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Fridman v Luxembourg: the $16 Billion Lawsuit Over Frozen Assets and What France Would Do

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Fridman v Luxembourg: the $16 Billion Lawsuit Over Frozen Assets and What France Would Do

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A sanctioned billionaire is asking an international tribunal to order Luxembourg to pay him at least 16 billion US dollars because his assets were frozen under European Union sanctions. The case, pending before the Permanent Court of Arbitration as PCA Case No. 2025-42, is one of the largest investment-treaty claims ever filed over a sanctions freeze, and it raises a question that matters far beyond one man: when does freezing assets stop being a temporary precaution and start being an expropriation that must be paid for? For anyone with funds, securities or business interests frozen in France, the answer runs through French freezing orders, European courts in Luxembourg and, increasingly, arbitration tribunals sitting as far away as Hong Kong. This analysis explains what Mikhail Fridman actually claims, the 1989 treaty his lawyers dusted off, and what the same fact pattern would trigger if the frozen accounts were in Paris rather than Luxembourg.

I. Can an EU Asset Freeze Become a $16 Billion Expropriation?

The short answer is that no court has said so yet, but the claim is no longer theoretical. A three-member arbitral tribunal chaired by Professor Joongi Kim, with Gourab Banerji and Professor Klaus Sachs, is now seized of the dispute, the proceedings are seated in Hong Kong under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 1976, and Luxembourg is defended by A&O Shearman while the claimant fields counsel from Twenty Essex, Gherson LLP, Omnia Strategy and Kiejman & Marembert. The tribunal will have to decide three things in sequence: whether a freeze can ever be a taking, whether this freeze was one, and who pays when the measure was decided in Brussels but applied in Luxembourg.

A. What Luxembourg Froze After Fridman Was Listed in 2022

Mikhail Fridman, a Russian-Israeli national and major shareholder of Alfa Group, one of Russia’s largest privately owned investment groups, was placed on the EU sanctions list on 28 February 2022, days after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Council described him at the time as a top Russian financier close to the inner circle of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Once a name enters Annex I of Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, Article 2(1) bites automatically: «Sont gelés tous les fonds et ressources économiques appartenant […] énumérés à l’annexe I […]» — all funds and economic resources of listed persons shall be frozen. Paragraph 2 adds the second lock: «Aucuns fonds ni ressources économiques ne sont mis, directement ou indirectement, à la disposition […] ni dégagés à leur profit.» Banks in Luxembourg, like banks in Paris, had no choice to make; the freeze applies directly and they must enforce it.

Fridman’s team then did what a growing number of listed persons do: they sued the Council in Luxembourg. On 10 April 2024 the General Court handed down its judgments in Cases T-301/22 Aven v Council and T-304/22 Fridman v Council, annulling both the initial listings and the acts maintaining them for the period from 28 February 2022 to 15 March 2023. As the Court’s press release No 61/24 explains, the reasons given could not support placing and keeping the two businessmen on the lists: none of the reasons in the initial acts was sufficiently substantiated, so the listing was unjustified, and the Council had adduced no additional evidence for the maintaining acts. The victory was real but partial: it covered a closed historical period, and both men remained listed under subsequent Council acts. That gap between winning on the reasons and staying on the list is exactly what pushed the dispute toward arbitration: even a successful annulment action does not unfreeze the past, and it does not compensate a single euro of loss.

Under EU law, that compensation gap is deliberate. Article 11 of the same Regulation, the so-called no-claims clause, provides that «Il n’est fait droit à aucune demande à l’occasion de tout contrat ou toute opération dont l’exécution a été affectée, directement ou indirectement, en tout ou en partie, par les mesures instituées en vertu du présent règlement […] telle qu’une demande de compensation […]» where made by a listed person or someone acting for them — no claim for compensation in connection with an affected transaction shall be satisfied — and it puts the burden of proving that a claim is not caught squarely on the claimant. Paragraph 3 preserves only «Le présent article s’applique sans préjudice du droit […] au contrôle juridictionnel de la légalité du non-respect des obligations contractuelles conformément au présent règlement.» In other words, Brussels tells listed persons: you may ask a judge to annul your listing, but you may not ask anyone to pay for what the listing cost you. Fridman’s answer is to step outside EU law entirely and sue under a bilateral investment treaty.

