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Ken Paxton Lawsuits: Can Dropped Texas Cases Be Refiled, and Who Pays the Fees?

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Ken Paxton Lawsuits: Can Dropped Texas Cases Be Refiled, and Who Pays the Fees?

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Ken Paxton lawsuits are ending one after another, but not in the same way. Since the November 3, 2026 election, the Texas attorney general’s office has dismissed a series of suits it had filed, and the effect of each dismissal turns on two words: with or without prejudice. Under Texas law, a nonsuit with prejudice bars the State from suing the same defendant again over the same subject matter. A nonsuit without prejudice ends the case but leaves the claim available to a later attorney general. For the organizations that were sued, recovering legal fees is harder: the Texas anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to enforcement actions brought by the attorney general in the State’s name, and fee awards under the main federal civil rights fee statute require a win that a court has sanctioned and made lasting.

According to the Texas Tribune, Ken Paxton lost his bid for the U.S. Senate on November 3, 2026, and KERA reported on November 18, 2026 that the incoming attorney general, Nathan Johnson, will take office in January. The Tribune reported on November 16, 2026, citing state court records, that the office had filed a notice of nonsuit in a Collin County case, and on November 20, 2026 that it had dismissed its Tarrant County action against Jolt Initiative, a nonprofit that runs voter registration drives. KERA reported that two cases were dropped without prejudice; the Houston Chronicle reported that others, including the case against Annunciation House, an El Paso shelter operator, were dropped with prejudice. The discussion that follows is general in scope: it describes checks useful in comparable situations and makes no findings about the situation of the attorney general’s office or of any organization it sued.

I. What does it mean when the Texas attorney general drops a lawsuit?

A. A nonsuit ends the case on the day it is filed

In Texas state court, the plaintiff controls the exit. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 162 allows a plaintiff to dismiss a case or take a nonsuit at any time before it has introduced all of its evidence other than rebuttal evidence. The State of Texas is a plaintiff like any other for this purpose: when the attorney general’s office files a notice of nonsuit, it does not need the defendant’s agreement, and it does not need to explain its reasons. The same rule protects the other side in two ways. It says that a dismissal “shall not prejudice the right of an adverse party to be heard on a pending claim for affirmative relief,” and it adds: “A dismissal under this rule shall have no effect on any motion for sanctions, attorney’s fees or other costs, pending at the time of dismissal, as determined by the court.” It also authorizes the clerk to tax court costs against the dismissing party when the dismissal terminates the case, unless the court orders otherwise.

The Supreme Court of Texas has explained how this works in practice. In Epps v. Fowler, 351 S.W.3d 862 (Tex. 2011), decided August 26, 2011, the court stated that no court order is required for a nonsuit, that a nonsuit terminates a case from the moment the motion is filed, and that a nonsuit does not affect any pending claim for affirmative relief or motion for attorney’s fees or sanctions. Federal courts sitting in Texas apply the same rule. In Willis v. Aron, No. 24-40585 (5th Cir. June 24, 2025), an unpublished decision, the Fifth Circuit rejected an argument, built on Rule 162 and Epps, that a state case remained open because no dismissal order had been entered: the record showed a notice of nonsuit filed on July 31, 2023, and the court held that the state action was terminated on that date, before the federal complaint was filed. A search of recent decisions citing Epps does not amount to a complete citator, but this 2025 application confirms that federal courts still read Texas nonsuit law this way.

For an organization that has just learned that the State dropped its case, the first practical check is therefore the filed document itself, not the press release or the news report. The notice tells you the filing date, which is the date the case ended; whether the dismissal covers every claim or only some of them; and whether it says “with prejudice.” The second check is the docket as it stood on that date. If you had a counterclaim on file, or a motion for sanctions, fees or costs, Rule 162 keeps it alive, and the trial court must still dispose of it. If you had not yet filed one, the nonsuit does not give you a new claim for fees; it only preserves what was already pending, subject to the court’s determination.

