KOHEN AVOCATS · PARIS, FRANCE
GTA 6 likeness lawsuit: can a real person sue over a video game character who looks like them?

Hassan Kohen is a Paris-based lawyer admitted to the Paris Bar (Avocat au Barreau de Paris). Initial strategic analysis: €80 incl. VAT, personal reply within 24 hours.

100% confidential · Legal professional privilege · No obligation

Article generated by artificial intelligence, through a process designed and supervised by the firm

Sources: U.S. court opinions and official U.S. government publications, read for this article

Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Hassan KOHEN
Attorney at the Paris Bar

GTA 6 likeness lawsuit: can a real person sue over a video game character who looks like them?

Speak to a lawyer 06 89 11 34 45

Grand Theft Auto VI has been on sale since November 19, 2026, the release date announced by Rockstar Games for PlayStation 5 and Xbox Series X|S, and searches such as “gta 6 likeness lawsuit” and “gta 6 lawsuit joker” have followed. They ask a real legal question: can a real person sue when a video game character looks like them? The short answer is yes, under the statutes of several states, but such claims rarely succeed. A claimant must show that the character is recognizable as that person, that the use falls within what the statute covers, usually advertising, merchandise or trade, and that no consent was given. The claimant must then get past the First Amendment protection that courts give video games. The franchise has been tested before. In 2018, New York’s highest court rejected two lookalike claims brought over Grand Theft Auto V against Take-Two Interactive Software and its affiliates, because neither woman was recognizable in the images. As of November 22, 2026, we found no court decision about any character in the new game, and the federal docket searches we ran that day did not identify a complaint claiming that a GTA 6 character copies a real person. The discussion that follows is general in scope: it describes checks useful in comparable situations and makes no findings about Grand Theft Auto VI, its developer or its publisher.

I. Can a real person sue over a video game character who looks like them?

A. Florida, New York and California protect name and likeness, but mainly against commercial uses

The right to stop others from profiting from your identity comes mainly from state law, and each state draws the line in its own place. Three states illustrate the range. Florida, New York and California all have detailed statutes, and their courts, together with the federal courts sitting in those states, have produced much of the case law on video games, films and digital likenesses. Federal law adds a separate claim for false endorsement under the Lanham Act, discussed in Part II. A person who believes a character copies them should start by identifying which state statute could apply, because the elements, the consent rules and the remedies are not the same.

Florida’s statute, section 540.08 of the Florida Statutes, provides that no person shall “publish, print, display or otherwise publicly use for purposes of trade or for any commercial or advertising purpose the name, portrait, photograph, or other likeness of any natural person without the express written or oral consent” of that person or of someone authorized in writing to license that use. If consent is missing, the person may sue to stop the use and to recover damages for the loss or injury caused, including an amount that would have been a reasonable royalty, as well as punitive or exemplary damages. Under Florida law, the statute does not apply to bona fide news reports that are not used for advertising, or to a photograph of a person shown solely as a member of the public who is not named or otherwise identified. It bars claims based on uses occurring more than 40 years after the person’s death, and it keeps the common-law privacy remedies available alongside the statutory claim.

For a game, the words “commercial or advertising purpose” matter most. A 2024 final bill analysis prepared by Florida House of Representatives staff summarizes the Florida case law this way: such a purpose “does not include publications which do not directly promote a product or service,” and it is not enough that a publication is offered for sale, because liability turns on whether the person’s name or likeness is associated with something else within the publication. The analysis relies on a 2005 decision of the Florida Supreme Court for that reading. It is staff guidance, not law, and the document itself states that it does not reflect the intent or official position of the bill sponsor or the House. Read with that caution, it points to a practical distinction for Florida claims: a lookalike used to sell something, on packaging, in an advertisement or on merchandise, fits the statute more easily than a background figure inside the story. The same analysis describes the 2024 Florida law it accompanied, effective October 1, 2024, which added a civil action for a person whose image or likeness is used without consent in a scheme to defraud.

Advertising is the clearest case. In Brecka v. The Individuals, Entities, and Unincorporated Associations d/b/a Groundingwell and Wellness Today, No. 24-60162 (S.D. Fla.), sellers ran social media advertisements built on a clip from a health influencer’s lecture, one of them with an artificially generated voiceover of him praising their product, and they never answered the suit. In a report and recommendation dated January 23, 2025, a federal magistrate judge in Florida recommended a permanent injunction and an award of $225,000 in actual damages plus $225,000 in punitive damages, using the influencer’s usual appearance fee as the starting point for the fair market value of his name, image and likeness. That is a recommendation in a default case, not a ruling after a contested trial, but it shows the kind of use the Florida statute and the federal false-endorsement claim were written for: a real person’s identity used to sell a product.

