On 24 September 2026, France allowed the aircraft carrying Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to cross French airspace on its way to the United Nations General Assembly in New York, although the International Criminal Court has had a warrant of arrest outstanding against him since 21 November 2024. The decision, reported by Reuters from Paris on 24 September 2026, immediately raised the question every international lawyer asks first: how can a State Party to the Rome Statute, formally bound to cooperate with the Court, open its sky to a man its own treaty obliges it to arrest? France’s answer, delivered by Foreign Ministry spokesperson Pascal Confavreux, was that the clearance was “in full conformity with international law” because, as he put it, the Statute creates no duties concerning overflights by a State aircraft carrying a passenger subject to an arrest warrant. Human-rights organisations call that reading a convenient fiction, and the Court’s own case law on non-cooperation gives them ammunition. This analysis draws the precise line the law actually draws: on French soil, an ICC arrest warrant triggers a short, strict judicial chain that ends in surrender to The Hague; in French airspace, a mere overflight with no landing scheduled is a different legal object, governed by the transit rules of the Statute. The distinction matters far beyond one flight, because it decides what happens the day an unscheduled landing, a refuelling stop or a medical emergency puts a wanted passenger on the tarmac in Paris.
I. On French soil, an ICC warrant means arrest and surrender, not discretion
A. The Rome Statute gives France an order, not an option, once the wanted person is on its territory
France is a State Party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and the cooperation regime of Part 9 of the Statute is drafted as an obligation, not an invitation. Its opening provision, article 86 of the Rome Statute, states the rule in one sentence: States Parties must cooperate fully with the Court in the investigation and prosecution of crimes within its jurisdiction. That framing governs everything that follows. When the Court wants a person arrested, provides that States Parties must comply with arrest and surrender requests under the procedures of Part 9 and their national law. Presence on the territory where the person may be found is the trigger: presence on French soil activates the duty, and French national procedure then organises how, not whether, the arrest happens.
The two warrants at the centre of the September 2026 controversy were issued on 21 November 2024 by Pre-Trial Chamber I, in the Situation in the State of Palestine, against Benjamin Netanyahu and then Defence Minister Yoav Gallant. In its press release of 21 November 2024, the Court explains that it unanimously issued two decisions rejecting challenges brought by Israel under articles 18 and 19 of the Statute, and that it issued warrants of arrest for the two men for alleged crimes against humanity and war crimes committed over a period running from at least 8 October 2023 to at least 20 May 2024, when the Prosecution filed the warrant applications. The Chamber added a point of jurisdiction that still structures every debate about these warrants: that Israel’s acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction was not required, since jurisdiction could rest on the territorial title of Palestine as an earlier composition of the Chamber had determined. The warrants themselves are classified as secret to protect witnesses, but the Chamber disclosed their existence because similar conduct appeared to be ongoing and victims and their families had an interest in knowing of the warrants’ existence. Two cautions belong here, and they are part of the law, not politeness: the warrants rest on “reasonable grounds to believe,” the standard recalled in the decision ICC-01/18-374 on Israel’s jurisdictional challenge and its companion decision ICC-01/18-375 on the article 18(1) notice, and they allege responsibility rather than establish guilt, which only a trial could do. Israel rejects the Court’s jurisdiction, denies war crimes in Gaza and is contesting the warrants, as Reuters recalled in its September 2026 reporting.
What refusal looks like, and what it costs, was spelled out less than a month before these warrants, in the case the Court’s judges now treat as the reference precedent. On 24 October 2024, Pre-Trial Chamber II found that Mongolia, by receiving Vladimir Putin on its territory without arresting him, had breached the Statute. The Court’s account of the Mongolia finding quotes the operative reasoning: that by failing to arrest Mr Putin while he was on Mongolian territory and surrender him, Mongolia had breached the cooperation request contrary to the Statute, preventing the Court from exercising its functions and powers within the meaning of article 87(7). The same decision reaffirmed the point on which the French debate keeps stumbling: that personal immunity, even of Heads of State, cannot be opposed to the ICC and needs no waiver, and that States Parties, as well as those accepting the Court’s jurisdiction, are duty-bound to arrest and surrender wanted persons whatever their office or nationality. The statutory basis of that referral is article 87(7) of the Rome Statute: which allows the Court, where a State Party fails to cooperate and thereby prevents it from exercising its functions and powers, to record that finding and refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties, or to the Security Council where the Council referred the situation. A referral to the Assembly of States Parties carries no prison cell and no fine; it is a political sanction, naming and shaming, which is exactly why governments weigh it differently from a domestic court order, and exactly why France, which presents itself as a champion of international justice, would pay a reputational price no smaller State would pay.
