On 7 October 2026, Israel marked three years since the attacks of 7 October 2023, while the ceasefire in Gaza entered its second year without entering its second phase. Almost a year earlier, on 17 November 2025, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2803, endorsing the American-backed Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict and authorizing a temporary International Stabilization Force for the enclave. The vote was 13 in favour to none against, with China and Russia abstaining. The force was supposed to secure the streets, oversee demilitarization, protect civilians and escort humanitarian aid while Israeli troops withdrew and a vetted Palestinian police took over. One year on, the force has still not deployed inside Gaza. Pledges trickle in, with Kosovo signing a participation agreement in Pristina on 7 September 2026, Albania discussing contributions the next day and Morocco signing in mid-July, yet the numbers discussed in the press have shrunk from the 20,000 troops originally envisaged to a possible 2,500, and Israeli media report that nothing substantial will move before Israel holds legislative elections in late October. Meanwhile the Security Council holds its quarterly open debate on the Palestinian question this month under the presidency of Greece. The legal questions are therefore immediate and practical: what does Resolution 2803 actually authorize, who answers for the treatment of civilians if the force deploys, and what can French nationals and residents already do before French courts in Paris.
This analysis answers those three questions from primary sources: the text of the resolution as reported in the official United Nations meetings coverage, the October 2026 monthly forecast of Security Council Report, field reporting on force generation, and the French statutes and court decisions that govern universal jurisdiction as they stand on 7 October 2026.
I. What UN Resolution 2803 authorizes in Gaza and what it leaves undecided
A. What the Security Council decided on 17 November 2025: Board of Peace, stabilization force and withdrawal tied to milestones
Resolution 2803 (2025), adopted at the 10,046th meeting of the Council and published as document S/RES/2803(2025), does three things at once. It endorses the Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict presented by the United States, it welcomes the establishment of a Board of Peace conceived as a transitional administration, and it authorizes that Board together with cooperating Member States to establish a temporary International Stabilization Force in Gaza. The authorization runs until 31 December 2027 unless the Council decides otherwise, and the Board must send the Council a written progress report every six months. Presenting the text, the American representative called it no mere paper promise, but a lifeline, and described a force that will deploy under a unified command to secure Gaza’s streets, oversee demilitarization, protect civilians and escort aid through safe corridors, all while Israel phases out its presence and a vetted Palestinian police force takes on a new role. He warned the chamber that a vote against this resolution is a vote to return to war.
The mechanics of withdrawal are sequenced rather than dated. As the force establishes control and stability, Israeli forces are to withdraw according to standards, milestones and timeframes linked to demilitarization to be agreed between the parties concerned, save for a security perimeter presence that will remain until Gaza is properly secure from any resurgent terror threat. Humanitarian aid is to resume fully through cooperating organizations, including the United Nations, without diversion by armed groups. France voted in favour but attached explicit conditions on the record. Its representative insisted that implementation be framed in a clear political and legal context built on the two-State solution, the swift return of a reformed and strengthened Palestinian Authority to Gaza with international support, the exclusion of Hamas from any governing role, and the unity of Gaza and the West Bank. Above all, Paris stated that any demographic or territorial change to the enclave or any occupation of Gaza are excluded. Those words matter because they define the mandate France considers itself bound by, and they will shape any future French contribution, endorsement or judicial reading of the operation.
The context one year later shows how much of the plan remains paper. The first phase delivered a ceasefire, the release of the hostages and the creation of the Board, chaired by the American president. The second and third phases, disarmament of Hamas and full Israeli withdrawal under the force’s oversight, have not been implemented. On 31 July 2026 the Board announced that Hamas had accepted a roadmap presented with the mediators Egypt, Qatar, Turkey and the United States, and on 26 August its High Representative for Gaza, Nickolay Mladenov, told the Council that the parties had agreed to disarm in exchange for withdrawal under a principle of one authority, one law, one weapon, with sequenced steps certified by an implementation verification committee. Yet within days the sequencing was publicly contested: after a meeting with the Israeli prime minister on 3 August the Board issued a statement read as tilting the roadmap in Israel’s favour, and on 9 August the prime minister was reported as ruling out the 15-point document. Mladenov acknowledged to the Council that Israel is not a signatory of the roadmap and that important questions remain open. For readers following the story from France, the consequence is direct: the mandate exists in international law, but the conditions for its execution are still being negotiated, which is why every question of responsibility and remedy must be examined now rather than after deployment. Our three-year assessment of the ceasefire, the arrest warrants and the French proceedings gives the broader picture into which this mandate fits. Three years after 7 October: ceasefire, ICC warrants and French courts.
