On 23 September 2026 at 11:00 Hague time, Trial Chamber VI of the International Criminal Court will deliver its judgment on conviction or acquittal in the case of The Prosecutor v. Mahamat Said Abdel Kani, the alleged Seleka commander accused of crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in 2013 at the Office Central de Répression du Banditisme (OCRB) in Bangui, in the Central African Republic. As the Court announced on 22 July 2026, the judgment on conviction or acquittal in the case of The Prosecutor v. Mahamat Said Abdel Kani will be delivered on 23 September 2026 at 11:00 Hague time. After a trial that opened on 26 September 2022, ran for 130 hearings, heard 58 witnesses for the Prosecution and 3 for the Defence, and gave 32 victims the right to participate through counsel, the judges will now say whether the charges have been proven beyond reasonable doubt (ICC announcement, case page). For victims, for the Central African diaspora in France, and for anyone facing the long arm of international criminal justice from Paris, the coming days matter enormously. This analysis explains what The Hague will decide, how an ICC trial judgment works under Article 74 of the Rome Statute, and what the verdict changes inside French courts, where universal jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes has just been reshaped by the 2023 reform of Article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and by three landmark rulings of the Cour de cassation.
I. The Verdict the ICC Will Deliver on 23 September 2026: the Said Trial From Bangui to The Hague
A. Who Is Mahamat Said Abdel Kani and What Happened at the OCRB Detention Centre in Bangui in 2013
In 2013, the Central African Republic collapsed into sectarian violence after the Seleka coalition seized power in Bangui in March of that year. The OCRB, the Central African police unit normally tasked with repressing banditry, was turned into a detention and interrogation centre where perceived supporters of ousted president François Bozizé were held, beaten and, according to the Prosecution, tortured. It is for what happened inside that building that Mahamat Said Abdel Kani, described by the Court as a former alleged Seleka commander, must answer. According to the official case presentation, the accused, described as a former alleged Seleka commander, faces charges of crimes against humanity — imprisonment or other severe deprivation of liberty, torture, persecution and other inhumane acts — and war crimes — torture, cruel treatment and outrages upon personal dignity — allegedly committed at the Office Central de Répression du Banditisme (OCRB) in Bangui, Central African Republic, in 2013. That single sentence carries the whole architecture of the case: the same physical acts, prolonged arbitrary detention and the mistreatment of detainees, are charged twice, once as crimes against humanity and once as war crimes, because international criminal law qualifies facts according to their context.
The distinction is decisive and worth spelling out for non-specialists. Crimes against humanity require a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population, with the individual acts forming part of that attack and the accused knowing of it. War crimes require an armed conflict, international or non-international, and a nexus between the acts and that conflict. Bangui in 2013 offered both settings at once: a non-international armed conflict between Seleka forces and anti-balaka militias, and a systematic campaign of arrests and abuse directed at a civilian population defined by its real or perceived political allegiance. Imprisonment becomes a crime against humanity when it is a severe deprivation of liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; torture, persecution on political grounds and other inhumane acts complete a catalogue that mirrors Articles 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute. On the war-crimes side, torture, cruel treatment and outrages upon personal dignity are the classic violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions in a non-international armed conflict. The Trial Chamber will therefore have to rule not only on what physically happened at the OCRB, but on the legal characterisation of each episode: was a given detainee held as part of the attack on the civilian population, as a measure connected to the armed conflict, or both.
