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Trump Signed the Graham Act on 18 September 2026: US Secondary Tariffs, and What French Law Orders You to Do in Paris

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Trump Signed the Graham Act on 18 September 2026: US Secondary Tariffs, and What French Law Orders You to Do in Paris

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On 18 September 2026, President Donald Trump signed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, the most aggressive American sanctions statute in a decade. Two days earlier, on 16 September, the House of Representatives had passed it by 262 votes to 159, after Senate adoption in August, and the President immediately turned it into a bargaining chip: on 24 September, the very day this article is published, he is scheduled to meet President Xi Jinping at the White House with trade and national security at the top of the agenda. The law targets Russian officials, banks and the shadow-fleet tankers that carry Russian oil around existing embargoes, and it authorises tariffs of up to 100 percent on the largest buyers of Russian hydrocarbons, starting with India and China. For a French bank that clears dollars, a Paris trading house that charters tankers, an insurer that covers cargo, or a manufacturer that exports precision tools, the question is immediate and practical: when Washington orders you to cut ties with a client, and Paris and Brussels order you not to obey Washington, which order do you follow, and what happens if you choose wrong? The answer lies in three layers of law that every compliance officer in France must hold together: the new American statute, the French blocking law of 1968 that makes it a criminal offence to comply with foreign injunctions, and the European Blocking Statute that prohibits compliance and lets victims sue for damages before EU courts. This article explains each layer with the exact texts, the French court decisions that enforce them, and the steps to take this week.

I. What Washington’s New Law Changes for Business Operating From France

A. The Graham Act: Secondary Tariffs, Shadow Fleet and a Presidential Waiver

After being adopted by the Senate in August, the Graham Bill cleared the House of Representatives on September 16, with several dozen Democrats joining Republican lawmakers to support the measure. The enrolled text is published by Congress as H.R. 5334, 119th Congress. President Trump signed it on 18 September 2026. The law introduces an unprecedented range of measures against Moscow and its partners, including India and China. However, many Democratic officials voiced concern that it gives Donald Trump the power to impose 100% tariffs on any country without oversight.

Concretely, the statute works on three fronts. First, it imposes sanctions on Russian officials, certain Russian financial institutions and the vessels of the shadow fleet used to circumvent existing sanctions. Second, it authorises sanctions against anyone who knowingly sells, leases or facilitates goods and services for Russia’s defence industrial base, a list that expressly includes computer numerical control tools, lubricant additives, specialty chemicals, chemical coatings, military-grade fibre optics, advanced sensors and every item on the Bureau of Industry and Security’s Common High Priority Items List, as detailed in the Weekly Sanctions Update of 21 September 2026. Third, and most explosively, it authorises the President to impose tariffs of up to 100 percent on the largest purchasers of Russian oil and natural gas and on countries that facilitate evasion of the oil sanctions, which puts China and India, reportedly the largest purchasers of Russian crude, directly in the crosshairs. The same update notes that China’s Commerce Ministry has already voiced its opposition, and that trade and national security issues are expected to take centre stage at the White House meeting with President Xi on 24 September. It is unlikely the White House would seek to start a trade war with Beijing at a time of such strategic vulnerability, but the legal weapon now exists, and European operators that sit in the middle of these flows cannot assume it will stay holstered.

The statute was deliberately designed with flexibility. It gained momentum after the President signalled support in November 2025, conditioned on new tariff authorities and flexibility over the imposition of sanctions, and it preserves a presidential waiver mechanism. Absent a waiver, the sanctions machinery starts moving on its own. That waiver architecture matters enormously for French strategy: an exemption granted today can be withdrawn tomorrow, and a compliance programme built on the assumption that waivers will cover your contracts is built on sand. The Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control is already tightening the net around the same targets. On 17 September, OFAC designated the digital-asset exchange BitBank, controlled by designated Iranian financier Babak Zanjani, together with its software developer Pishtaz Simorgh Electronic Trade Company and three individuals, as key components of Iran’s digital-assets sanctions-evasion infrastructure under Operation Economic Outcast. On the same day, the State Department sanctioned eleven Cuban targets, including four state-owned nickel-mining enterprises and four military research enterprises. And OFAC keeps adjusting the Russia file in real time: General License 131J now authorises, until 22 October 2026, certain transactions for the negotiated sale of Lukoil International GmbH and its majority-owned entities. The message for Paris is that American enforcement is active on every front at once, crypto included, and that licences are narrow, temporary and revocable.

