On 23 September 2026, Trial Chamber VI of the International Criminal Court will deliver its trial judgment in the case of The Prosecutor v. Mahamat Said Abdel Kani, closing a trial that opened in The Hague four years ago over crimes allegedly committed in Bangui, in the Central African Republic, in 2013. For victims, for the defence, and for every State watching how international justice handles detention-era abuse, the date matters: it will be the first ICC trial judgment in a Central African Republic case centred on a police detention facility, and it will set the tone for the sentencing and reparations phases that follow a conviction. For readers in France, the date matters for a second reason. France is one of the States the Court can ask to arrest and surrender a suspect, and French courts have built a precise, demanding test for answering that request. This article explains both sides: what the judges in The Hague are about to decide, and what a Paris court would check, step by step, before handing anyone over.
I. What Trial Chamber VI Will Decide on 23 September 2026
A. The OCRB charges: detention, torture and persecution in Bangui in 2013
The case concerns the Office Central de Répression du Banditisme, known as the OCRB, a police facility in Bangui. According to the Court’s case page, the charges combine crimes against humanity, namely imprisonment or other severe deprivation of liberty, torture, persecution and other inhumane acts, with war crimes, namely torture, cruel treatment and outrages upon personal dignity, all allegedly committed at the OCRB in Bangui in 2013. That charge sheet defines the whole trial. The year 2013 was the year the Séléka coalition seized power in the Central African Republic and the country slid into sectarian violence between Séléka and anti-Balaka forces; the OCRB, a criminal-investigation police building, is alleged to have been used as a detention and interrogation site where opponents and civilians were held, beaten and humiliated.
Two features of that charge sheet deserve attention from anyone following the judgment. First, the prosecution combined crimes against humanity and war crimes for the same place and period. Crimes against humanity require a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, while war crimes require a nexus with an armed conflict; proving both at one detention site means the judges must rule on the nature of the 2013 violence in Bangui itself, a finding with consequences well beyond one defendant. Second, the charge of persecution as a crime against humanity requires discriminatory intent, often the hardest element to prove in a detention case built on survivor testimony. The judgment will therefore show how Trial Chamber VI handled identification evidence, insider witnesses and documentary gaps more than a decade after the events, and that methodology will be read closely by every team litigating the remaining Central African Republic cases.
The closing arguments already gave a preview of where the fight lies. The Court scheduled the closing statements in Prosecutor v. Mahamat Said Abdel Kani for 25 to 27 November 2025, and international press covering those hearings reported a prosecution confident in its detention-site evidence facing a defence attacking the reliability of memory and identification after so many years. When the judgment comes down on 23 September 2026, the short version the world will read is conviction or acquittal, but the long version that lawyers will study is the reasoning on detention conditions, command responsibility and the credibility of witnesses who testified about what happened inside the OCRB.
B. From a sealed warrant to judgment day: a seven-year procedural road
The road to 23 September 2026 began in secrecy. According to the Court, the arrest warrant against Mahamat Said Abdel Kani was issued under seal in early January 2019, covering alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Bangui in 2013. A sealed warrant means the suspect does not know he is wanted, which allows States to organise an arrest without tipping him off. The suspect was surrendered to the Court at the end of January 2021 by the authorities of the Central African Republic, nearly two full years later. That two-year gap between warrant and surrender is ordinary in international justice: the Court has no police force and depends entirely on States to execute its warrants, which is exactly why the surrender procedures of countries such as France, examined in the second part of this article, are so important.
Once in The Hague, the case moved through each mandatory station of ICC procedure. The initial appearance before the Single Judge of Pre-Trial Chamber II took place within days of his arrival, at the end of January 2021, and the confirmation of charges hearing followed in mid-October 2021. Confirmation is the filter hearing at which the Pre-Trial Chamber decides whether the prosecution has enough evidence to send the case to trial. Here the filter bit: in December 2021, Pre-Trial Chamber II confirmed only part of the charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes and committed the accused to trial on that basis. A partial confirmation means some charges were dropped while others survived, a first signal that the evidence was strong on detention and mistreatment but thinner on other counts, and a reminder that ICC judges do not simply rubber-stamp the prosecution.