Several of the suits in the news were quo warranto actions, a remedy with its own statute. Article IV, section 22 of the Texas Constitution directs the attorney general to inquire into the charter rights of private corporations and, whenever sufficient cause exists, to “seek a judicial forfeiture of such charters.” Chapter 66 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code lists the grounds for an action in the nature of quo warranto, including a corporation that does or omits an act causing a forfeiture of its rights and privileges, and section 66.002 sets the procedure: the attorney general, or the county or district attorney of the proper county, petitions the district court for leave to file an information, the petition must state that it is sought in the name of the State of Texas, and the judge grants leave only if there is probable ground for the proceeding. In Paxton v. Annunciation House, Inc., 719 S.W.3d 555 (Tex. 2025), decided May 30, 2025, the Supreme Court of Texas held that the attorney general had the constitutional authority to file the quo warranto action he proposed against that El Paso nonprofit, vacated a trial court injunction, and remanded, while stating that it was too early for any court to express a view on the merits. In Jolt Initiative, Inc. v. Paxton, No. 1:25-CV-1808-RP (W.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 2026), discussed below, the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas cited Annunciation House on January 29, 2026 when it described quo warranto as a civil action historically used against abuse of corporate charters. A quo warranto request that is dismissed before leave is granted ends at an early stage; one dismissed after leave was granted ends a pending action. In both cases, the dismissal’s terms decide what can follow.

B. With or without prejudice: can the next attorney general refile?

The two words that matter most are the ones that describe the dismissal. In Epps v. Fowler, the Supreme Court of Texas explained that the res judicata effect of a nonsuit with prejudice works a permanent change in the parties’ relationship to the defendant’s benefit: “the defendant can never again be sued by the plaintiff or its privies for claims arising out of the same subject matter.” The same opinion states that when a case is nonsuited without prejudice, res judicata does not bar relitigation of the same claims. Put simply, a with-prejudice dismissal is the closest thing to a final win that a defendant can receive without a trial, while a without-prejudice dismissal is a pause that the plaintiff can end by filing again.

Who is the plaintiff when the attorney general sues? In these cases it is the State of Texas, not the person who holds the office. Section 402.021 of the Texas Government Code provides that the attorney general “shall prosecute and defend all actions in which the state is interested before the supreme court and courts of appeals,” and section 66.002 requires a quo warranto petition to be brought in the name of the State. A change of officeholder in January therefore does not change the party. A claim the State dismissed without prejudice remains a claim of the State, which a future attorney general could decide to bring again. Public statements by any officeholder about not pursuing such cases are statements of policy, not court orders, and they do not change the terms of a dismissal. Because section 66.002 also allows a county or district attorney to petition for quo warranto in the State’s name, readers should note one open point: the sources read for this article do not decide whether a with-prejudice dismissal obtained by one state officer binds another state officer who later petitions on the same facts. If that question matters to you, raise it with counsel before relying on the dismissal.

Time is not always a defense either. Section 16.061 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides that a right of action of the State or of a political subdivision “is not barred by any of the following sections,” and the list includes the general limitations provisions of chapter 16, among them the residual four-year period of section 16.051. That does not mean that every state claim is timeless: some statutes carry their own deadlines outside that list, and those must be checked claim by claim. But an organization should not assume that the State loses a dismissed-without-prejudice claim simply because a few years pass.

Federal court follows a similar logic with its own rule. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 (edition of December 1, 2025) lets a plaintiff dismiss without a court order by filing a notice before the opposing party serves an answer or a motion for summary judgment, or by a stipulation signed by all parties who have appeared. Unless the notice or stipulation states otherwise, that dismissal is without prejudice. There is one built-in limit: if the plaintiff previously dismissed any federal or state action based on or including the same claim, a second notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits. That two-dismissal rule applies to a notice of dismissal; it does not turn every stipulation into a final judgment.

A federal court in Austin has described what a without-prejudice dismissal can leave open. In Jolt Initiative, Inc. v. Paxton, No. 1:25-CV-1808-RP (W.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 2026), the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas recounted that the organization had first sued in 2024 over a request to examine its records, that the parties filed a joint stipulation of dismissal without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) on October 22, 2025, after written assurances that a new request to examine would not be served, that the court closed that case on October 23, 2025, and that on the same day the attorney general moved for leave to file a quo warranto action in Tarrant County, Cause No. 352-371410-25. On January 29, 2026, the court granted a preliminary injunction barring the attorney general from proceeding with that state action, after concluding that the organization was likely to succeed on its First Amendment retaliation and Voting Rights Act claims. The general lesson is that a stipulation without prejudice ends only the case in which it is filed, and an assurance that is not written into a judgment or a with-prejudice dismissal may not prevent a different proceeding on related facts.