B. Why Paris Banks, Traders, Insurers and Exporters Sit in the Blast Radius

France learned the price of American secondary sanctions the hard way. In 2014, BNP Paribas agreed to plead guilty and to pay $8.9 billion for illegally processing financial transactions for countries subject to U.S. economic sanctions, after systematically stripping identifying information from dollar payments linked to Cuba, Iran and Sudan so that they could clear through the American financial system. The bank was sentenced to five years of probation on top of the record payment. Every compliance department in Paris still studies that file, because the mechanism that produced it has not changed: any dollar payment clears in the United States, which gives American prosecutors jurisdiction over transactions that, from a Paris desk, look purely European, African or Asian. When the Graham Act adds new designated banks, new shadow-fleet vessels and new categories of defence-industry goods, the dollar-clearing trap widens automatically, and French institutions must re-screen their entire client and counterparty base, not only their American business.

The exposure goes far beyond banks. Commodity traders in Paris and Geneva charter the tankers, insurers cover hull and cargo, classification societies certify vessels, and bunker suppliers fuel them; each of these services to a newly designated shadow-fleet vessel becomes sanctionable under American law the moment the designation takes effect. Manufacturers of machine tools, sensors, specialty chemicals and fibre optics face the defence-industrial-base provisions, which target precisely the high-technology inputs that French and German Mittelstand-style exporters sell. Crypto intermediaries are now explicitly in the frame after the BitBank designations, which means French digital-asset service providers registered with the Autorité des marchés financiers must treat sanctions screening with the same seriousness as anti-money-laundering controls. Even passive investors are concerned: dividends, interest and sale proceeds linked to designated persons can be frozen mid-transfer, and the French courts, as we will see, refuse to treat an asset freeze as an excuse for not paying your own creditors. The practical result is a compliance shock that arrives in the same quarter as the European Union’s own sanctions renewal crisis, in which the Council only managed on 22 September 2026 to extend its Russia asset-freeze regime after dropping two prominent listed businessmen, a reminder that the European and American systems now move at different speeds and sometimes in different directions. A French company that aligns itself exclusively on Washington risks prosecution in Paris; one that aligns itself exclusively on Brussels risks losing access to the dollar system. The only safe route runs through both bodies of law at once, and that route starts with the French blocking statute.

II. What French and European Law Order You to Do in Paris

A. Do Not Obey Washington Automatically: the French Blocking Statute and the EU Blocking Statute

French law contains a loaded weapon pointed directly at foreign sanctions demands. The Law of 26 July 1968 on the communication of economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical documents and information to foreign persons provides, in its Article 1, in exact terms: Sous réserve des traités ou accords internationaux, il est interdit à toute personne physique de nationalité française ou résidant habituellement sur le territoire français et à tout dirigeant, représentant, agent ou préposé d’une personne morale y ayant son siège ou un établissement de communiquer par écrit, oralement ou sous toute autre forme, en quelque lieu que ce soit, à des autorités publiques étrangères, les documents ou les renseignements d’ordre économique, commercial, industriel, financier ou technique dont la communication est de nature à porter atteinte à la souveraineté, à la sécurité, aux intérêts économiques essentiels de la France ou à l’ordre public, précisés par l’autorité administrative en tant que de besoin. In plain English: if you are French, resident in France, or directing a company seated or established in France, you are forbidden from handing economic or technical information to a foreign public authority where disclosure would harm French sovereignty, security, essential economic interests or public policy. An American subpoena, a Treasury questionnaire or an OFAC voluntary-disclosure request that asks a Paris company to hand over its client files falls squarely inside this prohibition.

