On Sunday 20 September 2026, eighteen men boarded a plane in Port-au-Prince and landed in Florida as federal defendants. All are accused of taking part in the assassination of Haitian President Jovenel Moise, shot dead in his bedroom in July 2021. The United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida, Jason Reding Quinones, described the transfer as the next major phase in the pursuit of accountability and warned that five years on, defendants were still being brought before American courts and the effort was not finished, noting that thirty suspects have been indicted so far. Four men were already convicted in a Miami court in May for their part in the conspiracy, facing possible life sentences. The group flown in on Sunday comprised seventeen Colombian former soldiers and Joseph Badio, a senior figure in the Haitian justice ministry’s anti-corruption unit. American prosecutors say the killing was planned and financed in Florida, as well as in the Dominican Republic and Haiti itself. For an international reader, and especially for anyone who could one day be arrested in France on a foreign extradition request, this case is a live demonstration of how transnational murder prosecutions now work: a crime committed in one country, organised in a second, tried in a third after a mass extradition. This article reconstructs what happened, explains why Miami rather than Port-au-Prince is trying the case, and then applies the French test step by step: had these men been arrested in Paris instead of Haiti, would a French chambre de l’instruction have authorised their surrender, and which defences could have blocked it?
I. Why eighteen suspects boarded a plane to Florida instead of facing a judge in Port-au-Prince
A. Who the United States put on the plane: seventeen Colombian ex-soldiers and a Haitian anti-corruption official
When gunmen entered the presidential residence in Port-au-Prince on the night of 7 July 2021 and killed the fifty-three-year-old head of state, Haiti’s justice system began a collapse from which it has never recovered. Haitian investigations stalled as armed gangs seized control of large parts of the capital and the country descended into generalised lawlessness. The United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti counted at least 1,408 people killed and 656 injured between April and June 2026 alone. Presidential and legislative elections, the first since 2016, are scheduled for 13 December 2026 only if the security situation allows. In that context, trying the alleged assassins of a president in a Haitian courtroom was never a realistic option, and Washington took the lead.
According to the BBC’s reporting of 21 September 2026, the eighteen people extradited on Sunday fall into two very different groups, and the distinction matters for every extradition lawyer reading this file. Seventeen are Colombian former soldiers. They present themselves as hired guns who believed they had been recruited for a coup operation and claim they were unaware of any plan to murder the president. A Miami-based security firm is accused of having played the central role in recruiting them. The eighteenth man, Joseph Badio, is Haitian: he worked inside the justice ministry in an anti-corruption unit, which makes his alleged participation the insider thread of the prosecution narrative. Several other men allegedly connected to the murder were killed by police in the immediate aftermath in 2021, so the present defendants are the surviving alleged executors and facilitators.
Four defendants have already been convicted in Miami in May for conspiracy to kill or kidnap President Moise and conspiracy to provide material support, and they face possible life imprisonment. Those convictions are procedurally important for the eighteen newcomers: they show that the American theory of the case has already survived adversarial testing before a jury, at least for the financing and logistics branch of the plot. The thirty indictments announced by the United States Attorney also signal that further arrests are expected, and the FBI special agent quoted on the operation, Brett Skiles, described “multi-location and international arrests,” language which in extradition practice means several states cooperated in locating, arresting and handing over fugitives within the same coordinated sweep. Anyone arrested in France during such a sweep would go through the French extradition procedure described in Part II below, starting with presentation to the procureur general and, where the person does not consent, a reasoned opinion of the chambre de l’instruction on cases of arrest in France on an Interpol diffusion followed by a fight for release.
One factual point deserves emphasis because it shapes the whole French comparison: none of the reporting suggests that any of the eighteen is a United States national, and none is said to have been arrested on American soil. They were detained in Haiti and transferred outward. That is the mirror image of the classic French extradition case, in which France is the requested state and must decide whether to hand over a person found on its territory. The legal questions are nevertheless identical: dual criminality, sufficiency of the warrant, lapse of time, the political-offence exception, and the compatibility of the expected sentence with fundamental rights. France answers those questions through article 696-8 of the Code of criminal procedure, which provides that « toute demande d’extradition est adressée au gouvernement français par voie diplomatique et accompagnée soit d’un jugement ou d’un arrêt de condamnation, même par défaut, soit d’un acte de procédure pénale décrétant formellement ou opérant de plein droit le renvoi de la personne poursuivie devant la juridiction répressive, soit d’un mandat d’arrêt ou de tout autre acte ayant la même force et décerné par l’autorité judiciaire » In plain terms, no surrender without a proper judicial act identifying precisely the facts and their date. The Haiti-to-Florida transfers rested on federal indictments and arrest warrants of exactly that nature, and a Paris court seized of the same file would have started from the same documents.
