KOHEN AVOCATS FIRM · PARIS 16
Hormuz Tanker Attacks Hit a Wartime Record: What French Cargo Owners, Charterers and Insurers Can Lawfully Do Now

Hassan KOHEN acts in urgent matters, from the police station to the assize court. Initial strategic analysis: €80 incl. VAT, personal reply within 24 hours.

100% confidential · Legal professional privilege · No obligation

Article generated by artificial intelligence, through a process designed and supervised by the firm

Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

Paris Bar Police custody, investigation, assize court CNB listing avocat.fr
Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Hassan KOHEN
Attorney at the Paris Bar

Hormuz Tanker Attacks Hit a Wartime Record: What French Cargo Owners, Charterers and Insurers Can Lawfully Do Now

Speak to a lawyer 06 89 11 34 45

During the week that ended on 4 October 2026, eleven tankers came under attack while transiting the Strait of Hormuz, the highest weekly toll on commercial shipping since the war between the United States, Israel and Iran began on 28 February, according to CNBC, citing maritime-security data. The following weekend raised the stakes again: a tanker was hit by a drone off Sohar in Oman, another was struck by a projectile inside the Strait, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy claimed a supertanker had hit a mine after sailing an unauthorised route with its navigation systems off, and United States Central Command released footage of a fighter jet disabling a Panama-flagged bulk carrier that tried to run its naval blockade, according to Al Jazeera and Seatrade Maritime News, both citing the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations centre. Average crude flows through the Strait fell to 8.5 million barrels per day for the week ended 7 October, roughly 40 percent below normal levels, according to Kpler data cited by CNBC. No French casualty and no French-flagged vessel appear among the incidents reported by these sources at the time of writing, and no court has ruled on the legal classification of any of these strikes. For French cargo owners whose goods cross the Strait, for charterers asked to send ships into a listed war-risk area, and for the insurers who must price that risk, three questions arise at once: who pays the war-risk surcharge, whether missile strikes suspend or end the contracts, and before which court the losses can be recovered in France. French maritime, insurance and sanctions law gives structured answers to all three, and this article sets them out step by step, with the treaty, European and French-court references that decide real files.

I. Tanker war in the Strait of Hormuz: what happened this week and which rules apply on the water

A. Eleven tankers in seven days, a drone off Sohar and an American bomb in the Gulf of Oman: the facts of 4 to 11 October 2026

The chronology matters because every legal clock in this file runs from dated events. For the week that ended on 4 October, eleven tankers were attacked in the Strait, the most strikes on commercial ships since the war began, CNBC reported on 9 October. CNN’s analysis of 11 October reads this surge as Tehran’s answer to oil increasingly leaving the Gulf despite its threats: Iran is trying, in CNN’s words, to regain its stranglehold on shipping. Al Jazeera counts at least a dozen ships attacked over the week ending on 5 October and notes that at least one was hit off the north coast of Qatar, signalling that the danger extends beyond the immediate Hormuz passage. These figures come from commercial and military reporting, not from any judicial finding, and they must be read with that reservation.