The procedural journey to this verdict has been long. The trial opened on 26 September 2022. The Prosecution concluded its presentation of evidence on 15 November 2024. On 17 March 2025, the Defence called its first witness and concluded its presentation of evidence on 2 September 2025. Closing statements ran from 25 to 27 November 2025. Over 130 trial hearings, the Chamber heard 58 witnesses called by the Prosecution and only 3 called by the Defence, while 32 victims, represented by counsel Sarah Pellet, were authorised to participate in the proceedings. That asymmetry in witness numbers says nothing about the outcome: the Defence case rested largely on challenging the credibility of Prosecution witnesses, contesting Said’s hierarchical position within the Seleka apparatus, and disputing that he exercised the authority over the OCRB that the charges presuppose. Command responsibility is not charged here as a separate mode; the Prosecution case is built on direct and indirect perpetration, which means the judgment will turn on fine-grained findings about who ordered what, who was present where, and who could have prevented the abuse. Presiding Judge Miatta Maria Samba, alongside Judges María del Socorro Flores Liera and Sergio Gerardo Ugalde Godínez, with Judge Keebong Paek as alternate, will deliver those findings in open court, and every factual conclusion will have to survive the standard that governs all ICC trials.
B. How an ICC Trial Chamber Reaches Its Judgment: Article 74, Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt, Appeal and Reparations
Under Article 74 of the Rome Statute, the judges will either acquit or convict the accused. There is no third way, no suspended finding, no referral back for further investigation. Article 74 structures the deliberation in three rigid steps: the judges first determine whether the charges are proven, then, in case of conviction, consider the sentence in a separate phase, and finally address reparations to victims. The presumption of innocence is not decorative: The accused before the ICC is presumed innocent: the Prosecution must prove guilt, and the Trial Chamber may convict only if it is satisfied that the charges have been proven beyond reasonable doubt. And the evidentiary base is strictly fenced: The Chamber may base its decision only on the applicable law and on evidence submitted and discussed before it at trial. Evidence that was disclosed but never discussed in court cannot support a conviction; neither can press reports, NGO publications or the findings of UN commissions, however credible, unless they were admitted and debated adversarially.
Three scenarios are therefore possible on 23 September. Full conviction on all counts would move the case to sentencing, where the Chamber can impose up to 30 years’ imprisonment or, where justified by the extreme gravity of the crimes, life imprisonment, alongside fines and forfeiture. Partial conviction, entirely plausible given the dual characterisation of the same facts, would see the judges convict on some counts and acquit on others, with a reasoned explanation for each: the same detention episode might sustain a war-crimes conviction but fail the widespread-or-systematic-attack test for crimes against humanity, or the reverse. Full acquittal would end the trial phase immediately, without prejudice to an appeal by the Prosecutor. In every scenario, the losing side can appeal to the Appeals Chamber: the Prosecutor against an acquittal, the convicted person against conviction and sentence, and the victims’ legal representative on reparations issues. Appeals at the ICC are not retrials; the Appeals Chamber reviews errors of fact, law and procedure, and it can confirm, reverse or amend the judgment, or order a retrial before a different Trial Chamber. Practitioners should therefore treat 23 September as the end of the first decisive battle, not necessarily of the war: recent ICC history shows that trial judgments are appealed almost systematically and that appellate proceedings routinely add two to three years.
The reparations phase deserves separate attention because it is where the judgment touches victims most concretely. Under the Rome Statute system, a conviction opens a dedicated reparations stage in which the Trial Chamber can order the convicted person to repair the harm, and, where he is indigent, channel awards through the Trust Fund for Victims. Thirty-two victims participated in the Said trial through counsel; a conviction would allow them, and potentially a wider class of OCRB survivors, to claim restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. Even an acquittal does not erase the participatory rights already exercised, and the Trust Fund retains a general assistance mandate in the Central African Republic situation independently of any single case. For members of the Central African community living in France, some of whom followed the trial from Paris, the practical question after 23 September will be how to register as victims for reparations purposes, what documentation of detention at the OCRB is required, and what deadlines the Chamber will set. Those questions are answered case by case in the Chamber’s orders, not in the abstract, which is why anyone concerned should have the trial judgment and the subsequent scheduling orders reviewed by counsel experienced in ICC procedure rather than relying on summaries.