The prohibition goes further than passive silence. Article 1 bis of the same law states: Sous réserve des traités ou accords internationaux et des lois et règlements en vigueur, il est interdit à toute personne de demander, de rechercher ou de communiquer, par écrit, oralement ou sous toute autre forme, des documents ou renseignements d’ordre économique, commercial, industriel, financier ou technique tendant à la constitution de preuves en vue de procédures judiciaires ou administratives étrangères ou dans le cadre de celles-ci. It is therefore forbidden to seek out or assemble evidence for foreign judicial or administrative proceedings. A Paris compliance team asked by its New York parent to build a file for OFAC must refuse, or route the request through the proper treaty channel, typically mutual legal assistance, rather than cooperating directly. And Article 2 adds an active duty: Les personnes visées aux articles 1er et 1er bis sont tenues d’informer sans délai le ministre compétent lorsqu’elles se trouvent saisies de toute demande concernant de telles communications. You must inform the competent minister without delay as soon as you receive such a request. In practice, that notification goes through the French authorities before any response is given, and experienced counsel files it immediately to create a paper trail of good faith. The criminal sanction is real. Article 3 provides: Sans préjudice des peines plus lourdes prévues par la loi, toute infraction aux dispositions des articles 1er et 1er bis de la présente loi sera punie d’un emprisonnement de six mois et d’une amende de 18000 euros ou de l’une de ces deux peines seulement. Six months of imprisonment and an 18,000 euro fine, without counting heavier penalties available under other statutes. Complying with Washington without going through Paris can therefore be a French criminal offence in itself.

European Union law reinforces the same wall. Council Regulation 2271/96, the EU Blocking Statute, provides in Article 5 that no EU operator shall comply, directly or through a subsidiary or intermediary, actively or by deliberate omission, with any foreign requirement or prohibition, including requests from foreign courts, based on the listed foreign sanctions laws. The same article allows the European Commission to authorise full or partial compliance where refusal would seriously damage the operator or Union interests. EU operators, which include every company incorporated in France and every person resident here, must not comply with the listed foreign laws, and the Annex covers the American Cuba, Iran and Russia sanctions legislation that the Graham Act now extends. An authorisation procedure exists for cases where refusal would seriously damage the operator’s interests, but it runs through the European Commission, not through a unilateral business decision. Article 6 then gives the shield a sword: any EU operator harmed by the application of those foreign laws is entitled to recover all resulting damages, including legal costs, from whoever caused them, and recovery can be enforced by seizing and selling the liable party’s assets inside the Union, including shares in EU companies. A French company penalised by an American counterparty for refusing to break its contracts under American pressure can therefore sue in Paris and seize the American party’s European assets. Counsel in Paris now routinely insert Blocking Statute clauses into contracts, notify the Commission of extraterritorial demands, and prepare clawback actions as leverage in settlement talks with American banks and suppliers.

B. Freezes, Export Bans and Prison Terms Enforced by the French Courts

The second half of the French equation is that Paris enforces its own sanctions and export controls with genuine severity, so a company cannot hide behind American pressure to justify violating European or French measures either. The national asset-freeze regime sits in the Monetary and Financial Code. Article L. 562-2 provides: Le ministre chargé de l’économie et le ministre de l’intérieur peuvent décider, conjointement, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques : 1° Qui appartiennent à, sont possédés, détenus ou contrôlés par des personnes physiques ou morales, ou toute autre entité qui commettent, tentent de commettre, facilitent ou financent des actes de terrorisme, y incitent ou y participent ; 2° Qui appartiennent à, sont possédés, détenus ou contrôlés par des personnes morales ou toute autre entité elles-mêmes détenues ou contrôlées par les personnes mentionnées au 1° ou agissant sciemment pour le compte ou sur instructions de celles-ci. Alongside it, the European regulations freeze the funds of thousands of listed persons, and the French courts apply those freezes strictly. On 5 February 2026, the Second Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation held, in a case about Libyan public funds diverted under the former Qadhafi regime, that: Il résulte des dispositions du règlement n° 2016/44, qui a pour objectif la prévention de « la menace que représentent les personnes et entités qui possèdent ou contrôlent des fonds publics libyens détournés sous l’ancien régime de [O] [I], susceptibles d’être utilisés pour mettre en danger la paix, la stabilité ou la sécurité en Libye, ou pour entraver ou compromettre la réussite de sa transition politique » (2ème considérant), que ne peut être diligentée, sur des fonds ou des ressources économiques gelés, aucune mesure d’exécution qui aurait pour effet, non seulement de les faire sortir du patrimoine du débiteur, mais aussi de conférer au créancier poursuivant un simple droit de préférence, sans une autorisation préalable du directeur du Trésor, autorité nationale désignée en application de l’article 11, § 2, du règlement.. No enforcement step on frozen funds without the prior authorisation of the Director of the Treasury. In practice, the Directorate General of the Treasury is the gatekeeper for France, and any creditor, including one acting under American pressure, that tries to seize frozen assets in Paris without its green light will see the measure struck down.