The weekend of 10 and 11 October then produced four distinct types of incident that lawyers must keep separate, because each triggers a different legal regime. First, on 10 October, the Marshall Islands-flagged Suezmax Valthera was struck by an unknown projectile on its port side during an outbound transit of the Strait, causing a fire on board; the master requested assistance to fight the blaze and all crew were reported safe, according to maritime-security firm Vanguard Tech cited by Seatrade Maritime News. Second, on 11 October, an undisclosed tanker transiting outbound was struck on the port side by an unidentified projectile and damaged, with all crew safe, and a separate vessel was hit by a drone near the Sohar anchorage off Oman, with local authorities assisting the evacuation of the crew, according to United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations reports relayed by the same trade-press source. The Thailand-flagged bulk carrier Mayuree Naree, struck by a missile near the Strait, was left stranded off Iran’s Qeshm Island, Al Jazeera reports. Third, on Saturday night, the Revolutionary Guard Navy stated that an unnamed crude supertanker had hit a naval mine and suffered a major fire while using, in its words, an unauthorised route with navigation systems turned off, and warned of a similar fate for any tanker that, in its words, wishes to ignore the security and rules of the Strait; the United Arab Emirates separately said its coastguard had rescued 22 crew members after a fire broke out on an unnamed tanker close to its shores, without identifying the cause. Fourth, early on Sunday, United States Central Command released footage of a fighter jet striking the stern of the Panama-flagged bulk carrier Ocean Molica, also known as the Arika Sun, with a precision munition that fully disabled its propulsion without harming the crew, after, in its words, the crew ignored repeated warnings and attempted to run the naval blockade of Iran’s southern ports reimposed in mid-July; the vessel had previously called at an Iranian port. Since that blockade resumed on 14 July, American forces say they have disabled four commercial vessels, turned around 135 ships and destroyed 10 tankers linked with Iran, and Washington states that Tehran has exported no oil through the blockade line. Each of these accounts is the version of its source; the Guard’s mine claim, the American blockade-enforcement claim and the unattributed drone and projectile strikes have not been tested before any court, and only a competent court could attribute responsibility or qualify these facts in law.

The economic marker that French importers feel first is the collapse of throughput. Kpler data cited by CNBC shows average crude passing through the Strait for the week ended 7 October at 8.5 million barrels per day, roughly 40 percent below the normal level, after flows had briefly surpassed pre-war levels at the start of the month. Two earlier strikes show the human cost behind the figures. On 6 October, the Panama-flagged tanker On-Peace was hit by a projectile during its Hormuz transit and twelve crew members were injured, eleven of them Indian nationals evacuated to Khasab in Oman with Omani assistance, while on 3 October five Indian sailors had already been rescued from the Kuwaiti tanker Kazimah-III, likewise struck in the Strait, Le Monde reported, citing the Indian foreign ministry. On the diplomatic front, Le Monde, with AP, AFP and Reuters, reported on 9 October that Washington claimed productive discussions with Tehran while maintaining its blockade of Iranian ports, that Tehran set the end of pressure and threats as its condition for talks, and that the war, started by Israeli-American strikes more than seven months earlier, continued over Hormuz despite an April ceasefire and a June memorandum of understanding. For a French refiner, distributor or industrial buyer, that figure translates within days into war-risk additional premiums, rerouting invoices and delayed-delivery penalties, which is where French private law takes over from the communiques. France’s exposure is structural rather than anecdotal: crude, refined products, petrochemicals and containerised goods bound for or leaving French ports transit Hormuz, and French groups charter foreign tonnage daily. The companion analysis of French companies’ Saudi contracts under missiles, sanctions and force majeure, published on this site after the Riyadh airport strike, covers the commercial-contract side of the same war; the present article covers the maritime side, meaning the ship, the cargo on board and the insurance that follows them, and it links to that companion piece as the cluster’s contract-law pillar: French companies’ Saudi contracts under Houthi strikes: sanctions, force majeure and payment.

B. Blockade, self-defence and freedom of navigation: the public-international-law frame France must reason within

Private claims are pleaded in national courts, but those courts read them against a public-international-law background that the parties cannot rewrite. Three layers of that background decide how French judges will look at Hormuz files. The first is the law of the sea. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea guarantees the freedom of navigation on the high seas and the right of transit passage through straits used for international navigation, and it gives warships a limited right of visit only on exhaustively listed grounds such as piracy, the slave trade or statelessness. A naval blockade that stops, diverts or destroys neutral merchant vessels, and mine warfare that strikes tankers on unauthorised routes, sit in acute tension with those guarantees outside a mandate of the United Nations Security Council, and France has traditionally defended freedom of navigation as a matter of principle, including through the European-led maritime surveillance mission in the Strait of Hormuz and, in the Red Sea, the European Union’s defensive Aspides operation. None of this determines, by itself, who pays a given cargo loss: it frames the negotiation, the insurance wording and, at the margin, the French court’s assessment of what a prudent operator should have foreseen.

