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Gaza Truce at One Year: What the 10 October 2025 Ceasefire Changed in Law — and What France Can Still Do

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Gaza Truce at One Year: What the 10 October 2025 Ceasefire Changed in Law — and What France Can Still Do

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On 10 October 2025, a United States-brokered deal stopped the large-scale war in Gaza and brought the remaining Israeli hostages home. One year later, the anniversary coverage tells a split story. The guns largely fell silent and more food is entering the Strip, yet the international stabilization force promised by the plan never deployed, reconstruction never started, Israeli strikes continued through the year, and the two Hague cases about Gaza are still running their course. For readers who need more than commemoration, the first anniversary is the right moment to ask the lawyer’s questions: what did the truce actually settle as a matter of law, which court orders still bind the parties today, and what can victims, witnesses and counsel concretely do from France while the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrants remain unexecuted.

This analysis answers those three questions in order. It starts from the verified facts of the anniversary week, recalls what the law of armed conflict says about a truce that holds only partly, then maps the two accountability tracks that survived the ceasefire: the Hague track of ICC warrants and International Court of Justice orders, and the Paris track of universal jurisdiction complaints and ICC cooperation. Throughout, the perspective is that of a French courtroom practitioner: what a Paris prosecutor, an investigating judge at the crimes-against-humanity unit, or a victim’s lawyer can lawfully do with these materials, and where the limits lie.

I. The 10 October 2025 truce at one year: what was agreed, what held, and what never happened

A ceasefire agreement is a legal instrument before it is a headline. It creates dated obligations — stop firing, release named persons, open corridors, deploy a force — against which every later development can be measured. The Gaza deal that came into effect on 10 October 2025 is best read that way: line by line, promise against performance, one year on.

A. The part of the deal that held: major operations stopped and the remaining hostages came home

The core of the October 2025 arrangement was simple and it worked. As NPR reported from Gaza in its anniversary coverage, the American president pressed Israel to accept a ceasefire while Hamas released the remaining Israeli hostages, with the arrangement taking effect on 10 October 2025. The Los Angeles Times record of the same anniversary is that the United States-brokered truce halted major operations and secured the release of all remaining hostages. Those two outcomes — the end of large-scale operations and the return of every living hostage — are the measurable successes of the instrument, and they explain why the anniversary is being treated internationally as a real caesura rather than a dead letter.

The humanitarian picture improved in one specific respect. NPR notes that the truce year gave people in Gaza a chance to recover from the famine conditions that United Nations-backed experts had declared in the north of the territory the previous year, adding that larger quantities of food are now getting in and that starvation is receding across Gaza. A lawyer reading these lines should register both halves of the sentence. The famine finding by United Nations-backed experts belongs to the factual record of the pre-truce period, and the improvement in food deliveries belongs to the truce period. Both halves matter for later legal assessment, because courts judging conduct in Gaza — whether in The Hague or in Paris — will necessarily distinguish the period before 10 October 2025 from the period after it, and will ask different questions about each.

None of this means the truce produced peace, and the anniversary reporting is explicit on that point. The Los Angeles Times headline on the anniversary is that progress has stalled one year after the truce, with Israeli strikes continuing and Gaza’s two million Palestinians in limbo. NPR’s formulation is nearly identical in substance. The honest legal description is therefore a partial truce: the central exchange of calm for hostages was performed, while most of what was supposed to follow was not. That distinction structures everything that comes next, because international humanitarian law treats a ceasefire as a suspension of hostilities, not as an amnesty, not as a peace treaty, and not as the end of applicable law.

B. The part that stalled: no stabilization force, no reconstruction, and strikes that never fully stopped

The most striking gap between promise and performance concerns the international force. A year later, NPR reports, the promised international peacekeeping force is still absent from Gaza and reconstruction has not begun. The promise in question was given institutional form one month after the truce. On 17 November 2025, the United Nations Security Council, meeting at its 10046th meeting, adopted Resolution 2803 (2025), as recorded in the United Nations meeting record of that day, by which, according to the United Nations’ own meeting record, the Security Council endorsed the American-backed comprehensive plan to end the Gaza conflict, welcomed the creation of a Board of Peace, and authorized the follow-on security architecture. The Security Council Report service describes the operative content of Resolution 2803, as summarized by the Security Council Report service as endorsing that plan, welcoming the creation of a Board of Peace and authorizing it to establish a temporary International Stabilization Force for Gaza. Eleven months after that authorization, the anniversary reporting agrees that no such force is on the ground.

