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Sanctioned for Signing an Arrest Warrant: French ICC Judge Nicolas Guillou, US Sanctions and What France Can Do

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Sanctioned for Signing an Arrest Warrant: French ICC Judge Nicolas Guillou, US Sanctions and What France Can Do

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On 20 August 2025, the United States placed a sitting French judge on its financial blacklist. Nicolas Guillou, judge in the Trial Division of the International Criminal Court in The Hague, was designated under Executive Order 14203 for having ruled to authorise the arrest warrants issued for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant. Fourteen months later, the case has become the sharpest test of what judicial independence means when a great power answers a court decision with sanctions. On 9 October 2026, Washington designated the Court itself as an institution, and on 13 October 2026 France publicly condemned the move while naming its judge: Paris recalled that the American measures adopted on the basis of the presidential decree of 6 February 2025 had targeted judges and staff, including French judge Nicolas Guillou, before striking the institution as a whole. For an international audience, the questions are practical. What does an American listing change in the daily life of a French magistrate based in the Netherlands. Can a judge be punished by a foreign state for an act performed in his judicial capacity. And what can France, the European Union and private parties that deal with the Court concretely do now, from Paris courtrooms to bank compliance departments. This analysis answers each of these questions from the texts in force, with the exact references a practitioner needs.

I. Why is a French ICC judge on the American sanctions list and what does the listing do to him

A. What Washington reproaches Nicolas Guillou for and how the designation works in practice

The American designation is dated 20 August 2025. On that day, the State Department announced sanctions against four members of the International Criminal Court, acting under Executive Order 14203, which authorises sanctions against foreign persons engaged in certain action by the Court described by Washington as directed against the United States and Israel. The four names were Judge Kimberly Prost of Canada, Judge Nicolas Yann Guillou of France, Deputy Prosecutor Nazhat Shameem Khan and Deputy Prosecutor Mame Mandiaye Niang. The official reason given for each person was individual. According to the State Department fact sheet of 20 August 2025, Prost was designated for ruling to authorise the investigation into American personnel in Afghanistan, while the stated reason for Guillou was his ruling authorising the issuance of the arrest warrants for the Israeli prime minister and the former defence minister. The two deputy prosecutors were designated for continuing to support the same arrest warrants after taking up their functions in the Office of the Prosecutor.

The Guillou designation therefore punishes a ruling, not personal conduct. Nicolas Guillou sat in the Pre-Trial Chamber that authorised the warrants of 21 November 2024. France 24, reporting the designations with Agence France-Presse, recalled that Guillou is a veteran jurist who had worked for several years in the United States assisting the Justice Department with judicial cooperation during the presidency of Barack Obama, and that the case in which the warrants were issued was brought forward by the State of Palestine, which has acceded to the Rome Statute unlike Israel or the United States. The same reporting noted that the United States would bar entry of the sanctioned judges to American territory and block any property they hold in the American economy, measures more often taken against adversaries of the United States than against nationals of close allies. A Canadian judge, two deputy prosecutors from Fiji and Senegal, and earlier rounds of designations in June 2025 completed a list that the Court itself presented on 9 October 2026 as a series of designations against thirteen independent judges and prosecutors serving the cause of justice.

The concrete effects of the listing follow the standard mechanics of the American Specially Designated Nationals regime. The State Department fact sheet describes the standard blocking mechanics: property and interests in property of the listed persons that are in the United States or held or controlled by American persons are frozen and must be reported to the Treasury sanctions office, and any entity owned half or more, directly or indirectly, by one or more listed persons is frozen on the same basis. In practice, the designation does not freeze assets in France or in the Netherlands by itself, because American sanctions have no direct effect on French territory. Their force is extraterritorial and indirect: any bank, payment service, online travel agency or insurer with American activities, American branches or dollar clearing will refuse the listed person as a client rather than risk secondary penalties. Interviewed by the German broadcaster DW in July 2026, Judge Guillou described a daily life under sanctions in which major payment services, online travel booking and routine banking operations had become difficult or impossible, while he continued to sit and to work. The listing is therefore less a courtroom event than an administrative stranglehold on ordinary life, designed to make the judicial function materially painful to exercise.

Two features make the Guillou file unprecedented for a French lawyer. First, the designation targets a judge for the content of a judicial decision, a ruling to authorise warrants, which in every rule-of-law system is covered by judicial immunity and can only be challenged by appeal, never by executive retaliation. Second, the targeted judge is a French national elected by the Assembly of States Parties, whose country of nationality is a founding supporter of the Court and the host of no American investigation. Paris therefore faces the situation from two sides at once: as the State Party that owes cooperation to the Court, and as the home state of one of the sanctioned judges, which owes him diplomatic protection. Before examining what France can do, the legal question must be settled: what immunity covers an international judge against a foreign sanctions measure, and who can waive it.

