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Hungary Cuts Maja T.’s Sentence to Seven Years: What a Paris Court Must Test on a European Arrest Warrant

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Hungary Cuts Maja T.’s Sentence to Seven Years: What a Paris Court Must Test on a European Arrest Warrant

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On Wednesday 30 September 2026, a Hungarian appeals court in Budapest reduced the prison sentence of a German anti-fascist activist, identified by the Hungarian authorities as Maja T., from eight years to seven. That is the Associated Press courtroom report. The judge, the dispatch says, treated Maja T. as an accomplice rather than a perpetrator on one count and declined to treat them as a member of a criminal organisation. The prosecution had asked for fourteen years. The defence had asked for an acquittal. Deutsche Welle dated the first-instance eight-year sentence to 4 February 2026. The written Hungarian judgment has not been read here, and a courtroom dispatch is not a substitute for it.

The German constitutional case is a different decision. On 24 January 2025, in case 2 BvR 1103/24, the Federal Constitutional Court granted a complaint by a German national who identifies as non-binary and who had already been surrendered to Hungary. Its press release of 6 February 2025 does not name the complainant. The Associated Press and Legal Tribune Online identify that person as Maja T. The press release holds that the Berlin court violated Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights because it failed to investigate detention conditions. It does not find that inhuman treatment has been proved in the prison, and it does not quash the Hungarian sentence.

No French warrant exists in this file. The question is what a chambre de l’instruction would have to test if a European arrest warrant built on the same allegations, or on the seven-year sentence, were notified in France. The warrant would prevail over this general analysis. Only the competent judge decides.

I. What the Budapest appeal and the Karlsruhe order actually decide

A. The 30 September 2026 sentence, and the facts the wires do not settle

The Associated Press account, published from Budapest and carried the same day by other outlets, is the source for the appeal outcome. It reports that the appeals court reduced an eight-year sentence to seven years for taking part in assaults against participants of a far-right rally in Budapest in February 2023. The rally is described as the annual Day of Honor, one of the largest neo-Nazi gatherings in Europe. Prosecutors, in the wording the dispatch attributes to them, said the defendants planned to pursue an ideological struggle against supporters of the extremist right and to assault selected victims with instruments capable of causing death. Supporters gathered outside the Budapest-Capital Regional Court. Inside, according to the same report, Maja T. smiled at supporters on entering the courtroom.

The legally useful part of the dispatch is narrower than the political noise around it. The judge, the Associated Press says, reduced the sentence because Maja T. should be considered an accomplice rather than a perpetrator on one count, and should not be considered a member of a criminal organisation as originally charged. That is a judicial characterisation reported from the hearing. It is not a finding this article can verify against written reasons, because those reasons have not been read. It is also not a French characterisation. A later warrant would have to say, in its own terms, what the issuing judicial authority still alleges and what penalty it seeks to enforce. Article 695-13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires a European arrest warrant to state, among other things, « la nature et la qualification juridique de l’infraction, notamment au regard de l’article 694-32 », together with the date, place and circumstances of the offence and the degree of participation of the person sought. A press summary of an oral ruling is not that form.

The family reaction is also in the dispatch, and it should stay attributed. Maja T.’s father, Wolfram Jarosch, told the Associated Press that the result was more favourable than the first-instance decision and that he was nevertheless very disappointed. He said seven years is an extremely long time. He also said Maja T. had been held in what he called very undignified detention, including solitary confinement, which he said did not meet European human-rights standards. The same paragraph records that Hungarian authorities and the Hungarian Prison Service have denied such claims. A French analysis cannot choose between those two accounts. Neither is a judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court, and neither is a finding of a French court.

Two neighbouring facts in the dispatch matter only as context, and they must not be merged with the sentence. The Associated Press says that after arrest in Berlin, Maja T. was extradited to Hungary in December 2024, and that Germany’s Constitutional Court ruled last year that the extradition was unlawful because it could not be guaranteed that the defendant would not face inhuman or degrading treatment. The official German chronology, set out in the next section, does not match that compression. The arrest in Berlin was in December 2023. The surrender was on 28 June 2024. The constitutional order is dated 24 January 2025. The holding is a failure to investigate, not a finding that inhuman treatment had already been established. Readers who saw only the wire should treat the court’s press release as the source for those dates and for that holding.