Meanwhile the map changed under the truce. NPR reports that Israel’s military has expanded its control to roughly seventy percent of Gaza, compressing more than two million Palestinians toward the sea. Targeted operations never stopped either: Israel kept striking Hamas throughout the ceasefire year, attacks which Gaza’s Health Ministry says killed more than 1,400 Palestinians over the year, close to 500 of them women and children. Those casualty figures come from a party-affiliated source and must be read with that attribution in mind, but they are the figures circulating in the international press on the anniversary, and any future fact-finding will have to confirm, correct or replace them. The Al-Shifa and Baptist Hospital cases NPR documents from October and December 2025 — wounded children, a ten-year-old girl shot in her tent — illustrate why the evidentiary record of the truce year will matter as much as the record of the war years.

The legal consequence of a stalled truce is widely misunderstood, so it should be stated plainly. A ceasefire, even one endorsed by the Security Council, does not switch off international humanitarian law. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 keep applying to protected persons for as long as the underlying situation — armed conflict, occupation where it exists — persists, and obligations such as humane treatment, distinction between combatants and civilians, proportionality in attack, and the facilitation of humanitarian relief do not take a holiday because a political plan says a force will come. That is the framework within which the anniversary must be read: the truce changed the facts on the ground, it did not close a single legal file.

II. One year on, the law has not stood still: Hague warrants and orders still in force, and the Paris forum still open

If the political track stalled, the judicial tracks did not. The International Criminal Court’s arrest warrants are still outstanding, the International Court of Justice’s orders are still binding, and the French courts retain a fully equipped procedural machinery for receiving complaints about the most serious international crimes. This second part maps those three realities and explains how they interact.

A. The Hague after one year: ICC arrest warrants still outstanding and ICJ orders still binding

Start with the criminal track. On 21 November 2024, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court, ruling unanimously on the Situation in the State of Palestine, rejected Israel’s jurisdictional challenges and issued warrants of arrest for Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant. The press release of 21 November 2024 records the Chamber ruling on two Israeli filings of 26 September 2024, holding that Israel’s acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction was unnecessary because jurisdiction flows from the territorial jurisdiction of Palestine as previously determined, with state challenges brought before any warrant deemed premature. On substance, the Chamber found reasonable grounds to believe that Netanyahu, born in 1949 and prime minister at the time, and Gallant, born in 1958 and defence minister at the time, each bore criminal responsibility as co-perpetrators for starvation as a method of warfare as a war crime, and for murder, persecution and other inhumane acts as crimes against humanity. It added superior responsibility for both men over the war crime of directing attacks against the civilian population. The full reasoning is set out in the Chamber’s decision ICC-01/18-374 of 21 November 2024.

Two features of that decision matter for the anniversary. First, the Chamber fixed the applicable legal framework, holding that the law of international armed conflict between Israel and Palestine applied because both are parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Israel occupies at least parts of Palestine, while the law of non-international armed conflict governed the fighting with Hamas. That classification outlives the truce and governs the assessment of strikes conducted during the truce year as well. Second, the warrants are arrest warrants, not convictions: the presumption of innocence applies in full, and the Chamber’s “reasonable grounds to believe” standard is the threshold for arrest, not a finding of guilt. Precision on this point is not politeness; it is the law.

The warrants have not been executed to date, and the political pressure on the Court intensified exactly during the anniversary week. On 9 October 2026, hours after former ICC judge Navi Pillay was announced as Nobel Peace Prize laureate, the United States administration imposed sanctions on the International Criminal Court itself, with Reuters reporting that the measures include a grace period and carrying an interview with sanctioned ICC Deputy Prosecutor Nazhat Shameem Khan, who condemned the sanctions and said the Court’s work would continue. Readers of this firm’s English desk will recall the institutional analysis published here on the earlier rounds of American measures against the Court; the October 2026 designation is their extension to the institution as such. Legally, third-country sanctions do not dent the obligations of States Parties under Part 9 of the Rome Statute: a State Party that has a wanted person on its territory is bound to cooperate in arrest and surrender regardless of what a non-party decides in Washington. Politically, the sanctions raise the cost of visible cooperation and make discreet, procedure-driven compliance — through prosecutors and judges rather than declarations — more important than ever.

Turn now to the state-responsibility track in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel), still pending before the International Court of Justice. Its provisional measures orders are binding — the Court settled that provisional measures create legal obligations a quarter-century ago — and three of them frame the anniversary. In its Order of 26 January 2024, the Court indicated by fifteen votes to two that Israel must, under the Genocide Convention and toward Palestinians in Gaza, take all measures within its power to prevent acts within the scope of Article II, namely killing, serious bodily or mental harm, deliberately inflicted destructive conditions of life, and measures to prevent births. By sixteen votes to one it required immediate and effective steps to enable basic services and humanitarian assistance for the living conditions in the Strip. In its Order of 24 May 2024 (I.C.J. Reports 2024, p. 649), the Court ordered Israel to immediately halt its military offensive and any other action in the Rafah Governorate capable of inflicting destructive conditions of life on the Palestinian group in Gaza, and to guarantee unimpeded access for United Nations-mandated commissions of inquiry, fact-finding missions and investigative bodies probing genocide allegations.