B. Can a foreign state punish an international judge for a judicial act and what immunity Article 48 of the Rome Statute provides

The starting point is the treaty that created the Court. The Rome Statute, signed on 18 July 1998, devotes its Article 48 to privileges and immunities. Its first paragraph states the institutional principle that the Court enjoys, on the territory of each State Party, the privileges and immunities needed to fulfil its purposes. Its second paragraph extends the protection to the individuals who render justice: judges, prosecutor, deputy prosecutors and registrar enjoy, when acting for the Court, the same privileges and immunities as heads of diplomatic missions, and they keep immunity from any legal process for words spoken or written and acts performed in their official capacity even after leaving office. A ruling to authorise arrest warrants is the archetype of an act performed in an official capacity. The immunity therefore covers exactly what the American designation punishes.

The same article organises the only lawful exit from that protection. Paragraph 5 reserves any waiver concerning a judge or the prosecutor to an absolute majority of the judges, and assigns the waiver power for other officials to the Presidency, the Prosecutor or the Registrar according to their functions. No waiver concerning Judge Guillou has been adopted or even suggested. The detailed regime is completed by the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the Court, which gives effect to Article 48 in the domestic order of the States Parties. The consequence is straightforward: under the law of the States Parties, including France and the Netherlands, no legal process of any kind can be directed against the judge for words spoken or written and acts performed in his official capacity, and a foreign executive measure that attaches consequences to such an act has no legal effect on French or Dutch territory. It can only bite through the private compliance reflexes of operators exposed to the American market, which is a question of banking practice and risk appetite, not a question of law.

French domestic law confirms the direction of the obligation. Article 627 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure provides: « Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre. » The cooperation machinery follows in the articles of the same title, each of which designates the French authority competent to execute the Court’s requests. Article 627-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that « Les demandes d’entraide émanant de la Cour pénale internationale sont adressées aux autorités compétentes en vertu de l’article 87 du statut en original ou en copie certifiée conforme accompagnées de toutes pièces justificatives. » Article 627-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure entrusts execution to the anti-terrorism public prosecutor or to the Paris investigating judge acting across the national territory, and provides that the records drawn up in execution of these requests are sent to the Court. The symmetry is complete: the same French legal order that executes the Court’s requests protects the judges who issue them, and nothing in French law gives effect to a foreign sanction directed against a judicial act covered by Article 48.

The American demands addressed to the Court collide with a second treaty wall. Article 27 of the Rome Statute, on the irrelevance of official capacity, provides that the Statute applies equally to everyone regardless of official position, so that serving as head of state, government member or official never exempts a person from criminal responsibility nor reduces the sentence, and that immunities attached to official capacity under national or international law do not prevent the Court from exercising jurisdiction. The warrants of 21 November 2024 were issued on that basis, and only the judges of the Court can withdraw, amend or declare them moot through a judicial decision on jurisdiction, admissibility or the merits. A sanctions designation, even directed against the institution itself, cannot cancel a warrant, close an investigation or rewrite the Statute. It can only raise the cost of running the institution, which is precisely why the French and European response has moved to the terrain of practical support, as the second part of this analysis explains.

II. What France and Europe can concretely do for their judge and for everyone who works with the Court

A. What Paris has said since 13 October 2026 and which levers remain: diplomatic protection, European coordination and the blocking statute debate

The French position was stated on 13 October 2026 by the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs in a communiqué that names the judge and condemns the whole sanctions sequence. Paris declared that France condemns the American institutional sanctions against the Court, recalling that the measures taken under the presidential decree of 6 February 2025 had so far struck judges and staff, including French judge Nicolas Guillou, before reaching the institution itself. The statement then called on the United States to withdraw the sanctions, reaffirmed unwavering support for the Court and its staff, and recalled that the role of the Court remains essential in the fight against impunity. Finally, it described joint work with European partners and the other States Parties to the Rome Statute to keep the Court able to carry out its mission independently and impartially for the victims of the gravest crimes. Three points matter for practitioners. The condemnation covers both the individual designations and the institutional one. The call for withdrawal is addressed to Washington as a political demand, not as a legal remedy, because no French court can annul an American executive order. And the operational work is explicitly European and multilateral, conducted with the partners of the Union and the other States Parties.

