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National Weather Service Outage: Can You Sue If a Missed Warning Causes Damage?

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Sources: U.S. court opinions and official U.S. government publications, read for this article

Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Hassan KOHEN
Attorney at the Paris Bar

National Weather Service Outage: Can You Sue If a Missed Warning Causes Damage?

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On Friday, November 13, 2026, the National Weather Service’s website showed that the agency was experiencing nationwide internet and communications problems that could keep users from reaching products on its websites or cause outdated information to be displayed, according to a Reuters report dated the same day. Later that day, the agency said its radars were operating normally, that its radar website was fully operational and that outdated content from isolated webpages had been circulating, Reuters reported. Searches for “national weather service outage” climbed across the United States as people asked whether forecasts and warnings were still getting through.

Behind that worry sits a legal question: if a forecast is wrong, a warning never arrives or a federal weather system goes down, can someone who suffers a loss sue the federal government? Federal law allows damages claims for the negligence of federal employees, but a statutory exception for discretionary functions defeated the leading weather-forecast claim, and the Supreme Court reads that exception to cover operational choices that are susceptible to policy analysis. A claim stands on firmer ground when a written directive left no choice, when the government held out a specific aid as working, or when the failure was routine maintenance with no policy content. In every case, nothing can be filed in court until a written administrative claim has reached the right federal agency within the statutory time limit. The discussion that follows is general in scope: it describes checks useful in comparable situations and makes no findings about the National Weather Service’s systems or about any party named in the decisions discussed.

I. Can you sue the federal government when a weather warning fails?

A. The Federal Tort Claims Act opens the door, and the discretionary-function exception narrows it

The starting point is federal, and it applies nationwide. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions for money damages “for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment,” under circumstances where a private person would be liable under the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. A companion provision, 28 U.S.C. § 2674, makes the United States liable “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances,” but not for interest before judgment or for punitive damages. In practice there are two layers: a state-law tort, usually negligence, measured by the law of the state where the act or omission happened, and a federal statute that decides whether the United States has agreed to answer for it at all.

That agreement has exceptions. The one that matters most for weather is in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), which excludes any claim “based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.” The final clause is the hard part for anyone convinced that a forecast office made a poor call: the statute shields discretionary choices even when they turn out to be wrong. The same section lists other exceptions that can matter after a weather event, including subsection (h), which excludes claims “arising out of” misrepresentation, and subsection (d), which excludes claims for which chapter 309 or 311 of title 46, relating to suits in admiralty against the United States, provides a remedy. A boater or a fishing crew harmed at sea may therefore be steered toward the federal admiralty statutes rather than the Tort Claims Act, although, as discussed below, the leading forecasting case applied the same discretion limit in that setting.

The Supreme Court set the test that courts still apply in United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991), a case about federal savings and loan regulators decided by the Supreme Court on March 26, 1991. The Court first asks whether the challenged conduct involves an element of judgment or choice; it does not if a federal statute, regulation or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for the employee to follow. If there was choice, the Court asks whether the judgment is of the kind the exception was designed to shield, meaning decisions grounded in social, economic or political policy. Gaubert rejected the idea that only high-level planning decisions qualify: “Discretionary conduct is not confined to the policy or planning level.” When established policy allows an employee to exercise discretion, the Court said, it must be presumed that the employee’s acts are grounded in policy, and a complaint must allege facts showing that the challenged actions are not the kind of conduct that can be said to be grounded in the policy of the regulatory regime. The Court also supplied the counterexample that still anchors the other side of the line: an official who drives negligently on an official mission is not protected, because decisions made while driving can hardly be said to be grounded in regulatory policy. For a person hurt during a weather-service disruption, Gaubert means the claim must point to a specific choice that was either dictated by a written rule or untouched by policy, not merely to a bad outcome.

That test is very much alive. In 21st Century Centennial Insurance Co. v. United States, No. 6:24-cv-00092-MTK (D. Or. Feb. 11, 2026), the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon cited Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, in sorting claims arising from the 2020 Holiday Farm Fire, which the plaintiffs attributed to a federal agency’s power lines. The court held that “The identification and removal of a fall-into danger tree is not protected by the discretionary function exception,” because the crews applied technical criteria and a mandatory removal schedule rather than policy judgments, and it rejected a budget-based argument by quoting Ninth Circuit precedent that Congress “did not intend to protect decision-making based on budgetary constraints.” The same court dismissed the claims that the agency should have cut power to its lines, because those decisions required balancing reliability, safety, cost and expedition. The opinion also recites that the National Weather Service had forecast strong winds before the fire and that a fire weather watch followed, but the weather service was not the defendant whose conduct was judged. What the ruling shows is the Gaubert line running through a single disaster: routine, rule-bound maintenance on one side, policy-laden operating choices on the other.