The immunity objection, the one Paris raised in November 2024 and commentators revive with every flight, was answered in advance by the Statute itself. Article 27(2) of the Rome Statute provides: that immunities or special procedural rules attaching to official capacity, whether under national or international law, cannot bar the Court from exercising jurisdiction. Its first paragraph adds that Head-of-State or Government capacity can never exempt a person from criminal responsibility under the Statute. France’s own trajectory shows why the issue is sensitive: on 26 November 2024 Paris pledged to apply its cooperation obligation vigorously, and the next day the Foreign Ministry argued that the immunities of leaders of States not party to the Statute had to be taken into account, a statement the International Federation for Human Rights and its French member organisation, the Ligue des droits de l’Homme, denounced as disinformation. In their press release of 27 November 2024 (the Foreign Ministry statement it criticises), the two organisations insist that that the warrants for the two Israeli officials had to apply, with article 27 of the Statute expressly ruling out any immunity in that context, and they contrast Paris’s stance with its position on the warrant against Vladimir Putin, for whom, they note, no immunity was ever invoked. Whether one shares the severity of that verdict or not, the legal core is not seriously disputed among specialists of the Court: before the ICC itself, immunity does not bar jurisdiction, and a State Party asked to arrest and surrender cannot substitute its own immunity analysis for the Court’s, a point the Mongolia decision locked in with the referral mechanism to back it.
B. In Paris, a surrender to The Hague runs through a short, strict judicial chain that examines almost nothing on the merits
French domestic law organises ICC cooperation in a dedicated title of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and its opening article sets the tone: article 627 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that “Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre”, which an English reader may understand as France taking part in the punishment of the offences and cooperating with the Court under the conditions fixed by that title. Practitioners should note that these provisions currently appear with a deferred repeal flag, pending the entry into force of the recodified criminal procedure, but they remain the applicable law at the date of this analysis. From that principle flows a procedure built for speed, concentrated entirely in Paris, and deliberately blind to the merits of the ICC case.
The arrest itself starts with paper, not with discretion. Under article 627-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, arrest requests for surrender issued by the Court are sent in original, with supporting documents, to the competent authorities, which check their formal regularity and then both transmit them to the prosecutor general at the Paris Court of Appeal and execute them across the entire territory of the Republic; in urgent cases the request may go directly, by any means, to the locally competent prosecutor. Once apprehended, the person must be brought within twenty-four hours before the local prosecutor, who verifies identity, informs the person in a language they understand of the surrender request and of the forthcoming appearance before the Paris prosecutor general within five days, and guarantees immediate access to counsel of their choice or court-appointed counsel. That is the substance of article 627-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and its twenty-four-hour clock is the first of a series of peremptory time limits that make ICC surrender markedly faster than classic extradition. Transfer to the Paris jurisdiction and detention follow: article 627-6 requires transfer within five days, failing which the person is immediately released by decision of the president of the investigating chamber unless insurmountable circumstances delayed the transfer.
The judicial control then belongs to the investigating chamber of the Paris Court of Appeal, and its review is strikingly narrow. Article 627-7 seizes the chamber immediately, brings the person before it within eight days of presentation to the prosecutor general, and holds the hearing in public unless publicity would harm the proceedings, third-party interests or the dignity of the person. Then comes the decisive provision, article 627-8: where the chamber finds “qu’il n’y a pas d’erreur évidente,” that there is no obvious error, it orders surrender, and any other question raised before it is referred to the Court itself, which takes it from there. No assessment of the evidence, no double-criminality test, no political-offence exception of the kind that still structures State-to-State extradition: the French judge checks identity and obvious error, and everything else belongs to The Hague. The chamber must rule within fifteen days of the appearance, and on appeal the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation decides within two months of receiving the file. Liberty during the process is governed by article 627-9, which channels release applications through the chamber by reference to article 59 of the Statute, and the end of the road is fixed by article 627-10: surrender within one month of the final decision, failing which immediate release, again subject only to insurmountable circumstances. Even a person already prosecuted or convicted in France for different charges is caught by the same machinery under article 627-11, which applies the whole chain while suspending the French limitation periods for that person and withholding the benefit of the release valves. Beyond arrest, the same title equips the Paris antiterrorism prosecutor to execute the Court’s mutual-assistance requests across the national territory under article 627-1 and article 627-2, and to order conservatory measures for up to two renewable years at the Treasury’s advanced expense under article 627-3. Readers familiar with France’s recent ICC surrender practice, tested when an arrest in the Netherlands raised the question of onward surrender to The Hague, will recognise the same architecture at work, and those who follow how France handles an ICC surrender case after a European arrest will find here the statutory engine room behind that litigation.
