On 2 September 2026, the General Court of the European Union dismissed the action brought by Russian businessman Igor Albertovich Kesaev against the Council of the European Union (Case T-296/24, Kesaev v Council, ECLI:EU:T:2026:523). Sitting as the Tenth Chamber with Judge-Rapporteur Kalėda, the Court upheld the maintaining of his name on the EU asset-freeze list by the restrictive-measures acts of March 2024, September 2024 and March 2025 adopted under Regulation (EU) No 269/2014. The applicant lost on every plea and was ordered to bear the costs. The language of the case was Dutch, the application had been lodged on 5 June 2024, and the hearing took place on 27 January 2026.
Kesaev is the co-owner of the Mercury business group, which is associated with Megapolis Group, described in the proceedings as a leading distributor of tobacco products on the Russian market. The Council’s statement of reasons put his net worth at 3.6 billion US dollars according to Forbes. He argued that distributing cigarettes is not the same as belonging to the tobacco sector, that he had parted with his shares by transferring them to a personal foundation in December 2023, and that the Council had no right to keep re-listing him on recycled evidence. The judgment rejects each of those three lines of defence, with detailed reasoning running to more than two hundred paragraphs.
For international readers, and in particular for anyone with frozen accounts or blocked transactions in France, the ruling fixes three practical rules that will govern sanctions litigation for years. First, the listing test looks at the economic sector, not at the individual’s own tax bill: it is the sector that must fund Moscow, not the listed person. Second, moving shares into a foundation, a trust or any intermediate vehicle proves nothing unless the applicant documents a genuine sale to a genuinely independent third party. Third, as long as the underlying situation has not materially changed, the Council may maintain a listing on the same factual record. This article explains each point from the official text of the judgment, then sets out what a listed person or a French bank should concretely do when funds are frozen in France.
I. Why did the EU General Court keep Igor Kesaev on the Russia sanctions list on 2 September 2026?
A. What does the substantial source of revenue test in Article 3(1)(g) of Regulation 269/2014 actually require?
The legal hook that caught Kesaev is criterion (g) of the EU Russia sanctions regime. In June 2023 the Council widened the listing criteria to reach the business class behind the Russian war economy: Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1094 amended Decision 2014/145/CFSP, and Council Regulation (EU) 2023/1089 amended Regulation (EU) No 269/2014. The amended point (g) of Article 3(1) of Regulation 269/2014 now covers, in the official English wording, the key statutory phrase, “a substantial source of revenue”, now catches leading businesspersons operating in Russia and their families as well as businesspersons and companies involved in such sectors in a country the text holds responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine. That last clause is the so-called third limb of criterion (g), and it is the provision on which the Kesaev listings discussed here were maintained. The full amending text is Council Regulation (EU) 2023/1089 of 5 June 2023 (CELEX:32023R1089), amending the base act Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 (CELEX:32014R0269), both published in the Official Journal of the European Union.
Kesaev’s first plea was a defence of illegality directed at that criterion: he claimed the amended point (g) was unlawful, vague, disproportionate and discriminatory. The Court dissected the plea into several branches and dismissed them one by one. The most important holding for future cases concerns who must fund the Russian state. The judgment recalls that under the wording of the third limb, it is the economic sector, and not the listed individual, that must constitute a substantial source of revenue for the Government of the Russian Federation. The decisive point is that, in the Court’s words, “le secteur économique, et non la personne” carries the revenue test: it is the economic sector, and not the listed individual, that must significantly fill Moscow’s coffers. In plain English: the Council does not have to show that Kesaev personally bankrolls the war; it has to show that he does business in a sector that does. The official judgment is published on InfoCuria (Case T-296/24, ECLI:EU:T:2026:523), and the case file on InfoCuria (T-296/24 Kesaev v Council).
