Searches for water cremation surged this week after widely shared news reports about a celebrity’s funeral arrangements, and Texans quickly typed the follow-up question in their own words: is water cremation legal in Texas. The short answer, as of November 21, 2026, is no. Water cremation, which statutes call alkaline hydrolysis, breaks down a body with water and alkaline chemicals instead of fire. Texas law defines cremation, in Section 716.001(5) of the Texas Health and Safety Code, as “the irreversible process of reducing human remains to bone fragments through direct flame, extreme heat, and evaporation,” and the licensing chapter of the Texas Occupations Code repeats those words. A flameless process does not fit that definition, so no Texas crematory can lawfully sell it as cremation.
That is not the end of the road for a family. Texas law lets a person choose in advance who controls the disposition of their remains and leave written directions that the person in charge must carry out within the estate’s means, and its funeral licensing statute expressly contemplates a body being permanently transported out of Texas. The next dated step for anyone hoping the rule changes is January 12, 2027, when the Texas Legislature convenes in regular session under Section 301.001 of the Texas Government Code. This guide explains what the Texas statutes say, what Texas courts decided in comparable disputes over cremation and mishandled remains, and the concrete checks that protect a family’s choice.
I. Is water cremation legal in Texas right now?
A. Texas defines cremation by flame, which leaves water cremation out
Two Texas statutes control the answer, and they say the same thing. Chapter 716 of the Health and Safety Code, which governs crematories, defines cremation in Section 716.001(5) as “the irreversible process of reducing human remains to bone fragments through direct flame, extreme heat, and evaporation.” The cemetery chapter of the same code, Chapter 711 of the Texas Health and Safety Code, uses a slightly older formula in Section 711.001(12): cremation reduces remains to bone fragments “through extreme heat and evaporation,” and Section 711.001(13) describes a crematory as a structure containing a furnace. Alkaline hydrolysis uses a vessel filled with water and alkaline chemicals. It involves neither direct flame nor a furnace, so it falls outside both definitions.
The licensing statute closes the loop. Chapter 651 of the Texas Occupations Code repeats the flame-based definition in Section 651.651(1), and Section 651.656(a) provides that “A person may not conduct a crematory business in this state unless the person who is the owner or operator of the crematory holds a crematory establishment license issued by the commission.” The commission is the Texas Funeral Service Commission. Because the license is a license to perform cremation as the statute defines it, a Texas business cannot point to that license as authority to run a hydrolysis vessel. Chapter 716 also makes it a Class B misdemeanor, in Section 716.351, to represent to the public that a person may cremate human remains without the required license. A provider that marketed in-state water cremation as a licensed cremation service would be taking a serious risk with both its license and the criminal statute.
Lawmakers know about the gap. In the 2025 regular session, a senator filed Texas Senate Bill 1327, captioned as an act “relating to the cremation of human remains by alkaline hydrolysis.” The introduced text would have rewritten Sections 711.001(12), 716.001(5) and 651.651(1) so that cremation would occur “through direct flame, extreme heat, and evaporation or through alkaline hydrolysis,” and it would have directed the Funeral Service Commission to adopt rules for the process. A filed bill is only a proposal. The definitions in force when we read the codes on November 21, 2026 still require flame and heat, so that change did not become law in the form proposed. Under Section 301.001 of the Texas Government Code, the Legislature convenes “at 12 noon on the second Tuesday in January of each odd-numbered year,” which next falls on January 12, 2027. That regular session is the next scheduled opportunity for a bill authorizing alkaline hydrolysis, and nothing changes for families until such a bill is actually enacted and takes effect.
Other states made a different choice, which is why the answer to the national version of the question is “it depends on the state.” Kansas, for example, defines cremation in K.S.A. 65-1760(e) as “the mechanical and/or other dissolution process that reduces human remains to bone fragments,” a definition that is not tied to flame. Arizona goes further and regulates the process by name: Arizona Revised Statutes Section 32-1342 opens with the sentence “An alkaline hydrolysis facility licensed under this article must meet all of the following,” and then lists building, drying, refrigeration and staffing requirements, including, as a rule, a licensed alkaline hydrolysis operator. Those statutes do not apply in Texas. They matter to a Texan only because the law of the state where a hydrolysis facility operates governs how that facility may lawfully work.