The dispatch also records that former Prime Minister Viktor Orbán designated antifa a terrorist organisation last year, and that other supporters have doubted the chance of a fair trial in Hungary. Deutsche Welle, in its 4 February 2026 report of the first-instance sentence, likewise places a Hungarian terrorist-organisation listing of antifa in 2025. A political designation of a movement is not a judicial finding that this defendant is a member of a criminal organisation. The appeals court, if the Associated Press has the oral ruling right, reached the opposite conclusion on the criminal-organisation count. A terrorist label also does not, by itself, prove or disprove a fair-trial complaint. It is a fact a defence might invoke. It is not a French ground of refusal until a chamber finds that the statutory test is met.

A related case is mentioned only because the wire mentions it, and it is not this judgment. The Associated Press recalls that Italian activist Ilaria Salis was jailed in Hungary for more than a year after the 2023 assaults, released to house arrest in May 2024, and released a month later after winning a seat in the European Parliament. It says Hungarian prosecutors have sought an eleven-year sentence for her, and that the European Parliament refused a request to suspend her immunity. Those sentences are the wire’s account. They are not a reading of a parliamentary resolution or of a Hungarian indictment. They show why the Budapest file has a European audience. They do not supply the offence, the penalty, or the detention findings that a French chamber would need in Maja T.’s own file.

What, then, is safe to take from 30 September 2026? A Hungarian appeals court sat. It reduced a sentence from eight years to seven, according to the Associated Press. It is reported to have rejected a criminal-organisation characterisation and to have treated the defendant as an accomplice on one count. The prosecution’s request for fourteen years did not succeed. The defence request for acquittal did not succeed either, if a sentence remains. The written reasons, the exact counts, the Hungarian offence labels, and any further extraordinary remedy are not in the sources read for this piece. A European arrest warrant issued after that hearing would have to be read against the judgment, not against this paragraph.

B. The 24 January 2025 order: a failure to investigate, not a proved Article 4 violation in the prison

The Federal Constitutional Court’s English press release of 6 February 2025 is the source used here for the German holding. It summarises the order of 24 January 2025, 2 BvR 1103/24. This article has not read the full order line by line. Where the press release and a secondary headline diverge, the press release controls. Legal Tribune Online identifies the complainant as Maja T. and reports the same case number. The Court itself, in the press release, speaks only of a German national who identifies as non-binary.

The facts the Court records are these. Hungarian authorities charged the complainant, together with others, with attacking alleged far-right sympathisers in Budapest in February 2023, and with being a member of a criminal organisation. The complainant was arrested in Berlin in December 2023, on the basis of, among other things, a European arrest warrant issued at the request of the Hungarian authorities. On 27 June 2024 the Berlin Higher Regional Court, the Kammergericht, declared the extradition permissible. In the night of 27 to 28 June 2024 the surrender began. At 6:50 a.m. on 28 June 2024 German authorities handed the complainant to Austrian authorities for transit. An application for a preliminary injunction reached the Federal Constitutional Court at about 7:38 a.m. The Court issued a preliminary injunction at 10:50 a.m., provisionally prohibiting surrender to the Hungarian authorities, and instructed the Berlin chief public prosecution office to try to prevent the handover and to obtain a return to Germany. Only at 11:47 a.m. did that office inform the Court that Austrian authorities had already handed the complainant to Hungarian authorities at 10:00 a.m. The injunction came too late.

The complaint succeeded in the sense the press release states. To the extent the complainant asserted a violation of Article 4 of the Charter, the constitutional complaint was admissible and well-founded. The press release says the challenged order violates the complainant in their fundamental right under Article 4 of the Charter, because the Berlin court failed to satisfy its obligation to clarify fully the facts relevant to surrender. In particular, it failed to investigate sufficiently the detention conditions that awaited the complainant. That is a review of the German court’s reasoning. It is not a finding that a named Hungarian prison has been proved to inflict inhuman treatment, and it is not an order, in the press release, requiring Hungary to release the person or to return them.

The duty the Court describes is concrete. The complainant’s submissions had given the Berlin court sufficient indications of systemic or generalised deficiencies: increasing overcrowding, violence by other detainees or by staff, and shortcomings in legal remedies. The Berlin court relied on an older decision of the Celle Higher Regional Court, which had found no remaining specific indications that conditions in one Hungarian prison violated Article 4, by reference to 2020 anti-overcrowding measures and a Committee for the Prevention of Torture report of 17 March 2020. More recent material was in the file, including declarations in lieu of oath by former prisoners and reports of the Hungarian Helsinki Committee. The Berlin court, the press release says, did not sufficiently consider that more recent evidence.

