By Hassan Kohen, lawyer at the Paris Bar.
“Legionnaires disease” is being searched in the United Kingdom. Behind the medical question sits a legal one: when a person contracts Legionnaires’ disease, who was responsible for the water system that may have caused it, what has to be proved, and how long does that person, or a bereaved family, have to bring a claim? This guide answers that question under the law of England and Wales, where the duties of employers and of those who control premises come from the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 and its regulations, and where the time limits for personal injury claims are set by the Limitation Act 1980. Scotland and Northern Ireland have their own rules on civil liability and limitation, which are not analysed here.
The method set out here is of general scope. It describes no outbreak, building, business or individual case, and it draws no conclusion about the source of any infection. In each file, several facts still have to be established: where and when the exposure is said to have occurred, which water system was involved, who controlled it, what risk assessments, testing and maintenance records exist, and whether the medical evidence links the illness to that source. Medical questions, including diagnosis and treatment, are outside the scope of this guide. This is information on the law of England and Wales, written by a lawyer who practises in France and not in the United Kingdom. The texts discussed are the revised versions published on the official legislation website of the United Kingdom, as consulted on 19 November 2026.
I. Who is legally responsible for controlling legionella risks
A. The statutory duties: employers, those in control of premises and the COSHH regime
Legionella bacteria are not a product that anyone sells or a substance that anyone deliberately uses. They are a hazard that can develop in water systems: hot and cold water installations, cooling towers, spa pools, showers and other equipment that stores or sprays water. The law of England and Wales does not deal with them through a single “legionella statute”. It reaches them through general duties that apply to anyone who runs an undertaking or controls premises, and through a detailed set of regulations on hazardous substances. Understanding who carries those duties is the first step in identifying who may be answerable when someone falls ill.
The starting point is the 1974 Act. Section 2 of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 requires every employer to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health, safety and welfare at work of all employees. Section 2(2) lists, among the matters covered, safe plant and systems of work, safe arrangements for the use and storage of substances, and a working environment that is without risks to health. An employee who is exposed to contaminated water at the workplace is therefore within the first circle of protection.
Many people who contract Legionnaires’ disease are not employees of the business concerned. They are hotel guests, gym members, hospital visitors, shoppers or passers-by. For them, the key provision is section 3 of the 1974 Act. Section 3(1) requires every employer “to conduct his undertaking in such a way as to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that persons not in his employment who may be affected thereby are not thereby exposed to risks to their health or safety”. The duty is owed to the public at large, not only to workers. A business that runs a cooling tower on its roof, a spa pool in its premises or a shower block on a campsite is conducting its undertaking in a way that may affect people who have no contract of employment with it.
A third duty concerns the premises themselves. Section 4 of the 1974 Act applies to non-domestic premises made available to people who are not the controller’s employees as a place of work, or as a place where they may use plant or substances provided for their use there. Section 4(2) requires each person who has, to any extent, control of such premises, or of any plant or substance in them, to take reasonable measures to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that the premises and any plant or substance in them are safe and without risks to health. Section 4(3) adds an important rule for building management: a person who has, by virtue of a contract or tenancy, an obligation relating to the maintenance or repair of the premises, or to the safety of plant or substances in them, is treated as a person who has control of the matters to which that obligation extends. A facilities manager or a maintenance contractor who has taken on responsibility for a water system may therefore be a person “in control” for the purposes of this section, alongside or instead of the owner.
These general duties are made concrete by the Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations 2002, usually called COSHH. Regulation 2 defines a “substance hazardous to health” to include, in paragraph (c) of that definition, any substance “which is a biological agent”. The same regulation defines a biological agent as “a micro-organism, cell culture, or human endoparasite, whether or not genetically modified, which may cause infection, allergy, toxicity or otherwise create a hazard to human health”. Bacteria able to cause a serious lung infection fall naturally within that wording. Regulation 7(1) then states the core obligation: “Every employer shall ensure that the exposure of his employees to substances hazardous to health is either prevented or, where this is not reasonably practicable, adequately controlled.”
The COSHH duties are not limited to employees. Regulation 3(1) of the 2002 Regulations provides that where a duty is placed on an employer in respect of employees, the employer “shall, so far as is reasonably practicable, be under a like duty in respect of any other person, whether at work or not, who may be affected by the work carried out by the employer”. Some duties are excluded or restricted for non-employees: health surveillance under regulation 11 never extends to them, and the duties on monitoring, information and training and dealing with accidents extend to them only if they are on the premises where the work is carried out. The central duties, however, follow the risk wherever it reaches.