New York’s statute is older and, on its face, covers more attributes. Section 50 of the New York Civil Rights Law makes it a misdemeanor for a person, firm or corporation to use “for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade, the name, portrait, picture, likeness, or voice of any living person” without first obtaining that person’s written consent. Section 51 lets the person bring an action in the New York Supreme Court to stop the use and to recover damages, and it allows a jury to award exemplary damages when the use was knowing. Two features stand out. Consent must be written, unlike in Florida, and the protection is limited to living people. For people who have died, Section 50-f creates a separate New York right of publicity for deceased personalities domiciled in the state and a specific claim against unauthorized “digital replicas” of deceased performers, subject to a list of exemptions for expressive, newsworthy and entertainment works.

California’s main statute, section 3344 of the California Civil Code, makes liable any person who “knowingly uses another’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods,” or for advertising, selling or soliciting purchases, without prior consent. The California remedies are stronger than in many states: the greater of $750 or actual damages, plus the profits attributable to the use, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees and costs for the prevailing party. Since January 1, 2026, an amendment also lets a claimant seek an injunction or temporary restraining order, and a respondent ordered to remove the material must do so within two business days of service unless the order provides otherwise. The statute exempts uses in connection with news, public affairs, sports broadcasts and political campaigns. The fee rule cuts both ways: because the prevailing party recovers fees, a claimant who loses can end up paying the other side’s lawyers.

B. The decisive question is recognizability, as the earlier lookalike cases show

The leading state-court rulings on lookalike game characters come from the same franchise. In Lohan v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., 31 N.Y.3d 111 (2018), decided by the New York Court of Appeals on March 29, 2018, an actress claimed that a Grand Theft Auto V character, met in an optional “random event” in which the player helps her escape photographers, and two loading-screen illustrations of a blonde woman were her look-alike. The court first held that digital images can qualify under the New York statute: “We conclude a computer generated image may constitute a portrait within the meaning of that law.” It then held that these images did not qualify. The character was a generic depiction of a woman in her twenties without particular identifying physical characteristics, and the illustrations were “indistinct, satirical representations of the style, look, and persona of a modern, beach-going young woman.” The court noted that the game did not use her name or a photograph of her, and it affirmed the dismissal of her complaint at the pleading stage.

The same day, in Gravano v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., 31 N.Y.3d 988 (2018), the Court of Appeals rejected a similar claim by another woman about a different character in the same game. In a short memorandum, it repeated that a computer-generated image may be a portrait, but held that she was not recognizable from the images at issue, namely the character’s avatar. These two rulings remain the starting point in New York, and they are still applied: in July 2025, a federal judge relied on them to hold that the New York statute can reach artificial-intelligence clones of a living person’s voice.

That July 2025 decision is Lehrman v. Lovo, Inc., No. 24-cv-3770 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2025). Two voice actors alleged that an AI company had used recordings, requested from them for what they were told was research, to build and sell clones of their voices. Ruling on July 10, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed their Lanham Act claims and most of their copyright claims, but held that “claims for misappropriation of a voice, like the ones here, may be properly asserted under Sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law.” The court rejected the argument that the 2021 digital-replica provision for deceased performers implied that living people were left out, pointing to Lohan and Gravano, which had already treated computer-generated images of living people as covered. Applied to a lookalike character, Lehrman means that in New York a digital rendering or a synthetic voice is not excluded simply because no photograph or recording of you appears in the game. The question remains whether the character is recognizable as you and whether it is used for advertising or trade.

Recognizability is ultimately a question of fact, but courts screen weak claims early. Lohan explains that before a factfinder can decide whether an image presents a recognizable likeness, there must be a basis to conclude that the person depicted is “capable of being identified from the advertisement alone,” judged by the quality and quantity of identifying characteristics in the image. In practice, the features that make a character identifiable are the ones a stranger could use to pick you out: your name or a near copy of it, a photograph or a traced image, distinctive marks such as particular tattoos in particular places, a recognizable voice, a signature phrase, or a combination of details tied to your public persona. A general type, such as a beachgoer, a tourist, a bodybuilder or a local eccentric, is what Lohan treated as cultural comment rather than a portrait. A person known mainly through one viral photograph should gather evidence of how widely that image is associated with them, because the comparison will be made between the character and the person, not between the character and a style.

The other two statutes put the same question in different words. Florida protects the “other likeness” of a natural person, and its exception for a photograph of someone shown solely as a member of the public applies only where the person is not named or otherwise identified. California defines a person as readily identifiable from a photograph when someone viewing it with the naked eye can reasonably determine that the person depicted is the one complaining, and it treats people shown only as part of a definable group, such as a crowd at a sporting event, as members of that group rather than as individuals. Those provisions concern photographs, but they confirm the logic of the New York cases: the law protects a specific person who can be singled out, not a resemblance shared by many people.