The Supreme Court revisited the Act more recently without narrowing that exception. In Martin v. United States, No. 24-362 (June 12, 2025), a unanimous Supreme Court held that the law enforcement proviso in § 2680(h) overrides only the intentional-tort exception in that subsection, not the discretionary-function exception in subsection (a), and that the Supremacy Clause does not give the United States a separate defense in suits under the Act. The Court sent the case back for the lower court to decide whether the discretionary-function exception bars the claims and then, for any claim that survives, whether a private individual under like circumstances would be liable under state law, subject to the defenses listed in § 2674. The opinion acknowledged that lower courts have taken different views of the exception, including whether it protects conduct marked by individual carelessness rather than policy considerations, and expressly left those questions for another day. For anyone weighing a weather claim, Martin confirms the order of analysis: first the statutory exceptions, then ordinary state tort law, with no Supremacy Clause defense layered on top.

Martin also settles who answers for a mistake. The Court described the Tort Claims Act as the exclusive remedy for damages claims arising out of federal employees’ official conduct. A person who blames a particular forecaster, technician or office manager for a missed warning therefore does not ordinarily sue that individual for damages; the claim, if there is one, runs against the United States, through the administrative process described in Part II.

B. What the forecasting and warning cases actually decided

The case closest to a forecasting failure is Brown v. United States, 790 F.2d 199 (1st Cir. 1986), decided on May 13, 1986, by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Two fishing vessels left Hyannis, Massachusetts, after National Weather Service marine broadcasts predicted good weather; a storm of sudden and explosive development caught them on Georges Bank, one vessel sank, and crew members were lost. The trial court, hearing the case under the Suits in Admiralty Act, found the government negligent in not predicting the storm’s path earlier, on a theory built around its failure to repair or replace a sporadically malfunctioning weather buoy, and awarded damages. The First Circuit reversed. Noting that liability under that statute corresponds with the Tort Claims Act, it held that a weather service is a discretionary function: whether a fully adequate forecast would call for more buoys, more advanced computers or more operators is a matter Congress reserved to appropriations and to the agencies, and “A weather forecast is a classic example of a prediction of indeterminate reliability.” The court also refused to treat the decision not to announce the suspended buoy data in the Notice to Mariners as actionable, calling the government’s policy not to report changes in its weather computing system a classic discretionary matter. Brown is a 1986 ruling from one federal circuit, and the citation search run for this article found no decision from 2024 to 2026 applying it, so read it as the leading illustration for weather forecasts rather than as confirmed current law in every circuit. Applied to an outage, Brown suggests that claims attacking the quality of a forecast, or the resources behind it, face the steepest climb.

Brown drew its line by contrasting a much older Supreme Court decision, Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955), decided on November 21, 1955. There a lighthouse light on an island off the Gulf Coast had gone out, and a tug towing a barge went aground. A divided Supreme Court held that the Coast Guard did not have to undertake the lighthouse service, but once it operated the light and “engendered reliance on the guidance afforded by the light,” it had to use due care to keep the light in good working order and, if the light went out, to discover the failure and repair the light or give warning that it was not functioning; if the Coast Guard failed in that duty and caused damage, the United States was liable under the Act. Two features limit that ruling. The government did not invoke the discretionary-function exception in that case, and the First Circuit in Brown read Indian Towing narrowly, stressing that the government there had represented that an operating light was present, while the weather service had made no affirmative misstatement that the buoy was providing data. For an outage, the practical distinction is between a general forecast service, which Brown protects, and a specific aid the government holds out as live and working, which is where an Indian Towing argument begins.

A second statutory obstacle concerns information itself. If the only harm is that someone relied on wrong or stale information the government published, the government can be expected to argue that the claim arises out of misrepresentation under § 2680(h). In Morris v. United States, No. 24-40576 (5th Cir. May 18, 2026), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit drew that line in a very different setting. Taking the complaint’s allegations as true at the jurisdictional stage, the court described a federal probation officer who, after a woman reported threats from a man on federal supervised release, promised her that a warrant would issue immediately, but then did not inform the court, the prosecutors or local police of the danger before the man attacked her. The court held that the misrepresentation exception did not apply, because the claim rested on the officer’s failure to carry out an operational task rather than on the communication of misinformation, and that the discretionary-function exception did not apply either, because once the officer decided to seek an expedited warrant, the failure to act on that decision was not susceptible to policy analysis. The court added a caution worth quoting: “We do not today create liability every time a federal employee negligently implements a policy.” The same opinion described Indian Towing as being “on uncertain footing in the realm of the discretionary function exception,” while still treating it as a helpful illustration of the difference between a policy decision and the failure to carry it out. Transposed to weather, a decision about which warnings to issue would likely remain protected, while a claim that an office decided to send a specific warning and then never transmitted it could sit closer to Morris than to Brown.