That single sentence destroys the most intuitive defence available to businesspeople in non-military industries. Kesaev admitted that Megapolis Group distributes consumer goods including tobacco products, but he argued that only production and importation of tobacco generate excise revenue, so that mere distribution could not belong to a revenue-providing sector. The Court answered that even if Megapolis paid no excise duty itself, that circumstance was irrelevant to whether its activity sits inside the tobacco sector. And the tobacco sector, the Court found, plainly qualifies: excise revenue from tobacco represented 1.33 percent of the Russian Federation’s budget in 2021, which the judges treated as a sufficient indication that the sector provides a substantial source of revenue. The Court added that it is not required to survey the whole of Russia’s tax receipts, and that the existence of larger or more strategic sectors changes nothing: revenue from tobacco can still be substantial. A parallel argument, that paying taxes is a general legal duty and cannot justify a listing, failed for the same reason: the criterion targets the sector’s aggregate revenue, including taxes generated by the sector but not necessarily paid by the listed person or his companies, as earlier case law on Rashnikov and Chyzh had already established.
The judgment also gives a workable definition of the word “businessperson” in this context. Relying on the Zubitskiy and Kantor rulings, the Court recalls that the term covers persons carrying on an economic activity that is qualitatively or quantitatively far from negligible in such a sector, where listing them is capable of increasing pressure on Russia and raising the cost of its actions against Ukraine. Kesaev’s shareholdings, which he had himself admitted in the first round of his litigation at 37.245 percent of Mercury Retail and an indirect 40.95 percent of Megapolis Distribution, comfortably met that threshold. The circumstance that he was a major shareholder was sufficient, the Court held, to treat him as carrying on a far-from-negligible economic activity.
Constitutional-style attacks on the criterion fared no better. On fundamental rights, the Court recalled that freedom to conduct a business and the right to property, protected by Articles 16 and 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, are not absolute prerogatives and may be restricted for objectives of general interest pursued by the Union, citing Bank Melli Iran and Bank of Industry and Mine. A restriction must satisfy four conditions drawn from Article 52(1) of the Charter and the RT France case law: a legal basis, respect for the essence of the right, a genuine general-interest objective, and proportionality. All four were met. On proportionality specifically, the Court noted that the applicant’s arguments really challenged whether the listing conditions were fulfilled, which belongs to the review of manifest error rather than proportionality, and it recalled the Uss ruling that the Decision 2014/145 and Regulation 269/2014 freezes are in themselves appropriate, necessary and not manifestly disproportionate given the overriding importance of their objectives. The discrimination plea, invoking Article 21 of the Charter and Article 18 TFEU over Russian nationality and over the fact that two other major Megapolis shareholders were not listed, was rejected: nationality is not the listing criterion, business activity in a revenue-providing sector is, and the Council is not obliged to list every person in a comparable situation at the same time.
B. How did the Court assess the March 2024, September 2024 and March 2025 relistings?
The action as lodged on 5 June 2024 targeted the March 2024 relisting acts, namely Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/847 of 12 March 2024 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/849 of 12 March 2024 implementing Regulation 269/2014, insofar as they concerned him. Kesaev then adapted his conclusions to cover the September 2024 acts and later the March 2025 acts, a procedural mechanism that allows an applicant to extend an ongoing annulment action to successive renewals. The September 2024 reasoning was identical in substance to March 2024, and the March 2025 acts repeated the September 2024 statement of reasons except for the deletion of the word “president” of Mercury Group.
The March 2024 statement of reasons rested on three factual legs: Kesaev was co-owner and president of Mercury Group, associated with Megapolis Group, a leading tobacco distributor in Russia; Forbes estimated his net worth at 3.6 billion dollars; and he was a major shareholder of both groups. The Council’s evidence file, reference WK 1321/2024 INIT of 29 January 2024, contained a September 2023 Forbes article on Mercury Group’s business and results, a Forbes profile estimating his fortune at 4.1 billion dollars and ranking him 32nd among Russian billionaires in 2023, and several December 2023 retail-trade press articles about the transfer of his Mercury Retail holdings to his personal foundation. The Court worked through each leg. “Mercury Group”, which Kesaev himself described as an informal name for a set of related companies, could lawfully be treated as a group, and shareholder status in a group may cover all its member companies, following the OT rulings of September 2024 and July 2025. The Forbes material and his own prior admissions established the shareholdings. No manifest error was found.
