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18 Suspects Flown to Miami for the Moise Assassination: What France Would Do With an Extradition File Like This

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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18 Suspects Flown to Miami for the Moise Assassination: What France Would Do With an Extradition File Like This

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On the weekend of 20 September 2026, eighteen detainees boarded planes in Haiti and landed in Florida to answer for one of the most shocking political murders of the decade: the assassination of Haitian President Jovenel Moise, shot dead in his bedroom in Port-au-Prince in July 2021. Seventeen of them are former Colombian soldiers. The eighteenth is Joseph Badio, a senior figure from inside the Haitian justice ministry itself. American prosecutors say thirty people have been indicted in total, and four defendants were already convicted by a Miami jury in May 2026 for a conspiracy that United States investigators say was planned and financed on American soil. This column looks at the transfer from a French lawyer’s point of view. How can a Florida court try a murder committed in Haiti? And if the same file landed on a Paris desk tomorrow, would France hand the suspects to Miami, or would it prosecute them in its own courts? The answers run through the Franco-American extradition treaty, the refusal grounds of the French Code of Criminal Procedure, two recent rulings of the Cour de cassation, and the rules that let France try crimes committed abroad.

I. From Port-au-Prince to Miami: how eighteen suspects ended up in a Florida courtroom

A. A president murdered, an investigation that collapsed, and a mass transfer to Florida

Jovenel Moise was killed at his private residence in Port-au-Prince in July 2021 by an armed commando described by investigators as composed mainly of Colombian mercenaries. The murder shook the Caribbean country to its core: a sitting president killed at home with apparent ease, while the state around him was already failing. In the five years since, Haiti has sunk into gang violence on a scale the United Nations still struggles to quantify, with at least 1,408 people killed and 656 injured between April and June 2026 alone according to the UN Integrated Office in Haiti, and the country is now supposed to hold its first presidential and legislative elections since 2016 on 13 December 2026 if security allows. Inside Haiti, the judicial investigation into the assassination stalled, caught between gang control of the capital, murdered or intimidated witnesses, and institutions that barely function. That collapse is the reason the case moved to Miami.

American prosecutors have long argued that the plot was organized from Florida as much as from Haiti and the Dominican Republic, with a Miami-based security company accused of recruiting the Colombian ex-soldiers. On that theory, the Southern District of Florida opened its own case, and it has moved in stages. In May 2026, a federal jury in Miami convicted four men, Arcangel Pretel Ortiz, Antonio Intriago, Walter Veintemilla and James Solages, of conspiracy to provide material support for the killing, of providing that support, of conspiracy to kill and kidnap a person outside the United States, of conspiracy to commit offences against the United States, and of expedition against a friendly nation, with Intriago convicted on additional smuggling and false export information counts. All four face life in prison, with sentencing in the hands of United States District Judge Jacqueline Becerra. The September 2026 airlift is the second wave: eighteen more suspects, seventeen Colombian former soldiers plus Badio, the former anti-corruption official, flown to Florida after detention in Haiti. The head of the Miami prosecutor’s office publicly called the operation the next major phase of the accountability effort, warning that five years on, American courts are still bringing defendants to trial and the process is not finished, while the FBI stressed the multi-location and international character of the arrests. Several other men linked to the commando were killed by police in the hours after the murder, and the Colombian detainees have claimed they believed they were hired for a coup operation and did not know a killing was planned, a line of defence that will matter enormously at trial.

B. Why an American jury can try a murder committed in Haiti

Readers often ask the obvious question: the victim was Haitian, the bedroom was in Port-au-Prince, most of the gunmen were Colombian, so what gives a jury in Miami the right to decide? American federal criminal law answers with a set of extraterritorial conspiracy offences that look at where the plot was prepared rather than only at where the trigger was pulled. The Department of Justice press release on the May 2026 convictions lists the charges precisely: conspiracy to provide material support or resources to carry out a violation of section 956 of Title 18 of the United States Code, resulting in death, the actual provision of that support, conspiracy to kill and kidnap a person outside the United States, conspiracy to commit offences against the United States, and expedition against a friendly nation. Section 956 punishes conspiracy within American jurisdiction to kill, kidnap or maim abroad. The material support counts punish putting American money, weapons, logistics or personnel at the service of that plan. The expedition charge, heir to the old Neutrality Act now codified at section 960, punishes launching a military or armed enterprise from American soil against a country with which the United States is at peace. Put together, these counts tell a coherent story for prosecutors: the murder happened in Haiti, but the conspiracy lived in Miami, where it was financed, staffed and equipped, and that American footprint is what founds jurisdiction.