B. What that means when a Texas family wants water cremation anyway
The practical consequence of the Texas definitions is simple: the hydrolysis itself cannot take place at a Texas crematory. The Texas chapters read for this article regulate cremation performed in Texas, and they do not address a hydrolysis performed in another state. They do, however, recognize that some bodies leave Texas. Section 651.001(7) of the Occupations Code defines funeral directing as the acts associated with arranging the disposition of a body from the first call until services are complete or until “the body is permanently transported out of this state.” Section 651.001(5) describes the first call as the beginning of the funeral director’s duty to take charge of a body and have it prepared for burial or disposition “by embalming, cremation, or another method.” In other words, Texas licensing law already treats transfer out of state as a normal endpoint of a Texas funeral director’s work.
Federal consumer law gives families a way to see what that transfer costs. The Federal Trade Commission’s Funeral Rule, 16 C.F.R. Part 453, is a federal rule that applies to funeral providers, defined in Section 453.1 as any person, partnership or corporation that sells or offers to sell funeral goods and funeral services to the public; Section 453.9 allows the Commission to step aside only in a state it has found to offer equal or greater protection. Section 453.2(a) makes it an unfair or deceptive practice to fail to furnish accurate price information, and Section 453.2(b)(4) requires a printed general price list for people who inquire in person. That list must include, if the service is offered, “Forwarding of remains to another funeral home, together with a list of the services provided for any quoted price,” along with the price of receiving remains from another funeral home and the price range for direct cremations. For a Texas family, the forwarding line is the one to ask about first, because a transfer to a provider in a state that allows the process begins with forwarding the remains to another funeral home.
A transfer also creates real risk, and Texas courts have been clear about who bears it. In Rader Funeral Home, Inc. v. Chavira, 553 S.W.3d 10 (Tex. App. 2018), decided March 15, 2018, the Court of Appeals of Texas reviewed a case in which a funeral home picked up two accident victims, was paid to embalm one of them and transport the body across the state for the funeral, and shipped the wrong body. The family discovered the error when the casket was opened before a wake. The court affirmed a jury verdict for the widow and the father, holding, under the Texas Supreme Court’s reasoning, that “a special relationship existed between Rader and the Chaviras when Rader assumed responsibility for disposing of Roberto’s remains.” A Texas funeral home that agrees to forward a body to an out-of-state hydrolysis facility takes charge of the remains in the same way, so under Rader it would owe the family that same duty of care in identifying, documenting and shipping the body.
Rader is still cited for the limits of that duty. In Simonvil v. American Airlines Inc., No. 3:24-CV-01132-KDB-UMJ, an order of the Western District of North Carolina signed March 9, 2026, the court applied Texas law under the airline’s choice-of-law clause and relied on Rader for the rule that Texas does not recognize a general duty to avoid negligently inflicting emotional distress. The court cited Rader for the narrow categories in which mental anguish damages remain available, including special relationships such as contracts for preparing a corpse for burial, and held that a passenger’s dispute with a gate agent was not that kind of relationship. That 2026 citation confirms the line Rader draws: the duty attaches because a provider has taken charge of human remains, not because of ordinary commercial contact.
Three practical points follow for a Texas family weighing an out-of-state water cremation. First, ask the Texas funeral home for its general price list and look at the forwarding entry, then ask the receiving facility in the other state for its own written price for receiving the body and performing the hydrolysis. Second, ask which facility will perform the process and confirm that it holds the license its state requires, as Arizona’s statute does for alkaline hydrolysis facilities. Third, ask how the body will be identified at each handoff and how the remains will come back to the family, because Rader shows that identification errors during a long-distance transfer are exactly what Texas juries take seriously. None of these steps is exotic, and all of them can be done before a death, which is when a family has the most leverage.
II. Who decides, and what happens when the plan goes wrong?
A. Who has the last word: written directions and the Texas priority list
The most important document is not a contract with a funeral home. It is the decedent’s own written instruction. Section 711.002(g) of the Texas Health and Safety Code allows a person to “provide written directions for the disposition, including cremation, of the person’s remains in a will, a prepaid funeral contract, or a written instrument signed and acknowledged by such person.” The same subsection then imposes a duty on the family: “The person otherwise entitled to control the disposition of a decedent’s remains under this section shall faithfully carry out the directions of the decedent to the extent that the decedent’s estate or the person controlling the disposition are financially able to do so.” If the directions are in a will, Section 711.002(h) provides that “they shall be carried out immediately without the necessity of probate.” Directions may be modified or revoked only by a later writing that is signed and acknowledged.
