On 9 October 2026, a published case update from a London extradition practice (UK Extradition Lawyer blog, 9 October 2026) reported a striking development: in a case where France sought the surrender of a man convicted in his absence to serve a two-year prison sentence, the Crown Prosecution Service told the High Court that the National Crime Agency had reported the French arrest warrant as withdrawn. Formal confirmation and the resulting court order were still awaited, and the update gave no reasons from the French authorities. But the defence theory that preceded the withdrawal is what makes this case a landmark for anyone facing a French warrant in Britain. The man had spent seven days in custody and then lived under an electronically monitored curfew, every evening from 7pm to 6am, continuously since 31 August 2024. An opinion from a Paris Bar lawyer stated that, under French law, that custody and curfew time was fully deductible from the French custodial sentence, so that by September 2026 the credit had swallowed the entire two-year term and nothing remained to serve. The argument was no longer that extradition would be disproportionate in some vague sense. It was that there was nothing left to enforce. This article explains, from the French-law side, how a surrender case between France and the United Kingdom works after Brexit, what a London judge examines before ordering removal to France, and how time spent under a British tag can, in the right conditions, extinguish a French sentence altogether.
I. Arrested in London on a French warrant after Brexit: how the surrender machinery works
A. What a London judge checks before sending someone to France
Since 1 January 2021, extradition between France and the United Kingdom no longer runs on the European Arrest Warrant. It runs on the surrender agreement in Title VII of Part Three of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, which, as the House of Lords European Union Committee observed, broadly replicates the arrangements the United Kingdom formerly knew under the European Arrest Warrant, with direct transmission of warrants between judicial authorities preserved. The British implementing legislation is the Extradition Act 2003, whose Part 1 now covers warrants from the European Union’s Member States and, through the same machinery, the TCA arrest warrants issued by France. The first thing to understand is therefore terminological but consequential: a French request to London is an arrest warrant under an international treaty, executed by a British judge under a domestic statute, and every paragraph of that statute is a potential battleground.
The Westminster magistrate who sees the arrested person first applies the statutory filter in section 11 of the Extradition Act 2003. In substance the court asks whether the same facts were already judged, whether politics taints the request, whether delay has made surrender unjust, and whether specialty protection or a stronger British forum stands in the way. Each of these shields has French ramifications. Double jeopardy connects to the French ne bis in idem case law discussed below. Extraneous considerations cover prosecution for political opinions. Speciality means the person, once surrendered, may in principle be prosecuted only for the offences in the warrant. And the forum bar allows the British judge to refuse surrender where a substantial part of the conduct occurred in the United Kingdom and the British courts are the more appropriate forum, a provision that matters greatly in cross-border fraud and drug cases where the French file and the British connections overlap.
Then comes the human-rights stage, which is where most French cases are really fought. Section 21 of the Extradition Act 2003 creates a binary human-rights test: incompatibility with Convention rights means the person walks free, compatibility means removal to France The Convention right most often in play is Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which guards private and family life, home and correspondence, permitting only lawful interference that a democratic society genuinely needs, crime prevention being one recognised aim. Removal to France to serve a sentence that has arguably already been served, tearing the person away from an established private and family life in Britain, is exactly the kind of interference whose justification collapses when the sentence arithmetic turns in the defence’s favour. That is why the 9 October 2026 case paired the French-law credit argument with Article 8: the two arguments multiply each other, because the proportionality balance depends on what is actually left to enforce.