That construction is familiar to French lawyers because France uses the same logic in reverse when it prosecutes terrorist or organized crime conspiracies partly prepared on its soil. The American version goes further in one respect: it reaches foreign nationals for acts committed entirely abroad as soon as any meaningful act of preparation touched the United States. The courthouse statements around the verdict hammered that message home, with the Justice Department’s national security leadership saying that using American soil as a staging ground for a violent plot overseas violates both the law and sovereignty itself, the Miami prosecutor saying the defendants pursued power, influence and profit through violence across borders and destabilized a friendly nation, and the FBI saying it would use everything at its disposal against assassination conspiracies and that the verdict proves the United States will not serve as a staging ground for violent regime change abroad. Defence teams will attack exactly that link: if the Colombians were mere guns for hire recruited through intermediaries, with no knowledge of and no contact with the American side of the financing, the personal connection to Florida becomes thinner for them than for the Miami-based organizers. Expect motions challenging the sufficiency of each defendant’s American nexus, and expect the government to answer with money trails, phone records, travel through Fort Lauderdale and Miami meeting places, and the testimony of the men already convicted. The stakes could hardly be higher, since the counts of conviction carry life imprisonment, which concentrates every procedural fight: admissibility of statements taken in Haiti, conditions of detention before transfer, translation of thousands of pages of Creole, Spanish and French documents, and the political pressure of a case that doubles as a message to every armed network operating out of South Florida.

II. If the file landed in Paris: extradite to Miami or prosecute in France?

A. Could France hand the suspects over to the United States?

Suppose one of the Colombian ex-soldiers, or a Miami-based organizer, is arrested in Paris tomorrow on an American extradition request. France and the United States are bound by the extradition treaty signed in Paris on 23 April 1996 and published in France by the decree of 29 January 2002, so the treaty would govern first, and French domestic law would fill every gap the treaty leaves open. That subsidiary role of domestic law is stated in Article 696 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure: “En l’absence de convention internationale en stipulant autrement, les conditions, la procédure et les effets de l’extradition sont déterminés par les dispositions du présent chapitre. Ces dispositions s’appliquent également aux points qui n’auraient pas été réglementés par les conventions internationales.” (Article 696 du code de procédure pénale). In practice the file would go through the Paris prosecutor’s office, detention under an extradition warrant if release on guarantees is refused, and then the reasoned opinion of the chambre de l’instruction of the Paris Court of Appeal before any surrender decree signed by the Prime Minister on the proposal of the Minister of Justice, subject to review by the Conseil d’Etat. Two features of that procedure matter for a case like this. First, French law requires the person to be told exactly what is requested: “Si, lors de sa comparution, la personne réclamée déclare ne pas consentir à être extradée, la chambre de l’instruction donne son avis motivé sur la demande d’extradition.” (Article 696-15 du code de procédure pénale). Second, detention during the proceedings takes the specific form of custody under an extradition warrant at the prison of the court of appeal, a regime organized by Article 696-11 of the same code (Article 696-11 du code de procédure pénale).