The second layer is the law on the use of force. Strikes on merchant ships, the mining of a strait and the bombing of a bulk carrier’s stern are uses of force whose lawfulness depends on mandates, on the inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and on international humanitarian law if an armed conflict is characterised, questions on which States, scholars and courts disagree sharply in this war. A French civil or commercial court seized of a cargo or insurance dispute will not settle those questions: it will ask narrower ones, namely whether the contractual war-risk clause was triggered, whether the loss was caused by a warlike peril within the meaning of the policy, and whether performance had become impossible. This division of labour is why the press communiques, however dramatic, are only the starting point of a file: the IRGC Navy’s warning, CENTCOM’s blockade-enforcement footage and the UKMTO incident logs are evidence of the factual environment, not judgments attributing liability.

The third layer is European sanctions law, which binds French operators directly and immediately. Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 of 23 March 2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran is the Union’s central Iran instrument, and its asset-freeze and trade-restriction machinery is what a French bank, insurer or charterer must check before moving money, paying a claim or lifting a cargo with any Iranian nexus: Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 of 23 March 2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran. The penalties for dealing with listed persons, and the narrow prior-authorisation channels for releasing frozen funds, mean that sanctions screening is not a formality but a condition of lawful payment. The French dimension of this screening was put to the highest court in the Bank Sepah litigation, where the Assemblée plénière of the Court of Cassation, faced with enforcement proceedings pursued in Paris against the Paris establishment of an Iranian bank at 20 rue Auguste Vacquerie, decided on 10 July 2020 to refer questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union rather than decide the sanctions point itself: Ass. plén., 10 July 2020, Nos. 18-18.542 and 18-21.814, Bank Sepah. The first referred question is worth quoting in full because it governs every enforcement attempt against frozen assets in France: « 1°) Les articles 1er, sous h) et j), et 7, paragraphe 1, du règlement (CE) n° 423/2007, 1er, sous i) et h), et 16, paragraphe 1, du règlement (UE) n° 961/2010 ainsi que 1er, sous k) et j), et 23, paragraphe 1, du règlement (UE) n° 267/2012 doivent-ils être interprétés en ce sens qu’ils s’opposent à ce que soit diligentée sur des avoirs gelés, sans autorisation préalable de l’autorité nationale compétente, une mesure dépourvue d’effet attributif, telle une sûreté judiciaire ou une saisie conservatoire, prévues par le code des procédures civiles d’exécution français ? » (Must those provisions be interpreted as precluding enforcement steps without prior authorisation of the competent national authority over frozen assets where the step has no allocative effect, such as a judicial security or a conservatory seizure under the French civil-enforcement code; second question: whether the fact that the claim predates Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006) and is unrelated to the nuclear programme matters.) The lesson for Hormuz operators is practical and immediate: before seizing, paying or offsetting anything connected to an Iranian or listed interest, even as a victim of the tanker war, the file must pass through the sanctions filter and, where the regulation requires it, through the competent national authority, because a payment made in breach of the freeze can itself expose the payer to criminal and administrative penalties while failing to discharge the debt.

