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Three Hamas Fundraisers Arrested in France as Washington Unseals a $1.7M Crypto Case: What French Courts Do Next

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Three Hamas Fundraisers Arrested in France as Washington Unseals a $1.7M Crypto Case: What French Courts Do Next

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On 2 October 2026, the United States Department of Justice announced the dismantling of an international Hamas fundraising network that had allegedly collected more than $1.7 million since January 2020 under the cover of charitable campaigns for Gaza. On the same day, in a coordinated operation, the French General Directorate for Internal Security arrested three of the network’s alleged associates in France, while American agents arrested three other alleged donors in Louisiana and Florida and prosecutors in New York unsealed an indictment against the network’s alleged organiser, Saleem Alzaq, described as a member of the media apparatus of the Al-Qassam Brigades, the armed wing of Hamas. The case is built on wire transfers, intermediaries and cryptocurrency used, according to the prosecution, to hide money presented online as humanitarian aid. The charges in the United States include conspiring to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organisation, conspiring to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, money laundering conspiracy and wire fraud, with most counts carrying a maximum penalty of twenty years in prison. Every defendant is presumed innocent, and the American press release itself recalls that an indictment is merely an allegation. The question that matters for an international reader, and the one this article answers from the French side of the file, is what happens now to the three people arrested in France: which French charges their alleged conduct attracts, which court will handle them, and under which conditions, if any, Washington could obtain their surrender.

The short answer is that the American facts map almost line for line onto the French offence of financing a terrorist enterprise, an offence the Cour de cassation interprets broadly, and that the French handling will run through the specialised Paris terrorism prosecution and investigating judges, with extended police custody and a national asset-freezing mechanism available from the first hours. Any American extradition request would then face the classic French locks: no surrender of French nationals, no surrender for political offences, and no surrender without an unambiguous undertaking that no penalty contrary to French public policy will be applied. The Franco-American coordination visible on 2 October, with the FBI’s Paris Legal Attaché working alongside French authorities, shows that both countries prefer to prosecute in parallel rather than to fight over the same defendants, but the extradition scenario cannot be excluded and French judges have set demanding conditions for it in recent years.

I. The 2 October operation: a charity front, cryptocurrency and arrests on both sides of the Atlantic

A. A $1.7 million pipeline allegedly disguised as humanitarian aid for Gaza

According to the indictment unsealed in the Southern District of New York, Saleem Alzaq has operated since at least January 2020 an international fundraising network collecting donations from individuals around the world, including in the United States. The method described by prosecutors is familiar to counter-terrorism investigators: social media campaigns purportedly providing humanitarian aid to people in Gaza, while the money is funnelled to Hamas. Since January 2020, Alzaq allegedly collected more than $1.7 million through these purported charitable campaigns. His associates in France, named as Faouzi Barika, Amel Oualid and Nordine Barika, allegedly assisted him in collecting and transferring the money raised for Hamas. Prosecutors add that the network used cryptocurrency to try to hide the criminal activity, a detail underlined by the FBI Director in the Department’s announcement.

Alzaq himself is presented as serving in the Photography Department of the media office of the Shujaiyya Brigade of the Al-Qassam Brigades, photographing Hamas events, including events led by senior Hamas figures, and posting propaganda across social media platforms, including posts glorifying deceased Hamas leaders and celebrating the 7 October 2023 attacks against southern Israel, in which more than 1,200 people were murdered and more than 250 taken hostage, including 46 American citizens. These biographical allegations matter legally because they are offered to prove knowledge: the donors and intermediaries are accused of knowing that the organisation they funded engages in terrorist activity. American prosecutors quantify the American leg of the network precisely. Abdel Adhami, 35, and Omar Adhami, 33, both of Covington, Louisiana, allegedly contributed approximately $94,000 and $11,000 respectively to Hamas between February 2021 and September 2026, concealing their contributions through wire transfers and intermediaries. Raed Yousef, 56, of Lutz, Florida, allegedly provided almost $50,000 to the network and faces the heaviest American charging instrument of the three, with multiple counts of attempting to provide material support and funds to a specially designated terrorist, money laundering counts and one count of passport fraud.