B. The 1989 Treaty and the $16 Billion Compensation Claim

The treaty is the 1989 bilateral investment treaty between Belgium and Luxembourg on one side and the Soviet Union on the other, to which Russia succeeded. UNCTAD’s Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator records the case as Fridman v. Luxembourg (PCA Case No. 2025-42) and summarises the dispute as claims arising from the Luxembourg freeze of the claimant’s assets following the EU sanctions listing. The Permanent Court of Arbitration’s case page confirms the status as pending. In the documents outlining the claim, first reported in August 2024, Fridman’s lawyers allege the sanctions were applied without due process, say the assets remain frozen so that he can neither manage nor benefit from them, and call for “compensation based on the fair market value” of his investments, a figure “conservatively anticipated” at “no less than US $16 billion.”

The figure deserves a pause. Analysts who reviewed the filing note that the 16 billion dollars represents roughly double the assets Fridman actually holds in Luxembourg. The multiplier is not a clerical error; it reflects a fair-market-value method applied to investments, including interests whose value the freeze allegedly destroyed rather than merely immobilised, plus the destruction of the Alfa Group holding structure built through Luxembourg vehicles. Whether a tribunal accepts that method will decide whether this case is a landmark or a cautionary tale, because investment tribunals compensate proven loss, not headline numbers.

On the law, a careful August 2026 study of the case identifies three hurdles the claimant must clear. First, jurisdiction: Article 5 of the 1989 treaty protects investments against expropriation, nationalisation and measures having equivalent effect, subject to public interest, due process, non-discrimination and compensation, but Article 10(1), the dispute-settlement clause, is unusually narrow and covers only disputes about the “amount or method of payment” of any compensation due for expropriation. A tribunal empowered to price compensation may first have to decide whether any compensation is due at all, and the wording can be read as assuming an expropriation already established elsewhere. Second, the merits of indirect expropriation: a freeze is temporary by design, and tribunals have historically treated temporary restrictions as regulation rather than taking, unless the freeze is indefinite, total and destroys all economic use. Fridman’s strongest card here is the combination of duration, from 2022 with no end in sight, the General Court’s finding that the original reasons were unsubstantiated, and the continuing inability to manage or enjoy the assets. Third, attribution: the Council decided the listing, Luxembourg implemented it, and private banks executed it, so the loss cannot easily be pinned on one autonomous act of the respondent State. The organising answer proposed is that responsibility should follow the discretion Luxembourg actually exercised, and compensation should follow the loss that exercise caused.

The case does not stand alone. Four Russian investors whose securities and cash held via Euroclear were frozen have filed notices of dispute against Belgium in September and October 2025 under the same 1989 treaty, and those filings can proceed to arbitration once the six-month cooling-off period expires. Related vehicles have already brought claims against Ukraine, and a French dimension exists too: Severgroup, linked to the family of Alexey Mordashov, has sued France since 2021 for 4.5 billion euros over gold-mining licences in French Guiana never issued, a case brought under the France-Russia investment treaty that predates the sanctions wave and now runs alongside it. The Belgium-Luxembourg treaty with Russia has become the most-used instrument against EU States in this wave, and the Belgian government itself has cited the arbitration risk under that treaty when resisting proposals to channel immobilised Russian assets held at Euroclear, reportedly around 90 billion euros, into support for Ukraine. Whatever the tribunal in Fridman decides on jurisdiction alone will therefore ripple across half a dozen pending and threatened cases.

