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Jonathan Rinderknecht Sentencing: What the March 17, 2027 Hearing Can Decide

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Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Hassan KOHEN
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Jonathan Rinderknecht Sentencing: What the March 17, 2027 Hearing Can Decide

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Jonathan Rinderknecht sentencing is set for March 17, 2027, in federal court in Los Angeles. On November 20, 2026, a jury found him guilty of one count of destruction of property by means of fire and one count of arson affecting property used in interstate commerce, according to the U.S. Attorney’s Office release announcing the verdict. The same release states that U.S. District Judge Anne Hwang scheduled the sentencing hearing for that date, that he faces a mandatory minimum sentence of five years and a statutory maximum of 40 years in federal prison, and that he has been in federal custody since October 2025. The Justice Department’s case page for United States v. Jonathan Rinderknecht lists the case as No. 2:25-CR-833-AH in the Central District of California and describes the August 13, 2026 first superseding indictment as charging violations of 18 U.S.C. § 844(f)(1) and § 844(i) in a case arising out of the Lachman/Palisades Fire.

As of November 21, 2026, no sentence and no restitution order exist. Between a federal jury verdict and a final judgment, a defined sequence follows: possible post-trial motions, a presentence report, written objections, a hearing at which victims may speak, and a signed judgment that starts the appeal clock. Federal statutes and court decisions govern each of those steps, and they answer the questions readers are asking now: how long a federal sentence can be, whether people who lost homes can be repaid through the criminal case, and what can still change before March. The discussion that follows is general in scope: it describes checks useful in comparable situations and makes no findings about Jonathan Rinderknecht’s situation.

I. How long can a federal sentence be after a verdict on these two fire counts?

A. Five to twenty years per count, and whether the counts run together or back to back

The starting point is the text of the federal statute. Under 18 U.S.C. § 844, subsection (f)(1) reaches anyone who maliciously damages or destroys, by means of fire or an explosive, a building, vehicle or other property owned or possessed by, or leased to, the United States or one of its agencies, or property of an institution or organization receiving federal financial assistance. The penalty is imprisonment “for not less than 5 years and not more than 20 years,” a fine, or both. Subsection (i) covers property used in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any activity affecting that commerce, and sets the same base range of five to twenty years. The same federal section contains heavier tiers for cases in which personal injury or death results, including a range of seven to forty years where personal injury results and, where death results, terms that reach life imprisonment or the death penalty. Those tiers are separate provisions of the statute, and they matter for reading any federal fire case correctly.

The Justice Department release gives the figures for this case: a five-year mandatory minimum and a 40-year statutory maximum. Those numbers line up with two counts that each carry the base range of five to twenty years. A reader should keep the two numbers apart. The minimum is the statutory floor for each count. The maximum is a ceiling that can only be reached if the judge imposes the highest term on each count and orders the terms to be served one after the other. Neither the minimum nor the maximum predicts where a sentence will land between them.

Whether the terms are served together or in sequence is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3584, the federal provision on multiple sentences of imprisonment. Its default rule is plain: “Multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at the same time run concurrently unless the court orders or the statute mandates that the terms are to run consecutively.” Subsections (f)(1) and (i) of § 844, as quoted above, contain no command that their terms be stacked. The choice therefore belongs to the sentencing judge, and § 3584(b) tells the judge how to make it: by considering, for each offense, the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In practical terms, two concurrent terms produce one period of custody measured by the longer term, while consecutive terms add up. The same statute adds that multiple terms are treated for administrative purposes as a single, aggregate term of imprisonment.

Those factors appear in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court must impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to serve the purposes the statute lists: reflecting the seriousness of the offense, promoting respect for the law, providing just punishment, deterring criminal conduct, protecting the public from further crimes of the defendant, and providing needed treatment or training. The judge must also consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines, pertinent policy statements, the need to avoid unwarranted disparities among similar defendants, and, in paragraph (7), the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. Paragraph (4)(A)(ii) points to the guidelines that are in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced, subject to an exception the statute cross-references. For anyone following a federal sentencing, this list is the agenda of the hearing, and sentencing memoranda are usually organized around these factors.

A pronounced sentence is not the same thing as a release date. Once a federal judge imposes a term, the Bureau of Prisons computes credit and projects a release date under separate rules, which our guide on why a federal prisoner’s projected release date can change explains step by step.