The trial itself was a long evidentiary marathon. It opened at the end of September 2022. More than two years later, in mid-November 2024, the prosecution closed its case after the Chamber heard testimony from fifty-eight prosecution witnesses. Fifty-eight witnesses over two years gives a sense of the scale: survivors, insiders, experts and investigators. Then the defence took over, calling its own witnesses from March 2025 until early September 2025. Closing statements followed in November 2025, and then the judges withdrew to deliberate for roughly ten months. That deliberation period is normal for a case of this size; the Yekatom and Ngaissona trial, from the same Central African Republic situation, has shown similar rhythms. On 23 September 2026 the Chamber will read its conclusions in open court, ending the countdown the Court opened with its July 2026 media advisory announcing the judgment date.
A conviction would not end the story. Under the Court’s system, the judgment on guilt is followed by a sentencing phase and then by a reparations phase in which victims of the OCRB can seek redress, a sequence illustrated by the reparations hearing the Court held in the Abd-Al-Rahman case in September 2026. An acquittal, conversely, would mean release unless other grounds for detention exist, and it would raise hard questions about a prosecution built over seven years. Either way, the judgment will feed directly into the cooperation debate: every future arrest warrant the Court issues will be executed, or resisted, under national procedures like the French one described below.
II. What France Would Test Before Surrendering Anyone to The Hague
A. Who decides in Paris and what the review covers
France wrote a special chapter of its criminal procedure for the International Criminal Court, and its opening line leaves no doubt about the principle. Article 627 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure provides: “Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre.” Cooperation is therefore the default, not the exception, and it covers “toute personne poursuivie devant le Cour pénale internationale ou condamnée par celle-ci à raison des actes qui constituent, au sens des articles 6 à 8 et 25 du statut, un génocide, des crimes contre l’humanité ou des crimes de guerre.” In plain terms, anyone prosecuted for genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes as defined by the Rome Statute can be surrendered by France, and the procedure that follows is judicial from start to finish, with no government discretion comparable to classic extradition.
The machinery starts the moment a request arrives. Mutual-assistance requests from the Court follow a strict channel: Article 627-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that “Les demandes d’entraide émanant de la Cour pénale internationale sont adressées aux autorités compétentes en vertu de l’article 87 du statut en original ou en copie certifiée conforme accompagnées de toutes pièces justificatives.” Arrest warrants for surrender travel the same route, and the text is explicit about who checks them first: Article 627-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “Les demandes d’arrestation aux fins de remise délivrées par la Cour pénale internationale sont adressées, en original et accompagnées de toutes pièces justificatives, aux autorités compétentes en vertu de l’article 87 du statut qui, après s’être assurées de leur régularité formelle, les transmettent au procureur général près la cour d’appel de Paris et, dans le même temps, les mettent à exécution dans toute l’étendue du territoire de la République.” Paris has exclusive jurisdiction: every ICC surrender case in France runs through the prosecutor general at the Paris Court of Appeal, the Paris investigating chamber, and, on appeal, the criminal chamber of the Court of Cassation. For urgent cases the law adds that “En cas d’urgence, ces demandes peuvent aussi être adressées directement et par tout moyen au procureur de la République territorialement compétent.”
The first hours after arrest are tightly regulated. Article 627-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires that “Toute personne appréhendée en vertu d’une demande d’arrestation aux fins de remise doit être déférée dans les vingt-quatre heures au procureur de la République territorialement compétent.” Within that twenty-four-hour window the person receives the standard custody safeguards, and the prosecutor verifies identity and notifies the person, in a language they understand, of the ICC request. Transfer to Paris must then be fast: Article 627-6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “La personne réclamée est transférée, s’il y a lieu, et écrouée à la maison d’arrêt du ressort de la cour d’appel de Paris.” Speed matters because delay has a sanction, as the second half of this part explains.