Put these decisions side by side and an outage can be sorted into three kinds of failure. The first is a forecast that was simply wrong or late, which is the Brown pattern and the hardest claim to bring. The second is a dissemination failure, where a warning existed but did not reach the public; whether that is protected depends on whether a written directive required a particular step, and on whether the failure reflects a policy judgment about how to warn or a failure to carry out a judgment already made. The third is an equipment or maintenance failure, such as a radar, a buoy or a server. Here the case law does not speak with one voice: Brown treated decisions about repairing and replacing a buoy as resource allocation protected by the exception, while the 2026 Oregon ruling, applying Ninth Circuit precedent, refused to protect routine maintenance governed by fixed criteria and rejected budget constraints as a policy justification. Which approach governs a given claim can depend on the circuit where the claim would be filed and on what the agency’s written maintenance standards actually say.

II. What should someone harmed during a warning failure do?

A. File the administrative claim first, and describe the warning failure in it

Before any lawsuit, the Act requires an administrative claim. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), an action “shall not be instituted” on such a claim unless the claimant first presented it to the appropriate federal agency and the agency finally denied it in writing, sent by certified or registered mail. If the agency does not make a final disposition within six months after the claim is filed, the statute lets the claimant, at the claimant’s option any time thereafter, treat that silence as a final denial. A complaint filed before one of those two events occurs runs against the statute’s command.

The time limits are in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b): a tort claim against the United States “shall be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues or unless action is begun within six months after the date of mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was presented.” The statute sets those two windows. When a particular weather-related loss “accrues” is a separate question that the statutory text does not answer, and the sources read for this article do not resolve it for weather claims. The cautious course is to treat the earliest plausible date as the starting point and to file well inside two years, then to calendar the six-month window from the date a denial is mailed.

The Justice Department’s regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 14.2, says in paragraph (a) that a claim is presented when a federal agency receives “an executed Standard Form 95 or other written notification of an incident, accompanied by a claim for money damages in a sum certain” for injury or loss alleged to have occurred by reason of the incident. Under paragraph (b)(1), the claim goes to the federal agency whose activities gave rise to it; a claim sent to another agency is to be transferred if the proper agency can be identified from the claim, and it counts as presented for § 2401(b) purposes as of the date the appropriate agency receives it. That is one more reason not to wait until the end of the two-year window and then gamble on the address. Paragraph (c) also allows a pending claim to be amended in writing before final agency action or before the claimant exercises the § 2675(a) option, and it gives the agency six months from a timely amendment to make a final disposition.

For weather, federal law identifies the responsible department. Under 15 U.S.C. § 313, the Secretary of Commerce “shall have charge of the forecasting of weather, the issue of storm warnings,” the display of weather and flood signals, and the distribution of meteorological information, among other duties. The statute describes those duties in broad terms. It does not say how many radars to operate, how to route data or how quickly a webpage must refresh. That breadth matters twice: it points to the department whose activities would give rise to a forecasting or warning claim, and, under Gaubert, the absence of a specifically prescribed course of action tends to leave room for exactly the kind of judgment the discretionary-function exception protects.

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Abbott v. United States, 78 F.4th 887 (6th Cir. 2023), decided on August 17, 2023, shows both how forgiving and how risky the claim form can be. After a 2016 wildfire escaped Great Smoky Mountains National Park and burned into Gatlinburg, Tennessee, residents filed Standard Form 95 claims stating that the government had failed to follow mandatory regulations to monitor and extinguish the fire. When they sued, they also pressed claims that the National Park Service had failed to warn them, and the district court dismissed those warning claims as never presented. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the dismissal, holding that a claimant need not articulate the precise cause of action and that the forms gave the agency enough notice, because the monitoring, firefighting and warning failures formed a single course of action allegedly handled by the same official. It also held that the park’s fire plan, which said that neighbors, visitors and residents “will be notified” of fire activities with the potential to affect them, required an antecedent assessment, so the discretionary-function question had to be decided again on remand with further factual development. One judge’s concurrence warned that the plaintiffs had barely satisfied the requirement and that future plaintiffs should clearly state what claims they plan to bring. The lesson for a weather-related claim is direct: name the warning failure itself in the administrative claim, not just the damage it caused.

The amount deserves the same care. Under § 2675(b), a later lawsuit may not seek more than the amount presented to the agency, except where the increase rests on newly discovered evidence that was not reasonably discoverable when the claim was presented, or on allegation and proof of intervening facts relating to the amount. Because § 2674 rules out punitive damages and interest before judgment, the sum certain should reflect documented compensatory losses: repair estimates and invoices, medical bills, lost income and replacement costs. A claimant who later discovers additional damage can use the amendment procedure in § 14.2(c) while the claim is still pending, rather than hoping a court will allow a higher figure afterward.