The real battle would be fought over the eight refusal grounds of Article 696-4, and a Moise-type file triggers at least four of them. The article provides: “L’extradition n’est pas accordée : 1° Lorsque la personne réclamée a la nationalité française, cette dernière étant appréciée à l’époque de l’infraction pour laquelle l’extradition est requise ; 2° Lorsque le crime ou le délit à un caractère politique ou lorsqu’il résulte des circonstances que l’extradition est demandée dans un but politique ; 3° Lorsque les crimes ou délits ont été commis sur le territoire de la République ; 4° Lorsque les crimes ou délits, quoique commis hors du territoire de la République, y ont été poursuivis et jugés définitivement ; 5° Lorsque, d’après la loi de l’Etat requérant ou la loi française, la prescription de l’action s’est trouvée acquise antérieurement à la demande d’extradition, ou la prescription de la peine antérieurement à l’arrestation de la personne réclamée et d’une façon générale toutes les fois que l’action publique de l’Etat requérant est éteinte ; 6° Lorsque le fait à raison duquel l’extradition a été demandée est puni par la législation de l’Etat requérant d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté contraire à l’ordre public français ; 7° Lorsque la personne réclamée serait jugée dans l’Etat requérant par un tribunal n’assurant pas les garanties fondamentales de procédure et de protection des droits de la défense ; 8° Lorsque le crime ou le délit constitue une infraction militaire prévue par le livre III du code de justice militaire.” (Article 696-4 du code de procédure pénale). Start with nationality: France never extradites its own nationals, so any French citizen in the support network, a financier, a logistics man, a woman who hosted meetings in Paris, could only be tried in France, never surrendered to Miami. Continue with the political offence exception, the ground the Colombian detainees themselves point to when they say they signed up for a coup and not a murder: the defence would argue the operation had a political object, the overthrow of a president, while American prosecutors and the French prosecutor’s office would answer that a commando that executes a head of state in his bedroom is an assassination for private profit, not a political act, and that the profit motive documented by the FBI destroys the political characterization. Then comes the death penalty and irreducible life sentences under point 6: the federal counts retained so far expose the defendants to life imprisonment rather than capital punishment, which removes the sharpest French objection, but any defence lawyer in Paris would still demand formal American assurances on sentence administration, parole eligibility and detention conditions, because French courts read public policy strictly whenever an irreducible penalty is even arguably on the table. That strictness was restated only recently by the Cour de cassation: “lorsque la peine de mort est encourue à raison des faits pour lesquels l’extradition est demandée, il appartient à la chambre de l’instruction de s’assurer que l’Etat requérant prend l’engagement dénué de toute ambiguïté que cette peine ne sera pas appliquée à la personne réclamée.” (Cass. crim., 30 janv. 2024, n° 23-83.549). The ruling quashed an opinion that had settled for general considerations about a moratorium and international commitments described by the lower court itself as symbolic, insisting on an unambiguous commitment covering the specific person claimed. Even where only life imprisonment is at stake, Paris practitioners invoke that decision to force the requesting state onto the record with precise, individualized, written guarantees. Add the fair trial ground of point 7, which in an American federal trial file is usually answered by the documented guarantees of the federal courts, public jury, counsel, exclusionary rules, but which still requires the chambre de l’instruction to verify rather than presume, and the specialty rule recalled by the Cour de cassation for persons surrendered after an arrest warrant procedure: “Selon le premier de ces textes, lorsque la juridiction qui a émis le mandat d’arrêt a obtenu la remise de la personne recherchée, celle-ci ne peut être poursuivie, condamnée ou détenue en vue de l’exécution d’une peine privative de liberté pour un fait quelconque antérieur à la remise et autre que celui qui a motivé cette mesure.” (Cass. crim., 12 avr. 2022, n° 22-80.284, art. 696-6 du code de procédure pénale). In plain terms, anyone France surrendered for the Moise murder could be tried in Miami only for the Moise facts, not recycled into unrelated American investigations without fresh French consent. The bottom line for this prong is realistic: France could lawfully extradite non-French suspects to the United States in a Moise-type case, but only after a grinding adversarial procedure, individualized American assurances, and a surrender limited to the assassination file.