In practice, three of those duties generate the documents that matter most in any later dispute. Regulation 6 of the COSHH Regulations forbids an employer to carry out work liable to expose employees to a substance hazardous to health unless a suitable and sufficient assessment of the risk has been made and the steps it identifies have been implemented. Regulation 7 requires prevention or adequate control, with substitution and engineering controls ranked ahead of personal protection. Regulation 10 requires monitoring of exposure where the risk assessment shows it is needed, at regular intervals and whenever a change occurs that may affect exposure, and paragraph (5) requires a suitable record of that monitoring to be made and kept available. A risk assessment, a written control scheme and monitoring records are therefore not optional paperwork. Their existence, their content and their dates are among the first facts to establish after a case of Legionnaires’ disease.
Readers will often see references to official guidance on water systems. Its legal status depends on the 1974 Act itself. Section 16 of the 1974 Act allows the Health and Safety Executive to approve and issue codes of practice in order to provide practical guidance on the requirements of sections 2 to 7 and of health and safety regulations, with the consent of the Secretary of State and after consultation. That version of section 16 extends to England and Wales and Scotland. The content of any particular code is not analysed in this guide; what matters here is its legal effect.
That effect is set by section 17 of the 1974 Act. Section 17(1) begins: “A failure on the part of any person to observe any provision of an approved code of practice shall not of itself render him liable to any civil or criminal proceedings”. The same subsection, read with section 17(2), then gives the code real weight in criminal proceedings: where a relevant provision of the code was not observed, the matter the prosecution needs to prove is taken as proved unless the court is satisfied that the requirement was complied with in some other way. A code of practice is therefore not law in itself, but departing from it without an equally effective alternative is a serious risk for the person in control of the water system.
B. Landlords, hotels, holiday organisers and the public health notification system
Housing raises a different question. As far as the dwelling itself is concerned, a domestic tenant who falls ill at home is not covered by section 4 of the 1974 Act, which deals with non-domestic premises. The tenant’s position under civil law depends instead on the tenancy and on the Defective Premises Act 1972. Section 4 of that Act applies where premises are let under a tenancy that puts on the landlord an obligation to the tenant for the maintenance or repair of the premises.
In that situation, section 4(1) of the 1972 Act provides that the landlord owes to all persons who might reasonably be expected to be affected by defects in the state of the premises “a duty to take such care as is reasonable in all the circumstances to see that they are reasonably safe from personal injury or from damage to their property caused by a relevant defect”. The duty is owed not only to the tenant but to anyone who might reasonably be expected to be affected, which can include members of the tenant’s household and visitors.
Three features of section 4 deserve attention in a legionella case. First, under section 4(2) the duty arises if the landlord knows of the relevant defect, whether because the tenant reported it or otherwise, or if the landlord ought in all the circumstances to have known of it. Complaints about a water heater, stagnant pipework or a disused tank therefore matter, and so do their dates. Second, section 4(3) defines a “relevant defect” as a defect arising from, or continuing because of, an act or omission by the landlord that amounts to a failure to carry out the repairing obligation. Third, section 4(4) treats a landlord who has a right to enter to carry out maintenance or repair as if the landlord were under an obligation to do so, from the time the landlord is or can put himself in a position to exercise that right. The analysis in this guide is limited to the text of section 4 itself; tenants in Wales should also check whether other Welsh housing legislation applies to their occupation.
Holidays bring a third legal framework. A person who contracts Legionnaires’ disease during a package holiday, whether in the United Kingdom or abroad, will often find that the hotel or the resort that ran the water system is outside England and Wales. The Package Travel and Linked Travel Arrangements Regulations 2018 can then provide a defendant within reach: the organiser of the package.
Regulation 15(2) of the 2018 Regulations is unambiguous: “The organiser is liable to the traveller for the performance of the travel services included in the package travel contract, irrespective of whether those services are to be performed by the organiser or by other travel service providers.” Regulation 15(1) states that this rule is implied as a term in every package travel contract. Accommodation that was supposed to be provided safely, but was provided with a contaminated water system, may therefore engage the organiser’s responsibility even though the organiser did not run the hotel.