II. What usually defeats these claims, and what to check before filing

A. The First Amendment protects games, but not every realistic copy

Video games are expressive works, and a publisher’s first line of defense is the First Amendment. Courts have not treated that protection as absolute when a game copies a real person closely. In Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013), decided May 21, 2013, a former Rutgers quarterback sued under New Jersey law over his avatar in a college football game. The federal appeals court for the Third Circuit adopted the transformative use test, which asks whether the work adds enough creative contribution to the person’s identity, and found that the game did not transform his likeness into anything other than a digital representation of him playing the sport for which he is known. It added: “In finding that NCAA Football failed to satisfy the Transformative Use Test, we do not hold that the game loses First Amendment protection.” The court reversed the summary judgment that had been entered for the publisher. Hart is a precedential decision binding on federal courts in the Third Circuit; the citation search we ran on November 22, 2026 returned later decisions citing it only for procedural points, so its video-game holding is best read as that circuit’s leading statement rather than as a nationwide rule.

The Ninth Circuit, whose decisions bind federal courts in California, reached a similar result for professional players under California law. In Davis v. Electronic Arts Inc., 775 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2015), decided January 6, 2015, former NFL players challenged their depiction in the Madden NFL series. The court held that the publisher’s use “is not incidental, because it is central to EA’s main commercial purpose – to create a realistic virtual simulation of football games involving current and former NFL teams,” and observed that the game “replicates players’ physical characteristics and allows users to manipulate them in the performance of the same activity for which they are known in real life.” The underlying premise that games are protected speech is still applied: in NetChoice, LLC v. Bonta, No. 22-cv-08861-BLF (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2025), a federal district court in California cited Davis for the point that video games are entitled to First Amendment protection. What Hart and Davis share is realism. The plaintiffs were well-known athletes, shown doing the very thing that made them known.

A background lookalike is a different matter, as the Ninth Circuit held in July 2025 in a case about an animated series. In Hara v. Netflix, Inc., No. 23-3768 (9th Cir. July 28, 2025), a Hollywood drag performer alleged that an animated version of her likeness appeared in a single ten-second scene, as one of four drag queens who do not speak, in an episode of the series Q-Force, and in a promotional teaser. She sued for false endorsement under the federal Lanham Act. On July 28, 2025, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. Applying the Rogers test, it held that the Lanham Act does not reach the use of a likeness in an expressive work unless the use has no artistic relevance to the work or explicitly misleads as to its source or content. Here, her likeness helped “ground the scene of a West Hollywood gay bar in realism,” and nothing explicitly told viewers that she was behind the show. The court compared the scene to the use of a virtual strip club in Grand Theft Auto, a case to which it had applied the same test. Applied to a lookalike game character, Hara means a federal false-endorsement claim is hard to sustain unless the game or its marketing explicitly suggests that the real person endorsed it or helped make it. Her state-law publicity claims were not decided on the merits, because the district court dismissed them for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Hara also explains the limit of that protection. Relying on the Supreme Court’s 2023 decision in Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc. v. VIP Products LLC, it notes that the Rogers test does not apply when a mark is used as a designation of source for the user’s own goods. A likeness used as a product’s brand, rather than as part of the story, therefore falls back under the ordinary confusion analysis. The federal statute behind these claims, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), creates liability for a use in connection with goods or services that is “likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval” of goods, services or commercial activities. In Lehrman, the New York federal court accepted, quoting an earlier ruling, that this provision “does not require celebrity, only a likelihood of consumer confusion,” before dismissing the voice actors’ Lanham Act claims on other grounds. Taken together, these cases suggest a useful question to ask about any lookalike: is the person used as an element of the setting, or is the person’s identity part of what is being sold?

Names raise a separate federal issue. In Vidal v. Elster, No. 22-704 (June 13, 2024), the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the Lanham Act’s names clause, which bars registration of a trademark that consists of or comprises a name identifying a particular living individual except with that person’s written consent. Decided on June 13, 2024, the case involved an applicant who sought to register “Trump too small” for shirts and hats. The Court held “only that history and tradition establish that the particular restriction before us, the names clause in §1052(c), does not violate the First Amendment,” explaining that restrictions on trademarking names have historically been grounded in the notion that a person has ownership over his own name. Applied to a game, Vidal means a studio cannot obtain a federal trademark registration for a living person’s name without that person’s written consent, but the decision concerns registration only and does not decide whether a name may appear inside a game.