B. The Guidelines calculation, the cross-reference for deaths, and the victims’ place at the hearing

Federal judges begin with the calculation in the Guidelines Manual, which § 3553(a)(4) requires them to consider. The arson guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2K1.4 in the Sentencing Commission’s 2026 Guidelines Manual, sets a base offense level of 24 if the offense knowingly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to a person other than a participant, or involved the destruction or attempted destruction of a dwelling or certain public and infrastructure facilities. It sets level 20 where the offense created such a risk without the added knowledge element, involved the destruction of other structures, or endangered a dwelling or a structure, and it provides other levels for narrower situations. The Commentary lists 18 U.S.C. § 844(f) and (i) among the statutes the guideline covers. The guideline then contains a cross-reference that can change the entire calculation: “If death resulted, or the offense was intended to cause death or serious bodily injury, apply the most analogous guideline from” Chapter Two, Part A of the Manual, which covers offenses against the person, “if the resulting offense level is greater than that determined above.”

That sentence explains why a federal fire sentencing can involve homicide guidelines even when no homicide count was charged. The cross-reference works by comparison: the court computes the arson level, computes the level under the most analogous offense-against-the-person guideline, and uses the higher of the two. The guideline does not itself name which homicide guideline is the most analogous; that choice is made by the sentencing court on the record before it, and the parties can contest it in their sentencing papers and in objections to the presentence report. Whatever level results, the statute of conviction still sets the outer limits for each count, and the Guidelines range is one of the factors the judge must consider under § 3553(a).

The record for that calculation is built in the presentence report. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, unless the defendant has consented in writing, the probation officer may not submit the report to the court or disclose its contents until the defendant has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere or has been found guilty, which is why the work ordinarily begins after a verdict. The officer must give the report to the defendant, defense counsel and the government at least 35 days before sentencing unless the defendant waives that period, and the parties must state their written objections within 14 days after receiving it. At the hearing, the court must give defense counsel an opportunity to speak, address the defendant personally so the defendant may present any information to mitigate the sentence, and give the government an equivalent opportunity. The judgment that follows must set out the plea, the jury verdict, the adjudication and the sentence, and it must be signed by the judge and entered by the clerk.

Victims are not spectators in that process. Rule 32(i)(4)(B) provides that before imposing sentence the court “must address any victim of the crime who is present at sentencing and must permit the victim to be reasonably heard.” The Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771, gives a crime victim the right to reasonable, accurate and timely notice of public court proceedings, the right not to be excluded from them except in narrow circumstances, the right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving sentencing, the reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the government, and the right to full and timely restitution as provided in law. The statute also anticipates very large cases. Under § 3771(d)(2), where the court finds that the number of crime victims makes it impracticable to accord all of them these rights, the court shall fashion a reasonable procedure to give effect to the statute that does not unduly complicate or prolong the proceedings. The form of that procedure is left to the court. Separately, § 3771(d)(3) requires the district court to decide a motion asserting a victim’s right forthwith and allows a petition for a writ of mandamus to the court of appeals if relief is denied.

For people affected by the fire, the practical point is simple. The Justice Department’s case page describes a large and diverse group of people affected, including families whose loved ones died, residents whose homes burned, business owners whose businesses burned and public entities whose properties burned; the verdict release points victims to that page for updates, and the page invites questions to its Victim Assistance staff. Following that page and keeping contact details current with the prosecutors’ victim staff is how notice of hearing dates, of the presentence process and of any victim-statement procedure actually reaches a person entitled to it.

II. What happens next for victims and for the defense?

A. Restitution: mandatory in principle, shaped by statutory limits when losses are vast

Restitution in a federal case like this one is governed by the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, when sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense described in subsection (c), the court shall order restitution to the victim or, if the victim is deceased, to the victim’s estate. Subsection (c) includes an offense against property under Title 18 in which an identifiable victim has suffered a physical injury or pecuniary loss. A “victim” is a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the offense. For damaged or destroyed property, the order requires return of the property or, if return is impossible, impracticable or inadequate, payment of the greater of the property’s value on the date of the damage or its value on the date of sentencing, less the value of anything returned. Where bodily injury results in death, the order includes the cost of necessary funeral and related services, and in any case the defendant must reimburse lost income and necessary child care, transportation and other expenses incurred while participating in the investigation or prosecution.

The same section contains an exception that becomes central when losses are enormous. For offenses against property, § 3663A(c)(3) provides that the mandatory rule shall not apply if the court finds, from facts on the record, that “the number of identifiable victims is so large as to make restitution impracticable,” or that determining complex issues of fact related to the cause or amount of the victims’ losses would complicate or prolong the sentencing process to a degree that the need to provide restitution to any victim is outweighed by the burden on the sentencing process. That is a finding the court must make on the record; it is not automatic, and the statute does not presume it in large cases. Anyone with a loss should therefore prepare as if restitution will be decided, and should not assume either that a large total guarantees payment or that it rules restitution out.