Regulation 16 of the 2018 Regulations sets out the consequences. Under regulation 16(3), the organiser must offer the traveller, without undue delay, appropriate compensation for any damage the traveller sustains as a result of any lack of conformity. Regulation 16(4) allows the organiser to escape that liability only by proving that the lack of conformity is attributable to the traveller, to a third party unconnected with the provision of the travel services and is unforeseeable or unavoidable, or that it is due to unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances. The burden of proof on those defences rests on the organiser. Regulation 16(6) allows the contract to limit compensation in other cases, but such a limitation must not apply to personal injury or damage caused intentionally or with negligence, and must not amount to less than three times the total price of the package.
Two procedural details in the same instrument are easily overlooked. Regulation 15(3) requires the traveller to inform the organiser without undue delay of any lack of conformity perceived during the trip. Regulation 17(4) provides that, for the purpose of compliance with time limits or limitation periods, receipt of messages, requests or complaints by the retailer through which the package was bought counts as receipt by the organiser. A traveller who falls ill should therefore keep a written trace of any report made during or after the stay. One change is already on the statute book but not yet in force. The Package Travel and Linked Travel Arrangements (Amendment) Regulations 2026, made on 22 April 2026, come into force on 6 April 2027. They amend the definition of a package in regulation 2, remove the separate category of linked travel arrangements and adjust the application provisions of regulation 3, but they do not amend regulations 15 and 16 discussed above, and regulation 1(4) of the 2026 Regulations provides that the amendments do not have effect in relation to package travel contracts entered into before 6 April 2027. Until that date, whether a holiday is a “package” is decided under the 2018 text as it currently stands.
Finally, a case of Legionnaires’ disease does not remain a private matter between the patient and the business concerned. In England, the Health Protection (Notification) Regulations 2010 organise a public health reporting system. Regulation 1(2) states that they apply in relation to England only; Wales has its own notification rules, which are not analysed here. Regulation 2(1) requires a registered medical practitioner to notify the proper officer of the relevant local authority where the practitioner has reasonable grounds for suspecting that a patient has a notifiable disease. Schedule 1, which lists the notifiable diseases, includes “Legionnaires’ Disease”. Regulation 2(3) requires the notification in writing within three days beginning with the day on which the suspicion is formed, and regulation 2(4) requires oral notification as soon as reasonably practicable where the practitioner considers the case urgent.
The laboratory side of the system works in parallel. Regulation 4(1) of the 2010 Regulations requires the operator of a diagnostic laboratory to notify the United Kingdom Health Security Agency where the laboratory identifies a causative agent in a human sample, and Schedule 2 lists “Legionella spp” among those agents. The practical point for a civil claim is that the public health investigation and the civil claim are separate processes, run by different people for different purposes. The first aims to find and control the source of infection; the second aims to establish legal responsibility and compensation. The findings of the first may become relevant evidence in the second, but the rules on obtaining them are distinct and are not analysed here.
II. Claiming compensation after Legionnaires’ disease
A. Building the claim: the legal basis since 2013 and the evidence to gather
A reader who has followed the first part of this guide might assume that a person who caught Legionnaires’ disease can sue directly for breach of section 3 of the 1974 Act or of the COSHH Regulations. In England and Wales, that assumption is wrong for most recent cases. The reason lies in section 47 of the 1974 Act. Section 47(1)(a) has always provided that nothing in Part 1 of the Act confers a right of action in civil proceedings for a failure to comply with the general duties in sections 2 to 7.
The position of health and safety regulations changed in 2013. Section 47(2) of the 1974 Act, in its current form, provides: “Breach of a duty imposed by a statutory instrument containing (whether alone or with other provision) health and safety regulations shall not be actionable except to the extent that regulations under this section so provide.” Section 47(2A) applies the same rule to the older “existing statutory provisions”. The COSHH Regulations are a statutory instrument containing health and safety regulations. A breach of COSHH, on its own, therefore does not give the injured person a civil claim unless regulations made under section 47 say otherwise.
That wording was introduced by section 69 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, which came fully into force on 1 October 2013. Section 69(10) contains the transitional rule: “The amendments made by this section do not apply in relation to breach of a duty where that breach occurs before the commencement of this section.” Section 69(9) adds that the amendments do not apply to breach of a duty that the Scottish Parliament would have competence to impose. For a breach occurring in England or Wales today, the post-2013 rule applies.