The statute speaks of disposition, not just cremation in the Texas sense, so a written direction asking for alkaline hydrolysis in a state where it is lawful can reasonably be read as the kind of instruction Section 711.002(g) covers. No Texas decision read for this article has addressed such a direction specifically, and the financial-ability limit in the statute is real: if the estate cannot pay for transport and an out-of-state facility, the person in charge is not required to do the impossible. The practical answer is to pair the direction with funding, for example a prepaid arrangement or a clear source of payment, so that the financial-ability clause does not become the reason the wish is set aside.
The second tool is an agent. Section 711.002(a) lists, in order, the persons who “have the right to control the disposition, including cremation, of the decedent’s remains”: first a person designated in a written instrument signed by the decedent, then the surviving spouse, any one of the adult children, either parent, any one of the adult siblings, the executor or administrator, and finally the next of kin in the order of inheritance. Section 711.002(b) supplies a statutory form titled “Appointment for Disposition of Remains,” and Section 711.002(c) explains that the instrument must be signed by the decedent, with the signature acknowledged, and that the agent must sign before acting. Naming an agent who supports the choice of water cremation, and naming a successor, is the most direct way to keep the decision out of a family argument. The statute also contains its own timing rule: under Section 711.002(a-1) of Chapter 711 of the Texas Health and Safety Code, a person with the right to control who fails to make or delegate final arrangements before the earlier of the 6th day after receiving notice of the death or the 10th day after the death is presumed unable or unwilling, and the right passes to the next person in line.
Texas courts enforce that priority list, and they do so even when the relatives who acted meant well. In SCI Tex. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Nelson, 540 S.W.3d 539 (Tex. 2018), decided February 23, 2018, the Texas Supreme Court considered a cremation arranged by a woman’s siblings and her minor son, who all agreed she wanted to be cremated. Her adult son, whose right under Section 711.002(a) was superior to her siblings’, could not be reached and learned of her death only after the cremation. He sued the funeral home for mental anguish. The court held that “negligent mishandling of a corpse is one such legal duty where mental anguish damages may be available,” explained that “The relationship between a person disposing of a decedent’s remains and the next of kin is special, even without a contract,” and affirmed the court of appeals’ decision allowing his claim to go forward. For a Texas family planning a water cremation out of state, Nelson means the funeral home must deal with the person who holds the legal right of control, not simply the relatives who happen to be in the room.
Nelson remains the authority that courts applying Texas law reach for when mental anguish is claimed. In Burke v. PHH Mortgage Corp., No. 4:24-CV-0897, a memorandum and recommendation of the Southern District of Texas signed January 23, 2025, the magistrate judge cited Nelson for the rule that mental anguish is a type of damages recoverable for certain torts but does not constitute an independent claim, and recommended rejecting an emotional distress claim in a foreclosure dispute for lack of evidence. That 2025 citation shows how Nelson is applied today: a family must tie its mental anguish to the breach of a recognized duty, such as the duty not to mishandle a body, and must prove the distress with evidence rather than assume it.
Texas law also builds in protection for the businesses that follow the rules, which is one more reason to put the plan in writing. Section 711.002(i) provides that a cemetery organization, a crematory, a funeral director, an embalmer or a funeral establishment “shall not be liable for carrying out the written directions of a decedent” or the directions of a person who represents that he or she is entitled to control the disposition. A clear written instruction therefore helps the family and gives the funeral home a reason to honor it rather than hesitate. Inside Texas, Chapter 716 goes further for flame cremation: under Sections 716.054 and 716.204, a crematory may proceed on the decedent’s written directions even if the authorizing agent refuses to sign the authorization form, provided the costs are paid and the remains are positively identified. Those sections apply to cremation as Texas defines it, so they do not authorize hydrolysis, but they confirm how much weight the Legislature gives to a person’s own written choice.
B. Disputes, remedies and the body-donation exception
When relatives disagree, Texas sends the fight to a specific court. Section 711.002(k) provides that any dispute among the persons on the priority list about the right to control the disposition, including cremation, “shall be resolved by a court with jurisdiction over probate proceedings for the decedent, regardless of whether a probate proceeding has been initiated.” Funeral providers are not required to pick a side. The same subsection says a cemetery organization or funeral establishment is not liable for refusing to accept or dispose of the remains until it receives a court order or other suitable confirmation that the dispute has been resolved, and Section 716.201 gives crematories a similar right to refuse while a dispute over cremation is unresolved. Section 711.002(l) also takes the right of control away from a person who, in connection with the death, has been arrested, or is named in an arrest warrant, for a criminal homicide offense under Chapter 19 of the Penal Code involving family violence against the decedent, and from a person against whom the decedent had applied for, or obtained, certain protective orders. For a family that expects resistance to a water cremation plan, the lesson is to resolve the question of control in writing during life, because after death the dispute goes to a probate court while the body waits.
