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Mamdani Wanted Netanyahu Arrested at the UN — He Left in 24 Hours: What France Would Do With the ICC Warrant

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Mamdani Wanted Netanyahu Arrested at the UN — He Left in 24 Hours: What France Would Do With the ICC Warrant

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On September 24, 2026, Benjamin Netanyahu walked into the United Nations General Assembly hall in New York, delivered his speech as rows of delegates walked out, accused New York Mayor Zohran Mamdani of making the city unsafe for Jews, and flew back to Israel the same night. The whole visit lasted about 24 hours. Israel’s ambassador to the UN, Danny Danon, said there was no option but a whirlwind trip after the mayor publicly called the Israeli prime minister a war criminal and urged his arrest on the International Criminal Court warrant issued in November 2024. Mamdani later had to acknowledge what every international lawyer already knew: New York City has no legal authority to execute an ICC arrest warrant. The episode raises the question international travellers, journalists and lawyers keep asking this week: where on earth could that warrant actually be executed, and what would happen if the plane had landed in Paris instead of New York? France, unlike the United States, is a State Party to the Rome Statute. Its Code of Criminal Procedure contains a complete arrest-and-surrender machine, tested in real cases, that runs from the airport tarmac to the Paris chambre de l’instruction in a matter of days. This article explains why no handcuffs could come out in Manhattan, what the ICC warrant legally orders, and step by step how France would handle the same file.

I. Could Netanyahu Have Been Arrested During His New York UN Visit?

A. Why New York City Could Not Execute the ICC Warrant Against Netanyahu

According to the Associated Press, Netanyahu arrived in New York late on September 23, addressed the General Assembly on the afternoon of September 24, and flew back to Israel that same night. Ambassador Danon presented the 24-hour format as a direct consequence of Mayor Mamdani’s calls for an arrest over the Gaza war. The mayor had pointed to the ICC arrest warrant of November 2024 and encouraged the federal government to act on it. But as the same reporting makes clear, New York City does not have legal authority to take Netanyahu into custody, and the mayor’s office had to retreat on the practical side of the demand. A city mayor, however powerful politically, commands no jurisdiction to enforce the orders of a court his country never joined.

The reason is structural. The International Criminal Court has no police force and no agents of its own. It depends entirely on states to arrest and hand over suspects. The Rome Statute creates that duty only for its States Parties. The United States is not a party to the Statute, and neither is Israel. Washington has not merely stayed outside the system; the Trump administration has imposed successive rounds of sanctions on ICC staff in what the Associated Press describes as a campaign to dismantle the tribunal. When the host country of the United Nations headquarters actively sanctions the Court’s personnel, no mayor, no city police department and no state trooper can lawfully convert an ICC warrant into handcuffs on American soil. Only the federal government could theoretically cooperate, and it has chosen confrontation instead.

Entry to the United States is itself a federal lock. Foreign dignitaries travel on visas controlled by Washington, and the current administration has shown it is willing to use that lock politically: Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas was kept away from the same General Assembly for the second year running through the American visa ban, a story this desk already covered from the French angle. Netanyahu, by contrast, was admitted, protected by the federal bubble that surrounds visiting leaders during General Assembly week, and escorted through a schedule measured in hours precisely to shrink every window of legal and physical exposure. The walkout of delegations during his speech and the war of words with the mayor dominated the headlines, but on the legal plane nothing moved: no federal arrest, no court order, no referral. A 24-hour in-and-out visit is the oldest technique in the book for a wanted traveller, and it worked.

The lesson for an international audience is blunt. An ICC arrest warrant is not an Interpol red notice executed by any border policeman who happens to scan a passport. It is a judicial order addressed to a defined circle of states that accepted the Statute, transmitted through diplomatic channels, and executed under national procedures. Outside that circle, the warrant is a political fact of enormous weight, a travel map redrawn in red, but not an executory title. Netanyahu can still fly to Washington. He cannot safely fly to Paris, London, Berlin or any capital of the roughly 125 States Parties. That asymmetry is exactly what the drafters of the Rome Statute intended, and France is one of the countries where the machinery is the most precisely codified.

B. What the ICC Warrant Orders Every State Party to Do

On November 21, 2024, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court unanimously issued warrants of arrest for Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant, at the same time rejecting Israel’s challenges to the Court’s jurisdiction brought under articles 18 and 19 of the Rome Statute. The Chamber ruled on two requests submitted by Israel on September 26, 2024. In the first, Israel challenged the Court’s jurisdiction over the Situation in the State of Palestine in general and over Israeli nationals in particular. In the second, it asked the Chamber to order the Prosecution to send a fresh notification of the investigation and to halt all proceedings, including the pending arrest warrant applications filed on May 20, 2024. Both challenges failed. On jurisdiction, the Chamber held that Israel’s acceptance was not required because the Court acts on the territorial jurisdiction of Palestine, as decided in 2021, and that a challenge under article 19(2) before any warrant is issued is premature. On the notification point, it recalled that the Prosecution had notified Israel back in 2021, that Israel had then chosen not to seek deferral, and that the parameters of the investigation had not changed, so no new notification was due.