The renewal point is the second durable holding of the judgment. For the September 2024 and March 2025 acts, Kesaev essentially repeated his March 2024 arguments, and the Court held that the Council had committed no error in finding no change in his personal situation and in relying on the same evidence. The governing principle, recalled from the OT case law, is that maintaining a name on the list remains justified where the evidence is unchanged and has not become obsolete, assessed against both the general context of the country concerned and the individual’s situation, and against whether the objectives of the restrictive measures have been achieved. As long as the gravity of the situation in Ukraine persists and the applicant’s position is unchanged, the Council may lawfully renew on the existing file. For practitioners this closes the argument, often raised at renewal time, that the Council must produce fresh inculpatory material every six months. Assembling new evidence on individuals living in Russia, where EU investigators have no powers, is difficult; the judgment gives the regime the durability its drafters intended.
Two final procedural notes matter. This was Kesaev’s second case: by a judgment of 4 September 2024 in cases T-290/22 and T-763/22 (EU:T:2024:575, under appeal), the General Court had already dismissed his challenges to the 2022 and 2023 listings, and the present ruling builds expressly on those findings. And under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party pays the costs where costs have been sought: the operative part of the judgment is lapidary. “Le recours est rejeté.” In English: the action is dismissed, with Mr Kesaev ordered to pay the costs. Anyone contemplating similar litigation now knows the full price of losing.
II. Can a sanctioned billionaire escape the EU freeze by moving assets into a foundation?
A. Why did the December 2023 transfer of 73 percent of Mercury Retail to a Russian personal foundation fail to prove loss of control?
The most closely watched passage of the judgment concerns the December 2023 transfer by which Kesaev moved a 73 percent stake in Mercury Retail to his personal foundation established in Russia, as reported by the retail-trade press exhibits in the Council’s file. His argument, raised for the first time at the reply stage, was that he no longer controlled the shareholdings and therefore no longer met the listing criterion. The Court’s answer is now the leading statement on paper divestments in EU sanctions law: merely using an intermediate vehicle “n’est pas de nature à démontrer” any loss of control. In English: the mere use of an intermediate legal structure, such as a personal foundation in this case, is incapable of demonstrating that the applicant gave up control of the shareholdings managed by that foundation. The Court cited the Kantor ruling of 15 January 2025 to the same effect.
The judges went further and explained why. Personal foundations are a legal instrument that appeared in Russia in March 2022, just weeks after the full-scale invasion, and two of their advertised advantages are precisely the retention of control over assets even after their transfer and the protection of the confidentiality of the owners’ identity. Against that background, a transfer into such a vehicle looks less like a genuine exit and more like concealment. The Court then placed the burden of proof exactly where practitioners must now expect it: it is for the applicant who invokes a change in his personal situation to demonstrate that the disposal of his holdings was effective, that it produced a genuine renunciation of his shareholder prerogatives in the companies concerned and their related entities, and that it was made in favour of an independent third party. The judgment stresses that this is not a reversal of the burden of proof, citing the HX and Servier case law by analogy, because it is the applicant who alleges the change. Supporting evidence about procedures, modalities and conditions of a share sale is in the hands of the seller, not the Council: the applicant is the best placed to produce it, as the Timchenko ruling confirmed. The Mordashov and Vinokurov rulings add the independent-third-party requirement. Kesaev produced nothing of the kind. He merely pointed to press articles announcing the transfer, without any document on how the sale was conducted, on what terms, or to whom. The plea therefore failed even on the assumption that it was admissible despite being raised late.