B. The jurisdictional hook that lets Miami try a murder committed in Port-au-Prince
The most striking legal feature of this case is that the murder happened in Haiti, the alleged shooters are Colombian, the alleged insider is Haitian, and yet the trial takes place in Florida. United States prosecutors have been explicit about the basis: the planning and financing of the killing were orchestrated from Florida, alongside acts in the Dominican Republic and Haiti. Under American federal law, conspiracy to kill or kidnap outside the United States, and conspiracy to provide material support, give federal courts jurisdiction when part of the conduct, or certain effects, touch American territory. That is why the May convictions in Miami were entered for conspiracy offences rather than for the Haitian-law murder itself, and why the eighteen newcomers face the same conspiracy and material-support architecture, carrying possible life sentences.
French criminal law reaches the same result by a different road, and the comparison is what makes this case useful for a reader arrested in France. Had the financing meetings taken place in Paris rather than Miami, France could have prosecuted the whole plot at home. Article 450-1 of the Code penal provides that « Constitue une association de malfaiteurs tout groupement formé ou entente établie en vue de la préparation, caractérisée par un ou plusieurs faits matériels, d’un ou plusieurs crimes ou d’un ou plusieurs délits punis d’au moins cinq ans d’emprisonnement » An international team that rents houses, buys weapons, books flights and wires money to remove a head of state fits that definition without strain, and the French courts assert jurisdiction over complicity and conspiracy acts committed on French soil even when the planned murder is to occur abroad. The substantive French classification of the killing itself would be equally severe: article 221-1 of the Code penal states that « Le fait de donner volontairement la mort à autrui constitue un meurtre. Il est puni de trente ans de réclusion criminelle » while article 221-3 adds that « Le meurtre commis avec préméditation ou guet-apens constitue un assassinat. Il est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité » A night-time armed raid on a residence is, on its face, a premeditated killing, and the parallel with the life sentences available in Miami is exact.
There is a third French classification that an examining magistrate in Paris would have considered, and it matters for extradition as developed below: article 412-1 of the Code penal provides that « Constitue un attentat le fait de commettre un ou plusieurs actes de violence de nature à mettre en péril les institutions de la République ou à porter atteinte à l’intégrité du territoire national » Assassinating a sitting president to seize or destabilise state power is the textbook example of violence endangering the institutions of the Republic. That label does not only aggravate the sentence; in extradition law it decides whether the political-offence exception can even be invoked, because the murder of a head of state is precisely the case the treaties remove from political protection. The Colombian claim that they signed up for a coup rather than a killing therefore fails twice: factually it does not negate participation in an armed operation against the institutions, and legally a coup is not a defence but an aggravating narrative.
Finally, the American choice of Florida answers the question every practitioner asks first: why not extradite to Haiti, the territorial state? Because Haiti in 2026 cannot guarantee custody, a courtroom, or the safety of witnesses. International law does not oblige the United States to send defendants to the place of the crime when that state cannot try them; the aut dedere aut judicare logic runs the other way, allowing the state with custody and jurisdiction to prosecute. France applies the same reasoning when it tries at home, under its own extraterritorial heads of jurisdiction, cases it will not send abroad. The eighteen transfers are thus not an American anomaly but the standard response of a functioning judiciary to a collapsed one, and the December 2026 Haitian elections, if they happen, will unfold in a country whose former president’s alleged killers are being judged in Miami.