II. French cargo, French insurance, French courts: the private-law levers that actually pay

A. Who pays for war risk: French marine-insurance rules, the three-day aggravation notice and the extra premium

The first invoice a French cargo owner receives after a Hormuz incident is rarely the loss itself; it is the war-risk additional premium and the surcharge the carrier or the charterer passes down the chain. Whether that invoice can be refused, shared or passed on depends on three French insurance provisions that every operator should read before the ship sails, because they allocate the risk in advance and punish late reactions. The starting point is the war-risk exclusion of Article L.121-8 of the Insurance Code: « L’assureur ne répond pas, sauf convention contraire, des pertes et dommages occasionnés soit par la guerre étrangère, soit par la guerre civile, soit par des émeutes ou par des mouvements populaires. Lorsque ces risques ne sont pas couverts par le contrat, l’assuré doit prouver que le sinistre résulte d’un fait autre que le fait de guerre étrangère ; il appartient à l’assureur de prouver que le sinistre résulte de la guerre civile, d’émeutes ou de mouvements populaires. » (The insurer is not liable, absent agreement to the contrary, for loss caused by foreign or civil war, riots or popular movements; where these risks are not covered, the assured must prove the loss results from something other than an act of foreign war, while the insurer must prove civil war, riot or popular movement: Insurance Code, Art. L.121-8 on Légifrance.) Two consequences follow for Hormuz cargo. First, war cover exists only if the policy expressly buys it back, usually through dedicated war-risk clauses with cancellation and automatic-termination provisions, and the cargo interest that assumed its ordinary policy covered everything will discover the gap only after the missile strike. Second, the burden of proof is split by the statute itself: for a foreign-war peril the assured must affirmatively show a non-war cause, which in a week with eleven attributed and unattributed strikes is an evidentiary mountain, while for civil-war and riot perils the insurer carries the burden.

The second provision is the trap most often sprung after the event: aggravation of risk. Article L.172-3 of the Insurance Code, specific to marine insurance, provides: « Toute modification en cours de contrat, soit de ce qui a été convenu lors de sa formation, soit de l’objet assuré, d’où résulte une aggravation sensible du risque, entraîne la résiliation de l’assurance si elle n’a pas été déclarée à l’assureur dans les trois jours où l’assuré en a eu connaissance, jours fériés non compris, à moins que celui-ci n’apporte la preuve de sa bonne foi, auquel cas il est fait application des dispositions du deuxième alinéa de l’article L. 172-2. Si cette aggravation n’est pas le fait de l’assuré, l’assurance continue, moyennant augmentation de la prime correspondant à l’aggravation survenue. Si l’aggravation est le fait de l’assuré, l’assureur peut, soit résilier le contrat dans les trois jours à partir du moment où il en a eu connaissance, la prime lui étant acquise, soit exiger une augmentation de prime correspondant à l’aggravation survenue. » (Any mid-contract change producing a material aggravation of the risk terminates the cover unless declared to the insurer within three days of knowledge, excluding public holidays, absent proof of good faith; aggravation not attributable to the assured continues the cover against an increased premium, while aggravation attributable to the assured lets the insurer terminate within three days or demand the matching premium increase: Insurance Code, Art. L.172-3 on Légifrance.) Ordering a chartered vessel into the Strait after the Joint War Committee lists it, accepting a Sohar or Ras al-Khaimah call once UKMTO warnings multiply, or switching off the automatic identification system at an insurer’s back are textbook aggravations. The three-day declaration period runs from knowledge, so the operations email chain that proves when the charterer learned of the risk classification matters as much as the policy wording, and the good-faith proof the statute demands must be prepared contemporaneously, not reconstructed for litigation.

The third provision polices the inception of the cover. Article L.172-2 punishes material non-disclosure: « Toute omission ou toute déclaration inexacte de l’assuré de nature à diminuer sensiblement l’opinion de l’assureur sur le risque, qu’elle ait ou non influé sur le dommage ou sur la perte de l’objet assuré, annule l’assurance à la demande de l’assureur. Toutefois, si l’assuré rapporte la preuve de sa bonne foi, l’assureur est, sauf stipulation plus favorable à l’égard de l’assuré, garant du risque proportionnellement à la prime perçue par rapport à celle qu’il aurait dû percevoir, sauf les cas où il établit qu’il n’aurait pas couvert les risques s’il les avait connus. La prime demeure acquise à l’assureur en cas de fraude de l’assuré. » (Any omission or misstatement liable to lower the insurer’s assessment of the risk voids the cover at the insurer’s request, with a good-faith proportional-cover fallback unless the insurer shows it would not have covered at all, and earned premium in case of fraud: Insurance Code, Art. L.172-2 on Légifrance.) A cargo declaration that understates the Hormuz routing, or a hull proposal silent on Gulf trading, hands the insurer this weapon. Read together, the three articles draw a clear operational discipline: declare the Gulf exposure at placement, buy back war risks expressly with attention to cancellation clauses, notify any aggravation within three days in writing, pay the additional premium under protest while reserving recovery rights, and keep every premium debit note, because the surcharge paid today becomes the recovery claimed tomorrow against the party contractually bound to bear war risk.