The case itself is procedurally alive. The Court’s docket records 2026 developments including declarations of intervention filed in March 2026 by states including the United States, the Netherlands, Iceland, Namibia, Hungary, Fiji and Paraguay, an Order of 21 May 2026 fixing time-limits for Reply and Rejoinder, and Colombia’s withdrawal of its declaration of intervention on 22 September 2026 — a sequence this desk analysed in its 4 October 2026 piece on the ICJ proceedings and what a French court would do with a genocide file. None of these steps decides the merits, and none suspends the 2024 orders. A truce does not vacate provisional measures; only the Court can modify them, and it has not done so. Counsel assessing the truce year should therefore test the year’s events — blockade practices before October 2025, access for investigators, conditions of life in the Strip — directly against the operative paragraphs quoted above, because those paragraphs remain the binding yardstick until the final judgment.

B. The Paris forum: how victims and witnesses in France can lawfully trigger universal jurisdiction and ICC cooperation

France is not a bystander to these tracks; it is one of the best-equipped forums in Europe for receiving them. French criminal procedure gives victims and witnesses present in France three distinct doors — a national prosecution for the gravest crimes, cooperation with the ICC, and civil-party participation — each with strict entry conditions that a Paris practitioner must check before filing anything.

The first door is universal jurisdiction. Article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states the general principle: “Les auteurs ou complices d’infractions commises hors du territoire de la République peuvent être poursuivis et jugés par les juridictions françaises soit lorsque, conformément aux dispositions du livre Ier du code pénal ou d’un autre texte législatif, la loi française est applicable, soit lorsqu’une convention internationale ou un acte pris en application du traité instituant les Communautés européennes donne compétence aux juridictions françaises pour connaître de l’infraction.” For genocide, other crimes against humanity, and war crimes, the special provision is Article 689-11, which provides that “peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes : 1° Le crime de génocide défini au chapitre Ier du sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre II du code pénal ; 2° Les autres crimes contre l’humanité définis au chapitre II du même sous-titre Ier ; 3° Les crimes et les délits de guerre définis aux articles 461-1 à 461-31 du même code”. Three cumulative locks guard that door, and each must be verified on the facts. The French definitions behind that referral are themselves worth quoting, because they mirror the Hague charges: Article 211-1 of the Criminal Code provides that “Constitue un génocide le fait, en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, ou d’un groupe déterminé à partir de tout autre critère arbitraire, de commettre ou de faire commettre, à l’encontre de membres de ce groupe, l’un des actes suivants”, followed by the listed acts including attacks on life and conditions of existence meant to destroy the group in whole or in part. Article 212-1 of the same Code provides that “Constitue également un crime contre l’humanité et est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité l’un des actes ci-après commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique”, with the list expressly including “La persécution de tout groupe ou de toute collectivité identifiable pour des motifs d’ordre politique, racial, national, ethnique, culturel, religieux ou sexiste” and “Les autres actes inhumains de caractère analogue causant intentionnellement de grandes souffrances” — the domestic twins of the persecution and other-inhumane-acts charges in the ICC warrants. The suspect must have a habitual residence in France, assessed as “un lien de rattachement suffisant avec la France” in light of the duration and conditions of presence, the reasons for it, the stated will to settle or remain, and family, social, material or professional ties. Prosecution can only be opened at the request of the anti-terrorism public prosecutor in Paris, and only if no international court has requested surrender and no state has requested extradition — the provision obliges the prosecution to verify “l’absence de poursuite diligentée par la Cour pénale internationale” and to check that no competent international court has sought surrender and no state has sought extradition. And where that prosecutor closes the file without further action, the complainant who reported the facts may appeal to the prosecutor general at the Paris Court of Appeal under Article 40-3, who hears the complainant on request and answers a dismissal with a written reasoned decision. That special rule builds on the general appeal in Article 40-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: “Toute personne ayant dénoncé des faits au procureur de la République peut former un recours auprès du procureur général contre la décision de classement sans suite prise à la suite de cette dénonciation.”