II. What If Your Assets Are Frozen in France?

Shift the facts across the border: the accounts are in Paris, the securities sit with a French custodian, the bank that froze them answers to French supervisors. The EU Regulation applies identically, but everything around it changes: the authority that signs the order, the judge who can suspend it, the procedure for obtaining a derogation, and the treaty you could invoke if Europe offers no damages. France has one of the most complete national freeze architectures in the Union, and understanding its three layers is the difference between waiting years and acting within weeks.

A. How France Freezes Assets and Which Court Can Undo It

The first layer is European and automatic. Once a name is listed under Regulation 269/2014 or its sectoral counterparts, every French bank, insurer, notary holding funds and indeed every person on national territory must freeze without delay and is forbidden from making any funds available. French law then adds a national enforcement layer. The starting point is the principle of freedom stated in Article L151-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code, under which financial relations between France and abroad are free, subject to international commitments. The freeze machinery itself sits in Chapter II of Title VI: Article L562-3 provides that “Le ministre chargé de l’économie peut décider, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques” belonging to or controlled by persons designated under Chapter VII UN resolutions or acts adopted under Article 29 TEU or Article 75 TFEU, or entities they own, control or act through. Article L562-4 then conscripts the entire financial system: “Sont tenus d’appliquer sans délai les mesures de gel et les interdictions de mise à disposition ou d’utilisation […] et d’en informer immédiatement le ministre chargé de l’économie” every individual on French territory, every institution covered by Article L561-2, and every company operating in France, including French firms for their activity abroad and foreign firms for their activity in France. Two prohibitions complete the wall: Article L562-5 forbids making funds or economic resources available, directly or indirectly, to frozen persons, and Article L562-6 forbids knowingly taking part in any circumvention. The definitions in Article L562-1 were updated as recently as June 2025, which shows how actively Paris maintains this arsenal.

The second layer is property protection, and it runs in the listed person’s favour. Article 544 of the Civil Code still defines ownership as “le droit de jouir et disposer des choses de la manière la plus absolue, pourvu qu’on n’en fasse pas un usage prohibé par les lois ou par les règlements.” and a freeze that lasts for years without individualised justification strains that proviso. At the European level, the Grand Chamber’s judgment in Nada v. Switzerland (no. 10593/08), 12 September 2012, remains the lodestar on sanctions and human rights: the Court found “a violation of Article 8” and “a violation of Article 13” taken together with Article 8 where a State implemented a Security Council listing without giving the person any effective means to challenge it. The lesson for French files is direct: every additional layer of review the person is denied strengthens the eventual claim.

The third layer is remedies, and speed matters more than most clients expect. Against the EU listing itself, the only court is the General Court in Luxembourg, seized by an action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU, which gives the EU courts jurisdiction to review the legality of Council acts, within a strict two-month period from publication or notification. Fridman and Aven prove both the promise and the limits of that route: cogent reasoning can annul a listing, yet the Council can and does adopt fresh acts, and annulment never pays damages. Against a French national freeze order, the remedy is the administrative judge, with interim relief available where urgency and serious doubt combine. And alongside both runs the quieter administrative track that practitioners use first: derogation and authorisation requests. Article 6 of Regulation 269/2014 expressly lets Member State authorities release frozen funds to satisfy payments due under contracts concluded before listing, provided the payment does not breach the freeze, and, symmetrically, Article L562-7 confirms that crediting a frozen account does not itself breach the freeze. French practice channels such requests through the Ministry of the Economy. A well-documented derogation file for basic needs, legal fees, or a pre-existing contractual payment often achieves in weeks what litigation achieves in years, and it creates the paper trail that later supports any damages claim.

B. How to Get Frozen Funds Released or Claim Damages

Start with triage, in this order. First, identify exactly which measure froze what: an EU Annex I listing, a French ministerial order under Article L562-3, or a bank’s defensive over-compliance with neither. Over-freezing is common, because Article L562-4 threatens the institution that releases too much far more than the one that freezes too much, and a precise identification letter from counsel regularly thaws assets that should never have been caught. Second, calendar the two-month annulment deadline for any EU act and file protective proceedings even while negotiating; Fridman’s history shows that missing that window forfeits the only direct attack on the listing. Third, file the derogation requests immediately and in parallel: humanitarian needs, court-ordered payments, pre-listing contracts under Article 6, and legal fees all have dedicated channels, and each refusal is itself a reviewable decision that builds the record.