Assurances did not close the gap, on the Court’s account. A note verbale of 29 April 2024 transmitted a written guarantee from the Hungarian national prison authority. It described the European Convention, United Nations minimum rules, and the European Prison Rules as guiding principles to which Hungary had committed, and it said there were no known violent assaults linked to gender identity. The press release says that a general reference to a 2013 law, without information on actual current conditions and without a specific assurance for this complainant, could not automatically exclude a risk of treatment contrary to Article 4. The Berlin court already knew which prison had been designated for pre-trial detention. The next step, the Court says, would have been to clarify conditions in that prison. Guarantees from the requesting state do not relieve the executing court of its own prognosis of current risk, which is what makes it possible to test whether an assurance is reliable. That examination was missing. The same gap applied to an assurance that German consular officers could enter the prison and visit the complainant.

The second limb of the holding concerns the complainant’s non-binary identity, and it is easy to overread. The press release does not say that a non-binary identity is, by itself, a bar to surrender inside the European Union. It says the Berlin court could not automatically assume, on the material before it, that protection was sufficiently guaranteed. The Berlin court had attributed to the Hungarian authorities a risk assessment covering sexual orientation, gender identity, political views, origin, and other factors. That degree of specificity, the Constitutional Court says, could not be inferred from the written guarantee. The inference was also unconvincing because the same Berlin court had, in its detention order, treated current Hungarian government policy as gender-, homo- and transphobic, and as rolling back earlier equality measures. A Hungarian Helsinki Committee report of 27 May 2024, which was in the file, described a risk of verbal or physical harassment of lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, intersex and queer detainees by other detainees or by staff. The Hungarian authorities had stated that gender identity was not registered. If attacks linked to gender identity are not recorded as such, the Court says, it is unclear how discrimination on that ground is to be targeted. That is a failure of investigation and of reasoning. It is not a universal rule that every European arrest warrant from Hungary must be refused.

One further point in the press release matters for anyone who thinks the complaint became pointless once the train, or the helicopter, had left. The Court held that the complainant still had a legal interest. The challenged order was moot after surrender, but the surrender declared permissible was a severe and continuing interference, because the complainant was detained in a Hungarian prison. The speed of the operation had also made it effectively impossible to obtain a constitutional decision before the order took full effect. A French reader should not translate that into a power, in the press release, to unwind the Hungarian prosecution. The continuing interest justified hearing the complaint. It did not, on the text read here, annul the Budapest proceedings that later produced the February 2026 sentence and the 30 September 2026 appeal.

II. What a French court must test before executing a European arrest warrant in a file like this

A. Mutual recognition, detention conditions, and the strict limits on refusal

If the person were found in France, Hungary would not be asking for classical extradition under the regime that applies to states outside the European Union. Hungary is a member state. The instrument would be a European arrest warrant. Article 695-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, read as in force on 1 October 2026, defines it in these terms: « Le mandat d’arrêt européen est une décision judiciaire émise par un Etat membre de l’Union européenne, appelé Etat membre d’émission, en vue de l’arrestation et de la remise par un autre Etat membre, appelé Etat membre d’exécution, d’une personne recherchée pour l’exercice de poursuites pénales ou pour l’exécution d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté privative de liberté. » The same version carries a deferred repeal on 1 January 2029. It governs today. It is not a forecast of what a later code will say.

The threshold in article 695-12 is modest, and a seven-year sentence would clear it if the warrant were issued to enforce that sentence. The article covers « Les faits punis d’une peine privative de liberté d’une durée égale ou supérieure à un an ou, lorsqu’une condamnation à une peine est intervenue, quand la peine prononcée est égale ou supérieure à quatre mois d’emprisonnement ». A prosecution warrant and a sentence-enforcement warrant are not the same request. After 30 September 2026, if the Associated Press is right that a sentence stands, an issuing authority might seek execution of that sentence rather than a fresh prosecution. The French chamber would still have to read the form. Clearing four months, or one year, does not answer Article 4 of the Charter.