The Court answered the institutional designation in the same week with unusual gravity. Its press release of 9 October 2026 opened by noting that the United States had imposed sanctions on the Court as an institution, an unprecedented step following the designations of thirteen independent judges and prosecutors. The presidency warned that the measure targets an independent judicial institution created by treaty and entrusted by 125 States Parties with investigating and prosecuting genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression, and it called on the States to take concrete action so that the Court keeps the means to continue its work. The president of the Court added that it would continue to discharge its mandate independently and impartially, on the basis of law and evidence alone, for the victims of grave crimes. The United Nations Secretary-General condemned the new sanctions as a serious blow, United Nations experts described them as an assault on the administration of justice, and the European Union’s foreign policy chief spoke of a window for dialogue. The Belgian foreign minister raised the prospect that the Union could activate its blocking statute, the regulation that forbids European operators from complying with certain foreign sanctions and allows them to recover damages caused by such compliance. That prospect, already mentioned in the analysis of the institutional designation published on this site, deserves a precise explanation, because it is the only instrument that would directly protect a French bank that keeps the account of a sanctioned judge or processes a transfer for the Court.

France holds three distinct levers, and they should not be confused. The first is diplomatic protection of its national. As the home state of Judge Guillou, France can protest the designation through diplomatic channels, raise the case in every bilateral contact, support the judge’s practical needs through its embassy in The Hague, and coordinate consular assistance with the Netherlands as the host state. Diplomatic protection does not annul the American measure, but it documents the breach of Article 48 in the relations between the two states and sustains the political cost of maintaining it. The second lever is European. Within the Union, France can push for a common position of the Council, for financial support mechanisms that keep the Court’s operations funded when commercial banks hesitate to process its payments, and for the examination of the blocking statute route evoked by Belgium. The blocking statute was conceived for other sanctions programmes, and extending its protection to the Court’s situation would require a deliberate political decision with complex drafting, but the debate itself already signals to compliance departments that European law may forbid them from closing the account of a judge listed for a judicial act. The third lever is judicial and domestic. France can publicly confirm, by circular or by parliamentary answer, that American designations have no effect in the French legal order, that no French authority will execute them, and that the cooperation machinery of Articles 627 to 627-20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure continues to apply in full. Each lever works on a different plane, diplomatic, European and domestic, and only their combination restores to the sanctioned judge something close to a normal professional life.

Readers who want the full picture of the institutional designation of 9 October 2026, the 180-day grace period running to April 2027 and the American demands concerning the warrants and the Afghanistan investigation will find it in our companion analysis of the American ultimatum to the Court and what France still owes it, which examines the cooperation obligations for arrests, surrenders and frozen assets on French soil. The present article focuses on the other half of the file: the fate of the French judge as a person, the immunity that covers him, and the shields that Paris and Brussels can raise around him and around everyone whose profession brings them into contact with the Court.

B. What changes in practice for French banks, lawyers, NGOs and victims’ counsel who deal with the Court

The first practical question concerns money. A French bank that holds the account of a listed judge, or that processes a transfer from the Court to a French expert, witness counsel or victims’ representative, faces two opposite pressures. On one side, the American rules described above block property in American possession or control and extend the block to entities owned 50 percent or more by a blocked person, and correspondent banks in dollars may threaten to cut ties with any institution that serves a listed client. On the other side, French and European law give no effect to the American listing, anti-discrimination and account-closure rules constrain arbitrary termination, and the general principles of the French banking relationship require notice and a legitimate reason for closure. No French text orders a bank to freeze the assets of Judge Guillou, and the French freezing machinery that does exist serves the opposite purpose: Article 627-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that « L’exécution sur le territoire français des mesures conservatoires mentionnées au k du paragraphe 1 de l’article 93 du statut est ordonnée, aux frais avancés du Trésor et selon les modalités prévues par le présent code, par le procureur de la République antiterroriste. » The same article adds that « La durée maximale de ces mesures est limitée à deux ans. » French freezing measures therefore run at the request of the Court, ordered by the anti-terrorism prosecutor, for a maximum of two years renewable, and never at the request of a foreign sanctions authority acting against the Court’s own judges. A bank that would invoke the American listing to close the account of a French judge residing in the Netherlands for acts covered by Article 48 of the Rome Statute would have to explain that decision before a French court, where the listing has no legal value and the immunity has full value.

The second practical question concerns the criminal procedure that continues in Paris regardless of the sanctions. France remains bound to execute the Court’s requests for arrest and surrender, and the sanctions change nothing in that procedure. Article 627-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that « Les demandes d’arrestation aux fins de remise délivrées par la Cour pénale internationale sont adressées, en original et accompagnées de toutes pièces justificatives, aux autorités compétentes en vertu de l’article 87 du statut qui, après s’être assurées de leur régularité formelle, les transmettent au procureur général près la cour d’appel de Paris et, dans le même temps, les mettent à exécution dans toute l’étendue du territoire de la République. » Once the person is brought before the investigating chamber, Article 627-8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that « Lorsque la chambre de l’instruction constate qu’il n’y a pas d’erreur évidente, elle ordonne la remise de la personne réclamée et, si celle-ci est libre, son incarcération à cette fin. » Transit across French territory is authorised under Article 627-12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which states that « Le transit sur le territoire français est autorisé conformément à l’article 89 du statut par les autorités compétentes en vertu de l’article 87 du statut. » And the enforcement of the Court’s financial decisions is secured by Article 627-16 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, under which « Lorsque la Cour pénale internationale en fait la demande, l’exécution des peines d’amende et de confiscation ou des décisions concernant les réparations prononcées par celle-ci est autorisée par le tribunal correctionnel de Paris saisi, à cette fin, par le procureur de la République. » Each of these steps is a judicial act performed by a French magistrate, and each of them is exactly the kind of act for which the American sanctions punish the Court’s own judges. The Paris prosecutor, the investigating judge, the chamber and the correctional court apply French statutes that refer to the Rome Statute, and no foreign measure can relieve them of that duty or punish them under French law for performing it.