Frozen does not mean excused. In its landmark Bank Sepah ruling of 10 July 2020, the Plenary Assembly of the Court of Cassation held that: Ne constitue pas un cas de force majeure pour celle qui le subit, faute d’extériorité, le gel des avoirs d’une personne ou d’une entité qui est frappée par cette mesure en raison de ses activités. An asset freeze imposed because of the targeted person’s own activities is not force majeure for lack of exteriority, so default interest keeps running even though the debtor cannot pay. A French debtor that invokes American or European sanctions to stop paying its suppliers will keep accumulating interest, and its creditors keep their enforcement rights for the day the freeze lifts. The ruling concerned an Iranian bank sanctioned over proliferation, a fact pattern uncomfortably close to the banks, crypto exchanges and intermediaries the Graham Act and the OFAC designations of September 2026 now target.

Export controls carry the heaviest criminal machinery. The Defence Code provides that: L’exportation sans autorisation préalable de matériels de guerre et matériels assimilés vers des Etats non membres de l’Union européenne ainsi que des territoires exclus du territoire douanier de l’Union européenne est prohibée. Exporting war materials and similar items outside the Union without prior authorisation is prohibited, and the criminal penalties are severe: I. – Est puni d’un emprisonnement de sept ans et d’une amende de 100 000 € quiconque, sans respecter les obligations résultant des I et II de l’article L. 2332-1, se livre à la fabrication ou au commerce de matériels de guerre, armes, munitions et de leurs éléments, with penalties rising to ten years and 500,000 euros in an organised group, plus mandatory confiscation. Dual-use goods such as the numerical-control tools, sensors and fibre optics named in the Graham Act fall under the European dual-use regulation and French customs enforcement, and the customs courts show no leniency on procedure. On 14 May 2025, the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation recalled, for undeclared exports of prohibited goods, that: Il résulte de ce texte que les amendes douanières ne peuvent être assorties du sursis. Customs fines cannot be suspended. The declaration of guilt stood, the fines stood, and the Court quashed only the unlawful suspended portion to make the punishment fully enforceable. For a French exporter caught between an American designation of its customer and a French prohibition on exporting to it, the lesson is that the French prohibition is enforced first, in Paris, with criminal fines that no American licence can cancel.

The operational checklist for this week follows directly. First, re-screen all clients, vessels, banks and technology transfers against the new American designations and the updated European lists, because the two systems no longer overlap perfectly. Second, freeze any performance that would violate either system and apply to the Directorate General of the Treasury for authorisation before touching frozen funds. Third, refuse direct cooperation with foreign authorities over French-held documents and notify the competent minister without delay, as Article 2 of the 1968 law requires, while filing for a Blocking Statute authorisation from the Commission if compliance is commercially unavoidable. Fourth, document every American demand in writing, because that paper trail is the raw material of a future clawback action under Article 6 before the Paris courts. Fifth, review dollar-payment chains, charter parties, insurance wordings and dual-use licences clause by clause, since liability now attaches to services and financing, not only to the sale itself. Each of these steps has a deadline measured in days, because designations take effect immediately and the French notification duties run from the moment the request is received.

Conclusion

The Graham Act transforms the sanctions landscape in which French companies operate: secondary tariffs of up to 100 percent, a widened net over banks, shadow-fleet vessels and defence-industry suppliers, and a presidential waiver that can vanish with a change of political mood, all of it activated while the President negotiates directly with Beijing. But in Paris, American law does not apply itself. The French blocking statute forbids handing files to foreign authorities and punishes violations with imprisonment and fines, the European Blocking Statute forbids compliance and opens a damages action with seizure of European assets, and the French courts enforce asset freezes, export bans and customs fines with a rigour the Court of Cassation has repeated for years, from Bank Sepah to the Libyan funds and the customs fines of 2025. The winning strategy is therefore a dual-compliance file: screen against both American and European lists, notify Paris and Brussels before answering Washington, seek Treasury authorisations before moving frozen money, and keep counsel involved from the first American letter to the last seizure attempt. Companies that build that file now will survive the tariff war. Those that pick one side of the Atlantic will be punished by the other.

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