On 20 September 2026, eighteen men accused of assassinating Haitian President Jovenel Moïse were flown from Port-au-Prince to Florida to stand trial in an American federal court. The group — seventeen Colombian former soldiers and Joseph Badio, a senior official from Haiti’s own justice ministry — had been held in Haiti since the president was shot dead in his bedroom in July 2021. Their transfer to Miami is the largest single extradition in the five-year history of a case that American prosecutors say was plotted and financed on United States soil. Thirty suspects have now been indicted, and four men were already convicted by a Miami jury in May 2026. For readers facing an extradition request — or advising someone who is — this case is a live masterclass in how cross-border surrender works: how one state can try a murder committed on another continent, which defences survive the flight, and what would happen if the same men had been arrested in Paris instead of Port-au-Prince. A French extradition judge would run the file through a very different machine, and understanding that machine is the key to defending any extradition case in France.
I. How did eighteen suspects end up in a Florida court for a murder committed in Haiti?
A. Why can American courts try a Haitian assassination that was plotted from Miami?
The first question every international lawyer asks about this file is the jurisdiction question: by what right does a court in Miami try the murder of a Haitian president, killed in Port-au-Prince by mostly Colombian gunmen? The answer, and it is the backbone of the entire American prosecution, is that the plot itself lived in Florida. United States prosecutors allege that the planning and financing of the assassination were orchestrated from Florida, as well as from the Dominican Republic and Haiti itself, and that a Miami-based security firm played a key role in hiring the Colombian former soldiers who carried out the attack. When gunmen entered the president’s residence and murdered the 53-year-old head of state in his bedroom in July 2021, Haiti was shaken to its core — but the evidentiary trail pointed back across the water to South Florida.
That American footprint is what unlocks the federal charges. In May 2026, a federal jury in Miami convicted four defendants — Arcangel Pretel Ortiz, Antonio Intriago, Walter Veintemilla and James Solages — of conspiracy to provide material support to carry out a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 956, resulting in death, of providing that material support, of conspiracy to kill and kidnap a person outside the United States, of conspiracy to commit offences against the United States, and of expedition against a friendly nation, according to the official press release of the United States Department of Justice. One of them, Intriago, was additionally convicted of smuggling goods from the United States and of submitting false export information. These are not charges of murder under Haitian law applied abroad. They are American federal offences whose very definition includes acts committed on American soil in preparation of violence overseas: staging, financing, recruiting and equipping a commando that then flies to Port-au-Prince. Assistant Attorney General for National Security John A. Eisenberg put the theory in one sentence: using American soil as a staging ground for a violent plot abroad violates United States law and sovereignty itself
This is the mechanism international practitioners call extraterritorial jurisdiction by conduct: the receiving state does not claim the right to punish a foreign murder as such, but punishes the conspiracy, the financing and the material support that happened on its own territory. It is the same logic that lets France prosecute the financing of terrorism planned abroad, and it explains why the eighteen men flown to Florida in September 2026 are not being sent back to face Haitian courts. Given the drawn-out judicial process in Haiti — where the suspects had been held awaiting trial for years, as AP’s reporting from Port-au-Prince recalls — Washington and Port-au-Prince agreed that the forum capable of trying these men promptly was Miami, and the suspects now face justice in Florida. The United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida, Jason Reding Quiñones, described the transfer as the next major phase of the accountability effort, vowing that defendants would keep being brought before American courts five years on. Thirty suspects have been indicted so far, which means a dozen files are still in the pipeline.
The surrender itself followed the classic extradition sequence. Haiti, as the requested state holding the men, consented to hand them over; the United States, as the requesting state, received them on the tarmac in Florida. The FBI presented it as a multi-location international operation, with special agent Brett Skiles stressing the Bureau’s commitment to pursuing every participant in the plot. For the defence teams now assembling in Miami, the extradition is already history — the fight moves to the trial court, to the admissibility of evidence gathered across three countries, and to the individual role of each accused man. A Colombian ex-soldier who says he believed he was hired as a security guard stands in a very different position from Joseph Badio, the former anti-corruption official whom prosecutors place at the heart of the conspiracy. That differentiation of roles is precisely what the coming trials will test, and it is also what any extradition judge in Europe would have examined before authorising surrender: who did what, where, and on the basis of which documents.