This does not leave the injured person without a remedy. Section 47(4) of the 1974 Act states that subsections (1)(a), (2) and (2A) are without prejudice to any right of action which exists apart from the provisions of the Act. A claim therefore has to be built on another basis. Depending on the facts, that will usually be negligence at common law, the duty of a landlord under section 4 of the Defective Premises Act 1972, or the contractual liability of a package organiser under the 2018 Regulations, sometimes in combination. The statutory duties described in the first part of this guide keep a practical role: they describe what a careful person in control of a water system is expected to do, and evidence that a risk assessment, a control scheme or a monitoring programme was missing or ignored may help to show that reasonable care was not taken. They no longer found a civil claim by themselves.
Whatever the legal basis, the claim will turn on evidence. The first set of facts concerns the illness: the diagnosis, the laboratory confirmation where it exists, and the dates on which symptoms began and the diagnosis was made. The second set concerns exposure: a timeline of where the person was during the period before falling ill, including work, accommodation, travel, leisure facilities and visits to hospitals or care settings. The third set concerns the alleged source: who owned, controlled or maintained the water system, whether a risk assessment and a written control scheme existed, what the monitoring records show, and whether the system had been shut down, modified or left unused before the exposure. The fourth set concerns the link between the two, which in a disputed case will normally require expert evidence.
Requests for information should be made early and in writing. The reason is not only practical. Section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980, discussed below, lists among the circumstances a court must consider the conduct of the defendant after the cause of action arose, including the extent to which the defendant responded to requests reasonably made by the claimant for information or inspection for the purpose of ascertaining relevant facts. A dated request for the risk assessment, the control scheme and the monitoring records, and the answer or silence that follows, may therefore matter later, even on the question of time.
Employees are in a slightly different position. Their employer owes them the duties in section 2 of the 1974 Act and in COSHH, including health surveillance under regulation 11 where it is appropriate, and the records generated for those purposes concern them directly. The civil claim itself, however, follows the same post-2013 logic: it is built on negligence or another basis that exists apart from the Act. Questions specific to employment, such as sick pay, dismissal or industrial injury benefits, are outside the scope of this guide.
B. Time limits, and claims after a death
Personal injury claims in England and Wales are subject to a special limitation regime. Section 11 of the Limitation Act 1980 applies to any action for damages for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty, whether the duty arises from contract, from statute or independently of both, where the damages claimed consist of or include damages in respect of personal injuries. That covers claims in negligence, under the Defective Premises Act and, where personal injury is claimed, under a package travel contract. Section 11(4) sets the period at three years from the date on which the cause of action accrued or, if later, the date of knowledge of the person injured.
The date of knowledge is defined in section 14 of the 1980 Act. Under section 14(1), it is the date on which the person first had knowledge that the injury was significant, that it was attributable in whole or in part to the act or omission alleged to constitute negligence, nuisance or breach of duty, of the identity of the defendant, and, where the act or omission is said to be that of someone else, of that person’s identity and the additional facts supporting an action against the defendant. Knowledge that the facts did or did not amount to negligence as a matter of law is irrelevant. Section 14(2) treats an injury as significant if the person would reasonably have considered it sufficiently serious to justify proceedings against a defendant who did not dispute liability and was able to satisfy a judgment.
The date of knowledge is not purely subjective. Section 14(3)(b) of the 1980 Act includes knowledge that the person might reasonably have been expected to acquire “from facts ascertainable by him with the help of medical or other appropriate expert advice which it is reasonable for him to seek”. The same subsection protects a person who has taken all reasonable steps to obtain, and where appropriate to act on, expert advice: such a person is not fixed with knowledge of a fact ascertainable only with the help of that advice. For an infection whose source may be identified only after an investigation, the moment at which a person knew, or could reasonably have found out, that the illness was attributable to a particular water system and who controlled it may be later than the date of the illness itself. It should never be assumed, however, that the period will start late; the safest course is to work from the earliest plausible date.
If the three-year period has expired, the claim is not automatically lost. Section 33(1) of the 1980 Act provides: “If it appears to the court that it would be equitable to allow an action to proceed” having regard to the prejudice that the time limits cause the claimant and the prejudice a decision would cause the defendant, the court may direct that the time limits do not apply. Section 33(3) requires the court to have regard to all the circumstances, and in particular to the length of and reasons for the delay, the effect of the delay on the cogency of the evidence, the defendant’s conduct after the cause of action arose, any disability of the claimant arising after that date, the extent to which the claimant acted promptly and reasonably once aware of a possible claim, and the steps taken to obtain medical, legal or other expert advice. This is a discretion, not a right, and relying on it is always a weaker position than acting within time.
