On 23 September 2026, Trial Chamber VI of the International Criminal Court found Mahamat Said Abdel Kani guilty of crimes against humanity committed in the Central African Republic in 2013. The judges held that, as the Seleka commander in charge of the Office Central de Répression du Banditisme (OCRB) in Bangui, he acted as a direct co-perpetrator of imprisonment, torture, persecution and other inhumane acts inflicted on detainees between 12 April and 30 August 2013, and that his guilt was established beyond any reasonable doubt. On the same day, the Chamber declined to convict him of the war crimes charged on the same facts, one judge appending a separate opinion. The verdict is not the end of the case: the defence and the prosecution have thirty days to appeal, the Chamber has set a timetable for sentencing, and a reparations process for the victims is about to begin. For readers in France — suspects, victims, witnesses, families holding assets or documents in Paris — the judgment raises three immediate practical questions. What exactly did The Hague decide, and what is still open? If a person is arrested in France on an ICC warrant tomorrow, what procedure applies, and within which deadlines? And how does a victim living in France obtain compensation, or trigger a French prosecution, for the same category of crimes? This analysis answers each question with the controlling texts and the two landmark rulings the French Court of Cassation handed down in plenary assembly on 25 July 2025.
I. What the 23 September 2026 Said Verdict Decided, and What It Left Open
A. Guilty of Crimes Against Humanity at the Bangui OCRB, Cleared of the War Crimes Counts
The conviction concerns a precise place, a precise period and a precise role. The Chamber found that detainees held at the OCRB in Bangui between 12 April and 30 August 2013 were subjected to a system of detention and abuse for which Mr Said, as the Seleka commander running the facility, bore criminal responsibility as a direct co-perpetrator, acting with the necessary intent and knowledge. The four crimes against humanity retained — imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty, torture, persecution and other inhumane acts — mirror the core categories of the international definition, and they map directly onto the French domestic definition of crimes against humanity, which punishes, among other acts, “L’emprisonnement ou toute autre forme de privation grave de liberté physique en violation des dispositions fondamentales du droit international”, “La torture” and “La persécution de tout groupe ou de toute collectivité identifiable pour des motifs d’ordre politique, racial, national, ethnique, culturel, religieux ou sexiste”. That symmetry matters for French practitioners: the same factual pattern that sustains a Hague conviction also fits the domestic offence of article 212-1 of the Criminal Code, which carries life imprisonment, so parallel or follow-on proceedings before French courts rest on identical legal building blocks.
Equally instructive is what the Chamber refused to do. It did not find Mr Said guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the war crimes of torture, cruel treatment and outrages upon personal dignity charged on the same conduct. The split shows how international criminal trials dissect identical facts through distinct legal lenses: crimes against humanity require a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, while war crimes require a nexus with an armed conflict and distinct elements the majority considered unproven here. The acquittal on the war crimes counts is not, as a result, a finding that nothing happened at the OCRB; it is a finding that the prosecution did not prove those specific qualifications to the criminal standard. Judge Maria del Socorro Flores Liera appended a separate opinion, signalling that at least one member of the bench reasoned differently on part of the case — a document defence teams in future trials will study closely, because separate opinions often foreshadow appeal arguments.
The evidentiary scale behind the verdict deserves emphasis, because it sets the standard any related French case must meet. The trial opened on 26 September 2022. The prosecution closed its evidence on 15 November 2024, the defence called its first witness on 17 March 2025 and closed on 2 September 2025, and closing statements ran from 25 to 27 November 2025. Across 130 trial hearings, the Chamber heard 58 prosecution witnesses and 3 defence witnesses, admitted 3,863 items of evidence, and granted 32 victims the right to participate through their legal counsel. A conviction built on four years of adversarial testing, with victim participants represented in the courtroom, carries a weight that no press-cycle allegation can match — and it creates a factual record that victims’ lawyers in France can now invoke, while respecting the presumption attached to the counts still under appeal.