Refusal is the exception. The Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation, in its judgment of 7 August 2024, no. 24-81.863, said, under articles 695-24, 2°, and 695-33: « conformément au principe de reconnaissance mutuelle, l’exécution du mandat d’arrêt européen constitue le principe et le refus d’exécution, qui n’est possible que pour des motifs de non-exécution obligatoire ou facultative procédant de la décision-cadre 2002/584/JAI, est conçu comme une exception, à interpréter strictement ». The same judgment adds a procedural limit that defence teams sometimes miss. In the absence of a ground actually raised under article 695-24, 2°, the judges may not order supplementary information merely to check whether that optional ground is available. Mutual trust is the starting point. It is not a slogan that ends the hearing when fundamental rights are properly put in issue.

The mandatory grounds are in article 695-22. They include amnesty where French courts could have tried the facts, a final decision for the same facts with the penalty executed or no longer enforceable, and age under thirteen at the time of the facts. The fifth ground is the one a file like this will be said to raise: « S’il est établi que ledit mandat d’arrêt a été émis dans le but de poursuivre ou de condamner une personne en raison de son sexe, de sa race, de sa religion, de son origine ethnique, de sa nationalité, de sa langue, de ses opinions politiques ou de son orientation sexuelle ou identité de genre, ou qu’il peut être porté atteinte à la situation de cette personne pour l’une de ces raisons. » The statute requires that the prohibited purpose, or the risk of prejudice for one of those reasons, be established. A non-binary identity, a political opinion, or a governmental designation of a movement does not, by the mere fact of existing, establish the ground. Nor does the statute limit the enquiry to the issuing authority’s secret motive. The second limb, prejudice to the person’s situation, is wider than purpose. It is still a finding the chamber must make, and article 695-25 requires that « Tout refus d’exécuter un mandat d’arrêt européen doit être motivé. »

Detention conditions are not, in the code, one of the numbered grounds in articles 695-22 to 695-24. The Criminal Chamber has still required the investigating chamber to look at them when the point is raised. In its judgment of 21 January 2025, no. 24-87.212, it recorded the lower court’s statement that « si l’effectivité du danger que représenterait pour sa vie le transfert de la personne recherchée n’entre pas dans les motifs de refus prévus par les articles 695-22 à 695-24 du code de procédure pénale, il appartient néanmoins à la chambre de l’instruction de vérifier si les droits fondamentaux de celle-ci seront respectés en cas de remise. » The Court then held: « En se déterminant ainsi, la chambre de l’instruction a justifié sa décision. » The explanation is demanding, and it cuts both ways. The chamber had, « dans l’exercice de son pouvoir souverain d’appréciation, en réponse à l’argumentation du demandeur relative au risque d’exposition à des traitements inhumains ou dégradants et aux conséquences de la remise sur sa santé, d’une part, écarté le risque de défaillances systémiques et généralisées au sein des établissements pénitentiaires de l’Etat membre d’émission, d’autre part, relevé l’absence de motifs sérieux et avérés de croire que la remise exposerait l’intéressé à un risque réel de réduction significative de son espérance de vie ou de détérioration rapide, significative et irrémédiable de son état de santé, de sorte qu’elle n’était pas tenue de surseoir à ladite remise ni de solliciter des informations complémentaires auprès de l’autorité judiciaire d’émission. » That judgment is on the Court’s public record for pourvoi 24-87.212. It was an Italian warrant, not a Hungarian one. It does not decide Maja T.’s case. It does decide the method.

The method is the point of contact with Karlsruhe. The German court faulted Berlin for relying on an older, more favourable picture and for not testing a general assurance against more recent, specific material, including the prison actually designated. A French chamber faced with a similar file would not be free to stop at the principle of mutual trust, and it would not be free to treat every critical report as automatic proof. Judgment 24-87.212 shows that generalist press articles and a general report were not, in that file, objective and precise evidence of systemic deficiencies. Judgment of 29 July 2026, no. 26-84.072, shows the other half of the same discipline. The Criminal Chamber rejected the appeal because « les juges ont examiné et écarté, par d’autres énonciations que celles visées au moyen, les atteintes alléguées par M. [N] aux droits fondamentaux mentionnés à l’article 1er, § 3, de la décision-cadre 2002/584/JAI du Conseil du 13 juin 2002. » The decision is publicly available under that number. Examination is required. Success is not.