B. Why the force still waits: troop pledges, missing terms of reference and the occupation question
Force generation is the visible bottleneck. The force was initially presented as a body of up to 20,000 personnel under the command of American Major General Jasper Jeffers. By September 2026 the picture was far thinner. Kosovo signed a Participating Country Agreement in Pristina on 7 September 2026, with its defence minister and the commander of the Kosovo Security Force attending alongside General Jeffers, and the Board stated that Kosovo units had been contributing to planning on logistics, civil affairs and unexploded ordnance clearance since the spring. Albania discussed future contributions with General Jeffers on 8 September, and Morocco signed its own participation agreement in mid-July. Israel’s cabinet gave initial approval to a legal framework for deployment on 27 July 2026, with the Israeli press describing an initial footprint of some 200 troops confined at first to a humanitarian zone and subject to further sign-off by the prime minister and the defence and foreign ministers. Israeli outlets cited in September put a possible ceiling around 2,500 personnel and reported that planning would slow until after Israel’s legislative elections in late October. A Board official was quoted as saying the panel currently has little leverage over the Israeli prime minister before that vote. None of this is deployment: as of the October 2026 forecast, the force has yet to enter Gaza, while the Israeli army retains roughly half of the enclave behind the demarcation known as the yellow line and the technocratic Palestinian committee set up by the Board waits in Cairo, unable to enter.
The second difficulty is legal and was flagged before the vote. China abstained because the text was vague and unclear on the structure, composition and terms of reference of both the Board and the force, adding that Palestine is barely visible in the draft and that the United Nations itself was given no effective role despite its experience in post-conflict recovery. Slovenia asked for clear terms of reference and for inclusivity, transparency and good faith. Somalia regretted the limited clarity on the roles of the United Nations and the Palestinian Authority and the absence of any explicit reference to the two-State solution. Guyana recalled that the continuing occupation of the Palestinian territory is a violation of international law. One year on, those warnings read as predictions: there is still no published status-of-forces agreement, no public rules of engagement and no standing claims mechanism for civilians harmed by the force once it operates.
The third difficulty is the most sensitive and was mapped in detail in a study published on 2 October 2026. The Board is described in the resolution’s ecosystem as a transitional administration with international legal personality that will set the framework for redevelopment until a reformed Palestinian Authority can take back control. It is chaired by the American president, its executive is heavily American, and several major democracies, including Australia, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, chose not to join it. The study draws the parallel with the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq in 2003, which exercised governmental powers temporarily, and argues that if the Gaza plan is implemented as written, the Board could reasonably be described as running an administration that international humanitarian law would examine as an occupation, whatever the plan’s assertion that Israel will not occupy or annex Gaza. Under the revised Commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention, a State will also be responsible for the treatment of protected persons in situations of occupation by proxy, where it exercises effective control over a territory indirectly through its overall control of local authorities or organized armed groups. And where several States share effective control, several States may be classified as Occupying Powers, so that under Article 29 each of those States bears responsibility for the treatment accorded by its agents to protected persons who find themselves in the occupied territory. Whether one accepts that reading or not, it frames the litigation of the coming years: troop contributors, the Board and the States directing it will each be asked, possibly before foreign courts, on what legal basis their personnel detain, search, use force and restrict movement, and before which judge a civilian can complain.
II. Who answers for Gaza civilians and how French courts in Paris can act
A. Who is responsible for protected persons when an international force holds the ground
The Fourth Geneva Convention protects civilians who find themselves in the hands of a party to the conflict or an occupying power of which they are not nationals. Its Article 29 provides that the party in whose hands protected persons are is responsible for their treatment, whatever the individual responsibilities incurred, and the modern reading extends that responsibility to occupation by proxy and to multinational operations where several States share effective control. Concretely, once the stabilization force deploys, at least four layers of responsibility will overlap in Gaza: the force and its unified command for acts of its personnel, each troop-contributing State for the treatment accorded by its own agents, the Board of Peace as the transitional authority directing the mission, and Israel for the areas and perimeters it continues to control during the phased withdrawal. None of these layers cancels the others, and the absence of a published claims procedure makes the question of the competent judge urgent rather than theoretical.
The missions assigned to the force multiply the points of friction with civilian life. Demilitarization means searches, seizures and destruction of weapons infrastructure. Stabilization means checkpoints, curfews, crowd control and detention of suspects. Protection of aid means escorting convoys and securing corridors and distribution points. Each of these tasks can produce victims: persons detained and transferred, homes entered, property destroyed, convoys delayed, demonstrators injured. The record of the ceasefire year shows why procedures matter. According to the United Nations relief agency’s report of 24 September 2026, 1,394 Palestinians were killed after the ceasefire took effect in October 2025, bringing the reported total since October 2023 to 73,914. Nine in ten Gazans face frequent disruptions in access to safe water, 94 percent need shelter assistance, and on 16 September a damaged residential building collapsed in Gaza City killing at least 20 people sheltering inside, while heavy machinery, fuel and tents await entry approvals. In that environment, a force without visible rules on detention, handover of detainees, medical care, compensation for property and investigation of civilian casualties would inherit the conflict’s distrust on its first patrol. The October debate in New York, chaired by the Greek foreign minister during Greece’s presidency of the Council, is the forum where States can demand those rules before deployment rather than after the first incident.
