On 24 September 2026, France openly let a plane carrying a man wanted by the International Criminal Court cross its sky. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was flying to New York to address the United Nations General Assembly, and flight trackers showed his aircraft passing over Greece, Italy and France. Because the Court in The Hague has had an arrest warrant out for Mr Netanyahu since 21 November 2024, over alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity, every State Party to the Rome Statute on his route faced the same uncomfortable question: do we have to stop him? Paris answered no. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Pascal Confavreux told reporters that the overflight clearance was, in his words, “in full conformity with international law”, adding that, in the French reading, the Statute creates no obligations for overflights by a state aircraft carrying a person named in a warrant. The statement landed two days after United States President Donald Trump used his own General Assembly speech to urge every member of the Court to resign from what he called an out of control institution. France, which says it condemns threats against the Court, now had to explain why cooperation with that same Court did not mean grounding the plane. This analysis gives the French lawyer’s answer: why an overflight without landing triggers no arrest duty under the Statute, what the two Hague warrants actually order, and what would happen very differently if the aircraft touched French soil — because in France, an ICC fugitive who lands faces a surrender machine that moves in days, before the Paris chambre de l’instruction, with almost no room for the political arguments that dominate television debates.
I. Why France says letting the plane cross its airspace was lawful
A. What the ICC arrest warrants against Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant actually order
Any serious discussion starts with the warrants themselves, not with commentary about them. On 21 November 2024, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court issued a press release whose first paragraph deserves to be stated precisely: on 21 November 2024, Pre-Trial Chamber I, sitting for the Situation in the State of Palestine, unanimously rejected two Israeli challenges brought under articles 18 and 19 of the Rome Statute and issued arrest warrants for Mr Benjamin Netanyahu and Mr Yoav Gallant. The Chamber therefore did two things on the same day: it rejected Israel’s jurisdictional challenges and it issued the warrants. Both matter for France.
On jurisdiction, the Chamber’s reasoning was blunt. It noted, in the words of the official release, that that Israeli acceptance was unnecessary because the Court could rely on the territorial jurisdiction of Palestine as previously established by the Chamber. Israel had challenged the Court’s jurisdiction over the situation in general and over Israeli nationals in particular, but the judges held that a challenge brought before any warrant exists is premature, because that under article 19(1), states cannot bring an article 19(2) jurisdictional challenge before any warrant has been issued. The Prosecutor’s applications for the warrants had been filed on 20 May 2024, and the Chamber recalled that the Prosecution had notified Israel of the opening of its investigation back in 2021, when, despite an explicit clarification request, that Israel had chosen not to seek deferral of the investigation back in 2021. The parameters of the investigation had not changed since, so no fresh notification was required and there was that nothing justified suspending examination of the warrant applications. For readers in France, the practical point is that the warrants are not a political press release: they are judicial acts issued after adversarial jurisdictional litigation, and they remain in force until the judges withdraw them. Israel contests them and denies the allegations, but contestation does not suspend a warrant.
On substance, the Chamber issued the two warrants for alleged crimes against humanity and war crimes running from at least 8 October 2023 to at least 20 May 2024, the date the Prosecution applied for the warrants. The warrants are classified as secret, to protect witnesses and safeguard the investigations, but the Chamber published their existence because that similar conduct appeared to be continuing and because that victims and their families had an interest in knowing the warrants existed. Under the Statute, the relevant law is familiar to French criminal lawyers: the article 211-1 of the French Penal Code definition of genocide and the crimes-against-humanity framework that France itself prosecutes at home both descend from the same Nuremberg lineage as the Rome Statute. And one Statute provision answers in advance the most common television objection — that a sitting prime minister cannot be arrested. Article 27 of the Rome Statute provides: that the Statute applies equally to all persons regardless of official capacity, and that serving as head of state or government never exempts anyone from criminal responsibility nor mitigates the sentence by itself. Official capacity is therefore irrelevant to criminal responsibility before the Court. Whether it affects the separate question of arrest immunity for the head of government of a non-party State is a different legal debate — the one France sidestepped entirely by pointing to the sky.