The practical checks follow from these rules. Read the exact wording of the dismissal and keep a file-stamped copy. If the State offers to dismiss, ask whether it will dismiss with prejudice or agree to a judgment, rather than relying on a letter or a public statement. If the dismissal is without prejudice, write down the dates and the claims covered, because a later suit would have to be measured against them. And if you are unsure whether a deadline protects you, look first at section 16.061 and at the statute behind the specific claim, not at the general limitations periods alone.

II. Can the groups that were sued recover their fees or keep their federal cases alive?

A. Fees and sanctions in Texas court after the State nonsuits

The starting point in Texas is the American Rule. In Epps v. Fowler, the Supreme Court of Texas stated that Texas adheres to the American Rule with respect to attorney’s fees, under which litigants may recover attorney’s fees only if specifically provided for by statute or contract. Being dismissed, even with prejudice, does not by itself create a right to be paid. The question is always which statute, contract or rule would shift the fees, and whether its conditions are met.

Epps also answers a narrower question that often arises once a fee provision exists: is a defendant who was nonsuited a “prevailing party”? The court held that a defendant is a prevailing party when the plaintiff nonsuits with prejudice, because the res judicata effect immediately alters the parties’ legal relationship. When the nonsuit is without prejudice, the defendant is not a prevailing party unless the trial court determines, on the defendant’s motion, that the plaintiff took the nonsuit in order to avoid an unfavorable ruling on the merits. That distinction gives the words “with prejudice” a second consequence, beyond whether the claim can come back: they may decide whether a fee provision that depends on prevailing can be triggered at all.

Many people sued over speech, petitioning or association first think of the Texas Citizens Participation Act, the state’s anti-SLAPP statute. Under chapter 27 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, a party sued over the exercise of those rights may file a motion to dismiss, and if the court dismisses the action under the chapter, section 27.009 says the court “shall award to the moving party court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.” But section 27.010(a)(1) states that the chapter does not apply to “an enforcement action that is brought in the name of this state or a political subdivision of this state by the attorney general, a district attorney, a criminal district attorney, or a county attorney.” A quo warranto information or another enforcement suit filed by the attorney general in the State’s name appears to fall within that exemption on the text of the statute, and none of the sources read for this article holds otherwise, so the mandatory fee award of chapter 27 should not be expected to be available to a defendant in such a case.

What remains in state court is narrower. Rule 162 preserves any motion for sanctions, attorney’s fees or costs that was pending when the State dismissed, and in Epps the Supreme Court of Texas remanded so that the trial court could rule on a pending request for sanctions under chapter 10 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Court costs may also be taxed against the dismissing party under Rule 162. Whether any particular sanctions or fee claim can succeed against the State depends on the claim, the record and questions of governmental immunity that the sources read for this article do not resolve. The useful check is concrete: list every motion you had on file on the date of the nonsuit, confirm that the court still has it before it, and ask the court to set it for hearing rather than assuming the dismissal disposed of it.

B. Federal suits against the attorney general after the State backs down

Some organizations did not wait to be sued; they went to federal court, typically under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to stop a state proceeding they considered retaliatory. When the State then drops its own case, the federal court must ask whether anything is left to decide. Federal courts may hear only cases and controversies under Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, and a case that has become moot must be dismissed. The defendant’s voluntary decision to stop the challenged conduct does not automatically produce that result.

The Supreme Court set the federal rule in FBI v. Fikre, 601 U.S. 234 (2024), decided March 19, 2024. The Court held that the government had failed to show that a challenge to a No Fly List placement was moot after the plaintiff was removed from the list, because a defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged practice moots a case only if the defendant can show that the practice cannot reasonably be expected to recur, a standard the Court applied to governmental defendants no less than to private ones. Applied to a dropped state enforcement case, the question for a federal court is whether the State can show that it cannot reasonably be expected to bring the same action again, and a dismissal without prejudice leaves that possibility formally open, while a dismissal with prejudice closes it as to the claims it covers.