The decisive hearing belongs to the investigating chamber of the Paris Court of Appeal. Article 627-7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that “La chambre de l’instruction est immédiatement saisie de la procédure”, and that “La personne réclamée comparaît devant elle dans un délai de huit jours à compter de sa présentation au procureur général.” Eight days from presentation to hearing leaves defence counsel very little time, which is why anyone who might be affected should have a lawyer identified in advance rather than discovered in custody. The chamber then applies the test set out in Article 627-8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: “Lorsque la chambre de l’instruction constate qu’il n’y a pas d’erreur évidente, elle ordonne la remise de la personne réclamée et, si celle-ci est libre, son incarcération à cette fin.” The same article adds a jurisdictional boundary that surprises many defendants: “Toute autre question soumise à la chambre de l’instruction est renvoyée à la Cour pénale internationale qui lui donne les suites utiles.” Arguments about the merits of the ICC case, the credibility of witnesses or the fairness of the Hague proceedings do not belong in Paris; they belong in The Hague.
That narrow review is not theory. It was applied to one of the most famous fugitives ever arrested on French soil. On 16 May 2020, Félicien Kabuga, accused of genocide by the Rwanda tribunal system and wanted for more than two decades, was arrested in Asnières-sur-Seine; on 3 June 2020 the investigating chamber of the Paris Court of Appeal ordered his surrender to the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals; and on 30 September 2020 the criminal chamber of the Court of Cassation rejected his appeal, in decision Cass. crim., 30 September 2020, No. 20-83.181. The Court defined the chamber’s task in words every surrender lawyer in Paris now knows: “Il résulte de l’article 13 de la loi du 2 janvier 1995 auquel renvoie l’article 2 de celle du 22 mai 1996 applicable en l’espèce, que le contrôle de la chambre de l’instruction consiste seulement, en cette matière, à vérifier si les conditions de remise sont remplies quant à l’identité de la personne, la production des titres en vertu desquels la demande est formée, l’existence de faits entrant dans la définition posée à l’article 1er de cette loi, et l’absence d’une erreur évidente.” Four checkpoints only: identity, paperwork, qualifying facts, no manifest error. The Court added one extension that matters enormously in practice: “Ce contrôle inclut par ailleurs, si sa violation est invoquée, le respect des garanties fondamentales accordées à la personne réclamée.” Fundamental-rights arguments are admissible, but only if the defence raises them with evidence, and the Court then held that “ni les contestations relatives à la procédure de transmission de la demande émanant du Mécanisme, ni celles portant sur les examens pratiqués aux fins de s’assurer de l’identité de la personne recherchée, n’entrent dans ce pouvoir de contrôle.” Transmission complaints and identity-check complaints were thrown out, and the appeal was rejected: “REJETTE le pourvoi formé le 10 juin 2020.”
The Kabuga ruling carries a direct lesson for any future ICC surrender in France, including in a case resembling Said’s. The defence threw everything at the procedure: a seven-year-old warrant transmitted by email rather than through the justice minister, medical examinations allegedly conducted without an interpreter, DNA sampling allegedly without valid consent, and even the argument that surrender should be conditioned on a guarantee against later transfer to Rwanda. Every one of those arguments failed, either because it fell outside the four checkpoints or because the risk invoked was hypothetical. On the Rwanda point, the Court approved the chamber’s reasoning word for word: “En statuant ainsi, la chambre de l’instruction, qui était saisie d’une question relative à un transfert purement hypothétique, a justifié sa décision.” For defence teams, the message is blunt: in Paris, win on identity, on missing documents, on manifest error, or on proven fundamental-rights violations, or lose. Everything else goes to The Hague.
B. Fundamental rights, release and the one-month surrender clock
The narrow review described above does not mean the person sought is defenceless. French law builds three protections into the surrender track: release on bail under ICC standards, a strict timetable with release as the sanction for delay, and a fundamental-rights review that, in neighbouring extradition law, has teeth sharp enough to quash decisions.
Release is possible at any moment. Article 627-9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “La mise en liberté ou la mainlevée ou la modification du contrôle judiciaire ou de l’assignation à résidence sous surveillance électronique peut être demandée à tout moment à la chambre de l’instruction de la cour d’appel de Paris qui procède conformément à l’article 59 du statut et à la procédure prévue aux articles 148-1 et suivants du présent code.” Two features stand out. First, the request can be filed at any time, unlike the rigid windows of ordinary extradition detention. Second, the chamber applies Article 59 of the Rome Statute, the provision under which the custodial State’s judge examines whether the arrest was lawful, whether the person’s rights were respected, and whether detention remains justified pending surrender, while weighing the gravity of the alleged crimes. In practice, release pending surrender to the ICC is exceptional given the gravity of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, but the door is legally open, and electronic monitoring and judicial supervision are available as intermediate measures. Defence teams typically combine the release request with challenges to the conditions of arrest and detention, because the same hearing can address both.