This Luxembourgish severity is part of a wider 2026 trend against formalistic asset-shielding. On 21 May 2026 the Court of Justice handed down two preliminary rulings, in case C-483/23 (T Trust) and in joined cases C-428/24 and C-476/24 (FZ AR and SX), answering references from the Regional Administrative Court of Lazio in Italy about trusts governed by Bermudian law holding assets connected with persons designated under Regulation 269/2014. The question in each case was whether assets placed in a trust can still be regarded as belonging to or controlled by a designated settlor or beneficiary who holds no legal title or enforceable rights under the trust deed. As reported by legal commentators, the Court gave the control criterion real teeth, confirming that national authorities and courts across the Union must look past legal title to effective control. Read together with Kesaev, the message of 2026 is uniform from Luxembourg to Paris: neither a Bermudian trust nor a Russian personal foundation cleanses control. Only a documented, arm’s-length disposal to a truly independent buyer, with board resignations, no reserved powers and no family retention, has any prospect of persuading the Council or the Court, and even then the Council will verify rather than trust.
For deal lawyers the checklist writes itself. A divestment file capable of supporting a delisting request or an annulment plea must contain the signed sale agreement with price and payment proofs, evidence that the price reflects market value, complete closing and registration documents, proof of the buyer’s independence from the seller and his family, resignations from all management and supervisory bodies, termination of advisory or veto rights, and disclosure of any vendor financing, call options or side letters. Press clippings announcing a transfer, which were all Kesaev could show, are worth nothing. And timing matters: a transfer executed after listing, into a vehicle created after the invasion for the very purpose of retaining control confidentially, will be read as circumvention unless the file affirmatively proves the opposite.
B. What can a listed person or a French bank concretely do when funds are frozen in France?
A freeze is not a confiscation. Kesaev’s European holdings are immobilised: he cannot sell them, transfer them or draw income from them, but title has not been taken from him. That distinction structures everything that follows, both the remedies available at EU level and the very concrete French enforcement machinery that banks, notaries and company registries apply every day in Paris.
At EU level, the routes are narrow but real. A listed person may bring an annulment action before the General Court in Luxembourg against each listing or renewal act, adapting his conclusions as new six-monthly acts arrive, exactly as Kesaev did for the September 2024 and March 2025 renewals. He may plead illegality of the criterion, manifest error in its application to him, disproportionality and breach of fundamental rights, and he may seek interim relief. In parallel, and often more usefully, he may petition the Council directly for reconsideration with a documented file showing a genuine and lasting change of circumstances: a real sale, a resignation, an independently audited valuation, proof of funds. The Kesaev reasoning tells counsel precisely what that file must contain, because it shows what the absence of such a file costs. Our separate analysis of the opposite outcome, the annulment of an EU sanctions freeze in the Inter Rao Lietuva ruling of 3 September 2026, shows the mirror image: where the authority cannot produce sufficient, precise and consistent indicia, the freeze falls.
Even a listed person is not left without resources for daily life and for his defence. Article 4 of Regulation 269/2014 allows the competent authorities of the Member States to authorise the release of frozen funds where they are needed for “basic needs” such as food, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance and utilities for listed persons and dependent family members, or earmarked exclusively for “reasonable professional fees” and reimbursement of legal-service expenses. In France the competent authority for such release authorisations is the Directorate General of the Treasury, and applications must be documented to the euro: budgets, invoices, fee agreements. Routine holding and maintenance fees and duly notified extraordinary expenses can also be authorised under the same provision.
The French domestic layer is what foreign commentary usually misses, and it is severe. Anyone operating in France must apply EU freezes immediately. Article L. 562-4 of the French Monetary and Financial Code provides, in the official wording: “Sont tenus d’appliquer sans délai les mesures de gel et les interdictions de mise à disposition ou d’utilisation prévues au présent chapitre […] et d’en informer immédiatement le ministre chargé de l’économie”. In English: all persons concerned must apply the freeze measures and making-available prohibitions without delay and must immediately inform the Minister for the Economy. The provision is published on Legifrance (Article L. 562-4, Code monétaire et financier). Article L. 562-5 then prohibits making funds or economic resources available, directly or indirectly, to designated persons: “Il est interdit […] de mettre à disposition directement ou indirectement, ou d’utiliser des fonds ou ressources économiques au profit des personnes dont les fonds et ressources économiques font l’objet d’une mesure de gel”. See Legifrance (Article L. 562-5). Article L. 562-6 adds a deliberate-circumvention offence: knowingly and willingly taking part in activities whose object or effect is to circumvent the measures. See Legifrance (Article L. 562-6).