B. Why an overflight with no landing creates no French duty to arrest
The French position rests on a single, verifiable treaty paragraph — and Paris is right about its text. Article 89 of the Rome Statute, which governs surrender of persons to the Court, states the general rule in its first paragraph: that States Parties must comply with arrest and surrender requests under the rules of the cooperation Part and their own national procedure. Read alone, that sentence sounds absolute. But the same article contains a transit regime that most commentators overlooked in the first hours of the controversy, and its paragraph 3(d) settles the overflight question on its face: where a person is flown across a country with no landing scheduled there, no authorisation is required. The provision continues logically: that only an unscheduled landing allows the transit state to demand a transit request from the Court, with the transported person held in custody throughout the transit. In other words, the drafters of the Statute drew a bright line between a person on the ground — who must be arrested and surrendered — and a person merely crossing the sky, who triggers nothing at all. A scheduled overflight with no landing is not a grey area, an exception, or a French invention. It is the default rule of paragraph 3(d), and it is why Mr Confavreux could say, without stretching the text, that the Statute imposes no overflight obligations.
Two supporting provisions confirm that Paris did not invent a loophole. First, Article 86 of the Rome Statute sets the general cooperation duty in deliberately qualified terms: that States Parties must cooperate fully with the Court in investigating and prosecuting crimes within its jurisdiction, but strictly as the Statute organises that cooperation. That qualifying language means cooperation is owed exactly as the Statute organises it — including through the transit paragraph that expressly excludes scheduled overflights. A State that demands an arrest in the sky would be asking for more than the Statute provides, not enforcing it. Second, Article 87 of the Rome Statute channels cooperation requests through diplomatic or designated channels and through Interpol, and French domestic law mirrors that architecture: article 627-1 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “Les demandes d’entraide émanant de la Cour pénale internationale sont adressées aux autorités compétentes en vertu de l’article 87 du statut en original ou en copie certifiée conforme accompagnées de toutes pièces justificatives”, with transmission to the anti-terrorism prosecutor of Paris who gives them “toutes suites utiles”. The French system is therefore built to receive, examine and execute Hague requests on the ground — requests for arrest, for surrender, for interim measures — not to scramble jets for aircraft that never enter French jurisdiction in any legally relevant sense. International air law points the same way: a foreign state aircraft enjoys sovereign status, and nothing in the cooperation Part of the Statute purports to override that principle for a mere transit.
That reading also explains the contrast with the precedents that critics immediately cited. When journalists recalled that Mr Netanyahu had flown a circuitous route to New York the previous year to avoid several European airspaces, including the French one, Reuters itself reported that detour as a media account of caution, not as a legal admission. Caution and obligation are different things: a defence team that advises a client under warrant to avoid even theoretical risk is doing its job, and a government that later grants a routine overflight clearance after its legal service has read paragraph 3(d) is doing its own. The comparison with the Vladimir Putin trip to Mongolia in 2024, often raised in the same breath, actually supports the French position rather than undermining it — Mongolia was criticised precisely because the wanted person physically entered the territory of a State Party, which is the exact situation paragraph 3(d) distinguishes from a transit without landing. Greece and Italy, over which the aircraft also flew according to flight-tracking data, applied the same analysis, and reports that Canada likewise cleared the flight complete the picture: no State Party on the route treated a high-altitude transit as an arrest situation, because the treaty text gives them no handle to do so. France added one political nuance of its own — condemning American threats against the Court while granting the clearance — but legally the two gestures are consistent: defending the institution in principle and applying its letter in practice. The letter says that what stays in the sky is not subject to arrest, and France applied it.
II. What France would do if an ICC fugitive landed on its soil
A. Arrested in France on an ICC warrant: the surrender procedure step by step
The overflight analysis must not be misunderstood: had the aircraft landed at Roissy, the legal universe would have flipped in an instant from “no obligation” to a tightly scripted arrest-and-surrender procedure that leaves the executive almost no discretion. France implemented the cooperation Part of the Rome Statute in a dedicated chapter of its Code of Criminal Procedure, and every step is judicial, fast, and controlled by the Paris courts. The starting point is arrest. Article 627-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “Toute personne appréhendée en vertu d’une demande d’arrestation aux fins de remise doit être déférée dans les vingt-quatre heures au procureur de la République territorialement compétent”, and that within that period “les dispositions des articles 63-1 à 63-7 du présent code lui sont applicables” — in other words, the full custody-rights package (notification of rights, lawyer, doctor, interpreter) applies from the first hour. The prosecutor verifies identity and informs the person, in a language they understand, that an arrest request for surrender has been issued and that they will appear before the chambre de l’instruction. This is surrender, not extradition: unlike classic extradition, which remains partly a government decision ending in a decree, surrender to the ICC is ordered by judges, and the government’s role is confined to transmitting requests through the competent authorities designated under Article 87 of the Statute.