For families and counsel, the practical checklist follows from this architecture. First, identify precisely which authority acted: force contingent, Board entity, local committee or Israeli unit, since each points to a different respondent and a different forum. Second, preserve evidence from day one with the discipline of a criminal file: medical certificates describing injuries with dates, photographs of places and damage, names of witnesses, convoy and checkpoint references, copies of any document issued by the force, and a chronological account written while memories are fresh. Third, file contemporaneous complaints with every accessible body, including the force’s own complaints channel once published, humanitarian organizations present on the ground and consular authorities for nationals. Fourth, calendar the limitation and admissibility rules of each forum envisaged, because international criminal law, State responsibility and individual compensation obey different clocks. Fifth, never assume that an international mandate extinguishes individual criminal responsibility: it does not, and French law is explicit on that point, which is where Paris enters the picture.
B. What French law already allows: universal jurisdiction, war crimes and the Paris prosecutor
France equips its courts with one of the most detailed universal-jurisdiction regimes in Europe, and it applies directly to facts committed in Gaza regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator or the victim. The general gateway is Article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: Les auteurs ou complices d’infractions commises hors du territoire de la République peuvent être poursuivis et jugés par les juridictions françaises soit lorsque, conformément aux dispositions du livre Ier du code pénal ou d’un autre texte législatif, la loi française est applicable, soit lorsqu’une convention internationale ou un acte pris en application du traité instituant les Communautés européennes donne compétence aux juridictions françaises pour connaître de l’infraction. For grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, the companion provision is Article 689-1: En application des conventions internationales visées aux articles suivants, peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises, si elle se trouve en France, toute personne qui s’est rendue coupable hors du territoire de la République de l’une des infractions énumérées par ces articles. Presence on French soil is therefore the trigger for that route, which is why verifying a suspect’s travel and residence is always the first investigative step in Paris.
The central provision for atrocity crimes is Article 689-11, which lists the offences triable in France when committed abroad: peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes : 1° Le crime de génocide défini au chapitre Ier du sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre II du code pénal ; 2° Les autres crimes contre l’humanité définis au chapitre II du même sous-titre Ier ; 3° Les crimes et les délits de guerre définis aux articles 461-1 à 461-31 du même code. Three cumulative conditions frame its use. The suspect must have habitual residence in France, defined as a sufficient connecting link assessed through the length of presence, its conditions and reasons, the stated wish to settle or remain, and family, social, material or professional ties: La personne soupçonnée doit avoir une résidence habituelle sur le territoire français, celle-ci se définissant par un lien de rattachement suffisant avec la France. Prosecution can only be initiated at the request of the anti-terrorism public prosecutor, and only if no international or national court seeks surrender or extradition of the person: La poursuite de ces crimes ne peut être exercée qu’à la requête du procureur de la République antiterroriste et si aucune juridiction internationale ou nationale ne demande la remise ou l’extradition de la personne. The prosecutor must verify that the International Criminal Court is not seized and that no other competent court or State claims the person. Where the prosecutor closes the case, the complainant who reported the facts can challenge the dismissal before the prosecutor general of the Paris Court of Appeal, who hears the complainant on request and gives a reasoned written decision if the appeal is rejected. In a Gaza-related file, that architecture has a concrete consequence: a complaint filed in Paris against a suspect residing in France does not compete with The Hague, it defers to it, and it revives only if no international or foreign forum acts.
The substantive offences are defined in the Criminal Code in terms that cover the Gaza fact patterns. Genocide is defined as acts committed under a concerted plan to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, or a group defined by any other arbitrary criterion: Constitue un génocide le fait, en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, ou d’un groupe déterminé à partir de tout autre critère arbitraire, de commettre ou de faire commettre, à l’encontre de membres de ce groupe, l’un des actes suivants : – atteinte volontaire à la vie ; – atteinte grave à l’intégrité physique ou psychique ; – soumission à des conditions d’existence de nature à entraîner la destruction totale ou partielle du groupe ; – mesures visant à entraver les naissances ; – transfert forcé d’enfants. Crimes against humanity carry life imprisonment when committed under a concerted plan against a civilian population as part of a widespread or systematic attack: Constitue également un crime contre l’humanité et est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité l’un des actes ci-après commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique. War crimes cover violations of the laws and customs of war committed in international or non-international armed conflict against protected persons and property: Constituent des crimes ou des délits de guerre les infractions définies par le présent livre commises, lors d’un conflit armé international ou non international et en relation avec ce conflit, en violation des lois et coutumes de la guerre ou des conventions internationales applicables aux conflits armés, à l’encontre des personnes ou des biens visés aux articles 461-2 à 461-31 . And attacks on persons protected by international humanitarian law attract aggravated penalties: Sont passibles des aggravations de peines prévues à l’article 462-1 les atteintes volontaires à la vie, les atteintes volontaires à l’intégrité physique ou psychique de la personne ainsi que l’enlèvement et la séquestration, définis par le livre II du présent code et commis à l’encontre d’une personne protégée par le droit international des conflits armés en vertu des lois et coutumes de guerre et du droit international humanitaire.
