On 3 September 2026, Advocate General Jean Richard de la Tour delivered his Opinion in Case C-345/25, Grixta, a reference from the Court of Appeal of Malta in proceedings brought by the State of Libya to recover funds held in Malta in the name of Mutassim Gaddafi, the deceased son of the former Libyan leader, or in the name of third parties. The Libyan claim rests on two domestic statutes with strong criminal-law features, Law No 3 of 1986 and Law No 10 of 2002, and a Maltese first-instance court had already ordered full restitution by a judgment of 28 June 2022. The question before the Court of Justice is whether such an action, brought by a foreign state exercising powers no private litigant enjoys, falls within the notion of civil and commercial matters under Article 1 of the Rome II Regulation, and if so whether it sounds in tort or in unjust enrichment. The Advocate General proposes to declare the reference inadmissible and, in the alternative, to hold Rome II inapplicable. Behind the technical conflict-of-laws debate lies a much larger and very practical issue: once the assets of a fallen regime are frozen by the United Nations and the European Union, who actually gets them back, through which court, and under which law. This analysis explains the Opinion point by point and then shows the two routes that work in France, because France is one of the few countries where both routes, prosecution at home and enforcement of a foreign confiscation order, have been tested all the way to the Court of Cassation and have produced usable case law for anyone trying to recover, protect or defend assets caught in an international freeze.
I. The 3 September 2026 Opinion on Libya’s claim in Malta: Rome II does not cover a state’s exorbitant restitution action
A. Why the Advocate General says a foreign state’s asset-recovery claim is not a civil and commercial matter
The dispute started with a Maltese first-instance judgment that gave Libya everything it asked for. The court upheld all of the Libyan state’s claims and ordered restitution of the Malta-situated assets held in the name of Muatassim Kadhafi or in the name of third parties, applying Libya’s Law No 3 of 1986 and Law No 10 of 2002 directly. The defendants appealed on 21 July 2022, and the Court of Appeal of Malta referred three questions to Luxembourg by a decision of 28 April 2025. The hearing took place in May 2026 before a five-judge chamber, and the Opinion followed on 3 September 2026 under ECLI:EU:C:2026:694. Readers should know that the published case name is fictitious and matches no real party to the proceedings.
The referring court asked, first, whether the notion of civil and commercial matters in Article 1 of Regulation No 864/2007 covers a claim brought by Libya under those statutes to recover the deceased’s assets situated in Malta. Second, whether the administrative-matters exclusion in the same Article 1 covers such a claim instead. And third, if Rome II applies at all, how to distinguish a tort-based obligation under Article 4(1) from unjust enrichment arising out of a tort under Article 10(1) on these facts. The starting text is Article 1(1) of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007, which provides that the regulation covers, in cross-border situations, non-contractual obligations in civil and commercial matters, while revenue, customs and administrative matters and state liability for acts in the exercise of public authority stay outside Everything turns on whether Libya acted as a private creditor recovering a debt or as a sovereign wielding public power.
The Advocate General’s answer is blunt on both the procedural and the substantive level. Procedurally, he considers that the Rome II provisions put to the Court cannot usefully be applied by the referring court to resolve the main dispute, so the questions lack relevance to the outcome and the reference should be ruled inadmissible. In the alternative, should the Court reach the substance, the Opinion proposes a ruling that an action brought by a third state to recover funds held in a Member State, on the ground that they were illicitly obtained by its deceased national and founded on special laws conferring exorbitant powers as compared with the rules governing relations between private individuals, does not fall within civil and commercial matters within the meaning of that provision. The decisive criterion is therefore the exorbitant nature of the powers conferred on the claimant state by its own special legislation, measured against the rules that govern relations between private individuals, in line with the Court’s judgment of 3 September 2020 in Supreme Site Services (C-186/19, EU:C:2020:638, point 66).