The Cour de cassation, sitting as Assemblée plénière, gave these conditions their authoritative flexible reading in its landmark judgment of 12 May 2023, appeal no. U 22-82.468 (ECLI:FR:CCASS:2023:PL90669, published in the Bulletin), arising from a complaint filed in Paris on 26 June 2019 over torture, crimes against humanity and war crimes allegedly committed in Syria by members of the armed group Jaysh al-Islam. The Court recalled that “Selon l’article 689-11 du code de procédure pénale, modifié par la loi n° 2019-222 du 23 mars 2019, en vigueur à compter du 25 mars 2019, peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises, si elle réside habituellement sur le territoire de la République, toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger les crimes contre l’humanité”, and it approved a substance-based approach to dual criminality: for war crimes, the provision “exige que les faits poursuivis en France sous la qualification de crimes contre l’humanité, autres que le génocide, ou de crimes et délits de guerre, soient punis par la législation de l’État où ils ont été commis”, but ordinary criminal law of that state — murder, torture, involvement of children in hostilities — can satisfy that test in substance without a local war-crimes statute mirroring the French one. The appeal was rejected — “REJETTE le pourvoi” — and the investigation in Paris went forward. For Gaza-related files, the practical lesson is direct: complaints concerning conduct in the Strip can be received in Paris where the residence, monopoly and subsidiarity conditions are met, and Syrian-case law shows the judges will examine the file rather than close the door at the threshold. Conversely, files that fail on residence or that collide with an ICC surrender request will not pass, and counsel should say so early instead of filing for effect.

The second door is cooperation with the ICC itself. Article 627 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre”. The Title then organizes the concrete tools, including conservatory measures: Article 627-3 provides that “L’exécution sur le territoire français des mesures conservatoires mentionnées au k du paragraphe 1 de l’article 93 du statut est ordonnée, aux frais avancés du Trésor et selon les modalités prévues par le présent code, par le procureur de la République antiterroriste”, for a maximum of two years renewable at the Court’s request. Two operational consequences follow for the anniversary year. If a person wanted by the ICC were present on French territory, the French authorities would be under a duty to arrest and surrender under the Statute and the Code, with executive discretion confined to the procedures the law organizes — there is no lawful “transit exception” for ICC indictees. And French victims and witnesses can feed the Hague proceedings directly: Article 15 communications to the Prosecutor, cooperation with the Registry’s victims’ teams, and preservation of evidence — medical records, authenticated images, geolocated testimony — in a form the Paris investigating judges and the ICC can both use.

The third door is civil participation, and it is often the most immediately useful. A victim residing in France can file a criminal complaint with constitution de partie civile before the Paris judicial court, triggering, where the conditions are met, a judicial investigation by the specialized investigating judges of the crimes-against-humanity unit rather than leaving the file to prosecutorial discretion alone. Associations accredited for the defence of the relevant interests can join. Medical, Denis Mukwege-style documentation protocols aside, the evidentiary standard that matters at the filing stage is coherence and verifiability: dated records, named witnesses, chain of custody for digital material, and a precise chronology distinguishing pre-truce from post-truce facts, so that the investigating judge can test each period against the applicable law identified by the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber. Files built that way survive; files built from press clippings do not.

Three limits must be stated with equal clarity, because a serious forum does not promise what it cannot deliver. First, none of these routes permits a French judge to try the authors of the October 2023 attacks or the Gaza campaign in absentia on the basis of universal jurisdiction alone: without habitual residence in France, Article 689-11 does not open. Second, the subsidiarity lock means Paris yields to The Hague where the ICC acts: a French prosecution cannot proceed against a person whose surrender the ICC has requested, and counsel must check the ICC docket before asserting otherwise. Third, American sanctions against the Court change nothing in French domestic law — no French text makes a United States designation an excuse for non-cooperation — but they counsel procedural realism about timing, banking channels for victims’ funds, and the protection of witnesses and intermediaries.

Conclusion

One year after 10 October 2025, the Gaza truce has the shape of a performed exchange surrounded by unperformed promises. The hostages came home and large-scale operations stopped; the stabilization force never deployed, reconstruction never began, and the truce year’s strikes and casualties are already entering the evidentiary record. Legally, that record splits into two periods governed by the same law: the Geneva Conventions and their grave-breaches regime applied before the truce, and they kept applying after it, because a ceasefire suspends hostilities without extinguishing obligations. The Hague tracks reflect exactly that continuity. The ICC arrest warrants for starvation as a method of warfare, murder, persecution and other inhumane acts, and for directing attacks against the civilian population, remain in force and unexecuted, with the presumption of innocence intact. The ICJ’s 2024 orders — prevent genocide, enable humanitarian assistance, halt the Rafah offensive, admit United Nations investigators — remain binding until the Court says otherwise, and the case is moving through Reply and Rejoinder with states still choosing sides on intervention. From Paris, the forum is open but gated: habitual residence, the anti-terrorism prosecutor’s monopoly with appeal to the prosecutor general, subsidiarity to The Hague, and evidence built to judicial standards. Victims, witnesses and counsel who understand those gates can act now — filing structured complaints, preserving verifiable evidence, and feeding both the Paris and Hague proceedings — instead of waiting for a political settlement to do the work that courts were built to do.

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