B. Thirty Days to Appeal, a Sentence Still to Come, and a Reparations Phase About to Open
Three procedural tracks now run in parallel, and confusing them is the most common mistake in public commentary. First, the verdict itself can be appealed. Both the defence and the prosecution have thirty days from 23 September 2026 to file an appeal, meaning the conviction could still be reversed or amended on the crimes-against-humanity counts, while the prosecution could challenge the war-crimes acquittals. Until that window closes — and until any appeal is decided — every statement about the case should carry the qualification that the judgment is not final. Second, sentencing has not yet happened. In a decision issued the same day as the verdict, the Chamber fixed the timetable for sentencing proceedings, so the penalty for one of the gravest categories of international crimes will be debated and imposed in a separate phase, with submissions from the parties and the victims’ representative. Third, and most overlooked, a reparations process will begin for the victims of the crimes of conviction. Under the ICC system, reparations are ordered against the convicted person and can include restitution, compensation and rehabilitation, implemented through the Court and its Trust Fund for Victims. For victims living outside the Central African Republic — including the diaspora in France — this phase is the one that converts a Hague judgment into tangible redress, and it is also the phase where French enforcement tools become decisive, as explained below.
The timeline also clarifies the defence outlook. An appeal filed within the thirty-day window suspends the finality of the conviction but does not automatically release the convicted person; detention pending appeal follows its own regime before the Court. Defence teams will focus on the war-crimes acquittals as proof that the Chamber applied the reasonable-doubt standard rigorously, then argue that the same rigour should have defeated some or all of the crimes-against-humanity counts — particularly the modes of liability, since co-perpetration turns on intent, knowledge and the concrete exercise of command over the OCRB. The separate opinion of Judge Flores Liera may supply doctrinal support. Prosecution appeals, conversely, will attack the war-crimes acquittals and possibly the sentence once imposed. Anyone advising clients connected to the case — witnesses who testified, intermediaries, family members, holders of seized assets — should treat the coming months as still fully litigious: appeal briefs, sentencing submissions and reparations observations will each create new filings, new deadlines and new risks.
II. What the Said Conviction Changes for Files Handled From France
A. Arrested in France on an ICC Warrant: Twenty-Four Hours, Five Days, Fifteen Days
France is not a passive observer of ICC cases; it is a cooperation state bound by a dedicated title of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The opening provision states the principle plainly: “Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre.” The same article extends the regime to “toute personne poursuivie devant le Cour pénale internationale ou condamnée par celle-ci à raison des actes qui constituent, au sens des articles 6 à 8 et 25 du statut, un génocide, des crimes contre l’humanité ou des crimes de guerre.” In practice, this means that a suspect located in France and wanted by the ICC goes through a surrender procedure that resembles extradition but answers to The Hague rather than to a requesting state — a distinction with real consequences, as the French courts showed in earlier surrender litigation and as our analysis of arrests in France on Interpol notices explains for the parallel police-cooperation track.
The procedure runs on short, strict deadlines that defence lawyers must work within from the first hour. Any person apprehended under an ICC arrest-and-surrender request “doit être déférée dans les vingt-quatre heures au procureur de la République territorialement compétent”, with the standard custody safeguards applying in the meantime, and “elle comparaîtra, dans un délai maximum de cinq jours, devant le procureur général près la cour d’appel de Paris.” The person is informed in a language they understand, told they may be assisted by counsel of their choice or court-appointed counsel, and given immediate access to that lawyer. The file then moves to the chambre de l’instruction of the Paris Court of Appeal, which applies a deliberately narrow review: “Lorsque la chambre de l’instruction constate qu’il n’y a pas d’erreur évidente, elle ordonne la remise de la personne réclamée et, si celle-ci est libre, son incarcération à cette fin.” All other questions are sent back to the ICC itself. The chamber must rule “dans les quinze jours de la comparution devant elle de la personne réclamée”, and on further appeal “la chambre criminelle de la Cour de cassation statue dans un délai de deux mois suivant la réception du dossier à la Cour de cassation.” Twenty-four hours, five days, fifteen days, two months: the surrender machine tolerates no drift, and release applications must be built around these markers rather than around arguments the chambre de l’instruction is legally bound to forward to The Hague.