The American charging structure deserves attention because it foreshadows the French double-incrimination analysis developed below. Alzaq is charged with conspiring to provide material support to Hamas, a designated foreign terrorist organisation, which carries a maximum penalty of twenty years in prison, conspiring to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which carries a maximum penalty of twenty years in prison, conspiring to commit money laundering, which carries a maximum penalty of twenty years in prison, and conspiring to defraud the United States, which carries a maximum penalty of five years in prison. The Adhami brothers are each charged with providing and conspiring to provide material support, conspiracy to commit wire fraud and money laundering conspiracy, each carrying up to twenty years. None of the announced charges carries the death penalty, a point that will prove decisive if France is ever asked to surrender anyone, since the absence of capital punishment removes the heaviest French extradition obstacle while leaving the others intact. For now, the essential procedural fact is that the American cases are spread across three federal districts, the Southern District of New York for Alzaq, the Eastern District of Louisiana for the Adhamis and the Middle District of Florida for Yousef, with the Department’s Office of International Affairs acknowledged as having provided significant assistance, which is the office that handles extradition and mutual legal assistance requests.

B. Why France moved the same day: DGSI arrests and the FBI’s Paris bridge

The French leg of the operation is what makes this case exceptional from a Paris perspective. In a coordinated law enforcement operation in France, three of Alzaq’s associates, Faouzi Barika, Amel Oualid and Nordine Barika, were arrested by the French General Directorate for Internal Security. The FBI Director publicly thanked the FBI’s Paris Legal Attaché Office alongside French authorities for their work on the case, and the National Security Division thanked Joint Task Force 10-7, the task force created to seek justice for the victims of the 7 October 2023 attack. The announcement also claims, as context, 4,000 disruptions related to foreign terrorist organisations and 1,100 alleged terrorist actors stopped at home and around the world over the past year. These figures are the Department’s own claims and should be read as such, but the operational core is documented: simultaneous arrests in two countries, an unsealed indictment in Manhattan, and a public acknowledgement of French-American judicial cooperation.

That cooperation almost certainly runs through mutual legal assistance rather than through any joint investigation in the strict sense, since France and the United States each prosecute on their own territory under their own criminal law. The FBI Legal Attaché in Paris is a liaison office: it exchanges intelligence, helps prepare mutual assistance requests and coordinates timing, but it has no power of arrest on French soil. The arrests in France were carried out by the DGSI, the domestic intelligence service, which in terrorism matters works under the authority of the specialised Paris prosecutor’s office and the anti-terrorism investigating judges. This division of roles explains the synchronisation: American prosecutors unseal when the French police are ready to move, so that no suspect learns of the case from the American press before being apprehended in France. Readers familiar with earlier Franco-American terrorism files will recognise the pattern, and the analysis published on this site of the Georgian surrender of a terrorism-financing suspect to the United States shows how differently the same American charges play out depending on the country of arrest: Georgia surrendered its man within weeks, while the Paris extradition test applied to that Georgian file demonstrated that France would have imposed a far longer and more conditional procedure.

Two factual gaps must be stated clearly because they condition everything that follows. First, the American announcement does not give the nationality of the three people arrested in France, and nationality is the single most important variable in French extradition law, since France never extradites its own nationals. Second, it does not say whether a French judicial investigation was already open before 2 October or whether the DGSI acted on an American mutual assistance request that has since been converted into a French prosecution. Both configurations are common: the Paris prosecutor’s office frequently opens a preliminary investigation on the basis of American intelligence transmitted through the attaché channel, then takes over the case under French charges. What is certain is that the French police custody regime for terrorism, the specialised Paris jurisdiction and the terrorism-financing offence described below give the French authorities all the tools they need to hold, charge and try these suspects in France without waiting for any American request.

II. What French law does with the three people held in France

A. Terrorism financing charges that fit the American facts almost word for word

French law defines terrorist acts in article 421-1 of the Criminal Code, which provides that “Constituent des actes de terrorisme, lorsqu’elles sont intentionnellement en relation avec une entreprise individuelle ou collective ayant pour but de troubler gravement l’ordre public par l’intimidation ou la terreur, les infractions suivantes”, followed by the list of covered offences. The financing offence sits in article 421-2-2 of the Criminal Code, which states: “Constitue également un acte de terrorisme le fait de financer une entreprise terroriste en fournissant, en réunissant ou en gérant des fonds, des valeurs ou des biens quelconques ou en donnant des conseils à cette fin, dans l’intention de voir ces fonds, valeurs ou biens utilisés ou en sachant qu’ils sont destinés à être utilisés, en tout ou partie, en vue de commettre l’un quelconque des actes de terrorisme prévus au présent chapitre, indépendamment de la survenance éventuelle d’un tel acte.” Every element of the American allegation finds its French counterpart here: collecting funds through charitable campaigns is reuniting funds, transferring them through intermediaries is supplying and managing them, and advising donors on concealment through wire transfers and cryptocurrency is giving advice for that purpose. The final clause of the article, “indépendamment de la survenance éventuelle d’un tel acte”, means the prosecution does not need to prove that any specific attack was financed, only that the funds were destined for a terrorist enterprise.