Timing matters too, although the rules are specific. For flame cremation inside Texas, Section 716.004(a) of Chapter 716 of the Texas Health and Safety Code provides that “A crematory establishment may not cremate human remains within 48 hours of the time of death indicated on a death certificate” unless a justice of the peace, a medical examiner or a court waives the waiting period in writing. That rule governs Texas crematories. Whether and how long a facility in another state must wait before an alkaline hydrolysis depends on that state’s law, which is one more question to put to the receiving facility in writing.
There is one setting in which families often discover too late how little control they have: whole-body donation to a medical school. In Noah v. University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston, 176 S.W.3d 350 (Tex. App. 2004), decided August 12, 2004, the Court of Appeals of Texas, First District, Houston, heard appeals by families whose relatives had donated their bodies to a state medical school under forms stating that final disposition would be cremation. The school later wrote to the families that it could not return the ashes because donors’ ashes had been commingled. The court held that “the plaintiffs’ special relationship claims sound in contract, not tort,” that the families had no legislative consent to sue the state institution on a contract theory, and that the institution was immune from suit; it affirmed the dismissal. Families who choose a willed-body program should read the donation form closely, because it typically sets the method of disposition and a claim against a state institution can stop at the courthouse door.
That barrier was applied again in 2025. In Whitinger v. UTMB, No. SA-25-CV-498-XR (W.D. Tex. July 9, 2025), a magistrate judge of the Western District of Texas recommended on July 9, 2025 the dismissal of a son’s federal suit over the same school’s handling of his father’s donated remains. The recommendation described Noah’s holding that the school was immune from suit over donated remains, noted that the Texas courts had relied on Noah to dismiss the family’s earlier state case, and found the new claims barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents a federal district court from reviewing a state-court judgment, and by the institution’s sovereign immunity, and the district judge adopted the recommendation and dismissed the case on July 23, 2025. Read together with Noah, the 2025 ruling tells Texas families that once a state medical school controls a donated body, a later lawsuit over how the remains were handled faces immunity and finality hurdles that a suit against a private funeral home does not.
Noah needs one caution. To decide whether a special relationship existed, it relied in part on an appellate test that required a contract between the parties, and in Nelson the Texas Supreme Court later disapproved that contract requirement. Nelson did not address governmental immunity, however, and the 2025 Whitinger ruling shows that the immunity barrier for state institutions is still applied. The safest reading is that Nelson broadened the claims available against private providers, while Noah and Whitinger describe the separate obstacle of suing the state.
For private providers, the remedies are meaningful. Nelson confirms that close family members can recover mental anguish damages when a provider negligently mishandles a body, and Rader shows a jury award against a funeral home that shipped the wrong body; the trial court entered judgment for the widow and the father after reducing the verdict by the amount of a settlement with a second funeral home. Burke is a reminder that such damages must be proved with evidence of the distress itself. And the federal Funeral Rule gives anyone who asks in person the right to a written general price list before committing to a transfer. Taken together, these rules reward families who document the decedent’s wishes, the identity of the person in control, the provider’s quoted prices and each handoff of the remains.
Conclusion
Water cremation is not legal in Texas today in the sense that matters most: Texas statutes define cremation by direct flame, extreme heat and evaporation, and no Texas crematory license covers a flameless process. The 2025 bill that would have added alkaline hydrolysis to those definitions did not change the law, and the next opportunity for lawmakers begins when the Legislature convenes on January 12, 2027. A Texan who wants water cremation can still act now. Write the direction into a will, a prepaid funeral contract or a signed and acknowledged instrument under Section 711.002(g), name an agent and a successor with the statutory appointment form, make sure the estate can pay for transport, and ask funeral providers in writing for the forwarding price that the federal Funeral Rule requires on the general price list and for the license of the facility in the state where the process is lawful. Texas courts have made clear that the person with the legal right of control must be respected and that providers who take charge of a body owe the family real care, while body-donation programs run by state institutions follow different and much less forgiving rules.