Two refinements complete the picture for practitioners. First, the surrender track applies even when the person is already being prosecuted or has been convicted in France on other charges: “Les dispositions des articles 627-4 à 627-10 sont également applicables si la personne réclamée est poursuivie ou condamnée en France pour d’autres chefs que ceux visés par la demande de la Cour pénale internationale.” In that configuration, however, release is restricted — “la personne détenue dans ces conditions ne peut bénéficier d’une mise en liberté au titre des articles 627-6, 627-9 et du second alinéa de l’article 627-10” — and the ICC proceedings suspend the French limitation periods for both prosecution and sentence. Second, France also executes the ICC’s financial and protective orders: conservatory measures requested under the Statute are ordered on French territory by the anti-terrorism prosecutor, for a maximum of two years renewable at the Court’s request, since the Code provides that “L’exécution sur le territoire français des mesures conservatoires mentionnées au k du paragraphe 1 de l’article 93 du statut est ordonnée, aux frais avancés du Trésor et selon les modalités prévues par le présent code, par le procureur de la République antiterroriste.” Asset-blocking orders linked to an ICC case can as a result land on Paris bank accounts well before any trial, and challenging them requires acting against the French execution order while the ICC track continues in The Hague.
B. Recovering Money and Obtaining Justice From Paris: ICC Reparations, French Courts, and the End of Functional Immunity
The Said verdict opens a concrete path to compensation that victims in France should understand now, before the reparations phase produces its first orders. When the Trial Chamber issues a reparations order — against the convicted person, for restitution, compensation or rehabilitation — that order can be enforced on French territory. The Code of Criminal Procedure assigns the task to a specific court: “Lorsque la Cour pénale internationale en fait la demande, l’exécution des peines d’amende et de confiscation ou des décisions concernant les réparations prononcées par celle-ci est autorisée par le tribunal correctionnel de Paris saisi, à cette fin, par le procureur de la République.” The Paris court follows domestic procedural rules but is substantively bound: “Le tribunal est lié par la décision de la Cour pénale internationale, y compris en ce qui concerne les dispositions relatives aux droits des tiers.” It may order any measure needed to recover the value of confiscated proceeds or assets where direct execution proves impossible, and it hears both the convicted person and any third party claiming rights over the property. In plain terms, once The Hague quantifies what victims are owed, Paris provides the bailiff: bank accounts, real estate and other assets located in France can be seized and allocated under a domestic judgment that merely executes the international one. Victims and associations should therefore map assets early, file conservatory requests through the prosecutor’s channel, and prepare third-party claims with the precision the Paris court will demand — because the court is bound by the ICC’s decision, the battle is fought over identification and valuation of assets, not over the principle of liability.
Beyond enforcement, France offers a second, autonomous track: prosecuting the same categories of crimes before its own courts under universal jurisdiction. The mechanism sits in article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that “peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger” genocide, other crimes against humanity, or war crimes as defined by the Criminal Code. Three conditions frame the mechanism: the suspect must have a habitual residence in France, assessed through a sufficient connecting link such as the length and conditions of presence, the stated will to settle or remain, and family, social, material or professional ties; “La poursuite de ces crimes ne peut être exercée qu’à la requête du procureur de la République antiterroriste”; and the prosecution must yield if an international court or another state claims the person, since the prosecutor verifies that the ICC is not already prosecuting and that no competent international court or state has requested surrender or extradition. Complementarity with The Hague is therefore built into the French statute: a Hague conviction like Said’s occupies the field for the convicted person, while French courts remain available for lower-level perpetrators, accomplices and financiers present in France who fall outside the ICC’s selection of cases. This is also where civil-party constitution matters for victims: domestic law grants the civil action to “tous ceux qui ont personnellement souffert du dommage directement causé par l’infraction”, and victims’ associations with standing can join French proceedings to support the prosecution and claim damages.