The Cour de cassation has given this text a broad and settled interpretation that prosecutors will rely on. In a decision of 7 September 2021, appeal no. 19-87.367, published in the Bulletin (ECLI:FR:CCASS:2021:CR00868), the Criminal Chamber held: “En effet, il résulte des dispositions de l’article 421-2-2 du code pénal qu’il suffit pour que les faits soient susceptibles d’être établis que l’auteur du financement sache que les fonds fournis sont destinés à être utilisés par l’entreprise terroriste en vue de commettre un acte terroriste, que cet acte survienne ou non, peu important en outre qu’il n’ait pas l’intention de voir les fonds utilisés à cette fin.” That ruling, handed down in the case concerning payments made in Syria to the Islamic State organisation and other terrorist groups through intermediaries, establishes that mere knowledge of the destination of the funds suffices, even without any personal desire to see them used. Applied to the present file, the American evidence of repeated transfers over six years, of concealment through intermediaries and cryptocurrency, and of the recipients’ status as a designated terrorist organisation would, if proven, comfortably meet this knowledge test. Defence lawyers will therefore focus not on the wording of the statute but on the proof of knowledge for each individual, distinguishing, for example, a person who merely donated to what looked like a Gaza charity from a person who collected, routed and concealed the funds knowing their destination.

Alongside financing, French prosecutors routinely charge participation in a terrorist criminal association under article 421-2-1 of the Criminal Code: “Constitue également un acte de terrorisme le fait de participer à un groupement formé ou à une entente établie en vue de la préparation, caractérisée par un ou plusieurs faits matériels, d’un des actes de terrorisme mentionnés aux articles précédents.” The coordinated roles described by the Americans, one organiser abroad, collectors and transferors in France, donors in the United States, documented over several years, correspond to the groupement that this article targets, provided the French investigation establishes material preparatory acts on French territory. Procedure then follows the centralised terrorism track: article 706-16 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “Les actes de terrorisme incriminés par les articles 421-1 à 421-6 du code pénal, ainsi que les infractions connexes sont poursuivis, instruits et jugés selon les règles du présent code sous réserve des dispositions du présent titre”, which sends the case to the Paris prosecutor’s specialised unit and the Paris anti-terrorism investigating judges. Police custody in this track can be extended far beyond ordinary law: article 706-88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows, “si les nécessités de l’enquête ou de l’instruction relatives à l’une des infractions entrant dans le champ d’application de l’article 706-73 l’exigent, la garde à vue d’une personne peut, à titre exceptionnel, faire l’objet de deux prolongations supplémentaires de vingt-quatre heures chacune”, bringing custody to a maximum of one hundred and forty-four hours with deferred access to a lawyer in the early phase. In parallel, the ministers of the economy and of the interior can order a domestic asset freeze: article L. 562-2 of the Monetary and Financial Code provides that “Le ministre chargé de l’économie et le ministre de l’intérieur peuvent décider, conjointement, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques : 1° Qui appartiennent à, sont possédés, détenus ou contrôlés par des personnes physiques ou morales, ou toute autre entité qui commettent, tentent de commettre, facilitent ou financent des actes de terrorisme, y incitent ou y participent”. This national freeze sits alongside the European Union freeze against Hamas under the Union’s terrorist-listing instruments, so the French-based wallets, accounts and crypto-assets linked to the network can be immobilised within hours of the arrests.

B. If Washington asks for them: the French extradition locks before any surrender

France and the United States are bound by an extradition treaty signed in 1996, and the American Office of International Affairs acknowledged in the 2 October announcement is the office that would transmit any request. But a treaty opens the door; it does not remove the locks that French statute and case law place behind it. Article 696-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lists the cases in which “L’extradition n’est pas accordée”, and three of its eight bars deserve close attention here. The first is nationality: “1° Lorsque la personne réclamée a la nationalité française, cette dernière étant appréciée à l’époque de l’infraction pour laquelle l’extradition est requise”. If any of the three people arrested in France holds French nationality, including dual nationality, no American request can succeed against that person, and France would instead prosecute them itself, which is precisely what the French charges described above allow. The second is the political-offence exception: “2° Lorsque le crime ou le délit à un caractère politique ou lorsqu’il résulte des circonstances que l’extradition est demandée dans un but politique”. Terrorism-financing charges built on material support, wire fraud and money laundering are treated in French practice as ordinary serious crimes rather than political offences, so this bar would be difficult to raise, but it cannot be dismissed without argument where the underlying conflict is political, and the chambre de l’instruction would examine it on the facts. The sixth bar is the ordre public filter: “6° Lorsque le fait à raison duquel l’extradition a été demandée est puni par la législation de l’Etat requérant d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté contraire à l’ordre public français”. With American counts carrying up to twenty years each and potentially consecutive sentences, the defence would ask the Paris judges to test the overall foreseeable American sentence, and American prison conditions, against Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