The exorbitant character is visible on the face of the Libyan statutes. The so-called purification law deems any disproportionate increase in a public official’s declared wealth after taking office to be theft and illicit gain where the official cannot prove its lawful source, a mechanism reinforced by financial disclosure duties examined by purification committees that investigate complaints of illicit gains and report on them. A reversed burden of this kind, producing illicit gain by legal presumption rather than by proof of a specific offence, is precisely the type of sovereign prerogative the Court’s case law treats as incompatible with civil and commercial matters. The Opinion is equally instructive on what the parties themselves said the action was, because the characterisation is contested. Libya, joined by two of the defendants, argued that the claim seeks compensation for harm caused by an offence, is civil in nature and could be brought by any victim of a criminal offence. Malta viewed the proceedings as determining whether Libya owns the disputed property. The European Commission, by contrast, classified the case bluntly as an action to confiscate illicitly acquired assets. That classification matters enormously in practice. If the action is confiscation of illicitly acquired assets dressed as a civil claim, then the conflict-of-laws analysis under Rome II, tort versus unjust enrichment, with Article 4(1) pointing to the law of the country where the damage occurs governs, regardless of where the triggering event happened or where indirect consequences land and Article 10(1) providing that unjust enrichment attached to an existing relationship between the parties follows the law governing that relationship, may never even arise, because the claim never enters Rome II’s field of application. For practitioners, the lesson is that a foreign state’s recovery vehicle must be examined for sovereign prerogatives, reversed burdens, imprescriptibility or administrative presumptions before any discussion of applicable law begins. Where those features exist, the defendant should challenge the civil characterisation itself rather than argue about which country’s tort law applies.
B. Frozen does not mean recoverable: the United Nations freeze, the European Union freeze and the national court’s lack of power to unfreeze
The second major teaching of the Opinion concerns the asset freeze that overlays the whole case. Mutassim Gaddafi was subject to a United Nations Security Council asset freeze implemented by the European Union, and the Opinion recalls the chain precisely: Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011) imposed the freeze, and Resolution 2769 (2025) reaffirmed that assets frozen under paragraph 17 of Resolution 1970 must at a later stage be made available to the Libyan people and used for their benefit, stressing that freezing measures are taken for protective purposes and asking Member States to preserve the frozen assets for the future benefit of that population, including by preventing diversion and misuse, with Resolution 2819 (2026) adding preservation-of-value duties. At European Union level, Council Regulation (EU) 2016/44 of 18 January 2016 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Libya provides in Article 5(1) that all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by the listed persons, entities and bodies are frozen A freeze, the Opinion explains, is an operation designed to prevent any movement, transfer or access that would alter ownership or possession, with the objective of limiting to the maximum any transaction in frozen funds even where it would not remove property from the debtor’s estate.
The practical consequence is stated as a hard rule of European Union law. Citing the Court’s judgment of 12 March 2026 in EM System, the Advocate General recalls the principle that a national court cannot lift a freeze on funds until the measure itself has been withdrawn. A national court, whether in Malta, France or anywhere else in the Union, cannot lift a freeze that the Council has not withdrawn. Anyone reading a restitution judgment must therefore ask a second question immediately after who won: does the judgment actually release the money, or does it merely declare an entitlement that remains sterilised by the freeze until delisting or a humanitarian or judicial release authorisation. This is exactly the configuration French companies and banks face daily under European Union sanctions, and it is analysed in our hub on challenging listings and obtaining release authorisations, Frozen by Association: How to Rebut the EU 50 Percent Control Presumption and Get Your Company Unfrozen in France, as well as in the recent General Court defeat of Roman Abramovich on 9 September 2026, Abramovich Loses Again Before the EU General Court, which shows how narrow the path to annulment remains.
Three operational conclusions follow for the Malta file and for every similar file. First, the freeze and the ownership dispute run on separate tracks: winning the civil or restitution case does not delist the person or unfreeze the account. Second, a restitution order concerning frozen funds can only be executed through the sanctions machinery, by authorisation of the competent national authority or after withdrawal of the measure, and any bank that moves first exposes itself to circumvention liability under Article 5(3) of Regulation 2016/44. Third, the protective purpose of the freeze, recalled by the Security Council, means that courts handle these assets as funds held for a future Libyan people rather than as an ordinary estate to be distributed to heirs, which reshapes succession, creditor and third-party claims alike. The Court of Justice has not yet ruled; the Opinion is not the judgment. But the direction of travel is clear, and it narrows the space for civil-law recovery strategies built on Rome II when the claimant is a state acting under exorbitant legislation and the assets sit under a United Nations and European Union freeze.
II. Recovering foreign illicit assets through France: prosecution at home and enforcement of the foreign confiscation order
A. The French criminal route: convict for money laundering in Paris, confiscate everything, manage it through AGRASC
France offers a first route that needs no foreign judgment at all: prosecute the laundering on French soil and confiscate the assets located in France. The flagship precedent is the biens mal acquis case of Teodorin Obiang, Vice-President of Equatorial Guinea, definitively settled by the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation on 28 July 2021 (No 20-81.553), which rejected his appeal against the Paris Court of Appeal judgment of 10 February 2020 for money laundering, leaving a three-year suspended prison sentence, a 30-million-euro fine and a confiscation order in place. A foreign dignitary was thus convicted in France for laundering the proceeds of foreign corruption and stripped of his French property, with Transparency International France admitted as a civil party. The legal engine is Article 324-1 of the Criminal Code, which punishes five years’ imprisonment and a 375,000 euro fine and provides that “Constitue également un blanchiment le fait d’apporter un concours à une opération de placement, de dissimulation ou de conversion du produit direct ou indirect d’un crime ou d’un délit.” Any placement, concealment or conversion in France of the direct or indirect proceeds of a foreign crime or offence, buying a Paris mansion, moving funds through French accounts, using French intermediaries, can therefore anchor a French prosecution even though the predicate corruption was committed abroad.