Fourth, think beyond Luxembourg from day one. The General Court cannot award damages for an unlawful freeze, the no-claims clause in Article 11 blocks contractual recovery inside EU law, and French State liability for implementing EU acts is narrow. That is precisely why investment treaties have moved to centre stage: the France-Russia BIT of 1989, still in force, offers qualifying investors a path that EU law deliberately closes, as the Severgroup claim against France already demonstrates, and similar Soviet-era treaties cover other nationalities. Any BIT route must be prepared early, because treaties require protected nationality, a qualifying investment at the relevant date, and strict notice and cooling-off periods, typically six months, before arbitration can start. Fifth, preserve the human-rights file: document every refused request, every month of immobilisation, every destroyed transaction, because the Nada logic means that duration plus absence of review converts a proportionate precaution into a disproportionate interference, whether the eventual forum is Strasbourg, Luxembourg or an arbitral tribunal in Hong Kong.

Two recent developments sharpen the advice. The Court of Justice’s ruling of 3 September 2026 in the Inter Rao Lietuva case, annulling an EU freeze on related grounds, confirms that Luxembourg judges are still striking down listings with thin reasoning, and our analysis of that judgment explains how to frame the evidence challenge. And the wave of Euroclear-related notices against Belgium shows that custodians and States now fight a two-front war: enforcement pressure from sanctions authorities on one side, multi-billion arbitration exposure on the other. A French bank caught between Article L562-4 and a client’s treaty claim will freeze first and ask questions later, which is why the client’s questions must arrive first, precisely drafted and fully evidenced.

Clients often ask whether challenging the listing is even worth it when the Council can simply relist. The answer from recent Luxembourg case law is yes, and for two reasons that go beyond the individual file. First, each annulment raises the evidentiary bar for the next act: after the General Court held in April 2024 that proximity to power is not support for destabilisation, the Council must produce transaction-level or conduct-level material, and files that once survived on press cuttings now collapse. Our review of the Abramovich sanctions litigation and of the Russian central bank’s annulment action shows the same pattern repeating across claimant profiles, from individuals to sovereign institutions. Second, every annulled period shortens the lawful duration of the freeze, and duration is the variable that converts regulation into taking under both Strasbourg and investment-treaty analysis. A French-language roadmap of these national steps is available in our guide to contesting asset freezes in France. Even where the ultimate goal is an arbitral award in Hong Kong or Geneva, the Luxembourg annulment remains the foundation exhibit: it is an EU court certifying that the reasons were unsubstantiated, and no tribunal ignores that.

Conclusion

Fridman v Luxembourg will probably not produce an award for several years, and the tribunal may yet stop at the jurisdictional threshold of Article 10(1) without ever pricing the freeze. But the case has already changed the market: it proves that a listed person with the right nationality and structure can move the fight from the General Court, where only annulment is available, to an arbitral tribunal, where compensation is the whole point. The $16 billion figure will attract most of the headlines and should attract most of the scepticism, since tribunals pay proven loss rather than asserted value, and double the frozen holdings is a steep hill. The durable lessons lie elsewhere: reasons must be evidenced at the time of listing, as the General Court held in April 2024; freezes must remain reviewable and time-limited, as Strasbourg held in Nada; and States that implement collective measures through national orders and private banks cannot assume that no forum will ever attribute the loss to them. For holders of frozen assets in France, the practical moral is immediate: challenge the listing in Luxembourg within two months, petition Paris for derogations without delay, and audit treaty protection before the cooling-off clock becomes the reason the best remedy arrives too late. The freeze is the beginning of the procedure, not the end of the story.

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