The decisive doctrinal shift behind this French track came from the Court of Cassation itself, sitting in plenary assembly on 25 July 2025, in two companion rulings on Syrian cases that every international defence file in Paris must now digest. In the first ruling, on the arrest warrant issued against a sitting foreign head of state, the Court upheld personal immunity in broad terms: immunity flows from the sovereign equality of states, it applies before national courts while “Le principe de l’immunité ne peut être opposé devant les juridictions internationales, dont les statuts écartent expressément toute immunité, et qui agissent au nom de la communauté internationale”, and personal immunity covers all acts, private or official, of the serving head of state, head of government or foreign minister. Because it is a manifest procedural bar, “l’immunité personnelle doit être examinée d’office par le juge.” The Court refused any exception based on the gravity of the crime — “En l’état, le droit international n’admet cependant pas d’exception à l’immunité personnelle en raison de ce que le crime en cause est prohibé par une telle norme impérative.” — and annulled the warrant of 13 November 2023, holding that “DIT que le mandat d’arrêt délivré le 13 novembre 2023 contre M. [S] est nul”. But the ruling contains two lifelines for accountability that the Court stated with equal clarity. First, “L’immunité n’équivaut pas à l’impunité. Elle n’exonère pas la personne qui en bénéficie de sa responsabilité pénale.” Second, the annulment is temporally bounded: “cette annulation est sans incidence sur la validité d’un mandat d’arrêt délivré postérieurement à la perte de la qualité de chef d’État en exercice.” A former head of state can as a result be pursued in France for the same facts — which is precisely why ICC indictees and Syrian-era officials who travel or settle in France face a different risk calculus once they leave office.
The second plenary ruling, delivered the same day, goes further and removes the remaining shield for former officials. The Court held that “le principe d’immunité fonctionnelle de juridiction en matière pénale ne peut pas être opposé en cas de poursuites des chefs de génocide, crimes contre l’humanité et crimes de guerre.” Functional immunity — the argument that official acts performed for a state cannot be judged by another state’s courts — no longer protects anyone prosecuted in France for genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. The Court grounded this evolution in significant state practice excluding functional immunity for international crimes, noting that it intended to contribute to that evolution and to define a new balance between immunities and the fight against impunity. Applied to the Said pattern, the consequence is direct: a former Seleka commander, a prison director, a governor who placed state services at the disposal of repression units, or a financier who laundered proceeds of atrocities — if habitually resident in France — can be investigated, indicted and tried before French courts without hiding behind the official character of their past functions. Combined with the ICC track, the architecture is now complete: The Hague tries those it selects, with France surrendering suspects and enforcing fines, confiscations and reparations; French courts try those present on French soil whom The Hague does not take, with no functional immunity available. Our companion analysis of ICC arrest warrants transiting through France details how immunity arguments play out when a sitting leader’s aircraft crosses French airspace — the mirror image of the sitting-versus-former distinction the plenary assembly drew.
Readers primarily interested in the guilty verdict itself and the surrender procedure before the Paris chambre de l’instruction will find them detailed in our companion analysis of the ICC Said guilty verdict and France’s surrender process; the present article focuses on what comes next: sentence, enforcement, reparations and French prosecutions.
Conclusion
The 23 September 2026 Said conviction is a milestone, not a full stop. It establishes, after a four-year adversarial trial, that systematic detention and torture at the Bangui OCRB constituted crimes against humanity engaging the direct responsibility of the Seleka commander who ran the facility — while reminding observers, through the war-crimes acquittals and the separate opinion, that international criminal law acquits when the specific elements of a charge are not proven, even on grave facts. The appeal window, the coming sentence and the opening reparations phase will shape the case for many more months. From France, three reflexes are warranted today. Anyone learning of an ICC arrest-and-surrender request touching their family or business should secure counsel within hours, because the 24-hour, 5-day and 15-day deadlines of the surrender procedure leave no room for improvisation. Victims and associations should prepare the reparations track now — identifying assets in France, documenting harm, and positioning themselves for enforcement before the tribunal correctionnel de Paris once The Hague rules. And anyone aware of atrocity perpetrators living in France should know that the 25 July 2025 plenary rulings closed the functional-immunity escape route for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes: French courts can judge them here, for acts committed abroad, when the statutory conditions are met. The Hague convicts; Paris surrenders, enforces and, where competent, prosecutes. That division of labour is the real legacy of the Said case for French files.