The confiscation that follows is deliberately broad. Article 131-21 of the Criminal Code states that “La peine complémentaire de confiscation est encourue dans les cas prévus par la loi ou le règlement. Elle est également encourue de plein droit pour les crimes et pour les délits punis d’une peine d’emprisonnement d’une durée supérieure à un an, à l’exception des délits de presse.” It reaches instrumentalities, objects and direct or indirect proceeds, including where proceeds have been mixed with lawful funds, and it is secured upstream by the special seizure regime of Articles 706-141 and following of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which applies “afin de garantir l’exécution de la peine complémentaire de confiscation” over property, real estate, intangible rights and claims, including seizures without dispossession. Seized and confiscated property is then administered centrally: Article 706-160 entrusts the Agency for the management and recovery of seized and confiscated assets (AGRASC) with the task, stating that “L’agence est chargée d’assurer, sur l’ensemble du territoire et sur mandat de justice : 1° La gestion de tous les biens, quelle que soit leur nature, saisis, confisqués ou faisant l’objet d’une mesure conservatoire au cours d’une procédure pénale”, while Article 707-1 organises execution of confiscations in the name of the public prosecutor through the Agency. Victims are not forgotten: Article 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “L’action civile en réparation du dommage causé par un crime, un délit ou une contravention appartient à tous ceux qui ont personnellement souffert du dommage directement causé par l’infraction.” A foreign state harmed by the laundering of its stolen funds can therefore join the French criminal proceedings as a civil party, exactly as an anti-corruption association did in the Obiang trial, and seek damages from the confiscated estate.
The prosecution must still prove its case, and the Court of Cassation enforces that requirement even in money-laundering files built on presumptions. On 2 April 2025 (No 24-81.185, ECLI:FR:CCASS:2025:CR00448), the Criminal Chamber rejected the prosecution’s appeal against an acquittal where the court of appeal had found no proof of the fraudulent origin of casino funds flagged by Tracfin, holding that “elle a, par une appréciation souveraine, jugé que l’origine frauduleuse des fonds n’était pas établie et que les conditions nécessaires de la présomption prévue par l’article 324-1-1 du code pénal n’étaient pas non plus remplies.” That presumption, set out in Article 324-1-1, provides that “les biens ou les revenus sont présumés être le produit direct ou indirect d’un crime ou d’un délit dès lors que les conditions matérielles, juridiques ou financières de l’opération de placement, de dissimulation ou de conversion ne peuvent avoir d’autre justification que de dissimuler l’origine ou le bénéficiaire effectif de ces biens ou revenus”, but it only operates where those strict conditions are met. For a foreign government or a victim group watching the Malta proceedings, the French route means filing a criminal complaint with civil-party joinder before the National Financial Prosecutor in Paris, identifying the French nexus, accounts, real estate, intermediaries, and requesting special seizures before dissipation. Conversely, for the defence, the lesson of both precedents is that the battle must be fought early: challenge the French characterization of the predicate offence, contest the seizures measure by measure, dispute the confiscation base including mixed funds, attack the conditions of the statutory presumption, and prepare the European and international arguments, proportionality, third-party rights, before the trial court rules, because the Court of Cassation reviews legal reasoning, not facts. Where the assets are already frozen under European Union sanctions, the criminal route must additionally be coordinated with the sanctions track described in Part I: a French confiscation judgment concerning listed property still needs the freeze machinery to release or allocate the funds.