II. In French airspace, a simple overflight is a different legal object, and that is where the controversy lives
A. Transit rules cover surrender transports, not state aircraft carrying a wanted passenger, and the 96-hour trap waits for any landing
The Rome Statute does contain an air-transit rule, but it answers a narrower question than the one the September 2026 flight posed. Article 89(3)(a) of the Rome Statute requires a State Party to authorise, under its national procedural law, the transportation through its territory of a person another State is surrendering to the Court, unless transit there would impede or delay the surrender. The scenario is precise: a person already arrested, already being surrendered, moved by one State to The Hague through a second State. For that scenario, paragraph (d) then provides the sentence France now quotes: that no authorisation is needed where the person travels by air with no landing scheduled on transit-State territory. And paragraph (e) sets the trap for everything else: that if an unscheduled landing occurs, the transit State may require a Court transit request; it must then detain the transported person until the request arrives and transit is effected, with detention capped at ninety-six hours from landing unless the request arrives in time. Read together, these paragraphs say something coherent and limited: scheduled overflights of surrender transports need no paperwork, but the moment wheels touch the ground unexpectedly, the transit State must detain.
France’s September 2026 position stretches that logic one step further, and the step deserves to be stated plainly so readers can judge it. The aircraft over France was not a surrender transport at all: it was a State aircraft whose passenger happened to be the subject of an ICC warrant, travelling from Israel to New York. Paris argues that the Statute’s cooperation duties attach to persons “on the territory” of a State Party, that an overflight without landing puts nobody on French territory in the relevant sense, and therefore that nothing in the Statute required France to deny clearance, order a diversion or scramble an interception. That is the substance of the Confavreux statement quoted above, and it is consistent with how the flight was handled operationally: flight-tracking data showed the route over Greece, Italy and France, Italy’s Foreign Ministry told Reuters it could not immediately say whether permission had even been sought, and France openly owned its clearance as lawful. Context strengthens the political reading even if it does not settle the legal one: the previous year, the same traveller reportedly flew a circuitous route to New York skirting several European airspaces including France, so the September 2026 straight-line clearance marked a deliberate French choice, taken days after the American president publicly urged ICC member States to quit what he called an out-of-control institution, a call France said it condemned even as it opened its sky.
Critics answer with two objections, and a serious analysis must give both their full weight. First, they argue that the transit analogy is misplaced because article 89(3) presupposes custody: its no-authorisation rule exists to spare surrender transports administrative friction, not to create a right of innocent passage for fugitives of the Court, and a State Party that knowingly facilitates the movement of a wanted person, even overhead, sits uneasily with the article 86 duty to “cooperate fully.” Second, they warn about the precedent: if overflights are freely granted, the warrant becomes enforceable only at the destination, and the Court depends entirely on the transit States’ willingness to act when an aircraft diverts. The reply from Paris would be that the Statute gives the Court no air-policing power, that no State can lawfully force down a foreign State aircraft in peacetime on the basis of an ICC warrant, and that the cooperation duty cannot be stretched into an interception duty the drafters never wrote. Both readings are defensible as interpretations; neither is written in the text in so many words, which is why this controversy will recur with every long-haul flight to New York, and why the only legally safe moment for enforcement remains the landing.
That landing scenario is where French law turns from permissive to peremptory, and travellers, airlines and counsel should understand the mechanics cold. Had the aircraft touched down in France, scheduled or not, the passenger would have been “on the territory” and the article 627-4 chain described above would have applied in full: formal check, execution across the territory, twenty-four-hour presentation, Paris transfer, investigating chamber, surrender on a finding of no obvious error. The ninety-six-hour detention window of article 89(3)(e) would have covered the transit-request interval for a surrender transport; for a non-custodial overflight turned into a landing, France would more plausibly have proceeded by direct arrest under a Court request, with the chamber’s fifteen-day ruling clock and the one-month surrender deadline running behind it. No French judge in that posture could revisit the immunity question to refuse surrender: article 627-8 remits every substantive question to the Court, and the only exit the statute contemplates is obvious error, meaning mistaken identity or a facially irregular request. The practical lesson for anyone advising a person subject to an ICC warrant is therefore geometric rather than doctrinal: the sky is arguable, the tarmac is not, and any flight plan that crosses States Parties should be drawn with diversion airports, medical-stop risks and fuel-range arithmetic in mind, because a single unscheduled landing converts a lawful overflight into a detention.