II. What the Said Case Changes in France: Universal Jurisdiction and Cooperation With the ICC
A. Can French Courts Try Seleka-Era Crimes? Article 689-11 After the 2023 Reform, the Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor and Three Cour de Cassation Rulings
France is not a bystander to Central African atrocities. Paris maintained troops on the ground during the 2013 crisis, Central African nationals form a significant community in France, and French courts have spent a decade building one of Europe’s most active universal-jurisdiction practices for Syrian, Liberian, Rwandan and Ivorian cases. The legal doorway is Article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and its current wording must be read carefully because it was substantially rewritten with effect on 22 November 2023: “Hors les cas prévus au sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre IV pour l’application de la convention portant statut de la Cour pénale internationale, ouverte à la signature à Rome le 18 juillet 1998, peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes : 1° Le crime de génocide défini au chapitre Ier du sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre II du code pénal ; 2° Les autres crimes contre l’humanité définis au chapitre II du même sous-titre Ier ; 3° Les crimes et les délits de guerre définis aux articles 461-1 à 461-31 du même code.” Three cumulative locks then condition any prosecution: the suspect must be habitually resident in France, prosecution can only be initiated at the request of the anti-terrorism public prosecutor, and no international court or foreign state may have requested surrender or extradition. The text spells out the residence test in deliberately flexible terms: habitual residence means a sufficient connecting link with France, assessed in light of the current or foreseeable duration of presence, its conditions and reasons, the stated will to settle or remain, and family, social, material or professional ties. And it imposes a subsidiarity check on the prosecution service: before acting, the public prosecutor must verify that the ICC is not already prosecuting and that no competent international court has requested surrender and no state has requested extradition.
Each element of that framework maps directly onto a Seleka-era scenario. Suppose a former OCRB guard, a Seleka logistics officer or a militia financier now lives in the Paris region. The genocide and crimes-against-humanity definitions that a French investigating judge would apply are those of Article 211-1 of the Criminal Code (“Constitue un génocide le fait, en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux”), Article 212-1 of the Criminal Code, which punishes with life imprisonment acts “commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique”, including murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, “L’emprisonnement ou toute autre forme de privation grave de liberté physique en violation des dispositions fondamentales du droit international”, torture and sexual violence, and Articles 461-1 and following of the Criminal Code for war crimes (“Constituent des crimes ou des délits de guerre les infractions définies par le présent livre commises, lors d’un conflit armé international ou non international et en relation avec ce conflit, en violation des lois et coutumes de la guerre”). The OCRB facts fit these definitions without strain: systematic detention is the textbook case of severe deprivation of liberty, and detainee abuse maps onto torture and cruel treatment in both regimes. The general jurisdictional anchor sits one level up, in Article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which allows French courts to try perpetrators and accomplices of offences committed abroad where French law applies or where an international convention confers jurisdiction on French courts.
But the Cour de cassation has shown that the doorway, while open, is narrow, and three recent rulings draw its exact dimensions. The first is the judgment of 24 November 2021, appeal no. 21-81.344 (full text on Légifrance), concerning a Syrian national investigated in Paris since 15 February 2019 for torture, crimes against humanity and complicity for acts committed in Syria between March 2011 and August 2013. The defence argued that crimes against humanity were not incriminated as such in Syrian law and that the ICC, competent only for crimes on the territory of States Parties, could not decline a jurisdiction it never had. The Criminal Chamber quashed the Paris investigating chamber’s ruling and declared the French courts incompetent, holding: “Peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises, si elle réside habituellement sur le territoire de la République, toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger le crime de génocide, prévu par le code pénal, les autres crimes contre l’humanité définis par ce code, si les faits sont punis par la législation de l’Etat où ils ont été commis”, and, crucially: “l’exigence posée par l’article 689-11 du code de procédure pénale, selon laquelle les faits doivent être punis par la législation de l’Etat où ils ont été commis, inclut nécessairement l’existence dans cette législation d’une infraction comportant un élément constitutif relatif à une attaque lancée contre une population civile en exécution d’un plan concerté.” Mere punishment of the underlying acts, murder or torture as ordinary offences, was not enough; the foreign law had to contain the contextual element of the attack. For Central African cases this holding bites: the CAR Criminal Code does not incriminate crimes against humanity as autonomous offences, so under the 2021 reading a Paris prosecution for Seleka-era crimes against humanity would face a serious double-criminality objection.