II. The Paris test: what a French chambre de l’instruction would have done with this file
A. Would France surrender them? Dual criminality, the political-offence bar and the assassinated-head-of-state exception
Imagine the same eighteen men arrested in Seine-Saint-Denis rather than Port-au-Prince, on an American extradition request supported by the Florida indictments. French procedure would start the same day. The procureur general would notify them of the request, and if he decided not to leave them at liberty he would present them to the first president of the cour d’appel, because article 696-11 of the Code of criminal procedure provides that « s’il décide de ne pas laisser en liberté la personne réclamée, le procureur général la présente au premier président de la cour d’appel ou au magistrat du siège désigné par lui » Those who refused surrender, as the Colombians and Badio certainly would, would be placed under ecrou extraditionnel and brought before the chambre de l’instruction within ten working days. The Cour de cassation polices that timeline strictly: in its decision of 2 May 2024, no. 24-82.116, concerning a surrender to the British authorities, it recorded as the lawful starting point that « L’intéressé, qui n’a pas consenti à sa remise, a été placé sous écrou extraditionnel » (Cour de cassation, criminal chamber, 2 May 2024, no. 24-82.116). The chamber would then give its reasoned opinion, since article 696-15 of the Code of criminal procedure provides that « Si, lors de sa comparution, la personne réclamée déclare ne pas consentir à être extradée, la chambre de l’instruction donne son avis motivé sur la demande d’extradition » adding that « Cet avis est défavorable si la cour estime que les conditions légales ne sont pas remplies ou qu’il y a une erreur évidente » Only after a favourable opinion could the Government authorise surrender by decree, itself open to challenge before the Conseil d’Etat.
On the merits, the first hurdle is dual criminality and gravity, and the Haiti file clears it by a wide margin. Article 696-3 of the Code of criminal procedure allows extradition for « Tous les faits punis de peines criminelles par la loi de l’Etat requérant » and conspiracy to murder carrying life imprisonment in Florida corresponds in France to assassinat and attentat, both crimes punished with life. The Colombian defence of mistake, believing in a coup rather than a killing, is irrelevant at this stage: the chambre de l’instruction does not try guilt, it checks that the facts as described by the requesting state correspond to a French crime, and an armed commando operation against a presidential residence corresponds to several.
The second hurdle is the one the defence would actually plead: the political-offence exception. Article 696-4 of the Code of criminal procedure opens with the rule that « L’extradition n’est pas accordée : 1° Lorsque la personne réclamée a la nationalité française, cette dernière étant appréciée à l’époque de l’infraction pour laquelle l’extradition est requise » Nationality would help none of the eighteen in Paris, since they are Colombian and Haitian, not French. The next paragraph of the same article refuses extradition for offences of a political character or requested for a political purpose, and counsel would argue that removing a contested president is inherently political. That argument would almost certainly fail, for a reason the Cour de cassation has applied repeatedly and recalled as recently as 27 May 2026 in a decision on an Algerian request, no. 25-84.904, where the chamber had ruled on « l’absence de caractère politique des faits reprochés » before giving a partially favourable opinion. Regicide and the assassination of a head of state are the classic cases the extradition treaties expressly withdraw from political protection: the 1957 European Convention on Extradition states that the taking or attempted taking of the life of a Head of State shall not be deemed a political offence, and French courts apply the same attentat logic domestically. A commando that storms a presidential bedroom to kill its occupant is not exercising a political opinion; it is committing an assassinat and an attentat, and no Paris chamber would cloak that in political immunity. The related question of how France ranks competing extradition requests when two states want the same person would arise only if Colombia or Haiti filed parallel requests for the ex-soldiers, in which case Paris would weigh gravity, place of commission, chronology and the prospect of an effective trial, a balance that on these facts would still point toward the American prosecution already holding convictions.
B. The three defences that could still stop a surrender from Paris: irreducible life sentences, inhuman detention and release pending the decree
The political-offence argument having failed, competent defence counsel in Paris would shift to the ground that has blocked more extraditions to the United States than any other in the last decade: the sentence awaiting across the Atlantic. The four Miami convictions already carry possible life imprisonment, and the eighteen newcomers face the same exposure. French law refuses surrender where the expected penalty offends French public order, and the European Court of Human Rights prohibits removing a person to face an irreducible life sentence or inhuman prison conditions. The leading French-language analysis of when France refuses surrender to the United States over life sentences and Article 3 shows how Paris courts demand concrete assurances: a real possibility of release, sentence review, and detention conditions compatible with human dignity. On a file where prosecutors publicly emphasise life imprisonment as the likely outcome, the chambre de l’instruction would press the American authorities for detailed, binding assurances on sentence review and on the regime the defendants would serve, and an evasive or generic reply can turn a favourable opinion into an unfavourable one.