Two recent decisions of the Court of Cassation show how Paris judges apply these texts, and both repay close reading by anyone preparing a Gaza file. On 12 May 2023 the court sitting in plenary assembly rejected the appeal of a suspect investigated in Paris for torture, enforced disappearances and war crimes linked to Syria, and clarified the dual-criminality condition of Article 689-11: l’incrimination des faits par la loi étrangère, au sens de l’article 689-11 du code de procédure pénale, ne saurait résulter de la volonté affichée par un État de lutter contre des infractions. A State’s declared willingness to fight a crime is not enough; the foreign law must actually criminalize the conduct, with legality satisfied in substance. The court upheld the prosecution because the facts charged as war crimes were punishable in substance under Syrian law through ordinary criminal offences and the offence of involving children in hostilities: les faits pour lesquels M. [W] a été mis en examen, sous la qualification de crimes de guerre et complicité, étaient punis, en substance, par la législation syrienne au travers d’infractions de droit commun et de celle d’implication d’enfants dans les hostilités. Transposed to Gaza, the lesson is that complaints must plead the foreign criminal law precisely, article by article, rather than invoking treaties in the abstract. On 1 February 2023 the criminal chamber confirmed, in a case combining war crimes, crimes against humanity and a criminal seizure, that claims of official immunity are verified against the findings of the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs: le ministère de l’Europe et des affaires étrangères a confirmé que M. [B], qui revendique avoir exercé les fonctions de premier ministre de Côte d’Ivoire et invoque l’immunité pénale qui s’attache aux actes susceptibles de lui être reprochés en cette qualité, n’exerçait aucune fonction officielle entre le 6 décembre 2010 et le 11 avril 2011 et qu’il ne peut, au moins durant cette période, se prévaloir d’une quelconque immunité. Anyone targeting an official or former official in a Gaza file must therefore expect the Paris judges to ask the ministry who held what office and when, and to shape the temporal scope of the charges accordingly.
Victims themselves have a direct door into the Paris courts. Any person claiming to have suffered loss from a felony or misdemeanour may file a complaint and join the proceedings as a civil party before the competent investigating judge: Toute personne qui se prétend lésée par un crime ou un délit peut en portant plainte se constituer partie civile devant le juge d’instruction compétent en application des dispositions des articles 52, 52-1 et 706-42 . In practice, a Gaza-related complaint in Paris follows a disciplined sequence. It is filed first with the Paris prosecutor, with the evidence bundle organized around the statutory elements recalled above: civilian status of the victims, nexus with the armed conflict, identification of the perpetrators and their link of habitual residence with France where Article 689-11 is used. If the prosecutor dismisses the complaint, the dismissal can be challenged before the prosecutor general, and the complainant may then turn to the investigating judge through a complaint with civil-party joinder so that an independent magistrate, rather than the prosecution alone, directs the investigation. Medical, photographic and documentary evidence gathered early, with a verifiable chain of custody, decides these cases more often than legal theory. Families of French nationals should also activate consular protection in parallel and keep every administrative trace, because evacuation lists, border records and hospital transfers later become exhibits. The criminal complaint, the civil-party joinder and the consular file are three tracks that reinforce each other, and they can all be opened from Paris while the force has still not deployed.
Conclusion
Resolution 2803 gave Gaza a mandate without yet giving it a mission on the ground. The Council authorized a transitional Board and a temporary force, set a horizon of 31 December 2027 with six-monthly reporting, and tied Israeli withdrawal to demilitarization milestones. One year later the pledges exist on paper, from Pristina to Tirana to Rabat, the command is designated, the Israeli framework approval of July 2026 is on record, and still no international soldier patrols the enclave while half of it remains behind a demarcation line and its technocratic administrators wait in Cairo. The October open debate is the moment for States to supply what the resolution omitted: public terms of reference, a status agreement, rules on detention and handover, and a claims procedure worthy of the civilians the force is sent to protect. France, which voted for the text while excluding any demographic or territorial change and any occupation, has a particular voice in that debate, and its courts already offer what diplomacy has not yet delivered: a precise, demanding, but fully open path from complaint to investigation for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The anniversary counts the dead and the displaced. The procedure decides what justice can still do.