Where the warrant’s information is insufficient to decide on surrender, article 695-33 gives the chamber a tool the Berlin court was held not to have used properly: « Si la chambre de l’instruction estime que les informations communiquées par l’Etat membre d’émission dans le mandat d’arrêt européen sont insuffisantes pour lui permettre de statuer sur la remise, elle demande à l’autorité judiciaire dudit Etat la fourniture, dans le délai maximum de dix jours pour leur réception, des informations complémentaires nécessaires. » A request for the actual prison, the regime that would apply to a non-binary detainee, and whether gender identity is recorded, would be the French equivalent of the clarification Karlsruhe said was missing. Judgment 24-81.863 limits that tool when it is used to fish for an optional ground nobody has raised. It does not forbid a request when the chamber cannot yet answer a fundamental-rights objection that is before it. Judgment 24-87.212 shows the converse: if the evidence does not demonstrate systemic deficiencies or a real individual risk, the chamber is not obliged to ask for more.

Health and dignity can delay surrender. They do not, under the code, refuse it. Article 695-38 provides that the rules on the ten-day handover « ne font pas obstacle à ce que la chambre de l’instruction, après avoir statué sur l’exécution du mandat d’arrêt européen, puisse surseoir temporairement à la remise pour des raisons humanitaires sérieuses, en particulier si la remise de la personne recherchée est susceptible d’avoir pour elle des conséquences graves en raison notamment de son âge ou de son état de santé. » The postponement is temporary. A new date is agreed. At the end of the further ten days, detention without surrender leads to release unless another provision applies. A father’s account of solitary confinement, denied by the prison administration, is not yet the medical file article 695-38 requires. It may be a reason to ask for one. It is not, standing alone, a reasoned refusal.

B. Criminal organisation, political motive, specialty, and the Paris court

The appeal development that most changes a future warrant, if the Associated Press has the oral ruling right, is the rejection of the criminal-organisation label and the shift from perpetrator to accomplice on one count. French law does not re-try that point as if the chambre de l’instruction were a Hungarian appeal court. It asks whether the warrant, as filled in by the issuing judicial authority, may be executed.

Article 695-23 states the double-criminality rule and its exception. « L’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen peut également être refusée si le fait faisant l’objet dudit mandat d’arrêt ne constitue pas une infraction au regard de la loi française. » The next sentence removes that control when the issuing state’s penalty is at least three years and the conduct falls into a category listed in article 694-32: « un mandat d’arrêt européen est exécuté sans contrôle de la double incrimination des faits reprochés lorsque les agissements considérés sont, aux termes de la loi de l’Etat membre d’émission, punis d’une peine privative de liberté d’une durée égale ou supérieure à trois ans d’emprisonnement ou d’une mesure de sûreté privative de liberté d’une durée similaire et entrent dans l’une des catégories d’infractions prévues par l’article 694-32. » When that exception applies, « la qualification juridique des faits et la détermination de la peine encourue relèvent de l’appréciation exclusive de l’autorité judiciaire de l’Etat membre d’émission. » A seven-year sentence is above three years. The French question would then be the category ticked on the form, not a fresh French indictment.

Article 694-32, which article 695-23 incorporates by reference, lists « 1° Participation à une organisation criminelle » and « 14° Homicide volontaire, coups et blessures graves ». Its own opening words concern a decision of investigation, not a European arrest warrant. The cross-reference in article 695-23 is nonetheless express. If a Hungarian warrant still described the conduct as participation in a criminal organisation, or as grievous violence, and the issuing-state penalty met the three-year threshold, the French chamber would not rebuild the offence under French labels. The Budapest appeal, as reported, may have removed the criminal-organisation characterisation. If the written judgment says that, and if a later warrant still ticks that box, the mismatch is a point about the content of the warrant under article 695-13, not an invitation for the French court to ignore article 695-23. This article cannot make that comparison. The written judgment and any future warrant have not been read.

Optional grounds in article 695-24 will be pleaded, and most of them do not fit a German national sought for acts in Budapest unless the file shows more. The second ground allows refusal « Si la personne recherchée pour l’exécution d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté privatives de liberté est de nationalité française, a établi sa résidence sur le territoire national ou demeure sur ce territoire et si la décision de condamnation est exécutoire sur le territoire français en application de l’article 728-31 ». Nationality, or residence, or dwelling in France, is not enough. The foreign sentence must also be enforceable in France under article 728-31, which this article does not unpack because that provision was not the text needed to answer the warrant question. A short stay in France does not become a ground of refusal. Other optional grounds cover French proceedings already opened, facts committed in whole or in part in France, extraterritorial offences French law would not pursue, a final third-state decision, and French prescription where French courts could have tried the facts. None of those is established by the wires read here.