The Convention anchor of that defence is short and absolute. Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment A French court does not need to find that American federal prisons are inhuman in general; it examines the individual fate of the person before it, including age, health, the security regime likely to apply to presidential assassins, and the reducibility of the sentence in law and in practice. High-profile cop-killers and terrorists are typically held under severe regimes, and counsel would argue that men presented worldwide as the murderers of a head of state would face the harshest available conditions. The Government’s decree, if it ever came, would then face a second siege before the administrative courts and potentially a Rule 39 interim measure from Strasbourg suspending the surrender. None of this guarantees refusal, American assurances on federal life sentences have satisfied French courts in past cases, but it guarantees time, and time in extradition practice is leverage: memories fade, witnesses disperse, and prosecutors become willing to bargain over charges and sentencing recommendations.
The second practical defence is liberty during the procedure itself. Detention under ecrou extraditionnel is not automatic imprisonment until the plane leaves. Article 696-19 of the Code of criminal procedure provides that « La mise en liberté peut être demandée à tout moment à la chambre de l’instruction selon les formes prévues aux articles 148-6 et 148-7 ». Counsel for the Colombians would file for release under judicial supervision, surrender of passports, electronic monitoring and a ban on leaving France, arguing years of proceedings ahead, the collapse of the Haitian case files, and the need to prepare a complex transnational defence. Release does not end the extradition, but it transforms it: a free person can meet lawyers, gather evidence from Bogota and Port-au-Prince, and challenge each American supplemental filing as it arrives. The Badio file would add a further twist, because as a former justice ministry official he could claim that Haitian evidence against him was extracted under gang coercion or political score-settling, forcing the chamber to order supplemental information from Washington and slowing the calendar further.
The third line of defence looks beyond the courtroom to the file’s weakest point: proof. France extradites on the requesting state’s account of the facts, but the chamber verifies that the file is coherent and that the person before it is the right person. Here the Colombian narrative, that they were deceived about the mission’s purpose, does not defeat extradition, since French law surrenders for trial precisely so that defences can be heard by the trial court, yet it colours every discretionary assessment the chamber and the Government must make. Add the five-year delay, the killing of several alleged participants in 2021 whose testimony is lost forever, and Haitian investigative acts performed amid state collapse, and a Paris chamber could plausibly order successive supplements of information, stretching the procedure over years. The Cour de cassation’s 27 May 2026 decision, no. 25-84.904, illustrates the pattern: three successive opinions and supplements of information across 2024 and 2025 before the final partially favourable opinion in a case where Algeria sought execution of a life sentence imposed in absentia (Cour de cassation, criminal chamber, 27 May 2026, no. 25-84.904). Extradition from Paris is therefore not a rubber stamp but a slow, adversarial audit, and on a file as heavy as the Moise assassination the audit would be exhaustive.
Conclusion
The flight that carried eighteen suspects from Port-au-Prince to Miami on 20 September 2026 will not end the Moise case: thirty indictments have been announced, more arrests are promised, and the December 2026 Haitian elections will decide whether the country can begin rebuilding the justice system whose absence made the Florida trials necessary. The lesson for an international audience is structural. When the territorial state collapses, prosecution migrates to the state that holds the conspiracy’s financial and logistical threads, and extradition becomes the bridge between the crime scene and the courtroom. Had that bridge run through Paris instead of Port-au-Prince, French law would very likely have authorised surrender: dual criminality is satisfied by assassinat and attentat, nationality protects none of the defendants, and the murder of a head of state cannot shelter behind the political-offence exception. But authorisation would have come slowly, conditionally, and possibly with binding American assurances on life sentences and detention, after years of litigation over release, proof and fundamental rights. That is the French paradox of extradition: a system that surrenders, yet subjects every surrender to exacting judicial verification. Anyone who may one day be the person in the dock, or the family hiring counsel for him, should understand both halves of that equation before the plane tickets are booked.