In February 2026, the criminal chamber of the French Court of Cassation upheld a favourable opinion for the extradition of a Ukrainian national to Ukraine. Two years earlier, the same court had upheld exactly the opposite outcome: a refusal to extradite another Ukrainian to the same country, on the ground that martial law there created a real risk of a flagrant denial of justice. In October 2025, the same court quashed the extradition of an Austrian citizen to Brazil because the French judges had forgotten to warn Austria first. And in June 2025, the EU Court of Justice, answering a French court about a Georgian request, ruled that one Member State’s refusal to extradite does not bind the others. These four rulings, handed down within months of each other, redraw the map of extradition from France to non-EU states. They matter to anyone living in France who is wanted by a country outside the European Union: Ukraine, Georgia, Brazil, the United States, the United Kingdom, Morocco, Algeria, Turkey or any other requesting state. This article explains, from inside French procedure, when France surrenders a person to a third state, when it refuses, and which defences actually work in 2026.
French extradition law starts from a simple statutory base. Where no treaty says otherwise, Article 696 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the conditions, the procedure and the effects of extradition are determined by the provisions of that chapter, in the French text “les conditions, la procédure et les effets de l’extradition sont déterminés par les dispositions du présent chapitre”. The same chapter states that France may surrender any person without French nationality, in the French text “toute personne n’ayant pas la nationalité française”, found on French territory and wanted for prosecution or for the enforcement of a sentence. French nationals are protected by the opposite rule: extradition is not granted when the requested person holds French nationality. A second structural condition is double criminality: extradition is never granted by the French government where the act is not punishable under French law by a criminal or correctional penalty, in the French text “En aucun cas l’extradition n’est accordée par le gouvernement français si le fait n’est pas puni par la loi française d’une peine criminelle ou correctionnelle”. These two filters, nationality and double criminality, decide many cases before human rights even enter the picture. Where they are satisfied, the real fight begins, and it takes place in two courtrooms: the investigating chamber of the court of appeal, which gives a reasoned opinion, and then the Court of Cassation, which reviews it.
Readers looking for the general playbook of an extradition arrest in France, from the red notice to the investigating chamber, can usefully read it alongside our full guide to fighting surrender before the French courts. The present article focuses on what changed in 2025 and 2026 for requests coming from states outside the European Union.
I. When France refuses to extradite to Ukraine and other third states
A. Martial law, derogations and the flagrant denial of justice test
The central human-rights test in French extradition law is statutory. Article 696-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lists the cases in which extradition is not granted, including where the requested person would be tried in the requesting state by a court that does not ensure the fundamental guarantees of procedure and protection of defence rights, in the French text “serait jugée dans l’Etat requérant par un tribunal n’assurant pas les garanties fondamentales de procédure et de protection des droits de la défense”. Courts apply this provision together with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court of Cassation has spelled out the method in a leading 2023 ruling. In a case concerning an Italian request for the enforcement of a life sentence imposed in absentia, the criminal chamber held that a requested state must satisfy itself that the person will not face a flagrant denial of justice, using the short French formula “déni de justice flagrant”, which may result in particular from the impossibility of obtaining a fresh determination of the charge by a court after hearing the person. The decision is Court of Cassation, criminal chamber, 28 March 2023, no. 22-84.382. The same ruling confirms the second great defence, proportionality under Article 8 of the Convention: where the requested person has lived in France for decades, built a family and a stable working life, surrender may constitute a disproportionate interference with private and family life even for offences of exceptional gravity. In that case the person had been continuously present in France for thirty-nine years, had married, had two children and worked, and the Court of Cassation let the unfavourable opinion stand.
The Ukraine cases apply the same test to wartime conditions. After the 2022 invasion, Ukraine notified derogations from its obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and those derogations have been extended since. The French courts had to decide whether surrender to a country under martial law exposes the requested person to a flagrant denial of justice. On 7 November 2023, the Court of Cassation rejected the prosecutor’s appeal against a refusal to extradite a Ukrainian national wanted for aggravated misappropriation of property and money laundering. The decision is published at Court of Cassation, criminal chamber, 7 November 2023, no. 23-82.220. The investigating chamber had found that Ukraine had derogated from its obligations under Articles 5, 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention, that the restrictions on fair-trial rights had amended Article 615 of the Ukrainian Code of Criminal Procedure so that pre-trial detention could be ordered by an authorised officer rather than a judge and investigations could be suspended until the end of martial law, and that these restrictions applied across the whole Ukrainian territory rather than only in occupied areas. The chamber had added that, given the destruction of court buildings and the recommendations to postpone non-urgent cases, a trial within a reasonable time was not guaranteed. The Court of Cassation approved this concrete analysis and concluded that there were serious and corroborated reasons to believe the person would face a real risk of a flagrant denial of justice, using the French formula “risque réel de déni de justice flagrant” supported by “motifs sérieux et avérés”, meaning serious and corroborated reasons.