Courts of appeals still apply Fikre, with their own refinements. In Mehneh v. Rubio, No. 25-5001 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 16, 2026), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit cited Fikre for the defendant’s formidable burden under the voluntary-cessation doctrine, while explaining that the burden does not apply automatically whenever mootness follows a party’s voluntary conduct and that the court imposes it when there is some evidence of an attempt to manipulate its jurisdiction; it dismissed the visa-delay appeals before it as moot. Federal courts in Texas sit in the Fifth Circuit, whose own case law on this point was not part of the sources read for this article, so the D.C. Circuit’s approach illustrates the debate rather than settling it for a Texas case.

Fees in the federal case raise a separate and often decisive question. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) provides that in an action to enforce section 1983, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs. Everything turns on the words “prevailing party,” and the Supreme Court has read them narrowly.

The starting point is Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001), decided May 29, 2001, in which the Supreme Court held that a party that has failed to secure a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree is not a prevailing party, even if its lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant’s conduct. The Court thereby rejected the “catalyst theory” that many courts of appeals had accepted. A target whose federal lawsuit pushed the State to drop its case therefore cannot rely on that result alone to claim fees: under Buckhannon, a voluntary change by the defendant is not a judicially sanctioned change.

The Supreme Court has since reaffirmed that reading. In Lackey v. Stinnie, No. 23-621, decided February 25, 2025, the Supreme Court explained that in Buckhannon it had established that the change in the parties’ legal relationship must be judicially sanctioned, and that its new holding followed naturally from that precedent. The opinion is the clearest recent statement that Buckhannon remains the governing reading of section 1988(b).

That newer decision is the one most likely to matter to groups that won early rounds. In Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U.S. 192 (2025), decided February 25, 2025, the Supreme Court held that drivers who obtained a preliminary injunction against a Virginia license-suspension statute were not prevailing parties under section 1988(b) after the legislature repealed the statute and the case was dismissed as moot, because no court had conclusively resolved their claims by granting enduring relief on the merits. In the Court’s words, “A plaintiff who wins a transient victory on a preliminary injunction does not become a ‘prevailing party’ simply because external events convert the transient victory into a lasting one.” For a group that obtained a preliminary injunction against a state proceeding that the State later abandons, the consequence is direct: if the federal case then becomes moot before a final judgment, the preliminary injunction alone does not make the group a prevailing party under section 1988(b).

Lower courts have taken that message on board. In United States v. Ross, No. 24-1421-cv (2d Cir. Dec. 4, 2025), a civil forfeiture fee dispute, the Second Circuit said that the continued controlling effect of Buckhannon’s construction of prevail is confirmed by Lackey, which requires a change in the parties’ legal relationship that is judicially sanctioned and enduring. The forfeiture statute in that case is different from section 1988(b), but the court treated Lackey as part of the same line of authority.

For organizations with a pending federal case, these decisions point to a short list of checks. First, find out whether the State’s dismissal in state court was with or without prejudice, because that fact feeds directly into the mootness analysis under Fikre. Second, look at what relief the federal court has actually granted: a preliminary injunction is not a final judgment, and under Lackey it does not by itself support fees if the case ends as moot. Third, if the case is heading toward resolution, consider whether the relief you want, including any fee claim, can be embodied in a final judgment, a court-ordered consent decree or another form of enduring relief that a court sanctions, rather than in a voluntary change of course by the other side. Settlement terms on fees, if any, have to be negotiated expressly; they do not follow from a dismissal.

Conclusion

When a Texas attorney general drops a lawsuit, the case ends on the day the notice is filed, but the claim does not necessarily die with it. A nonsuit with prejudice gives the defendant the protection of res judicata against the State on the same subject matter; a nonsuit without prejudice leaves the State free to sue again, and section 16.061 means that the passage of time will not always prevent it. Rule 162 keeps alive any motion for sanctions, fees or costs that was pending at the time of dismissal, but the Texas anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to enforcement actions brought in the State’s name, and a federal fee award under section 1988(b) requires a judicially sanctioned, enduring change, which a voluntary retreat or a preliminary injunction followed by mootness does not provide. The most useful steps are to obtain the filed dismissal, read whether it is with or without prejudice, list every motion that was pending on the date of dismissal, and, in any federal case, assess mootness and fees before agreeing to end it.

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