Above the statute sits the treaty itself, and 2026 brought important judicial clarification of how it works. On 23 April 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union, Third Chamber, gave judgment in Case C-528/24 Boothnesse, on arrest warrants issued on the basis of the TCA for surrender to the United Kingdom. The Court recalled that, through Article 524(2) of the TCA, cooperation never displaces the fundamental-rights safeguards of the ECHR and the Charter that bind the executing court, and that the executing judicial authorities of the Member States must therefore ensure respect for the fundamental rights of the person sought. The logic runs in both directions: within the TCA system, surrender is a rights-constrained procedure, and refusal grounds are those arising from the agreement itself. On the facts of that case, the Court held that the specialty rules in Article 625 do not on their own justify refusing a prosecution warrant because of an unrelated domestic sentence for conduct outside that warrant. Speciality, in other words, is not a free-standing escape hatch; but fundamental rights, channelled through Article 524(2), remain the hard limit on every surrender decision. For the defence team in London, the practical consequence is clear: gather evidence of the foreign law, frame it as a rights question, and force the requesting state to answer.
B. What Paris must get right for a French warrant to survive in London
The French side of the equation begins with who issues the warrant and how. Under Article Article 695-16 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure, “Le ministère public près la juridiction d’instruction, de jugement ou d’application des peines ayant décerné un mandat d’arrêt met celui-ci à exécution sous la forme d’un mandat d’arrêt européen soit à la demande de la juridiction, soit d’office, selon les règles et sous les conditions déterminées par les articles 695-12 à 695-15” In plain English: the French public prosecutor attached to the court that issued the domestic arrest warrant converts it into a European or treaty arrest warrant, at the court’s request or on his own motion. A French warrant is therefore a prosecutorial act built on a prior judicial warrant, and any defect in the underlying domestic warrant, any failure to respect the issuing conditions, can be attacked both in France and before the executing judge. Defence lawyers in London routinely ask their Paris counterparts to audit the French file for exactly this reason, and repeated approaches to the French prosecuting authorities seeking withdrawal of the warrant are part of the standard playbook, as the October 2026 case illustrates.
A large share of French warrants executed in London concern convictions pronounced in the defendant’s absence, and French law on default judgments is unusually protective once it is properly invoked. Before the cour d’assises, Article Article 379-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that an accused who is absent without a valid excuse at the opening of the hearing “est jugé par défaut”, is tried by default. Before the correctional courts, the remedy is the opposition: Article 489 provides that “Le jugement par défaut est non avenu dans toutes ses dispositions, si le prévenu forme opposition à son exécution”, meaning the default judgment is deemed never to have existed in any of its provisions if the defendant lodges an opposition to its enforcement. A person surrendered to France after a conviction in absentia therefore has, in many configurations, the right to a fresh trial on opposition, and the European Court of Human Rights has long required that anyone convicted in absentia without knowledge of the proceedings must have the right to a retrial. The London argument writes itself: surrender to face a procedure that offers a full retrial is one thing, and British judges know it; surrender to enforce, without any retrial, a stale in-absentia sentence for 2014-2015 conduct, after years of compliant curfew, is quite another. The distinction between a warrant for prosecution and a warrant for execution of a sentence structures the entire defence.
It also structures French executing-side case law, which is directly instructive because France applies the same analytical framework when it receives warrants. On 29 July 2026, the Criminal Chamber of the Cour de cassation, in decision no. 26-84.072 on a Romanian European Arrest Warrant, rejected a surrender challenge and clarified three points of general importance. First, on procedure: “L’audition de la personne recherchée en vertu d’un mandat d’arrêt européen par la chambre de l’instruction, en application de l’article 695-30 du code de procédure pénale, ne vise qu’à constater son identité, à recevoir ses observations sur le déroulement de la procédure dont elle fait l’objet et à lui permettre de consentir ou non à sa remise, de sorte que cette formalité est préliminaire à tout débat.” The hearing before the chambre de l’instruction is preliminary, limited to identity, observations and consent. Second, on successive warrants: a 2023 final refusal concerning a distinct earlier warrant could not block examination of the new warrant, for want of identical subject matter. Third, and most importantly for London practitioners, on ne bis in idem: “la procédure relative à l’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen émis en vue de l’exécution d’une décision de condamnation ne constitue pas une poursuite nouvelle pour les faits objet de cette condamnation, de sorte que le principe ne bis in idem ne lui est pas applicable.” Executing a sentence is not a new prosecution, so double-jeopardy arguments must be aimed at the right target: not the surrender procedure itself, but the question whether the sentence still exists to be executed. That is precisely the curfew-credit argument, and it leads to the second half of this article.