B. The French enforcement route: executing a foreign confiscation order in Paris and the four defences that can stop it
The second French route takes a confiscation judgment obtained abroad and executes it against assets in France. The procedure is organised by Articles 713-36 to 713-41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and its leading illustration is the Criminal Chamber’s judgment of 5 January 2023 (No 21-87.017, ECLI:FR:CCASS:2023:CR00021), published in the Bulletin, which arose from a Swiss Federal Criminal Court judgment of 1 October 2014 convicting an individual of foreign bribery, dishonest management and money laundering and ordering confiscation of the proceeds, including a Paris apartment held through a property company. The Paris investigating judge had first seized the apartment in 2012 at Switzerland’s mutual-assistance request, the Swiss authorities then sought enforcement of the confiscation in 2019, and the National Financial Prosecutor applied to the Paris criminal court, which ordered execution. The framework article provides that “les articles 713-37 à 713-40 sont applicables à l’exécution des décisions de confiscation prononcées par les autorités judiciaires étrangères”, and the Court of Cassation confirmed the architecture, holding that “Les articles 713-36 à 713-41 du code de procédure pénale, qui organisent l’exécution des décisions de confiscation prononcées par les autorités judiciaires étrangères, ne prévoient pas de dérogation à ce principe.” The principle at stake there was the publicity of hearings, a matter of public policy from which those articles create no exception, and the Paris appeal ruling was quashed in full and remanded for that reason alone.
The same judgment usefully maps the four statutory refusal grounds that are the defence arsenal. Article 713-37 provides that “l’exécution de la confiscation est refusée : 1° Si les faits à l’origine de la demande ne sont pas constitutifs d’une infraction selon la loi française ; 2° Si les biens sur lesquels elle porte ne sont pas susceptibles de faire l’objet d’une confiscation selon la loi française ; 3° Si la décision étrangère a été prononcée dans des conditions n’offrant pas de garanties suffisantes au regard de la protection des libertés individuelles et des droits de la défense”, to which the article adds a fourth ground where the foreign decision was issued to prosecute or punish a person on account of sex, race, religion, origin or other discriminatory motives. Each ground is litigable: dual criminality measured against French law, confiscability of the specific property under Article 131-21, fair-trial guarantees of the foreign proceedings including third-party owner rights, and political or discriminatory purpose. The judgment also settled standing and notice: “Le jugement du tribunal correctionnel autorisant l’exécution d’une décision de confiscation prononcée par une autorité judiciaire étrangère doit être notifié à la personne condamnée et au tiers propriétaire du bien confisqué si son titre est connu ou s’il a revendiqué cette qualité au cours de la procédure.” Those persons may appeal within ten days and then petition the Court of Cassation. Upstream, mutual assistance itself has a public-policy filter, since Article 694-4 provides that “Si l’exécution d’une demande d’entraide émanant d’une autorité judiciaire étrangère est de nature à porter atteinte à l’ordre public ou aux intérêts essentiels de la Nation, le procureur de la République saisi de cette demande ou avisé de cette demande en application du troisième alinéa de l’article 694-1 la transmet au procureur général qui détermine, s’il y a lieu, d’en saisir le ministre de la justice et donne, le cas échéant, avis de cette transmission au juge d’instruction.”
Applied to a Libya-style file with assets in France rather than Malta, the roadmap is therefore concrete. The requesting state transmits the confiscation decision through mutual assistance, the National Financial Prosecutor seises the Paris criminal court, seizures already taken conservatively secure the property, and the court orders execution unless one of the four refusal grounds is made out. The defence must work the file on four levels at once: attack dual criminality by showing the foreign predicate has no French equivalent, attack confiscability by showing the asset is neither instrumentality nor proceeds under French law, attack the foreign procedure through fair-trial and third-party-rights evidence, and attack publicity and notification defects, which the 2023 judgment shows can quash an execution order single-handedly. Heirs add a further layer, since confiscation against successors and bona fide third-party owners raises distinct proportionality issues that must be pleaded with documents, not slogans. And where the property is also frozen under European Union sanctions, the execution order and the sanctions authorisation must advance together, because the criminal judge’s order does not replace the Council’s freeze, exactly as the Advocate General recalled for Malta. This combined criminal, mutual-assistance and sanctions discipline is where a Paris-based practice adds measurable value to a cross-border recovery file.
Conclusion
The Grixta Opinion of 3 September 2026 clarifies the European side of the equation: a foreign state’s restitution action founded on exorbitant special legislation does not belong in civil and commercial matters under Rome II, and a national court cannot lift a European Union freeze the Council has maintained. The judgment, when it comes, will confirm or correct that course, but files cannot wait. On the French side, two tested routes already exist. Prosecute the laundering in France and confiscate under Articles 324-1 and 131-21 of the Criminal Code, as validated against a foreign head of state’s entourage in the Obiang case. Or enforce the foreign confiscation order in Paris under Articles 713-36 to 713-41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as mapped by the 2023 Swiss-French precedent, while working the four refusal grounds and the procedural guarantees the Court of Cassation actually enforces. In both routes, coordinate with the sanctions machinery from day one, because frozen does not mean recoverable. Anyone holding, claiming or defending assets caught between a foreign recovery claim, a French seizure and a European freeze should have the file reviewed now, before the next hearing fixes the positions irreversibly.