The Supreme Court settled what kind of obligation this is in Ellingburg v. United States, 607 U.S. 163 (2026), decided on January 20, 2026. Reading the statute’s text and structure, the Supreme Court held that “Restitution under the MVRA is plainly criminal punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause.” The Court pointed out, among other features, that restitution is imposed at sentencing together with other criminal punishments and that the government, not the victim, is the party adverse to the defendant, and it explained that victims cannot initiate or settle the restitution process as they could in a civil proceeding. The opinion, published in the preliminary print of volume 607 of the United States Reports, reversed the Eighth Circuit and remanded. For a person who lost a home or a family member, the application is concrete: restitution in a federal criminal case is part of the sentence, so a victim’s role is to document losses for the prosecutor and the probation officer, while any separate civil claim against any party stays a distinct proceeding governed by its own rules. A district court has since addressed that holding. In United States v. Weinlein, No. 1:22-CV-769 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2026), decided on September 21, 2026 by the Northern District of New York, the court described Ellingburg as holding that MVRA restitution is criminal punishment such that the Ex Post Facto Clause applies, concluded that the decision did not disturb Second Circuit precedent, and then dismissed the government’s foreclosure petition on a restitution lien because the statutory collection period had ended and could not be equitably tolled. The observed lesson for victims is that a restitution order is enforced by the government within a period fixed by statute, not indefinitely.

The procedure is in 18 U.S.C. § 3664. The probation officer must include in the presentence report, to the extent practicable, a complete accounting of the losses to each victim, and must tell the court if the number or identity of victims cannot be reasonably ascertained. On request of the probation officer, but not later than 60 days before the date initially set for sentencing, the prosecutor, after consulting with identified victims to the extent practicable, must provide a listing of the amounts subject to restitution. Before submitting the report, the probation officer must, to the extent practicable, notify identified victims of the offenses of conviction, the amounts submitted, the opportunity to submit information about their losses, the date, time and place of sentencing, the availability of a lien in favor of the victim, and the opportunity to file a separate affidavit, with an affidavit form. Disputes about the amount are resolved by a preponderance of the evidence, and the burden of proving a victim’s loss is on the government.

Several rules in § 3664 change how victims should keep their records. The court must order restitution to each victim “in the full amount of each victim’s losses as determined by the court and without consideration of the economic circumstances of the defendant.” Insurance payments are not considered in fixing the amount, but where a victim has been compensated by an insurer, the court orders restitution to the insurer, and all victims must be paid before any such provider. Where the United States is itself a victim, all other victims must receive full restitution before the United States receives any. Amounts later recovered as compensatory damages for the same loss in a federal civil proceeding, or in a state civil proceeding to the extent state law provides, reduce what is paid under the order. And under § 3664(l), a conviction for an offense involving the act giving rise to a restitution order estops the defendant from denying the essential allegations of that offense in any later federal or state civil proceeding brought by the victim, to the extent consistent with state law.

Timing is the next question, because losses from a large fire are rarely final by a sentencing date. Under § 3664(d)(5), if a victim’s losses are not ascertainable by the date that is 10 days before sentencing, the government or the probation officer must inform the court, and the court shall set a date for the final determination of the losses, “not to exceed 90 days after sentencing.” A victim who later discovers further losses has 60 days after discovery to petition for an amended restitution order, which may be granted only on a showing of good cause for not including those losses in the initial claim. In Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605 (2010), decided on June 14, 2010, the Supreme Court held that “a sentencing court that misses the 90-day deadline nonetheless retains the power to order restitution — at least where, as here, the sentencing court made clear prior to the deadline’s expiration that it would order restitution, leaving open (for more than 90 days) only the amount.” The practical application is that what the judge says at sentencing about restitution matters: a clear statement that restitution will be ordered, with only the amount left open, preserves the court’s power to fix the figures later, even when the work takes longer than the statute’s schedule.

Courts of appeals continue to apply that rule. In United States v. Omoruyi, No. 24-1561 (1st Cir. July 15, 2026), decided on July 15, 2026, the First Circuit cited Dolan and the MVRA’s ninety-day provision and held that a district court had jurisdiction to enter a restitution order after the defendants had already appealed their first judgment, because the court had indicated in its initial judgment that it would impose restitution and defer the amount. The First Circuit affirmed the restitution orders. For victims, the First Circuit decision shows that a deferred restitution determination can survive even after an appeal of the first judgment has begun.

How a court values a destroyed home is illustrated by United States v. Hemingway, No. 24-7076 (10th Cir. Feb. 10, 2026), decided on February 10, 2026. After a jury convicted the defendant of arson in Indian Country, the district court held a separate restitution hearing and ordered $21,086 for a mobile home destroyed by the fire, a figure it treated as the home’s fair market value. In its order and judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, explaining that the statute requires the greater of the value on the date of destruction or the value on the date of sentencing, that the government bears the burden of proving the loss by a preponderance of the evidence, that the court may choose the best measure of value in each circumstance, and that restitution may not exceed the actual loss caused by the conduct. The application for anyone whose property burned is direct: the valuation method is litigated, so appraisals, tax assessments, replacement estimates, insurance inventories and photographs should be gathered early and kept in a form the prosecutor and probation officer can use.