The third practical question concerns the lawyers, non-governmental organisations, experts and victims’ counsel who cooperate with the Court from France. Article 48, paragraph 4 of the Rome Statute extends the necessary treatment to counsel, experts, witnesses and any other person required to be present at the seat of the Court, in accordance with the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities. In Paris, cooperation typically takes the form of mutual legal assistance requests executed under Articles 627-1 and 627-2, witness travel, transmission of evidence, and representation of victims authorised to participate in the proceedings. None of these activities violates French law, and none of them becomes unlawful because a foreign state has sanctioned the judges who will receive the evidence or hear the counsel. The risk for these actors is the same indirect pressure that weighs on the judge: a bank that hesitates to process fees, an airline that refuses a booking, an insurer that reassesses a contract. The answers are documentary and preventive: keep the designation letter of the Court or the counsel mandate, keep proof that the funds come from institutional budgets rather than from a listed person, route sensitive transfers through banks with limited American exposure where possible, and request written reasons for any refusal of service, because a refusal motivated solely by a foreign listing against a judge protected by Article 48 is a document that can be used. French associations that support the Court should also record, for each hindered operation, the date, the operator, the reason given and the additional cost, since any future European compensation mechanism under an extended blocking statute would require precisely that evidence.

The fourth practical question is the definition of the crimes themselves, because the sanctions debate must never obscure what the Court was created to punish. French law mirrors the Rome Statute in the Penal Code. Article 211-1 of the Penal Code provides: « Constitue un génocide le fait, en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, ou d’un groupe déterminé à partir de tout autre critère arbitraire, de commettre ou de faire commettre, à l’encontre de membres de ce groupe, l’un des actes suivants : – atteinte volontaire à la vie ; – atteinte grave à l’intégrité physique ou psychique ; – soumission à des conditions d’existence de nature à entraîner la destruction totale ou partielle du groupe ; – mesures visant à entraver les naissances ; – transfert forcé d’enfants. » Article 212-1 of the Penal Code defines crimes against humanity as any of eleven listed acts, from wilful killing to apartheid and other inhumane acts, committed in execution of a concerted plan against a civilian population within a widespread or systematic attack, and punishes them with life imprisonment. Article 461-1 of the Penal Code provides that war crimes and war offences are the violations defined in that book committed during an international or non-international armed conflict in connection with it, in breach of the laws and customs of war or the applicable international conventions, against the protected persons and property. These definitions matter for two audiences. For victims and their counsel, they recall that the warrants and investigations under American attack concern the gravest crimes known to the law, and our analysis of the Taliban arrest warrants and their enforcement from France shows how the same Paris surrender machinery applies to every ICC warrant. For companies and banks, they explain why European law treats cooperation with the Court as a protected activity rather than a sanctionable one.

Conclusion

Nicolas Guillou was sanctioned for signing, as a judge, the authorisation of arrest warrants that the law required him to examine independently and impartially. The Rome Statute answers that situation with unusual clarity: judges enjoy the immunities of heads of diplomatic missions for acts performed in their official capacity, those immunities survive the end of their functions, and only an absolute majority of the judges can waive them. No waiver has been adopted, and none is conceivable for an act that is the very substance of the judicial function. France answered with the 13 October 2026 condemnation, the call for withdrawal, and the commitment undertaken with its European partners and the other States Parties to keep the Court able to work. The rest is a matter of follow-through: diplomatic protection sustained over time for the French judge, a European debate on the blocking statute brought to a decision rather than left as a prospect, domestic confirmation that American listings have no effect in the French legal order, and practical documentation by every bank client, counsel, expert and association that encounters a refusal motivated by the sanctions. The sanctions can complicate payments, travel and banking. They cannot cancel a warrant, close an investigation, rewrite the Statute, or relieve France of the cooperation duties that Article 627 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states in a single sentence: France participates in the punishment of these offences and cooperates with the Court. That sentence, unlike a sanctions list, is law on French territory.

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