B. Immunity, jurisdiction and pressure on the Court will decide whether the next flight looks like this one
The deeper fight behind the overflight is the immunity battle, and it will outlive any single General Assembly week. France’s November 2024 argument, that leaders of States not party to the Statute carry immunities the Court must respect, draws on a real tension in international law: the International Court of Justice’s Arrest Warrant judgment of 2002 recognised the personal immunity of serving foreign ministers before national courts, and States not party to the Rome Statute never consented to its article 27. The ICC’s answer, repeated from the Al-Bashir litigation through the Mongolia finding, is that this immunity is opposable, if at all, between States and before national courts, but never before the Court itself, whose Statute expressly removes it, and that States Parties executing the Court’s requests exercise the Court’s jurisdiction rather than their own. Pre-Trial Chamber I’s rejection of the articles 18 and 19 challenges in November 2024 extended the same logic to jurisdiction: Palestine’s territorial title suffices, Israel’s non-membership does not block proceedings, and admissibility challenges belong to later stages, not to the arrest phase. None of this binds a national judge in a future case with the force of precedent as a common-lawyer understands it, since the ICC has no stare decisis, but the line of decisions is now consistent enough that any counsel advising reliance on immunity before French authorities would be advising reliance on an argument Paris itself may not repeat twice.
The institutional weather around the Court makes the next episodes less predictable, not more. Reuters reported that Washington has opened a campaign to isolate the Court, that the American president on 22 September 2026 urged member States to resign immediately, and that France says it condemns the threats against the institution. A State that denounces pressure on the Court while granting overflight clearances to the Court’s most prominent wanted person is not necessarily contradicting itself; it may simply be separating institutional support from case-by-case enforcement, giving at the level of principle and yielding at the level of aircraft. But that separation has a cost measured in credibility, the very currency the FIDH statement accused Paris of spending, and it invites the Assembly of States Parties dynamic seen after Mongolia: findings of non-compliance that punish without compelling. For France, the specific exposure is reputational rather than judicial. No court can order France to have denied the overflight, because no provision expressly required it; yet every future French demand that another State arrest a suspect on its soil will now be read against the September 2026 clearance, and defence counsel in surrender proceedings worldwide have already noticed.
For the international reader, the operational conclusions divide by position. If you are counsel to a person subject to an ICC warrant, treat every State Party’s airspace as passable on paper and every one of its runways as a detention risk, verify warrant status before any travel, assume flight-tracking publicity, and never confuse a granted overflight with a safe-conduct on the ground. If you are an airline or a flight planner, log the distinction between surrender transports under article 89(3) and State-aircraft overflights, brief diversion scenarios, and remember that an unscheduled landing starts a detention clock measured in hours, not days. If you are a victim, a witness or an NGO, understand that the Paris route to accountability does not depend on intercepting aircraft: France’s antiterrorism prosecutor already receives ICC assistance requests under articles 627-1 and 627-2, and French courts separately hear international-crime complaints from French nationals, a mechanism illustrated by how the Paris prosecutor handles international-crime complaints from French nationals detained abroad. And if you are simply watching the Court’s authority being tested in real time, fix your attention on the next finding of non-compliance, the next Assembly session, and the next flight plan filed across Europe, because the law of ICC cooperation is now written as much in clearances and referrals as in judgments.
Conclusion
The September 2026 overflight looks paradoxical only until the two halves of the regime are separated. On the ground, France’s duty is as close to absolute as international criminal law gets: article 86 commands full cooperation, article 89(1) commands compliance with arrest and surrender requests, article 87(7) punishes refusal with referral, article 27 strips away immunity, and articles 627 through 627-11 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure convert those commands into a Paris-centred judicial machine that checks identity and obvious error and remits everything else to The Hague within weeks. In the air, the same treaty is nearly silent: article 89(3)(d) exempts scheduled overflights of surrender transports from any authorisation, no provision addresses State aircraft carrying wanted passengers, and France’s reading, that no obligation attached to the crossing, occupies a space the text neither expressly permits nor expressly forbids. That silence is not an acquittal of the French position, and still less an endorsement; it is a gap, and gaps in enforcement treaties are where politics lives. The Mongolia referral showed what happens when a State Party lets a wanted Head of State walk on its soil; the French clearance showed what happens one level up, where no landing forces the question. Until States Parties close the gap, by agreement, by Assembly resolution or by the slow accretion of consistent practice, each long-haul flight of a wanted leader will restage the same scene: a lawful sky, an uncompromising tarmac, and ninety-six hours standing between the two whenever the weather, the fuel or the engines decide otherwise.