That recovery obeys a strict time limit that French courts enforce without indulgence. In a 22 November 2023 ruling on a marine hull policy, the Commercial Chamber quashed an appeal judgment precisely for failing to characterise the marine character of the risk before applying the marine prescription rules: « En se déterminant ainsi, sans caractériser, comme il lui incombait, les circonstances permettant de qualifier de risques maritimes, exclus de l’application des dispositions d’ordre public de l’article R. 112-1 du code des assurances, les opérations couvertes par l’avenant au contrat d’assurances, la cour d’appel n’a pas donné de base légale à sa décision. » (By ruling as it did, without identifying, as it had to, the circumstances establishing the marine character of the risks, excluded from the public-policy provisions of Article R.112-1 of the Insurance Code, the court of appeal failed to give its decision a legal basis: Cass. com., 22 Nov. 2023, No. 22-14.253.) The appeal court had retained that the parties’ common intention was to subscribe a marine policy, and I quote, « qu’il est établi que la commune intention des parties était de souscrire une police d’assurance maritime et en matière maritime dont les actions se prescrivent par deux ans » (that the parties’ common intention was to subscribe a marine policy, and that marine actions prescribe in two years). The practical warning is therefore double: marine actions run on a short two-year clock, and invoking the marine regime requires the file to plead and prove the marine character of the operation from the first writ, because a court that glosses over that characterisation will see its judgment quashed, after years of procedure, for lack of legal basis.

B. From force majeure to the French courtroom: charterparties, the shipper’s standing and the clause that cannot be imposed

When the missile hits, the charterparty is where the loss stops first, and French contract law decides whether it stays there. Article 1218 of the Civil Code defines the test: « Il y a force majeure en matière contractuelle lorsqu’un événement échappant au contrôle du débiteur, qui ne pouvait être raisonnablement prévu lors de la conclusion du contrat et dont les effets ne peuvent être évités par des mesures appropriées, empêche l’exécution de son obligation par le débiteur. Si l’empêchement est temporaire, l’exécution de l’obligation est suspendue à moins que le retard qui en résulterait ne justifie la résolution du contrat. Si l’empêchement est définitif, le contrat est résolu de plein droit et les parties sont libérées de leurs obligations dans les conditions prévues aux articles 1351 et 1351-1 . » (Force majeure requires an event beyond the debtor’s control, unforeseeable at contracting and unavoidable by appropriate measures, preventing performance; temporary prevention suspends, definitive prevention terminates by operation of law: Civil Code, Art. 1218 on Légifrance.) A projectile strike on the chartered vessel, a mined strait closed to traffic or a binding naval-blockade order are strong candidates for the first two prongs, but the third, unavoidability by appropriate measures, is where Hormuz files are won and lost: the owner who sailed an unauthorised route with navigation systems off, in the IRGC Navy’s own description of the supertanker incident, will struggle to show that appropriate measures were taken, while the owner who obeyed UKMTO guidance, kept systems on and accepted naval coordination will plead the same facts as diligence. Article 1351 completes the mechanism for definitive prevention: « L’impossibilité d’exécuter la prestation libère le débiteur à due concurrence lorsqu’elle procède d’un cas de force majeure et qu’elle est définitive, à moins qu’il n’ait convenu de s’en charger ou qu’il ait été préalablement mis en demeure. » (Definitive force-majeure impossibility releases the debtor proportionally, unless it assumed the risk or was already in default: Civil Code, Art. 1351 on Légifrance.) Two drafting consequences follow. First, war, blockade and restraint-of-princes clauses in the charterparty, including the standard BIMCO war-risk forms, displace or refine the statutory default, and their cancellation, safe-port and additional-premium provisions must be operated to the letter, by the contractual notice, before invoking the Code. Second, delay alone rarely terminates: a rerouted voyage around the Cape of Good Hope suspends and surcharges rather than resolves, so demurrage, deviation and extra-freight clauses, not grand force-majeure declarations, decide most of the money.