According to a specialist extradition-law analysis that reproduces the full text of the judgment, the Paris Court of Appeal followed the same path on 29 October 2025 in case no. 2024/10328, again refusing extradition to Ukraine after finding that martial law extends over the entire territory, that Article 615 of the Ukrainian Code of Criminal Procedure permits detention decisions by non-judicial authorities, that non-urgent proceedings are widely suspended, and that the diplomatic assurances offered by Ukraine were too general to compensate for these systemic effects. The analysis is available at Extradition to Ukraine under Scrutiny: Emerging Trends Across Courts in Europe. The same analysis reports a converging trend in Italy, where the Court of Cassation now treats the spread of the conflict as a notorious fact and regards general Ukrainian assurances as insufficient, citing Section VI decisions no. 4828 of 12 November 2025 and no. 1167 of 30 December 2025, and in the Netherlands, where the Rotterdam District Court refused surrender to Ukraine in judgments of 13 October 2025 and 3 March 2026 on detention conditions, air-raid risk and lack of shelter. By contrast, the same analysis notes that a London magistrates’ court in March 2026 refused extradition to Ukraine on family-life grounds while accepting that ordinary law still operated in western Ukraine and that Ukrainian assurances gave concrete guarantees. Europe therefore disagrees with itself, and that disagreement is precisely what makes the French forum matter: the outcome depends on where the requested person is arrested and on what the file contains.
B. Paper assurances are not enough, but files differ: the February 2026 green light
The refusal cases must not be misread as a blanket ban. On 10 February 2026, the Court of Cassation rejected the appeal of a Ukrainian national whose surrender to Ukraine had received a favourable opinion from the Paris investigating chamber. The decision is Court of Cassation, criminal chamber, 10 February 2026, no. 25-86.478. The person was wanted under a Ukrainian arrest warrant for large-scale cannabis cultivation, drug manufacturing and storage, and precursor offences committed in 2020. He argued that martial law and the Ukrainian derogations from the Convention deprived him of the fundamental guarantees of security, procedure and defence rights. The Court of Cassation upheld the investigating chamber because that chamber had done the work: it had ordered further inquiries specifically into the risk of violations of Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention, it had set out the information supplied by the Ukrainian authorities on detention conditions and access to a lawyer, and it had recorded that Ukraine guaranteed the person a fair and public judicial examination within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal, together with defence rights and legal assistance, in the French text “un examen judiciaire équitable et public dans un délai raisonnable par un tribunal indépendant et impartial, ainsi que le droit à la défense et à l’assistance d’un avocat”. The chamber had further noted that only an investigating judge would decide on any pre-trial detention. On that record, the Court of Cassation held that the chamber had sovereignly set aside the alleged risk to fundamental rights.
The lesson for requested persons and their lawyers is direct. French judges no longer accept formulaic references to fair-trial principles; they demand concrete operational guarantees, verified through additional inquiries, covering the place of detention, its compatibility with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, access to counsel, and the judicial character of detention decisions. Where the requesting state supplies that material and the chamber examines it seriously, surrender can proceed even to a country at war. Where the assurances remain general, the chamber issues an unfavourable opinion, and an unfavourable opinion ends the case. Procedurally, the mechanism is strict: where the requested person tells the prosecutor general that he or she does not consent to extradition, the investigating chamber is seised without delay and gives its reasoned opinion on the request, in the French text “la chambre de l’instruction donne son avis motivé sur la demande d’extradition”. An appeal lies against that opinion and the Court of Cassation reviews only whether the formal conditions of its legal existence are met; it does not substitute its own assessment for that of the judges. Defence strategy must therefore be built at the investigating-chamber stage, with evidence, not with rhetoric on appeal: country reports, prison monitoring documents, proof of the concrete detention facility, and targeted questions forcing the requesting state to answer precisely.
II. The European shield: how EU citizens force France to check with their home state
A. Warn the home state first: the Petruhhin mechanism applied in France
A second line of defence exists for citizens of the European Union who are wanted in France by a non-EU state. It comes from the Court of Justice of the European Union. In the Petruhhin judgment of 6 September 2016, case C-182/15, the Court held that where an EU citizen who is a national of one Member State is the subject of a third-state extradition request in another Member State, that state must inform the citizen’s home Member State and, if the home state so requests and is competent to prosecute, surrender the citizen to it under the European Arrest Warrant framework rather than extraditing him or her to the third state. The mechanism flows from the Treaty principles of non-discrimination and Union citizenship. On 15 October 2025, the French Court of Cassation gave this mechanism teeth in a spectacular way. The case concerned an Austrian national arrested in Martinique under an extradition request from Brazil for firearms offences. The investigating chamber of the Fort-de-France court of appeal had issued a favourable opinion without checking whether Austria had ever been informed. The Court of Cassation quashed the entire decision. The ruling is Court of Cassation, criminal chamber, 15 October 2025, no. 24-86.904.