B. Build the claim around a written duty, and plan for the likely answer

The Sixth Circuit returned to the same fire in American Reliable Insurance Co. v. United States, Nos. 22-6014/23-5439 (6th Cir. June 28, 2024), a suit by insurance companies that had paid claims to policyholders and then sued the United States. Citing Abbott, 78 F.4th 887, as its recent published decision on the warning claims, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the government’s facial challenge to those claims and remanded them for the same analysis. On the other claims the court divided the conduct: the way the fire was monitored and the use of a decision-support system were treated as discretionary fire-suppression judgments, but the failure to use the mandatory incident-command structure was not protected, because written interagency policy left no choice. Two judges wrote separately, one of them dissenting on the command-structure claim and warning that the ruling risked a split with other circuits. For a weather-related claim, the case shows why the most useful evidence is a written, mandatory instruction, a manual or directive that says what must be done, as opposed to general goals that leave room for judgment.

Both Sixth Circuit cases also show who tends to bring these claims. Homeowners and families filed claims in Abbott, and insurers that had already paid policyholders sued in American Reliable, as insurers did in the Oregon fire litigation. A homeowner who has been paid by an insurer should therefore expect that the insurer may pursue its own claim for what it paid, and should keep the insurer informed about any federal claim the homeowner files for uninsured losses, so that the two claims describe the same incident consistently.

Put together, the cases suggest a short list of questions to answer before investing in a claim. What exactly failed: the content of a forecast, the dissemination of a warning that had already been issued, or equipment such as a radar, a buoy or a server? Was there a written rule that prescribed the specific step that was missed, or only a general mission statement such as § 313? Did the government affirmatively hold out a particular product as live and current when it was not, which is the Indian Towing pattern, or did it produce a less accurate forecast, which is the Brown pattern? Would the claim really be about relying on wrong information, which invites a misrepresentation defense under § 2680(h), or about a failure to perform a task the agency had decided to perform, which is the Morris pattern? And can the loss be traced to the failure rather than to the weather itself? Brown drew its dividing line around the same idea: liability has followed when the government created a danger after its discretionary decision had been made, and in a forecasting case the government did not create the weather.

Evidence on those questions is perishable, so it is worth preserving early. Useful items include screenshots of the agency pages a person consulted, with visible dates and times; any alert messages received or not received on a phone, a weather radio or a television broadcast; the local warnings that other sources issued at the time; and a timeline linking each step to the loss. Where a claim depends on a written directive, the directive itself and the version in force on the date of the event matter as much as the outcome, because Gaubert and the Sixth Circuit cases turn on what the written rule required and whether the employee had a choice.

If a claim survives the statutory exceptions, it is decided under the tort law of the state where the act or omission occurred, as § 1346(b)(1) provides and as Martin confirmed. State rules on duty, reliance and causation then become central, which means the merits can differ from one state to another even though the federal gatekeeping rules are the same everywhere. The government may also raise the defenses that § 2674 preserves, including any judicial or legislative immunity that the employee would have had, “as well as any other defenses to which the United States is entitled.” A person evaluating a claim should therefore read both the federal exceptions and the negligence law of the state where the relevant federal office acted.

Because the discretionary-function exception will defeat many forecast and warning claims, the realistic recovery route after weather damage often runs elsewhere. A property owner’s own insurance policy, read under state law, is usually the first document to check; our guide on whether a California homeowners policy covers a rain-triggered landslide shows how much turns on the policy’s exclusions and on the cause of the loss. Travelers caught in the same day’s disruptions faced a different set of rules, because a grounded or cancelled flight raises refund questions rather than a tort claim against a weather office, as our guide to FAA ground stop refunds explains. And anyone who suffered a loss on the water should look first at the admiralty route, because § 2680(d) removes from the Tort Claims Act claims for which chapter 309 or 311 of title 46 provides a remedy, and Brown itself was litigated in admiralty.

Conclusion

When a federal weather system falters or a forecast misses, federal law gives an injured person a claim in principle and a narrow path in practice. The Tort Claims Act waives immunity for the negligence of federal employees, but its discretionary-function exception, as the Supreme Court framed it in 1991 and as courts still applied it in 2026, protects judgments that are susceptible to policy analysis, and the leading forecasting decision treated weather prediction as exactly that kind of judgment. Claims stand a better chance when they target a specific step that a written directive required, an aid the government held out as working, a decision already made and then never carried out, or routine maintenance governed by fixed criteria in a circuit that refuses to protect it. Whatever the theory, nothing can be filed in court without a written claim to the right agency that names the failure, states a sum certain and respects the two-year and six-month windows in § 2401(b).

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