For the cargo itself, French maritime transport law starts from a simple definition that still governs container and bulk disputes. Article L.5422-1 of the Transport Code states: « Par le contrat de transport maritime, le chargeur s’engage à payer un fret déterminé et le transporteur à acheminer une marchandise déterminée, d’un port à un autre. Ce contrat de transport s’applique depuis la prise en charge jusqu’à la livraison. » (By the contract of carriage by sea, the shipper undertakes to pay a fixed freight and the carrier to carry specified goods from one port to another, from taking over to delivery: Transport Code, Art. L.5422-1 on Légifrance.) Article L.5422-2 extends the chapter’s rules, in the absence of a charterparty, to all parties interested in the carriage, and to bills of lading issued under a charterparty in the relations between the carrier and third-party holders: « Les dispositions du présent chapitre s’appliquent : 1° Aux rapports entre tous les intéressés au transport, en l’absence de charte-partie ; 2° Aux connaissements émis en exécution d’une charte-partie, dans les rapports du transporteur et des tiers porteurs. » (Transport Code, Art. L.5422-2 on Légifrance.) The Court of Cassation gave these texts their full practical scope on 23 March 2022 in a dispute between a Mexican shipper and the Marseille-based carrier CMA CGM over damaged cargo, a configuration close to many Hormuz files where a French operator sues or is sued over goods damaged in transit: « Il résulte de ce texte que l’intérêt à agir n’est pas subordonné à la démonstration préalable du bien-fondé de l’action. En conséquence, le chargeur, partie au contrat de transport, est recevable à agir en responsabilité contre le transporteur maritime, en invoquant le préjudice qu’il subit du fait d’une avarie de transport, la preuve de l’existence de ce préjudice n’étant que la condition du succès de son action en réparation. En outre, le chargeur tenant son droit d’action en responsabilité contractuelle du contrat de transport et non du document qui le constate, il n’y a pas lieu, pour apprécier l’ouverture de ce droit, de distinguer selon que le transport a donné lieu à l’émission d’un connaissement ou d’une lettre de transport maritime, ni selon que le chargeur est identifié ou non sur ces documents. » (Standing does not depend on proving the merits upfront; the shipper, as party to the contract, may sue the carrier for transit damage, with the loss itself going to success rather than admissibility, and the right of action flows from the contract, not from the document evidencing it, whether bill of lading or sea waybill, whether or not the shipper is named: Cass. com., 23 Mar. 2022, No. 19-16.466, FRHOMIMEX v CMA CGM.) For a French importer whose containers sat on a vessel that turned back, diverted or was struck, the message is that the absence of a bill of lading in its own name, or carriage under a mere sea waybill, does not close the French courtroom door, though proving the quantum of its own loss remains its burden.