B. Deadlines, consent, procedure and evidence

Timing can end a claim before the merits are reached. In New York, the court in Lehrman stated that “The statute of limitations applicable to NYCRL Section 51 is one year,” citing the state’s civil practice rules, and that New York courts apply a single publication rule under which the claim accrues on the date the offending material is first published. The same decision noted that a genuine republication of the material can refresh the limitations period, and it declined to dismiss the voice actors’ claims as untimely at that early stage. The statutes and decisions read for this article do not settle the limitation period for claims under Florida’s section 540.08 or California’s section 3344, so a person considering a claim in those states should have the applicable period checked promptly rather than assume it is long. The Florida statute’s own time bar concerns something else: uses occurring more than 40 years after the person’s death.

Consent rules differ by state and deserve a check first, because many people who appear in games, films or promotional shoots have signed something. Florida accepts express written or oral consent, New York requires written consent, and California requires prior consent. An old agreement can also defeat a later claim in another way. In Robinson v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, No. 2:24-cv-12355 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 26, 2025), former University of Michigan football players argued that forms they signed as students had forced them to give up their publicity rights. The federal court in Michigan dismissed their federal antitrust and unjust-enrichment claims as untimely, holding that the continued commercial use of those rights after 2012 was a manifestation of the original conduct, not a new and independent act restarting the limitations period. That case concerned antitrust and unjust-enrichment claims, not a state publicity statute, but it is a reminder that a court may treat later uses under an old agreement as part of the original act. Anyone with a release, a model agreement or a casting document should find it and read its scope, including whether it covers digital uses.

Procedure also shapes these cases. California’s anti-SLAPP statute lets a defendant sued over speech ask the court to strike the claims early, and game publishers have used it against publicity claims: Davis reached the Ninth Circuit as an appeal from the denial of such a motion. In Gopher Media LLC v. Melone, No. 24-2626 (9th Cir. Oct. 9, 2025), the en banc Ninth Circuit changed that practice on October 9, 2025, holding that “a district court’s denial of a motion to strike under the California anti-SLAPP statute does not satisfy the requirements for an interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine,” and overruling the 2003 precedent that had allowed those appeals. The dispute itself involved online reviews, not a video game, and the court assumed, without deciding, that the anti-SLAPP statute applies in federal court. Applied to a lookalike claim filed in federal court in California, Gopher Media means that if the judge denies the publisher’s anti-SLAPP motion, the case moves forward without an immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine. The motion itself remains available, and a defendant who wins it can still end the claims early.

Before contacting a studio or filing anything, a person who believes a character copies them can assemble the facts that these decisions treat as decisive. First, capture the use: screenshots or video with dates, the place in the game where the character appears, and whether the same image is used on the cover, in trailers, in advertising or on merchandise, since the Florida, New York and California statutes all focus on advertising, trade or products. Second, document identifiability: which features match, whether the character carries your name, a traced photograph, distinctive tattoos or your voice, and whether people who do not know you personally would recognize you. In Hara, messages from friends, coworkers and fans expressing confusion did not show an explicitly misleading use under the Lanham Act. Third, locate every release or agreement you signed and check whether it covers digital or interactive media. Fourth, note when you first saw the use, because in New York the one-year period runs from first publication. Fifth, weigh the cost of losing, since California awards attorney’s fees to the prevailing party under section 3344.

The forum matters as well. Hara shows that a federal court that dismisses the federal claims may decline to decide the state-law publicity claims, which then have to be pursued, if at all, in state court. Lohan and Gravano were state-court cases decided under the New York statute, while Hart, Davis and Hara were federal cases. A claimant who relies mainly on a state publicity statute should consider where that claim can actually be heard, and a claimant who relies on the Lanham Act should expect the Rogers test to be raised immediately if the challenged use is part of an expressive work. None of these steps requires accusing anyone; they turn a sense of resemblance into the specific facts a court would examine.

Conclusion

A real person can sue over a lookalike video game character under the statutes of Florida, New York, California and other states, but successful claims share features that most lookalike complaints lack. The person must be recognizable from the image itself, not merely similar to a type. The use must fall within what the statute covers, which in Florida and California centers on advertising, products and merchandise and in New York on advertising and trade. And there must be no consent. Even then, the First Amendment protects video games as expressive works. Courts have allowed claims to proceed where a game reproduced well-known athletes doing what made them known, as in Hart and Davis, and have rejected them where the images were generic or satirical, as in Lohan and Gravano, or where a likeness simply helped set a scene, as in Hara. Lehrman confirms that the New York statute reaches digital replicas of living people, voices included; Vidal confirms that a living person’s name cannot be registered as a federal trademark without written consent; and the Ninth Circuit’s 2025 en banc ruling removes the immediate appeal that once followed the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion in the Ninth Circuit. For anyone who recognizes themselves in a game, the useful next steps are to preserve the evidence, find any release they signed and have the limitation period in their state checked before it runs.

📄 Official circular