevant to the review. A structure chart should be dated, signed and consistent with the beneficial-ownership documents, financing documents and market disclosures. Inconsistencies are not always fatal, but they create avoidable questions at the moment when the timetable is most exposed.

Before filing, the buyer should perform a document-level quality check. Are the protected activities described by reference to what the French business actually does? Is the 10% calculation made in voting rights rather than only capital? Are concert arrangements included? Are convertible instruments and derivatives addressed? Is the foreign market on the official list? Does the closing mechanism avoid an investment during the transitional window or, if it falls within it, apply the correct version of the rule? Does the investor’s public announcement use language consistent with the application?

The answer to those questions should be recorded. A contemporaneous legal memo can later show why the parties selected notification, preliminary review or full authorisation. It can also identify what changed if the investor increases its position, changes its governance rights or brings in a co-investor. That record is particularly valuable for a listed company, where a position can move quickly through market purchases and where several actors may be alleged to act in concert.

B. What happens if the buyer closes first or the minister imposes conditions?

French law gives the minister significant tools when an investment is made without the required authorisation. Article L. 151-3-1 allows the minister, after giving the investor an opportunity to submit observations, to order the investor to file an application, restore the previous situation or modify the investment. The minister may also suspend voting rights, limit or suspend distributions, restrict the disposition of assets and appoint a representative to ensure compliance. The text and the procedural safeguards are set out in Article L. 151-3-1.

The consequences are therefore wider than an administrative fine. A buyer may own the shares economically but be unable to vote them. It may face limits on dividends or on the use of strategic assets. The minister may require a remedial transaction or a governance change. For an overseas-listed company, those measures can also trigger market disclosure, financing-default and change-of-control issues. The risk should be priced before the first purchase, not discovered after the threshold has been crossed.

Article L. 151-3-2 adds financial penalties for an unauthorised investment, a fraudulent application or a failure to comply with conditions. The maximum can be the highest of twice the value of the irregular investment, 10% of the target’s annual pre-tax turnover, €5 million for a legal person or €1 million for an individual, subject to the statutory calculation. The official provision is available at Article L. 151-3-2. The amount is large enough to change the economics of a transaction that was described internally as a small minority position.

The civil consequence is even more fundamental. Article L. 151-4 states: “Est nul tout engagement, convention ou clause contractuelle” when the investment has not received the required authorisation. In practical terms, a buyer cannot assume that a signed share-purchase agreement is protected merely because the parties have agreed to seek clearance later. The condition precedent, the closing mechanics and the allocation of risk must respect the prior-authorisation principle. The exact provision is available on Légifrance’s Article L. 151-4 page.

If the minister is prepared to authorise the investment, the decision can carry conditions. Article R. 151-8 requires those conditions to respect proportionality: “dans le respect du principe de proportionnalité”. They may protect continuity of operations, security of supply, know-how, internal governance, sensitive information or the integrity of the French business. The minister may also require the sale of shares, assets or a branch to a separate approved entity. The conditions are not a generic promise to behave well; they can reshape the investment and should be reflected in the shareholder agreement.

The minister can refuse authorisation by a reasoned decision. Article R. 151-10 permits the assessment to take account of links between the investor and a foreign government or public body, as well as relevant criminal convictions or sanctions. The point is not that a state-linked investor is automatically excluded. The point is that ownership, financing, governance and strategic alignment are part of the regulatory record. A buyer should explain those links candidly and show how the investment will be governed, financed and operated.

A refusal or condition is not the end of legal protection. The French administrative courts can review the minister’s decision. In Conseil d’État judgment of 23 October 1981, no. 23994, the court stated in the relevant analysis that “Le juge administratif exerce un contrôle normal” over the ministerial assessment in the regime then under review. The legal framework has evolved, so the judgment is not a substitute for analysing the current Code, but it shows why a reasoned administrative record and a precise challenge strategy matter. The decision is available at Légifrance.

Article R. 151-8 also shows why mitigation should be designed before the filing. If the buyer can ring-fence sensitive technology, preserve French production, keep critical contracts under French governance, restrict access to protected information, or maintain an independent compliance committee, those measures may be more persuasive when they are concrete and enforceable. A vague statement that the investment will support France is weaker than a timetable, reporting mechanism, governance covenant and remedy that a minister can monitor.

For a listed-company transaction, the remedial plan should cover market disclosure as well as French compliance. If the buyer is required to reduce voting rights, suspend votes or sell an asset, the parties need to know who will announce the measure, how the foreign market’s rules interact with the French decision, and whether the financing package permits the restructuring. The legal team should coordinate French administrative advice with securities, antitrust, national-security and foreign-investment advice in the investor’s other jurisdictions.

The strongest practical safeguard is sequencing. First, identify the French activity. Second, map the investor and control chain. Third, confirm the exact market and voting-rights calculation. Fourth, use the preliminary mechanism if the activity is genuinely unclear. Fifth, choose notification or full authorisation. Sixth, build the statutory period and information requests into the contract. Seventh, close only after the legal route has produced the protection it promises. That sequence is slower than an unreviewed market purchase, but faster than repairing a prohibited threshold crossing.

Conclusion

France’s 2026 reform is best understood as a change in perimeter and deal visibility. The 10% voting-rights trigger remains part of a wider regime that depends on a French protected activity, a foreign investor and the statutory acquisition event. The new decree makes the rule relevant to French companies listed on specified foreign regulated markets and requires transaction teams to check the market list, effective date and filing route with care.

For a non-EU buyer, the safe conclusion is practical. Do not treat an overseas quotation as a legal escape route. Do not calculate the position only from the immediate purchaser. Do not rely on silence unless the transaction actually qualifies for the notification mechanism. And do not close first: unauthorised investment can lead to injunctions, loss of voting rights, financial penalties, contractual nullity and a forced restructuring. A well-supported French file can instead turn the screening process into a managed condition of the transaction.

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