For completeness, readers should know that outside the European Union and the TCA, France surrenders and requests under the classic extradition regime of Articles 696-2 to 696-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a regime worth comparing because it shows the philosophy behind the French rules. Article Article 696-2 states that the French government may surrender to foreign governments any person without French nationality who is prosecuted or convicted abroad and found on French soil. Article Article 696-3 sets the thresholds: offences punishable under the requesting state’s law by at least two years’ imprisonment, or, for convicted persons, a pronounced sentence of at least two months. And Article Article 696-4 lists the mandatory refusals: “L’extradition n’est pas accordée : 1° Lorsque la personne réclamée a la nationalité française, cette dernière étant appréciée à l’époque de l’infraction pour laquelle l’extradition est requise ; 2° Lorsque le crime ou le délit à un caractère politique ou lorsqu’il résulte des circonstances que l’extradition est demandée dans un but politique”, with further bars for offences committed on French territory and for cases already finally judged in France. France never extradites its own nationals, never for political offences, and never where its own courts have finally decided the case. Within the TCA, the nationality bar works differently, since Member States may refuse to surrender their own nationals but France declared it would surrender French nationals to the United Kingdom under conditions of return to serve the sentence in France. And when the person sought in France does not consent, Article Article 696-15 provides that the chambre de l’instruction is seized without delay and gives a reasoned opinion on the request. The architecture is consistent: a judicial filter, reasoned decisions, and review by the Cour de cassation, whose 2026 decisions show a court fully engaged with the Luxembourg case law, including the CJEU’s Breian judgment of 29 July 2024 on successive warrants.
II. When the sentence itself defeats the surrender: how a British curfew can extinguish a French prison term
A. How France counts time served abroad: detention, electronic monitoring and the deduction rule
French sentencing law starts from a simple and generous principle. Article Article 716-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that pre-trial detention, at whatever stage of the proceedings, “est intégralement déduite de la durée de la peine prononcée”, is fully deducted from the duration of the pronounced sentence. The deduction is total, automatic, and it extends, as the same article and the case law confirm, to detention suffered abroad in execution of a European arrest warrant. But the decisive extension for the London cases concerns measures that are not imprisonment in a cell: house arrest with electronic monitoring. Article Article 142-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows the investigating judge or the judge of freedoms and detention to order “l’assignation a residence avec surveillance electronique”, house arrest with electronic surveillance, for a person facing at least two years’ imprisonment, obliging the person to remain at home except on the judge’s conditions. And Article Article 142-11 then states the consequence: “L’assignation à résidence avec surveillance électronique est assimilée à une détention provisoire pour l’imputation intégrale de sa durée sur celle d’une peine privative de liberté, conformément à l’article 716-4” House arrest with electronic monitoring counts as pre-trial detention and is fully credited against any custodial sentence. The question that decides London cases is whether a British electronically monitored curfew, imposed as a bail condition during extradition proceedings, can be assimilated to that French measure even though English law itself gives no credit for curfew time under nine hours a day.