B. What do the May 2026 Miami convictions change for the eighteen men just extradited?
The four convictions secured on 8 May 2026 transform the legal landscape for the eighteen new arrivals, and defence lawyers in Miami know it. A federal jury has already validated the prosecution’s theory: that South Florida was used as a staging ground for a deadly foreign plot, in the words of United States Attorney Quiñones, who declared after the verdict that the defendants had sought power, influence and profit through violence, and that the jury verdict was the answer of the rule of law. That verdict, reported in the Department of Justice release, gives prosecutors enormous momentum. The day after the extradition, Badio and the other new arrivals already appeared before a federal judge in Miami — Badio in a wheelchair — under a new indictment filed on 27 August and unsealed that weekend, while a dual Haitian-American citizen from Palm Beach County, Christian Sanon, was preparing to face trial the following week, according to AP’s court reporting. At least nine people have now been convicted at trial or through guilty pleas, which tells every new defence team exactly what it is up against. Juries in the same courthouse will hear the next cases; cooperating witnesses from the first trial can be called in the second; and the documentary record — money transfers, travel bookings, weapons purchases, the Miami security firm’s hiring files — is now an established exhibit set rather than an untested allegation. Anyone advising one of the eighteen must therefore assume that the prosecution’s narrative already has judicial credit, and build the defence around individual distance from the conspiracy rather than a frontal attack on the existence of the plot.
That does not mean the eighteen are without weapons. American federal procedure offers them the full arsenal of an adversarial trial: discovery of the prosecution file, cross-examination of every witness, motions to suppress evidence seized in violation of constitutional guarantees, and above all the presumption of innocence before a jury that must be convinced beyond reasonable doubt, defendant by defendant. Several lines of defence are already visible. First, the knowledge defence: many of the Colombian recruits are expected to argue they were hired for legitimate close-protection work and learned the true objective only when it was too late to withdraw — a claim that, if believed for a given individual, severs the intent required for conspiracy. Second, the withdrawal defence: a conspirator who genuinely and timely renounces the plot can escape liability for what follows, and the timeline of each man’s movements between Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Haiti and the United States will be dissected flight by flight. Third, the evidentiary defence: statements obtained in Haitian detention, where the justice system has barely functioned for years, will face fierce challenges on voluntariness and on the conditions in which they were taken.
There is also a structural asymmetry worth noting for European observers. In the American system, the extradition and the trial are two strictly separate chapters: once the men set foot in Florida, the Haitian surrender decision is almost never re-examined by the trial court, under the long-standing rule that a court’s jurisdiction does not depend on how the defendant was brought before it. In France, by contrast, the extradition phase itself is the accused person’s greatest procedural opportunity, because an independent court — the chambre de l’instruction — reviews the legality of the request before any surrender, and its unfavourable opinion definitively blocks the transfer. That contrast is the reason this firm’s international desk insists on comparing the two systems: a suspect who can choose, even marginally, where he is arrested shapes the rest of his case. The eighteen men of September 2026 were arrested and held in Haiti, a state willing to surrender them; had any one of them reached French soil, the file would have entered the French extradition machine — and that machine deserves a detailed tour, because it is where French lawyers win or lose these cases.
II. What would happen if the United States asked France to extradite these men from Paris?
A. How does the French chambre de l’instruction test an extradition request?
Imagine that one of the Colombian former soldiers, instead of being detained in Port-au-Prince, is stopped by French border police at Roissy airport on the basis of an American extradition request. From that second, a strictly regulated judicial sequence begins, and every step of it is a potential line of defence. French law states the framework plainly: “les conditions, la procédure et les effets de l’extradition sont déterminés par les dispositions du présent chapitre” in the words of article 696 of the Code of criminal procedure. Where a bilateral treaty exists — as between France and the United States — the treaty applies first, and the Code fills every gap the treaty leaves. The first reflex of a Paris extradition lawyer is therefore to read both texts together and to hold the requesting state to the stricter of the two.
The personal scope of extradition from France already decides many files. Under article 696-2 of the Code of criminal procedure, the French government may surrender to a requesting state “toute personne n’ayant pas la nationalité française” — any person without French nationality — and only where the offence was committed on the requesting state’s territory, or abroad by one of its nationals, or abroad against its interests in defined cases. Applied to the Moïse file, the consequence is immediate: the seventeen Colombian nationals and the Haitian official, none of them French, would in principle be extraditable from France, because the murder was committed on Haitian territory at Haiti’s request — or on American territory in the Americans’ conspiracy theory. But had any suspect held French nationality at the time of the offence, France would have refused surrender outright and offered to try him in French courts instead, under the absolute bar of article 696-4. That nationality shield is the reason experienced fugitives study passports as carefully as lawyers study treaties, and it is the first question this firm asks in every extradition consultation.