The decision itself belongs to the chambre de l’instruction of the Paris Court of Appeal, ruling within fifteen days of the person’s appearance. Article 627-8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure sets a deliberately narrow standard of review: “Lorsque la chambre de l’instruction constate qu’il n’y a pas d’erreur évidente, elle ordonne la remise de la personne réclamée et, si celle-ci est libre, son incarcération à cette fin.” The court does not retry the Hague case, does not weigh the evidence of war crimes, and does not second-guess the Pre-Trial Chamber. It checks identity, the absence of manifest error, and procedural regularity; “Toute autre question soumise à la chambre de l’instruction est renvoyée à la Cour pénale internationale qui lui donne les suites utiles.” An appeal lies to the criminal chamber of the Court of Cassation, but the filter is strict and the timetable compressed — the whole design serves the Statute’s promise of prompt surrender. French case law on surrender procedures, even outside the ICC context, shows how narrow the judicial review is and how seriously the courts police its few gateways. In a 5 October 2021 ruling on a Portuguese surrender under a European arrest warrant, the criminal chamber recalled that the liberty and detention judge had, in the Court’s own summary of the proceedings, had dismissed a specialty-violation argument based on the absence from the file of the Portuguese surrender decision (Cass. crim., 5 Oct. 2021, No. 21-84.194) — a reminder that specialty and documentary regularity are among the rare arguments a surrender judge will actually examine, and that they turn on concrete proof, not rhetoric. Conversely, a 18 November 2025 decision on an Emirati extradition shows the Court of Cassation upholding a chamber that rejected a specialty plea after verifying, through an official note from the Ministry of Justice’s mutual-legal-assistance office, the exact basis of the foreign decision: had rejected a specialty plea after verifying, through an official 23 July 2025 note from the Justice Ministry mutual-assistance office, the exact basis of the foreign surrender decision (Cass. crim., 18 Nov. 2025, No. 25-85.814). The lesson for any ICC file in Paris is identical: the defence must arrive with documents, and the court will check them meticulously — but it will not reopen The Hague’s case.
Three complementary provisions complete the picture of the French machine. First, simplified surrender: article 627-14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows a person under provisional arrest to consent to be surrendered to the Court even before the formal surrender request arrives, with the Paris chambre de l’instruction deciding after informing the person of their rights — the fast track that experienced counsel always keep in mind when continued detention would be worse than surrender. Second, interim protection of assets and evidence: article 627-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “L’exécution sur le territoire français des mesures conservatoires mentionnées au k du paragraphe 1 de l’article 93 du statut est ordonnée, aux frais avancés du Trésor et selon les modalités prévues par le présent code, par le procureur de la République antiterroriste”, with a maximum duration of two years renewable at the Court’s request — meaning that an ICC suspect with Paris bank accounts or property could find them frozen by the anti-terrorism prosecutor before any surrender hearing opens. Third, parallel domestic exposure: article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure gives French courts universal jurisdiction over genocide and crimes against humanity committed abroad, so landing in France could theoretically open two fronts at once — the Hague surrender track and a French investigation. The contrast with ordinary extradition is instructive for foreign readers: in the classic extradition track, article 696-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure still organises detention under an “écrou extraditionnel” ordered by the first president of the court of appeal pending a government decree, whereas ICC surrender short-circuits the executive entirely. Had Mr Netanyahu’s aircraft touched down in France, therefore, the question would not have been whether Paris “wants” to arrest him. The prosecutor, the chambre de l’instruction and the Court of Cassation would have owned the file, on a clock measured in days.