The second ruling softened the picture for war crimes. On 12 May 2023, the Assemblée plénière, the Cour de cassation’s most solemn formation, rejected appeal no. 22-82.468 (full text on Légifrance) brought by the former spokesman of the Syrian armed group Jaysh al-Islam, investigated in Paris for torture, complicity in enforced disappearances and war crimes committed between 2012 and 2018. The Court accepted that abstract references to international instruments cannot satisfy double criminality where Syrian law does not refer to them and the instruments themselves prescribe no penalty: “en l’absence de renvoi par la loi syrienne aux incriminations des instruments internationaux et de prévision d’une peine par lesdits instruments, le principe de légalité criminelle fait obstacle à ce que des faits soient considérés comme punis, au sens de la loi française, par la législation de l’État étranger à travers de telles normes.” But it upheld jurisdiction because the war-crimes charges were punishable in substance under Syrian law through ordinary offences and the offence of involving children in hostilities: “l’arrêt n’encourt pas la censure, dès lors qu’il ressort de ses énonciations que les faits pour lesquels M. [W] a été mis en examen, sous la qualification de crimes de guerre et complicité, étaient punis, en substance, par la législation syrienne au travers d’infractions de droit commun et de celle d’implication d’enfants dans les hostilités.” Transposed to Bangui, the lesson is that Seleka-era war-crimes charges, torture and cruel treatment of detainees, stand on firmer ground in Paris than crimes-against-humanity charges, because ordinary Central African criminal law punishes murder, assault and unlawful detention in substance. The third ruling completes the triptych: on 1 February 2023, appeal no. 22-82.235 (full text on Légifrance), the Criminal Chamber confirmed, in a case arising from a preliminary inquiry into war crimes, crimes against humanity and complicity allegedly committed in Côte d’Ivoire and targeting a man claiming to have served as prime minister, that jurisdiction under Article 689-11 is conditioned on the judicial authorities’ practical ability to prosecute a person habitually resident in France: “Il résulte de ces dispositions que la compétence des juridictions françaises pour connaître des crimes et délits susvisés est conditionnée par la faculté, pour les autorités judiciaires françaises, de pouvoir poursuivre la personne résidant habituellement sur le territoire de la République.” Residence is therefore not a formality but the operative trigger, now assessed through the broad multi-factor test introduced in 2023.
That 2023 reform is the hinge on which future French cases will turn. It replaced the old presence-based case law with a statutory definition of habitual residence centred on a sufficient connecting link, and it centralised the decision to prosecute in the hands of the anti-terrorism prosecutor, who alone can set universal-jurisdiction machinery in motion. It did not, however, rewrite the double-criminality condition for crimes against humanity as interpreted in 2021, so defence lawyers in any future Seleka-related Paris file will certainly plead the CAR Code’s silence on crimes against humanity, while prosecutors will answer with war-crimes qualifications and complicity theories that survived the Assemblée plénière’s in-substance test. Anyone in France with information about OCRB-era abuse, whether as a victim, a witness or a person fearing investigation, should understand that French files typically begin with a complaint filed with the Paris prosecutor or a civil-party petition before the investigating judge of the Paris crimes-against-humanity unit, that the prosecutor’s subsidiarity check will first ask whether The Hague or Bangui claims the case, and that the ICC’s own judgment in Said, conviction or acquittal, will become the reference factual record every French magistrate consults next.