The Cour de cassation answered yes, in a decision that every lawyer handling a French warrant in London should know by heart. On 17 March 2021, in decision no. 20-84.365, the Criminal Chamber upheld a Paris appeal court’s ruling that a period spent in the United Kingdom under an electronically monitored curfew had to be fully deducted from French prison sentences. The facts were made for the principle: after thirty-two days of detention, the persons concerned had been released on bail with a curfew at their residence from 10pm to 5am, electronically controlled, plus exclusion zones, a daily check-in at the police station, a permanently worn ankle tag, and a telephone required to be switched on at all times. The Paris court had reasoned from the CJEU’s JZ judgment of 28 July 2016 (C-294/16 PPU) on Article 26(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584, under which, in the Court’s words as recalled by the French judges, “la notion de « détention », au sens de cette disposition, désigne une mesure non pas restrictive, mais privative de liberté, qui ne prend pas nécessairement la forme d’une situation d’enfermement et qu’il convient d’examiner la mesure litigieuse, pour déterminer si, en raison de son genre, de sa durée, de ses effets et de ses modalités d’exécution, elle revêt un tel degré d’intensité qu’elle est de nature à priver la personne concernée de sa liberté de manière comparable à une incarcération.” Detention, in the European sense, is any deprivation of liberty comparable to imprisonment in kind, duration, effects and execution arrangements, not necessarily a locked cell. Applying that test, the French judges held that even though English law deducts nothing for a curfew under nine hours a day, “il y a lieu de l’assimiler, en droit français, à une mesure d’assignation à résidence sous surveillance électronique qui n’opère aucune distinction selon la durée quotidienne de l’obligation de rester au domicile.” French house arrest makes no distinction based on the daily hours, so the British curfew maps onto it. The court added that “l’article 142-11 du code de procédure pénale français prévoit que l’assignation à résidence avec surveillance électronique est assimilée à une détention provisoire pour l’imputation intégrale de sa durée sur celle d’une peine privative de liberté et que l’article 716-4 du même code, auquel il renvoie, ne distingue pas selon que la mesure de détention provisoire est effectuée en France ou qu’elle est imposée sous la forme d’une incarcération provisoire, en exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen, lorsqu’il prévoit cette déduction.” The Cour de cassation rejected the prosecution’s appeal, confirming that the court of appeal, “apres un debat contradictoire”, after adversarial debate, and on the basis of the detailed information supplied in particular by the executing state’s authorities, had justified treating the British measures as French house arrest with electronic monitoring deductible under Article Article 142-11. Three practical lessons follow. First, the credit is a matter for the law of the issuing state, France, not the executing state: what London does not count, Paris may count in full. Second, the intensity test is global: tag, curfew hours, check-ins, exclusion zones and phone obligations are weighed together, so the defence must document every restriction in granular detail. Third, the information must come through proper channels, with the executing authorities’ records of the exact measures, because the French judge decides after adversarial examination of that material.
The 2021 decision concerned a European Arrest Warrant, but its reasoning transfers naturally to TCA warrants, since the deduction rules of Article 142-11 and Article 716-4 belong to French domestic sentencing law and apply regardless of the instrument under which the person was detained abroad. And the October 2026 London facts fit the template almost exactly: seven days of custody plus an uninterrupted 7pm-to-6am electronic curfew running since 31 August 2024, an eleven-hour nightly restriction far above the seven-hour British measure credited in 2021, applied against a two-year sentence until, on the Paris lawyer’s computation, nothing remained. Whether the French prosecution ultimately agreed with that computation or withdrew for other reasons is unknown, the published update being explicit that no reasons were given and confirmation was pending. But the legal mechanism is now demonstrated end to end: French deduction law, proved by expert opinion in London, converts dead bail time into served sentence, and the requesting state is forced to reconsider whether it is asking for the surrender of a person with nothing left to serve.
B. Can a British curfew stop a French extradition: the London litigation playbook
The first step is evidential, and it must be French. A London court will not take counsel’s word for French sentencing law; it requires a reasoned opinion from a French-qualified lawyer, updated as the curfew months accumulate, computing the credit against the exact sentence in the warrant. In the October 2026 case that opinion came from a Paris Bar lawyer acting for the client in France, and its form is worth copying: it identified the sentence, the custody days, the curfew start date and daily hours, the uninterrupted duration, and the conclusion that the credit had exceeded the sentence by September 2026. The opinion should annex the French provisions in their current version, Article 142-5, Article 142-11 and Article 716-4, the 17 March 2021 decision no. 20-84.365 of the Cour de cassation, and the CJEU’s JZ ruling, so that the British judge sees a complete chain from treaty to code to supreme court. Parallel requests should go to the French prosecuting authority, through French counsel, asking for withdrawal of the warrant or for an alternative mechanism, because a withdrawal, as the October 2026 update shows, ends the case without a contested hearing, and prosecutors who receive a rigorous computation sometimes prefer to withdraw rather than defend an empty enforcement request.