B. How a Paris lawyer can still fight an ICC surrender: the real defences
Saying that surrender review is narrow is not saying that defence is futile — it means the defence must be aimed at the few targets the law actually exposes. The first target is admissibility and competing proceedings. Article 627-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure expressly contemplates the case where “la personne réclamée est poursuivie ou condamnée en France pour d’autres chefs que ceux visés par la demande de la Cour pénale internationale”: the surrender provisions still apply, but a person detained on that parallel basis cannot claim release under the interim-liberty articles, and the ICC proceedings suspend limitation periods against them. In plain terms, a suspect already facing French charges does not escape The Hague by pointing to the French file — but counsel can sequence the two cases, negotiate timing, and force every authority to state in writing which prosecution takes precedence and why. The Statute itself organises the same priority fight at Article 90, for competing requests between the Court and a State, and the French judge must consult rather than improvise. A second target is the ne bis in idem challenge: where the person has already been tried for the same conduct, Article 89(2) of the Statute requires the requested State to consult the Court immediately and to proceed only if the case is admissible — a mechanism that turns a well-documented prior trial into a genuine procedural roadblock rather than a talking point.
The third and most politically charged target is immunity — and here the French lawyer’s edge is knowing exactly where the Statute stops protecting officials and where general international law arguably continues to do so. Article 27 strips official capacity of any exonerating effect before the Court itself, but Article 98 of the Rome Statute immediately qualifies the cooperation machinery: that the Court cannot pursue a surrender request that would force the requested state to breach its international-law obligations toward the state or diplomatic immunity of a third state, unless it first secures that third state’s waiver. Because Israel is not a party to the Statute, defence teams argue that arresting its sitting prime minister would breach the requested State’s obligations toward a third State, and that the Court must first resolve that knot. The Court’s answer so far — territorial jurisdiction plus Article 27 — is known, but Article 98 litigation remains the principal battlefield in every ICC file involving officials of non-party States, from Khartoum to Jerusalem, and any Paris surrender hearing concerning such a person would inevitably become its next chapter. Counsel would plead it with expert opinions, state practice and the Court’s own evolving case law, forcing the chambre de l’instruction to refer the question to The Hague under Article 97 consultations rather than brushing it aside. A fourth target, quieter but often decisive in practice, is interim liberty and human-rights control: the surrender judge examines detention, health, family life and the conditions of transfer, and the European Court of Human Rights stands behind the whole procedure as the ultimate safety net against a surrender that would expose a person to treatment contrary to the Convention. None of these defences replays the merits of the Gaza allegations — that trial, if it ever happens, belongs to The Hague alone. Each of them instead tests whether France, as the requested State, is entitled to surrender this person, now, on this file. That is the only question the Paris judges will answer, and it is a question a prepared defence can genuinely contest.
Conclusion
The Netanyahu overflight episode will be remembered less for the flight itself than for the legal clarity it forced into public view. France’s clearance was lawful because the Rome Statute says, in plain treaty language, that a scheduled overflight with no landing requires no authorisation and no arrest — a rule the Foreign Ministry quoted accurately and applied consistently with Greece, Italy and Canada. The Hague warrants themselves remain fully alive: issued on 21 November 2024 after rejected jurisdictional challenges, covering alleged crimes from October 2023, and unaffected by American calls for mass resignation from the Court. And the French ground procedure stands ready for the day any ICC fugitive actually lands: twenty-four hours to see a prosecutor with full custody rights, fifteen days to a surrender ruling by the Paris chambre de l’instruction on a manifest-error standard, cassation review, frozen assets through the anti-terrorism prosecutor, and a defence fought on admissibility, competing cases, Article 98 immunity and human rights — not on television narratives. For international readers, the French lesson is therefore a double one: the sky is governed by paragraph 3(d), and the soil is governed by articles 627-1 and following. States that understand both can cooperate with the Court faithfully without grounding every aircraft that crosses their airspace, and lawyers who understand both can tell a client, before take-off, exactly where safety ends and surrender begins. Anyone facing an ICC request, an Interpol notice linked to an international case, or a surrender hearing in Paris should get that advice before the wheels leave the ground — because once they touch it, the timetable belongs to the judges.