Legionnaires’ disease can be fatal, and the law provides two distinct routes after a death. The first is the claim of the deceased person’s estate. Section 11(5) of the 1980 Act deals with the cause of action that, under the legislation on the survival of actions to which it refers, continues for the benefit of the estate: if the injured person dies before the end of the period that applied to them, the period for the estate is three years from the date of death or from the date of the personal representative’s knowledge, whichever is later. Under section 11(7), where there are several personal representatives with different dates of knowledge, the earliest date counts.
The second route belongs to the family. Section 1(1) of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 provides: “If death is caused by any wrongful act, neglect or default which is such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the person injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof”, the person who would have been liable remains liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death. Section 1(2) states that the action is for the benefit of the dependants of the deceased.
The 1976 Act expressly covers illness, not only accidents. Section 1(6) of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 provides: “Any reference in this Act to injury includes any disease and any impairment of a person’s physical or mental condition.” A death caused by an infection is therefore within its scope, provided the wrongful act, neglect or default is established. The list of dependants in section 1(3) is broad. It includes a spouse, civil partner or former spouse or civil partner; a person who lived with the deceased in the same household as a partner immediately before the death and for at least two years before it; parents and other ascendants; a person treated by the deceased as a parent; children and other descendants; a person treated as a child of the family in relation to a marriage or civil partnership of the deceased; and brothers, sisters, uncles, aunts and their issue.
A narrower group may also claim damages for bereavement. Under section 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976, the claim is available to the spouse or civil partner of the deceased, to a cohabiting partner who meets the two-year household condition in section 1A(2A), and, where the deceased was a minor who was never married or a civil partner, to the parents or, in the case covered by section 1A(2)(b)(ii), to the mother alone. Section 1A(3) currently fixes the sum at £15,120. Section 1A(4) provides that where the award is for the benefit of more than one person, it is divided equally between them, subject to any deduction for costs not recovered from the defendant. Section 1A(5) allows the Lord Chancellor to vary the figure by order, so the sum applicable to a particular death must be checked against the version in force at the relevant time.
The time limit for the family’s claim is set by section 12 of the Limitation Act 1980. Under section 12(2), an action under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 must be brought within three years from the date of death or from the date of knowledge of the person for whose benefit the action is brought, whichever is later. Section 12(1) adds a condition that is often missed: no action may be brought if, at the time of death, the person injured could no longer maintain an action and recover damages, for example because their own limitation period had already expired. Section 12(3) makes sections 28, 33, 33B and 35 of the 1980 Act applicable to these actions, so the discretion in section 33 is available here too, within the limits set by section 33(2).
This analysis concerns the law of England and Wales. The author’s English-language legal practice in Paris operates under French law, in a different jurisdiction. A claim arising from Legionnaires’ disease needs to be assessed under the texts that govern it, which may include the law of another country where the exposure occurred abroad, on the basis of the actual medical evidence, dates and documents described above.
Conclusion
In England and Wales, the duty to control legionella risks falls on those who run undertakings and control premises. Employers owe it to their employees under section 2 of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 and to members of the public under section 3; those in control of non-domestic premises owe it under section 4, which also catches contractors who have taken on maintenance obligations. The COSHH Regulations treat bacteria able to cause infection as a substance hazardous to health and require risk assessment, prevention or adequate control and, where needed, monitoring with records. Approved codes of practice do not create liability by themselves but weigh heavily in criminal proceedings. Landlords with repairing obligations owe a duty of care under section 4 of the Defective Premises Act 1972, and package organisers answer for the performance of the travel services they sell under the 2018 Regulations. In England, doctors and laboratories must notify cases under the 2010 notification regulations.
Since 1 October 2013, a breach of health and safety regulations is no longer actionable by itself, so a civil claim is built on negligence, on the 1972 Act or on the package contract. The ordinary time limit is three years from the illness or from the later date of knowledge, with a court discretion to extend it; after a death, the estate and the dependants each have their own three-year periods, and the bereavement award currently stands at £15,120. In each case, the facts remain to be established: where and when the exposure occurred, which water system was involved, who controlled it, what records exist and what the medical evidence shows. Until those facts are known, no conclusion can be drawn about responsibility for any particular illness.