B. Post-trial motions, the retrial question and the appeal clock

A guilty verdict can still be challenged in the trial court. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c), a defendant may move for a judgment of acquittal, or renew such a motion, within 14 days after a guilty verdict or after the court discharges the jury, whichever is later, and if the jury has returned a guilty verdict, the court may set aside the verdict and enter an acquittal. The question on such a motion is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction, which ties back to what the government had to prove to the jury in the first place, a subject covered in our article on what a federal criminal jury has to decide. Under Rule 33, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires; a motion grounded on newly discovered evidence must be filed within 3 years after the verdict or finding of guilty, and a motion on any other ground within 14 days after the verdict or finding of guilty. Whether any such motion is filed, and on what schedule, will appear on the court’s docket; nothing in the verdict announcement itself answers that question.

This verdict came at a second trial. According to an Associated Press report published by PBS NewsHour on June 26, 2026, the first federal trial ended in a mistrial after the jury deadlocked, Judge Hwang set a retrial date, and Jonathan Rinderknecht had pleaded not guilty. The governing rule on retrials after a hung jury comes from Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317 (1984), decided on June 29, 1984, in which the Supreme Court held “on the authority of these cases that the failure of the jury to reach a verdict is not an event which terminates jeopardy.” The Court explained that the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause applies only if there has been some event, such as an acquittal, which terminates the original jeopardy. The general application is straightforward: when a jury cannot agree and a mistrial is declared, the government may try the case again, and a double jeopardy objection based only on the earlier deadlock runs into this holding.

Federal courts still rely on that holding today. In Bellar v. Stancil, No. 24-1450 (10th Cir. Oct. 23, 2025), decided on October 23, 2025, the Tenth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability to a Colorado prisoner who had been convicted of felony murder at a second trial after the first jury hung on that charge, noting that the state appellate court had cited Richardson for the rule that the failure of the jury to reach a verdict is not an event that terminates jeopardy. The Tenth Circuit order also shows the limit of the rule: the double jeopardy problem changes when a defendant is acquitted of a charge, which is why that court examined what the first jury had and had not decided before denying relief.

The appeal follows the judgment, not the verdict. Rule 32(j)(1) requires the court, after sentencing a defendant who pleaded not guilty and was convicted, to advise the defendant of the right to appeal the conviction and of any right to appeal the sentence. Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b), a defendant’s notice of appeal in a criminal case must be filed in the district court within 14 days after the later of the entry of either the judgment or the order being appealed, or the filing of the government’s notice of appeal. If a defendant timely makes a motion for judgment of acquittal under Rule 29, or for a new trial under Rule 33 (in the case of newly discovered evidence, only if made no later than 14 days after entry of the judgment), the notice of appeal from a judgment of conviction must be filed within 14 days after the entry of the order disposing of the last such motion, or within 14 days after the entry of the judgment of conviction, whichever period ends later. A notice filed after the court announces a sentence but before the judgment is entered is treated as filed on the date of and after the entry. In the federal system, then, the calendar for an appeal runs from the entry of the judgment that records the sentence.

Restitution can follow its own track within that calendar. When a court defers the amount under § 3664(d)(5), the later restitution order may be challenged separately, which is what happened in the First Circuit and Tenth Circuit cases described above. Victims and defendants alike should therefore read the judgment and any later amended judgment closely, because each may carry its own deadlines.

Conclusion

A federal jury verdict on two fire counts opens a sentencing process rather than ending one. The statutory range for each count runs from five to twenty years, terms imposed at the same time run concurrently unless the judge orders otherwise, and the judge must weigh the full list of § 3553(a) factors, including the Guidelines range and the need to provide restitution. In an arson case, the Guidelines’ cross-reference can move the calculation to an offense-against-the-person guideline when death resulted, which makes the presentence report and the objections to it the place where much of the real argument happens.

For people who lost relatives, homes or businesses, the useful steps are concrete. Keep the victim assistance office informed so that notices arrive. Answer the probation officer’s notice and use the affidavit procedure to document losses. Gather valuation evidence early, because courts choose among valuation methods and the government must prove each loss. Remember that insurance does not reduce the restitution figure but can redirect part of the payment to the insurer, that the court can finalize amounts up to 90 days after sentencing when losses are not yet ascertainable, and that later-discovered losses carry their own 60-day petition window. For the defense, the next markers are the post-trial motion deadlines in Rules 29 and 33 and, after judgment, the 14-day notice of appeal under Appellate Rule 4(b). Until the court rules on those questions, the March 17, 2027 hearing remains the date that will define the sentence.

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