A different rule applies where the person is French, or has lived lawfully and without interruption in France for at least five years, and the warrant is for prosecution rather than for a sentence already passed. Article 695-32 says execution « peut être subordonnée à la vérification qu’elle peut être renvoyée en France pour y effectuer la peine qui sera éventuellement prononcée par l’autorité judiciaire de l’Etat d’émission ». That is a condition, not a refusal, and it looks forward to a penalty not yet imposed. It would not, on its own wording, convert a seven-year Hungarian sentence into a right to serve that sentence in France. Judgment 24-81.863 is a reminder that the social-rehabilitation ground in article 695-24, 2°, has to be raised, and that its aim is to increase the chances of reintegration. It is not a general humanitarian veto.

Specialty is the rule that survives surrender, and it is where the appeal’s change of characterisation would keep working. When France is the issuing state, article 695-18 provides that the person surrendered to France « ne peut être poursuivie, condamnée ou détenue en vue de l’exécution d’une peine privative de liberté pour un fait quelconque antérieur à la remise et autre que celui qui a motivé cette mesure », except in listed cases, including an express waiver and later consent. The Criminal Chamber, on 5 October 2021, no. 21-84.194, drew the same limit from Article 27 of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA and from that article. It held that « lorsque le ministère public qui a émis le mandat d’arrêt européen a obtenu la remise de la personne recherchée, celle-ci ne peut être poursuivie, condamnée ou détenue en vue de l’exécution d’une peine privative de liberté pour un fait quelconque antérieur à la remise et autre que celui qui a motivé cette mesure, sauf dans l’un des cas énumérés audit article. » The decision is on the Court’s site. It concerns a person surrendered to France. It is the mirror, not the Hungarian file.

When France is the executing state, the consent decision after surrender sits with the same chamber. Article 695-46 provides that « La chambre de l’instruction devant laquelle la personne recherchée a comparu est saisie de toute demande émanant des autorités compétentes de l’Etat membre d’émission en vue de consentir à des poursuites ou à la mise à exécution d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté prononcées pour d’autres infractions que celles ayant motivé la remise et commises antérieurement à celle-ci. » Consent is given when the conduct is one of the article 694-32 offences and falls within article 695-12. It is refused for a ground in articles 695-22 and 695-23, and it may be refused for a ground in article 695-24. If France surrendered a person on an assault warrant, a later request to prosecute a criminal-organisation count that the issuing state’s own appeal had rejected would have to be examined as a different prior offence, not as a detail already covered. A waiver of specialty given at the surrender hearing is, under article 695-31, irrevocable once the chamber has recorded it after explaining the consequences. That is a reason not to treat consent to surrender, or a waiver, as a formality.

The calendar, if the person were arrested in France, is statutory, and it is shorter than many people expect from classical extradition. Article 695-27 requires that « Toute personne appréhendée en exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen doit être conduite dans les quarante-huit heures devant le procureur général territorialement compétent. » The prosecutor general verifies identity, explains the warrant in a language the person understands, and notifies the right to a lawyer, including a lawyer in the issuing state. Article 695-28 then sends the person, if not left at liberty, before the first president of the court of appeal or a judge he designates, who orders incarceration « à la maison d’arrêt du siège de la cour d’appel dans le ressort de laquelle elle a été appréhendée », unless appearance at later hearings is sufficiently guaranteed. Article 695-29 seizes the investigating chamber at once. « La personne recherchée comparaît devant elle dans un délai de cinq jours ouvrables à compter de la date de sa présentation au procureur général. »

The hearing is public unless publicity would harm the conduct of the proceedings, the interests of a third party, or the dignity of the person. That limit is in article 695-30: « L’audience est publique, sauf si la publicité est de nature à nuire au bon déroulement de la procédure en cours, aux intérêts d’un tiers ou à la dignité de la personne. » A closed hearing is a decision of the chamber, on the application of the prosecution or of the person sought, or of its own motion. It is not an automatic right flowing from gender identity. The person is heard, assisted by a lawyer if they have one, and by an interpreter if needed. The issuing state may be authorised to attend through a designated person. It does not become a party.

If the person consents, article 695-31 requires the chamber to explain that consent is irrevocable, and to ask whether specialty is waived, after explaining that waiver too. The decision then comes within seven days of the appearance, unless further information has been ordered, and it is not subject to appeal. If the person does not consent, « la chambre de l’instruction statue par une décision dans le délai de vingt jours à compter de la date de sa comparution ». That decision may be taken to the Court of Cassation by the prosecutor general or by the person sought. Once the decision is final, article 695-37 requires handover « au plus tard dans les dix jours suivant la date de la décision définitive de la chambre de l’instruction ». Force majeure can move the date once. It does not erase the fundamental-rights examination that should already have been done.