Whether that courtroom is in France at all is the next battle, and here a 14 December 2022 ruling sets the rule that protects French cargo interests against boilerplate. A Korean carrier had sued on a jurisdiction clause in its bills of lading giving exclusive competence to the Seoul district court, seeking to strip the Paris commercial court of a case brought by the subrogated cargo insurer. The Commercial Chamber preserved French jurisdiction and stated the principle in terms every litigator should memorise: « La recevabilité de l’action en responsabilité contractuelle contre un transporteur maritime s’apprécie indépendamment des mentions du connaissement émis pour constituer, notamment, la preuve du contrat de transport, ces mentions n’ayant pas pour objet d’attribuer de manière exclusive aux seules personnes qu’elles indiquent la qualité de partie à ce contrat, de sorte que l’action contractuelle peut être ouverte au destinataire qui invoque un préjudice du fait du transport. Pour autant, ce destinataire n’est lié par ce document qu’en ce qu’il définit et précise les conditions du transport lui-même, depuis la prise en charge jusqu’à la livraison. Il ne peut, dès lors, se voir opposer la clause de compétence que le connaissement contiendrait, à moins qu’il ne l’ait spécialement acceptée ou que la compétence internationale qu’elle institue ne s’impose en vertu d’un traité ou du droit de l’Union européenne. L’acceptation de cette clause attributive de juridiction ne peut être déduite de l’existence d’un usage en matière de transport international, ni des seules relations commerciales antérieures entre les parties, ni de la présence d’une mention au recto du connaissement renvoyant à des conditions générales figurant au verso de ce document. » (The consignee is bound by the bill of lading only as it defines the carriage itself, and a jurisdiction clause in it cannot be opposed to the consignee unless specially accepted or imposed by treaty or Union law; acceptance cannot be inferred from trade usage, prior dealings or a front-page reference to back-page conditions: Cass. com., 14 Dec. 2022, No. 20-17.768, Eukor.) In practice, a French consignee that never specially accepted a London, Seoul or Dubai clause keeps its access to the French judge, and within the European Union that access is organised by Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels I bis), whose place-of-performance and choice-of-court provisions the French courts apply daily. Domestically, commercial maritime disputes between traders fall to the commercial courts under Article L.721-3 of the Commercial Code, which provides: « Les tribunaux de commerce connaissent : 1° Des contestations relatives aux engagements entre commerçants, entre artisans, entre établissements de crédit, entre sociétés de financement ou entre eux ; 2° De celles relatives aux sociétés commerciales ; 3° De celles relatives aux actes de commerce entre toutes personnes. » (Commercial Code, Art. L.721-3 on Légifrance.) The file-building checklist for the coming weeks therefore writes itself: protest every surcharge in writing while paying under reserve, declare every aggravation to insurers within three days, operate charterparty war clauses by their contractual notices, screen every payment against Regulation 267/2012 before instructing it, and file within the short marine time limits before the French court whose jurisdiction no unaccepted boilerplate can take away.

Conclusion

The week of eleven attacked tankers and the weekend of the Sohar drone, the Valthera fire and the disabled Ocean Molica mark the most dangerous phase yet for commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, with crude flows down 40 percent and mediation stalled behind the American midterms of 3 November and the Israeli election of 27 October. No court has attributed any of these strikes, no French victim or French-flagged vessel is reported in the sources cited, and the IRGC Navy’s mine claim, like the American blockade-enforcement claim, remains a party’s account, not a judgment. What is established, and what this article has mapped, is the French-law path from incident to indemnity: war risks are covered only if expressly bought back, and the assured carries the proof burden for foreign-war perils; any aggravation of the risk must be declared within three days or the cover falls; marine actions prescribe in two years and the marine character of the operation must be pleaded from the start; force majeure suspends more often than it terminates, and delay costs are decided by charterparty clauses rather than declarations; the shipper sues on its contract whether or not it holds a bill of lading; an unaccepted jurisdiction clause in a bill of lading cannot exile the French consignee from its judge; and no payment touching an Iranian or listed interest moves without the sanctions filter of Regulation 267/2012 and, where required, the competent authority’s prior authorisation. Open the insurance, contract and sanctions files now, in writing and with dated evidence for every step, because in maritime war-risk litigation the best substantive right still loses to the missed deadline.

📄 Official circular