The second step is procedural: getting the evidence before the right British court at the right time. After an extradition order, the route is appeal to the High Court, and where the French-law computation matures after the order, as it naturally does while curfew months accrue, the defence proceeds by fresh-evidence application, exactly as in the October 2026 case, where permission to appeal had been refused on the papers in March 2026 and the battle continued through a renewed application listed for 13 October. The reported defence authorities, A v France in 2022, Doga v France in 2023 and Prisacari v France in 2025, form the High Court line on the weight of electronically monitored curfew in French cases, and the earlier N.C. v France withdrawal in May 2026 shows the same chambers securing discharge by the same method. The argument has two layers that must be kept distinct. The narrow layer is arithmetic: the sentence described in the warrant no longer reflects any subsisting custodial liability. The wider layer is Article 8 proportionality: removing a person from an established private and family life in Britain to enforce a sentence already exhausted is, on the defence submission, a fundamental alteration of the balance the court struck when it ordered extradition. Judges respond to this structure because it is falsifiable: either the French computation holds, in which case enforcement is pointless, or it fails, in which case the Article 8 claim is assessed on its own terms.
The third step is the endgame, and it has three possible exits. The best is withdrawal of the warrant by France, communicated through the National Crime Agency to the Crown Prosecution Service and recorded by the High Court, which is the outcome reportedly achieved days before the 13 October hearing in the October 2026 case. The second is discharge by the High Court on Article 8 grounds, with the French-law evidence doing the decisive work in the proportionality assessment. The third, often overlooked, is action in France itself: opposition to the default judgment where the conviction was pronounced in absentia, which renders the judgment non-existent and reopens the case for a full trial, or an application to the French sentence-enforcement judge to record the credit formally. Readers in the converse position, arrested in France on a British TCA warrant, as in the Kinahan cartel surrender litigation between Dubai, Dublin and France or the Tate brothers extradition hearings, face a mirror image: the French chambre de l’instruction examines identity, consent and refusal grounds, and the Cour de cassation reviews, with the 29 July 2026 decision no. 26-84.072 showing how strictly the court reads successive warrants, fundamental-rights complaints and ne bis in idem pleas. In both directions, the lesson of October 2026 is the same: the sentence in the warrant is a starting figure, not a final one, and the lawyer who computes what has actually been served, under the law of the state that will enforce it, holds the key to the case.
Conclusion
The reported withdrawal of a French arrest warrant in London in October 2026 is not an anecdote about one man’s luck. It is the visible tip of a legal structure that rewards preparation: a treaty that makes surrender fast but rights-constrained, a British statute that tests every extradition against statutory bars and Convention rights, and a French sentencing code that credits electronic monitoring in full, including monitoring suffered abroad. The Cour de cassation’s 17 March 2021 decision proves that a British curfew can count as French detention. The Criminal Chamber’s 29 July 2026 decision proves that Paris and Luxembourg police the boundaries of successive warrants and fundamental-rights review. And the CJEU’s 23 April 2026 Boothnesse ruling confirms that within the TCA, fundamental rights are the ultimate limit on surrender. Anyone arrested in London on a French warrant, or arrested in France on a British one, should therefore do three things at once: commission a reasoned French-law opinion on sentence credit without delay, preserve every record of custody, curfew, tag data and check-ins from the first day, and open a channel to the issuing prosecution for withdrawal alongside the courtroom challenge. Enforcement requests describe the past. Sentence arithmetic decides the future. When the credit has swallowed the sentence, there is nothing left to surrender for, and even the most determined requesting state must eventually agree.