Once arrested, the requested person is brought before the general prosecutor, and if he does not walk free, the senior judge of the court of appeal orders the detention known as “le placement sous écrou extraditionnel de la personne réclamée” under article 696-11 of the Code of criminal procedure. The écrou extraditionnel is a detention of its own kind: it is neither pre-trial detention for a French offence nor the execution of a sentence, but a custodial measure whose sole purpose is to guarantee surrender. It can be challenged at any time, and the statute organises release applications before the chambre de l’instruction with counsel summoned at least forty-eight hours before the hearing, under article 696-19 of the Code of criminal procedure. If the person declares that he does not consent to extradition, the chambre de l’instruction is seised without delay, the person appears before it within ten working days, and, in the words of article 696-15 of the Code of criminal procedure, “la chambre de l’instruction donne son avis motivé sur la demande d’extradition.”
That opinion is the heart of the French system, and its effects are brutally simple. “l’extradition ne peut être accordée” states article 696-17 of the Code of criminal procedure — an unfavourable opinion that has become final kills the request, and the person walks free unless held for another reason. Conversely, “l’extradition est autorisée par décret du Premier ministre” under article 696-18 of the Code of criminal procedure. Note the asymmetry: the court can definitively block surrender, but it can never order it — only the government signs the surrender decree, which is itself challengeable before the administrative courts. Defence strategy therefore plays on two tables at once: convince the three judges of the chambre de l’instruction, and prepare, in parallel, the petition against the decree.
The Cour de cassation polices this procedure with uncompromising rigour, and two recent rulings show how. On 9 August 2023, in a case where the chambre de l’instruction had issued an unfavourable opinion and the general prosecutor had appealed, the criminal chamber held that the appeal suspends the effects of that opinion: “il s’induit des dispositions de l’article 696-17 du même code que la mainlevée de la mesure de contrôle judiciaire dont fait l’objet la personne réclamée ne saurait être acquise dès le prononcé d’un arrêt de la chambre de l’instruction qui a émis un avis défavorable à son extradition” (Cass. crim., 9 August 2023, no. 23-83.192, published in the Bulletin). Practically, this means the requested person stays under judicial supervision while the appeal runs — a warning to defence teams that victory before the chambre de l’instruction must be protected all the way to finality. And on 27 May 2026, the Court confirmed the full checklist the chambre de l’instruction must work through — applicable treaty, non-political character of the facts, completeness of the supporting documents, sentence quantum, limitation periods and double criminality — while rejecting complaints about arbitrary detention risks and inhuman treatment where the file documented collective detention with freedom of movement, health and hygiene standards and at least six hours of daily outdoor exercise (Cass. crim., 27 May 2026, no. 25-84.904). The lesson for a Moïse-type file is that French judges verify everything, but accept documented answers: incomplete American paperwork would be fatal to the request, while a complete and precise file survives.
B. When will France refuse surrender: death penalty, unfair trial and protected persons?
The second half of the French test is the wall of mandatory refusal grounds, and in a case as grave as a presidential assassination, three of them would dominate the hearings. Article 696-4 of the Code of criminal procedure lists the situations in which “L’extradition n’est pas accordée” and each one maps onto the Moïse file. French nationality is an absolute shield: “la nationalité française, cette dernière étant appréciée”. The political-offence exception — “le crime ou le délit à un caractère politique” — would certainly be argued by imaginative defence counsel, but a murder carried out by hired gunmen against a sitting head of state, for money and power rather than for a political cause, is the textbook example of a common-law crime that no French court treats as political, and the Cour de cassation routinely verifies the chambre de l’instruction’s finding that the facts lack political character, as it did again in the May 2026 Algerian case. Double jeopardy also matters: where the acts were already finally tried in France, surrender is barred — irrelevant for the Moïse accused, but decisive in many files this firm handles.