The machinery reaches deep into property and daily life. Under Article L. 562-8, freezes may be recorded in the land register against the designated person’s real estate, and the Interior Minister may block any transfer of a vehicle’s registration certificate. See Legifrance (Article L. 562-8). Ministerial freeze decisions are published by extract in the Official Journal and become enforceable upon publication under Article L. 562-9. See Legifrance (Article L. 562-9). The measures bind third parties even for rights born before the freeze under Article L. 562-10. See Legifrance (Article L. 562-10). Alongside EU listings, France may adopt its own national freezes: Article L. 562-2 allows the Economy and Interior Ministers to freeze, for six renewable months, funds belonging to or controlled by persons involved in terrorism, while Article L. 562-3 gives the Economy Minister a parallel power linked to United Nations resolutions. See Legifrance (Article L. 562-2) and Legifrance (Article L. 562-3). Definitions sit in Legifrance (Article L. 562-1). Breach is criminal: Article L. 574-3 punishes evasion of freeze obligations with the penalties of Article L. 542-1 of the Customs Code. See Legifrance (Article L. 574-3). Banks that fail to freeze, officers who release funds, and designated persons who dissipate assets all face prosecution, and customs investigators handle the files.
French administrative courts police the national procedure strictly, and here lies a striking contrast with the latitude Luxembourg grants the EU Council. On 17 May 2023 the Paris Administrative Court of Appeal held, in cases 22PA00493 to 22PA00496, that while an initial freeze may be ordered without prior adversarial proceedings so that assets cannot be spirited away, any renewal must in principle be preceded by a contradictory procedure giving the person notice and time to submit observations, plus a right to an oral hearing on request unless the request is abusive. In the lead case the court found that “l’arrêté attaqué a été pris au terme d’une procédure irrégulière et doit être annulé pour ce motif”, annulling the renewal order because the hearing request had been ignored although time remained before expiry. See Legifrance (CAA Paris, 17 May 2023, 22PA00496). The lesson for Paris files is operational: calendar every six-month expiry, demand the file, file written observations, and systematically request a hearing.
French enforcement of EU sanctions also reaches beyond banks. On 15 July 2026 the Conseil d’Etat ruled in case 509579 on Cloudflare’s challenge to an order by the audiovisual regulator Arcom, which had required the company, under Article 11(II) of the Law of 21 June 2004, to block access from French territory to online services disseminating content from persons targeted by Regulation (EU) 833/2014 and Regulation (EU) No 269/2014. See Legifrance (Conseil d’Etat, 15 July 2026, 509579). The case shows that in France, sanctions enforcement runs through regulators and intermediaries, not only through bank compliance departments. Hosting providers, DNS operators and platforms with French exposure should treat EU listings as a direct operational risk. Our French-language guide details the parallel domestic track: compte gele apres des sanctions UE, autorisation de deblocage et recours a Paris.
Conclusion
The Kesaev judgment of 2 September 2026 is the most complete judicial statement to date on how the EU Russia sanctions list works in practice. It validates the sector-based listing criterion, it kills the paper-divestment escape route, and it confirms that renewals stand on unchanged evidence while the war and the applicant’s situation persist. The first Kesaev judgment is already under appeal, and this second one may follow the same path to the Court of Justice, so the story is not procedurally over. But the direction of travel in 2026 is unmistakable, from the May trust rulings to the September foundation ruling: formal ownership engineering no longer moves the needle. What moves it is evidence, real sales, independent buyers, and complete files. Anyone frozen, and any institution holding frozen assets in France, should build that file now, before the next six-monthly renewal, and should do it with counsel who knows both the Luxembourg courtroom and the Paris Treasury desk.