On that last point, recent French case law sets a demanding standard for the requesting state. In a decision of 30 January 2024, appeal no. 23-83.549, published in the Bulletin (ECLI:FR:CCASS:2024:CR00067), the Criminal Chamber quashed a surrender opinion concerning Tunisia and held: “En effet, lorsque la peine de mort est encourue à raison des faits pour lesquels l’extradition est demandée, il appartient à la chambre de l’instruction de s’assurer que l’Etat requérant prend l’engagement dénué de toute ambiguïté que cette peine ne sera pas appliquée à la personne réclamée.” The case concerned the death penalty, which is not at stake here, but the method travels: general considerations, moratoria and international commitments described by the requesting state are not enough where the chamber itself calls them symbolic; only a clear, individualised, unambiguous undertaking specific to the person claimed will do. Transposed to an American request, this means the United States would be expected to give precise, person-specific assurances on sentencing exposure and on any measure the Paris court found contrary to French ordre public, and an ambiguous diplomatic note would expose a favourable opinion to cassation. Procedure adds further layers: article 696-15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “Lorsque la personne réclamée a déclaré au procureur général ne pas consentir à son extradition, la chambre de l’instruction est saisie, sans délai, de la procédure”, the person appears within ten working days, the chamber gives a reasoned opinion, and the final decision belongs to the Prime Minister by decree, itself open to challenge before the Conseil d’Etat. The specialty principle then confines any trial in the requesting state to the facts for which surrender was granted.

In practice, none of this may need to be tested, because the coordinated nature of the 2 October operation suggests that France and the United States intend to prosecute in parallel: the Americans try the Louisiana, Florida and New York defendants at home, while France tries the three people arrested on its territory under articles 421-1, 421-2-1 and 421-2-2. Parallel prosecution avoids the hardest questions, including the rule that France does not surrender conduct already definitively tried on its territory and the political sensitivity of sending residents of France to face decades in an American prison for a Gaza-charity network. But parallel prosecution requires the two countries to share evidence continuously through mutual assistance, to agree on who tries whom first, and to manage the asset freezes so that confiscation in one country does not frustrate compensation or confiscation in the other. If Washington nevertheless requests surrender, perhaps for the alleged organiser’s French-based associates whose testimony it wants, expect the Paris chambre de l’instruction to examine nationality first, double criminality second, since terrorism financing, criminal association, money laundering and fraud all exist on both sides, and then assurances and proportionality, with the 2024 Tunisian-precedent method applied to American sentencing. The defendants, for their part, remain presumed innocent at every stage, in France as in the United States, and the French investigation will have to prove, person by person, not only the movements of money but the knowledge of its terrorist destination that article 421-2-2 requires.

Conclusion

The 2 October 2026 operation is a textbook example of modern counter-terrorism financing enforcement: an online charity front, cryptocurrency concealment, donors on one continent, collectors on another, and two countries moving on the same day through intelligence shared between the FBI’s Paris office and the DGSI. For the three people arrested in France, the immediate future is French: extended police custody under the terrorism rules, a case directed by the specialised Paris prosecution and investigating judges, likely charges of financing a terrorist enterprise and participation in a terrorist criminal association, and a probable freeze of their funds and economic resources. An American extradition request remains legally possible but faces the full set of French locks, starting with nationality and ending with the Cour de cassation’s insistence on unambiguous, person-specific undertakings from the requesting state. The file will therefore be watched on three tracks at once: the Manhattan, Louisiana and Florida prosecutions, where twenty-year counts set the stakes; the Paris investigation, where the knowledge element of article 421-2-2 will be fought person by person; and the diplomatic-judicial track, where any surrender request would test how far the Franco-American counter-terrorism partnership of 2 October extends into the courtroom. No accident, no intrusion and no damage beyond the alleged transfers has been established by any court at this stage, no responsibility has been judicially found, and only a judge, in France or in the United States, will decide.

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