The two grounds that would truly shape a French hearing on this file are the death-penalty guarantee and the fair-trial guarantee. French law refuses extradition for any act punishable in the requesting state by a penalty deemed “contraire à l’ordre public français”. Capital punishment is the paradigm case: France abolished it, the Constitution forbids it, and no French judge authorises a surrender that could end on death row without an ironclad, individualised assurance. The Cour de cassation set the standard on 30 January 2024 in a Tunisian extradition case: where the death penalty is incurred for the facts in the request, the requesting state must give an undertaking that is “dénué de toute ambiguïté” — free of all ambiguity — that the sentence, if pronounced, will not be carried out in the specific situation of the person claimed (Cass. crim., 30 January 2024, no. 23-83.549, published in the Bulletin). A general moratorium in the requesting state, or its symbolic international commitments, will not do — the Court quashed an opinion that relied on them. Applied to Miami, the message is concrete: for any American charge in the Moïse file that exposes the accused to capital punishment, Paris would demand a written, unambiguous, person-specific American commitment that the sentence will neither be sought nor carried out, and without it the transfer stops. Defence lawyers should also remember the European anchor of this rule: the prohibition in article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights on torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, which French extradition judges apply alongside the Code.
The fair-trial ground would run in parallel: no surrender before a court “n’assurant pas les garanties fondamentales de procédure et de protection des droits de la défense”, in the words of article 696-4 of the Code of criminal procedure. Against the United States, this argument almost always fails — American federal courts, with juries, discovery, exclusionary rules and appellate review, plainly satisfy fundamental guarantees, and the May 2026 Miami trial itself demonstrates an adversarial process functioning at full capacity. But the ground remains a live weapon wherever the requesting state’s courts are compromised, and French judges examine detention conditions with the same seriousness: in May 2026 the Cour de cassation approved an opinion that had verified collective detention with free movement, health and hygiene standards and daily outdoor exercise before rejecting an inhuman-treatment complaint. For the eighteen men, the sharper French-law point would instead be double criminality: the chambre de l’instruction must satisfy itself that the American conspiracy and material-support charges correspond to offences punishable under French law. They do — French law punishes murder with thirty years’ imprisonment (“Le fait de donner volontairement la mort à autrui constitue un meurtre” article 221-1 of the Criminal Code) and premeditated murder with life (“Le meurtre commis avec préméditation ou guet-apens constitue un assassinat” article 221-3 of the Criminal Code) — and French courts also punish conspiracy and complicity in such crimes. A file as well documented as the American Moïse indictment, with its financial trails and recruitment records, would therefore likely survive the French double-criminality test, leaving the defence to fight on assurances, specialty and procedure rather than on the substance.
Two final French particularities deserve emphasis because foreign lawyers routinely misunderstand them. First, the specialty rule: a person surrendered by France may be tried only for the facts that justified the surrender, and the Cour de cassation enforces it strictly — which is why the Tunisian accused’s refusal to waive specialty, noted in the January 2024 ruling, is standard defence practice, not obstruction. Any Moïse suspect surrendered from Paris could therefore be tried in Miami only within the perimeter of the authorised charges. Second, the tempo: ten working days to appear, a reasoned opinion, a possible appeal, then a Prime Ministerial decree, then administrative review — a sequence that typically runs for many months and sometimes beyond a year, during which a detained person can repeatedly seek release. Readers who want the general method for fighting surrender from France will find it in this firm’s guide to arrest on an Interpol notice and extradition defence in France: challenge the file early, demand the requesting state’s documents in full, and never consent lightly, because consent waives specialty and accelerates everything.
Conclusion
The flight that carried eighteen accused men from Port-au-Prince to Miami on 20 September 2026 closes one chapter and opens a harder one. Haiti, unable to try them at home, entrusted American federal justice with the murder of its president; the May 2026 Miami convictions prove that the American forum can deliver verdicts; and the coming trials will decide, man by man, who conspired and who was merely used. But the case is also a standing lesson for anyone exposed to cross-border prosecution: the state that arrests you decides the procedure that judges you. In Florida, extradition is an executive handover followed by a jury trial. In France, it is a full judicial examination — treaty first, Code second, chambre de l’instruction within ten working days, mandatory refusal grounds, unambiguous death-penalty assurances, specialty protection, and a government decree the defence can attack. A Colombian recruit or a Haitian official arrested at Roissy would face months of French hearings before any American prosecutor saw him, and each hearing would be a genuine chance to stop the transfer. That is the French lawyer’s edge in international cases, and it is why early advice, in both the requesting and the requested state, changes outcomes.