An arrest in Paris, or elsewhere in Île-de-France, does not create a separate European regime. It identifies the court. The investigating chamber is that of the court of appeal in whose district the person was apprehended. An arrest in Paris therefore goes to the Paris court of appeal, and the remand prison, if detention is ordered, is the remand prison of that court’s seat, not a prison chosen for political convenience. An arrest at an airport or a station outside that district goes to the court of appeal of that other district. The deadlines above do not change because the arrest was in the capital. What can change is practical: the language of the warrant, the availability of an interpreter, the speed with which the designated prison’s conditions can be described by the issuing authority, and whether the person can show five years of lawful uninterrupted residence for article 695-32, or a dwelling that might matter under article 695-24, 2°, together with enforceability under article 728-31. None of those local facts is known in this file, because there is no French arrest.

The same Paris chamber is the one that would later decide a specialty request under article 695-46. That continuity is the practical reason to build the record at the surrender hearing, not afterwards. Assurances about the designated prison, about registration of gender identity, about consular access, and about the exact counts still pursued after the 30 September 2026 appeal, are useful only if they are in the file the chamber actually judges. Karlsruhe held that a general assurance, untested against the prison named and against more recent reports, was not enough for the Berlin court. A Paris chamber applying judgment 24-87.212 would be entitled to reach a different factual conclusion on a different record. It would not be entitled to skip the question. The wider French path before that chamber is set out in how French extradition procedure works before the chamber of the investigation. The European arrest warrant has its own articles, cited above. The classical extradition timetable should not be pasted onto this warrant.

Conclusion

The news of 30 September 2026 is a sentence reduction, reported by the Associated Press from a Budapest courtroom, from eight years to seven, with a reported rejection of a criminal-organisation characterisation and a shift to accomplice on one count. The prosecution did not obtain fourteen years. The defence did not obtain an acquittal, if a sentence remains. The written reasons have not been read here. Deutsche Welle dates the first-instance eight-year sentence to 4 February 2026. Claims of solitary confinement are the father’s account to the Associated Press, and they are denied, in the same dispatch, by Hungarian authorities and the prison service. A terrorist-organisation designation of a movement, reported for 2025, is not a finding that this defendant belongs to a criminal organisation.

The German decision that the wire compressed is older and more precise. Order of 24 January 2025, 2 BvR 1103/24, published on 6 February 2025, holds that the Berlin Higher Regional Court violated Article 4 of the Charter by failing to investigate detention conditions and the protection of a non-binary detainee before declaring surrender permissible. The arrest was in December 2023. The surrender was completed on the morning of 28 June 2024, before a preliminary injunction issued at 10:50 a.m. could take effect. The press release does not find proved inhuman treatment in a named prison, does not name the complainant, and does not quash the later Hungarian sentence. Secondary identification of the complainant as Maja T. is consistent across the Associated Press and Legal Tribune Online. It is not a sentence of the Court’s own press release.

A French court seized of a European arrest warrant in a file of this kind would start from mutual recognition. Articles 695-11 and 695-12 would be met by a member-state warrant seeking at least four months of an imposed sentence, or one year of an offence not yet judged. Article 695-22, 5°, would refuse execution only if it were established that the warrant was issued to prosecute or punish because of political opinions, gender identity, or another listed ground, or that the person’s situation might be prejudiced for one of those reasons. Articles 695-23 and 694-32 would remove French double-criminality control if the issuing authority classified the conduct in a listed category and the issuing-state penalty was at least three years. Judgments 24-87.212 and 26-84.072 would still require a real examination of fundamental rights, and they would uphold surrender where systemic deficiencies and a real individual risk are not shown. Article 695-33 would allow a focused request for the designated prison. Article 695-38 could delay handover for serious humanitarian reasons. It would not replace a refusal. Specialty under article 695-46 would remain after surrender, especially if a count abandoned on appeal were later revived.

No French warrant exists in this matter. No French judge has ruled on these facts. The texts cited were read as in force on 1 October 2026, with the deferred repeal date already noted. Any future warrant, assurance, or written Hungarian judgment would prevail over this general analysis. Only the competent court decides.

📄 Official circular