The reasoning deserves close attention because it creates a checklist that French investigating chambers must now follow in every third-state case against an EU citizen. Citing Articles 18 and 21 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the framework decision on the European Arrest Warrant, the Petruhhin judgment and the later By judgment of 17 December 2020, case C-398/19, the Court held that the requested Member State must inform the home state’s competent authorities not only of the existence of the extradition request but of all the legal and factual material supplied by the third state, and must keep them informed of any relevant change in the requested person’s situation. The purpose of this exchange is to put the home state in a position to exercise its sovereign discretion to prosecute the acts itself and to issue a European Arrest Warrant for that purpose. In the Martinique case, the chamber had issued its favourable opinion without ensuring that Austria had been informed of the request, of the material communicated by Brazil, or of its opportunity to consider issuing a European Arrest Warrant. The Court therefore held that the chamber had disregarded the Treaty provisions and quashed the decision in full, remanding the case to a differently composed chamber.
The same decision contains a second warning that matters far beyond extradition technique. The person had been unable to appear because a prison officers’ protest had blocked all extractions that day, and the chamber had ruled in his absence, invoking imperative listing deadlines. The Court of Cassation quashed on this ground too, holding that extradition proceedings open with the questioning of the person concerned and therefore take place in his or her presence, and that the chamber had not justified ruling in absence where the hearing could have been postponed. For requested persons, the practical message is that presence at the hearing is a substantive right, and any favourable opinion given in absence without genuine impossibility is vulnerable on appeal.
B. A refusal in one EU country does not bind France, but France must listen
The newest piece of the puzzle comes from Luxembourg and answers a question French practitioners had asked for years. Suppose Belgium has already refused to extradite a person to Georgia on fundamental-rights grounds. Can France, seised of a Georgian request against the same person for the same sentence, simply surrender him? The Montpellier court of appeal put exactly this question to the Court of Justice in case C-219/25, known as Kamekris: a Greek and Georgian national, convicted in absentia in Georgia to life imprisonment for large-scale organised cocaine trafficking, preparation of group murder and illegal firearms possession, whose extradition had already been refused by a Belgian court on the ground of denial of justice and inhuman-treatment risks. Montpellier asked whether the Treaty provisions on judicial cooperation require France to follow Belgium’s refusal. On 19 June 2025 the Court answered, as reported by the Max Planck Institute’s European criminal-law review at ECJ: No Obligation for Mutual Recognition of Decision Taken in Favour of a Person Requested for Extradition to a Third Country, docketed in Luxembourg as case C-219/25. The Court held that an authority of a Member State is not obliged to give mutual recognition to another Member State’s decision refusing extradition to a third state, but that it must take due account of the reasons for that earlier decision when it assesses itself whether surrender would breach fundamental rights.
For the defence, this ruling is a double-edged instrument that must be used actively. On one side, a Belgian, German or Spanish refusal is not a passport: France examines the Georgian, Ukrainian, Brazilian or other request afresh, and the requesting state will try to fill the gaps identified by the first court with fresh assurances. On the other side, the French chamber cannot pretend the earlier refusal does not exist; it must engage with its reasons, and the defence can file the foreign judgment, translate its decisive passages, and force the chamber to explain why the same risk would not materialise after surrender from France. Combined with the Petruhhin mechanism, the strategy becomes threefold: first, demand that the home Member State be fully informed so that a European Arrest Warrant alternative exists; second, import the reasoning of any earlier EU refusal and require the chamber to answer it point by point; third, attack the concreteness of the requesting state’s assurances with the French case law on martial law, detention and trial delay. Each of these steps has a hook in a 2025 or 2026 decision, which is what makes them quotable before the chamber rather than merely arguable.
Two final procedural points complete the picture. First, time works differently in extradition: the investigating chamber must give its opinion within one month of the person’s appearance unless further inquiries are ordered, which is why defence requests for additional information must be filed early and precisely, identifying the exact guarantee that is missing. Second, the Court of Cassation’s review is formal but real: it verifies that the opinion answers the essential arguments in the parties’ briefs with reasons free of insufficiency and contradiction, and it quashes where the chamber skips a mandatory step, as the Martinique case shows. An extradition file is therefore won or lost on the completeness of the record built before the investigating chamber, not on general speeches about the requesting country.
Conclusion
French extradition law in 2026 is neither open nor closed to third states; it is conditional, and the conditions are now written in very recent ink. Surrender to Ukraine can be refused where martial law and derogations create a real risk of a flagrant denial of justice, as the Chambéry chamber and the Court of Cassation held in November 2023 and as Paris confirmed in October 2025, yet it can be granted where the requesting state provides concrete, verified guarantees on detention, counsel and judicial control, as the Court of Cassation confirmed in February 2026. Surrender of an EU citizen to any third state can be quashed where France forgot to inform the home state, as the Martinique ruling of October 2025 demonstrates. And a refusal pronounced in another Member State does not automatically protect the person in France, but it forces the French judges to confront its reasons, as the Court of Justice ruled in June 2025. For anyone arrested in France under a foreign warrant, the consequence is practical: check nationality and double criminality first, then build the human-rights record early, demand the home-state notification where Union citizenship applies, and import every earlier European refusal into the French file. The courts have set the tests; the files that meet them are the files that win.