B. Arrest, Surrender, Sentences and Reparations: How France Executes ICC Decisions and What Victims in France Should Do Now
Parallel to prosecution, France owes the ICC a second duty: cooperation. The framework sits in Article 627 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the articles that follow: “Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre.” Those provisions apply to “toute personne poursuivie devant le Cour pénale internationale ou condamnée par celle-ci à raison des actes qui constituent, au sens des articles 6 à 8 et 25 du statut, un génocide, des crimes contre l’humanité ou des crimes de guerre.” Concretely, if the ICC issues an arrest-and-surrender request concerning a suspect on French soil, Article 627-5 organises the first hours: “Toute personne appréhendée en vertu d’une demande d’arrestation aux fins de remise doit être déférée dans les vingt-quatre heures au procureur de la République territorialement compétent”, who verifies identity, notifies the person in a language they understand, and warns them that they will appear within five days before the prosecutor general at the Paris Court of Appeal. The person is entitled to counsel of their choice, consular notification and a judicial review of the surrender that tests identity, manifest error and the specialty principle, not the merits of the ICC charges. This is surrender, not extradition: no government decree, no political reciprocity test, and no nationality bar of the kind that still structures classic extradition law. A Central African national arrested in Seine-Saint-Denis on an ICC warrant would therefore move through this pipeline in days, not months, which is precisely why defence strategy in ICC-related arrests must be prepared before any arrest, with counsel identified, language rights asserted and the regularity of the warrant challenged at the earliest hearing.
Cooperation does not stop at surrender. If Trial Chamber VI convicts Said on 23 September and later orders fines, forfeiture or reparations, Article 627-16 gives those orders a direct path into the French legal order: “Lorsque la Cour pénale internationale en fait la demande, l’exécution des peines d’amende et de confiscation ou des décisions concernant les réparations prononcées par celle-ci est autorisée par le tribunal correctionnel de Paris saisi, à cette fin, par le procureur de la République”, with the Paris court bound by the ICC decision including on third-party rights, while retaining the power to order measures to recover the value of proceeds or property. For victims living in France, this is the enforcement bridge that turns a Hague reparations order into seizable assets on French territory: bank accounts, real estate and business interests located in France can be targeted once the Paris court authorises execution. The practical checklist for the weeks after the verdict is therefore straightforward. First, read the trial judgment itself, not summaries, to see which detention episodes the Chamber found proven and which victims’ accounts it credited, since reparations eligibility will follow those findings. Second, contact the victims’ legal representative or the Victims Participation and Reparations Section before the Chamber sets the reparations calendar, because late applications face stricter scrutiny. Third, preserve every document linking detention at the OCRB to the harm suffered: medical certificates, witness contacts, proof of presence in Bangui in 2013, and any prior statements given to NGOs or journalists. Fourth, where assets of convicted persons or their networks are believed to be in France, alert counsel early so that preservation measures can be sought in parallel with the ICC reparations phase. And fifth, for anyone who fears being drawn into a French universal-jurisdiction file as a suspect, seek specialised advice before any contact with investigators, because the first statements made during garde à vue or a voluntary hearing shape the entire assessment of the residence link and of individual criminal responsibility.
Conclusion
On 23 September 2026, three judges in The Hague will close a thirteen-year arc that began in a Bangui police building and passed through 130 hearings, 61 witnesses and the participation of 32 victims. A conviction would validate the Prosecution’s dual characterisation of OCRB detention as both crimes against humanity and war crimes, open a sentencing phase and then a reparations phase with direct enforcement routes into France under Article 627-16. An acquittal, total or partial, would test the Prosecutor’s appetite for appeal and leave the factual record to French magistrates handling Seleka-era complaints under Article 689-11, armed with the Assemblée plénière’s in-substance test for war crimes and the still-strict double-criminality reading for crimes against humanity. Either way, the Said judgment will become the authoritative account of the OCRB that every future court, in The Hague, Paris or Bangui, will have to confront. The week after the verdict is the moment to act: victims should secure their place in the reparations calendar, witnesses should preserve their testimony, and anyone exposed to investigation should organise a defence while the procedural options are still open.