Time limits protect the person sought even more mechanically. Once the investigating chamber orders surrender, Article 627-10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires that “La personne réclamée est remise dans un délai d’un mois à compter du jour où cette décision est devenue définitive, faute de quoi elle est immédiatement libérée sur décision du président de la chambre de l’instruction, à moins que sa remise ait été retardée par des circonstances insurmontables.” One month from the final decision to the handover, with immediate release as the penalty for missing the deadline, excused only by genuinely insurmountable circumstances. The same article organises the handover itself: the chamber’s decision, the place and date of surrender, and the length of detention already served are notified to the Court “par tout moyen, par les autorités compétentes en vertu de l’article 87 du statut”, so that time spent in French custody counts toward the Hague proceedings. The fifteen-day deadline for the chamber’s own ruling, combined with the eight-day deadline for the first hearing, means the entire Paris phase of an ICC surrender is designed to last weeks, not months, a pace far faster than classic extradition.
Alongside these ICC-specific rules sits the ordinary extradition case law, which shows how seriously French judges take procedural fairness when liberty is at stake. On 15 October 2025, the criminal chamber quashed a surrender opinion in an extradition to Brazil, in Cass. crim., 15 October 2025, No. 24-86.904. The person sought, an Austrian national detained in Martinique, had been unable to appear because a prison officers’ protest blocked all extractions that day, and the Fort-de-France investigating chamber issued its favourable opinion in his absence. The Court of Cassation held: “En émettant un avis favorable à l’extradition en l’absence du demandeur, qui n’avait pu être extrait, en raison d’une circonstance qui n’était pas extérieure au service de la justice, et alors que sa comparution pouvait être reportée, jusqu’au 23 septembre à minuit, la chambre de l’instruction n’a pas justifié sa décision.” A prison strike is not an external event of the justice system, the hearing could have been postponed within the legal deadline, and deciding without the person was therefore unjustified: “La cassation est, dès lors, encourue.” The same decision recalled the European duty to inform the Member State of nationality before surrendering an EU citizen to a third State, under Articles 18 and 21 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The lesson for ICC surrenders is indirect but real: the ICC track has its own statutes, yet it runs before the same chambers, under the same European human-rights standards, and with the same insistence that the person be heard.
Put together, the French test for an ICC surrender looks like this. The Court of Cassation checks identity, documents, qualifying crimes and manifest error, plus any proven violation of fundamental guarantees. The investigating chamber hears the person within eight days, rules within fifteen, and surrender must follow within one month of the final decision. Release can be requested at any time under Rome Statute standards. And behind every step stands the European Convention, which French courts apply even when the requesting side is an international court. That is the gauntlet any ICC arrest warrant executed in France must run, whether it concerns a detention-site commander like the Said case or any future suspect transiting through a Paris airport.
Conclusion
On 23 September 2026, the Said judgment will answer the factual questions of the OCRB case: what happened inside that Bangui police building in 2013, who is responsible, and whether the evidence proves crimes against humanity and war crimes. The procedural record already tells its own story of international justice at work, from a sealed warrant in January 2019 to surrender in January 2021, partial confirmation in December 2021, fifty-eight prosecution witnesses, a defence case running from March to September 2025, closing statements in November 2025, and judgment ten months later. Whatever the outcome, the next phases, sentencing or release, and reparations for the victims, will keep the case alive well beyond September. And every step of that cooperation chain depends on national courts willing to arrest and surrender. France has equipped itself with one of the clearest procedures in Europe: exclusive Paris jurisdiction, twenty-four hours to present the arrested person, eight days to the hearing, fifteen days to the ruling, one month to the handover, release available at any time, and a Court of Cassation that limits review to identity, documents, qualifying facts and manifest error while keeping the door open to proven fundamental-rights claims. Anyone living in France who could be affected by an international warrant should understand that timetable now, not after the arrest, because the Paris phase moves too fast for improvisation.