B. Could France try them itself instead of surrendering them?

Refusing extradition is not the same as granting impunity, and French law offers several doors to a trial in Paris, though none opens automatically on these facts. The first door is active personality jurisdiction: “La loi pénale française est applicable à tout crime commis par un Français hors du territoire de la République.” (Article 113-6 du code pénal). If any member of the conspiracy, gunman, intermediary or financier, held French nationality at the time, France could prosecute that person for the murder without needing anyone’s permission, and as noted above it could not extradite that person anyway. The second door is passive personality jurisdiction, which attaches to the victim’s nationality: “La loi pénale française est applicable à tout crime, ainsi qu’à tout délit puni d’emprisonnement, commis par un Français ou par un étranger hors du territoire de la République lorsque la victime est de nationalité française au moment de l’infraction.” (Article 113-7 du code pénal). Jovenel Moise was Haitian, so this door stays shut for the murder itself, but it could open for satellite offences committed against French victims, French journalists, humanitarian workers or relatives threatened or harmed in the aftermath, a detail investigators should always check before closing the file. The third door is treaty-based jurisdiction under Article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: “Les auteurs ou complices d’infractions commises hors du territoire de la République peuvent être poursuivis et jugés par les juridictions françaises soit lorsque, conformément aux dispositions du livre Ier du code pénal ou d’un autre texte législatif, la loi française est applicable, soit lorsqu’une convention internationale ou un acte pris en application du traité instituant les Communautés européennes donne compétence aux juridictions françaises pour connaître de l’infraction.” (Article 689 du code de procédure pénale). The conventions that give France jurisdiction over attacks on internationally protected persons, starting with the 1973 New York Convention on the prevention of crimes against heads of state and diplomats, would have to be examined clause by clause, since a sitting president is the textbook example of a protected person, and France would then need implementing legislation covering the precise conduct. None of this displaces the straightforward domestic characterization available the moment any part of the plot touched French territory: voluntary homicide is defined as “Le fait de donner volontairement la mort à autrui constitue un meurtre. Il est puni de trente ans de réclusion criminelle.” (Article 221-1 du code pénal), and killing with premeditation or ambush becomes assassination, “Le meurtre commis avec préméditation ou guet-apens constitue un assassinat. Il est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité.” (Article 221-3 du code pénal). A commando operation planned for weeks, with recruited soldiers, weapons and a target’s home under surveillance, is premeditation in its purest form, so any French court seized of the facts would reason in terms of assassination, not simple murder, with life imprisonment on the table and a safety period of up to twenty-two years.

Two practical obstacles would still confront a Paris prosecution. The first is evidence: the crime scene, the ballistic material, the bodies of witnesses and most of the accused are in Haiti, Colombia or Florida, and France would depend on mutual legal assistance, joint investigation teams and the transmission of the American discovery, a slow and politically sensitive process. The second is the double jeopardy lock of Article 696-4, point 4: once the Miami courts have definitively tried a defendant, France cannot retry the same person for the same facts, and conversely an American extradition would normally be refused for facts already judged in France. That is why sequencing matters so much in multi-state cases: the first jurisdiction to render a final judgment effectively closes the criminal door everywhere else, while suspects not yet tried remain available. For the Haitian diaspora in Paris and across Ile-de-France, which follows this case closely and includes potential witnesses, these rules have a concrete meaning: testimony can be given to French investigating judges, civil party claims can be filed in a French proceeding if one is opened, and anyone contacted by foreign investigators on French soil should take advice before answering, because statements made in one jurisdiction travel into the others.

Conclusion

The Moise case is a masterclass in twenty-first century transnational justice. A murder in Port-au-Prince, planned in Miami and Santo Domingo, executed by Colombians, now judged in Florida because Haiti’s courts collapsed under gang rule. The American jurisdictional bet is bold but legible: punish the conspiracy where it was organized, not only the murder where it bled. France, faced with the same file, would neither surrender blindly nor prosecute automatically. It would run the request through the treaty and the eight locks of Article 696-4, demand unambiguous individualized assurances wherever an extreme penalty looms, limit any surrender to the assassination facts under the specialty rule, and keep its own courts open for French suspects, French victims and any fragment of the plot committed on its territory, with assassination carrying life imprisonment. For defence teams, the lesson is that every transfer between jurisdictions is a checkpoint to be litigated, assurances, political offence characterization, specialty, double jeopardy, before the trial court ever hears the merits. For the victims’ families and a Haitian nation waiting for elections, the lesson is simpler and harsher: justice in this case will be American before it can ever be Haitian, and it will arrive, if it arrives, one extradition and one jury at a time.

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