The warrants themselves rest on reasonable grounds to believe in two layers of criminal responsibility. The Chamber found that Netanyahu and Gallant each bear criminal responsibility for the war crime of starvation as a method of warfare and for the crimes against humanity of murder, persecution and other inhumane acts, as co-perpetrators for committing the acts jointly with others. It further found reasonable grounds to believe that both men bear criminal responsibility as civilian superiors for the war crime of intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population of Gaza, having failed to prevent or repress the crimes or submit the matter to the competent authorities despite having the measures to do so. Israel denies the charges, and the warrants are allegations for trial, not convictions. But for every State Party, they trigger a binding legal duty that leaves no room for political appreciation at the execution stage. For the full general framework of the warrant itself, see our companion analysis The ICC Will Not Withdraw the Netanyahu Warrant: What France Must Do If He Sets Foot in Paris.

That duty is written in the Statute itself. Article 86 states the general rule: States Parties must cooperate fully with the Court in the investigation and prosecution of crimes within its jurisdiction. Article 89 organises surrender: the Court may send an arrest-and-surrender request, with the supporting material listed in article 91, to any state where the person may be found, and States Parties must comply with such requests under the Statute and their own national procedure. The same article adds that a State Party must authorise transit through its territory of a person being surrendered by another state, unless that transit would impede or delay the surrender. In plain terms, a suspect who sets foot in France, Germany, Spain, Belgium or any other State Party must be arrested and handed over, and even a refuelling stop on the way to The Hague is regulated.

The Statute also closes the immunity escape in front of the Court itself. Article 27 provides that the Statute applies equally to all persons without distinction based on official capacity, and that official capacity as Head of State or Government, member of a Government or parliament, elected representative or government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility nor constitute a ground for reduction of sentence. Immunities under national or international law, it continues, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction. That is why the Israeli challenge failed and why the warrants name a sitting prime minister and a former defence minister without any legal contradiction. Whether national police forces may strip a sitting leader of immunity on their own soil is a separate question, governed by different rules, and it is precisely there that the French procedure deserves a close look.

II. What Would Happen if Netanyahu’s Plane Landed in France Instead?

A. How Does France Arrest and Surrender a Person Wanted by the ICC?

France recognised the International Criminal Court in its own constitutional order and then built a dedicated procedural track inside the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Cour de cassation itself describes the architecture in the leading surrender case: by the convention signed at Rome, the great majority of United Nations member states, including France, recognised the institution of the Court; by its Constitution, France officially recognised the existence of the Court; and by the statute of February 26, 2002, France transposed the Statute’s provisions into the Code of Criminal Procedure, inserting articles 627 to 627-20. The arrest-and-surrender procedure is governed by articles 627-4 to 627-15, and the competent court is the chambre de l’instruction of the Paris Court of Appeal, acting as the judicial authority of the custodial state. Nothing is improvised. Every hour is counted.

The sequence starts the moment the wanted person is located on French territory. Requests for arrest for surrender issued by the Court are sent in original, with all supporting documents, to the authorities competent under article 87 of the Statute, which check their formal regularity and then transmit them to the procureur general at the Paris Court of Appeal while simultaneously executing them across the entire territory of the Republic. In urgent cases the request can go directly, by any means, to the locally competent public prosecutor. The statute of the Court and the French code thus interlock: the ICC issues, Paris checks the paperwork, and every police service in France can move at once. A landing at Roissy, an arrival by Thalys at Gare du Nord or an interception at a highway toll would all feed the same channel within hours.

The person arrested must be brought within twenty-four hours before the territorially competent public prosecutor, under article 627-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Within that period the standard custody safeguards apply, and after verifying identity the prosecutor informs the person, in a language he or she understands, that an ICC arrest-for-surrender request is pending and that he or she will appear within a maximum of five days before the procureur general at the Paris Court of Appeal. The prosecutor also explains the right to a lawyer of his or her own choice, or to court-appointed counsel designated by the bar president, and the right to speak with that lawyer immediately. Everything is recorded in an official report transmitted at once to Paris. If the prosecutor decides not to leave the person at liberty, a liberty-and-custody judge rules on detention. The transfer to Paris, where custody continues at the prison within the jurisdiction of the Paris Court of Appeal, must occur within five days under article 627-6 of the first presentation, failing which the president of the chambre de l’instruction orders immediate release unless insurmountable circumstances delayed the transfer. The procureur general then formally notifies the arrest request and the charges, again in a language the person understands.

The judicial hearing follows at speed. The chambre de l’instruction is seized immediately and the person appears before it within eight days of presentation to the procureur general, with a possible additional eight-day extension at the request of either side before the debate. An interrogation is held and recorded, the hearing and the ruling are public unless publicity would harm the ongoing proceedings, third-party interests or the dignity of the person, and the decisive rule is famously narrow: when the chamber finds that there is no manifest error, it orders the surrender of the person, and, if the person is at liberty, orders detention for that purpose, as article 627-8 provides. Any other question raised before the chamber is referred to the International Criminal Court for appropriate action. The chamber rules within fifteen days of the appearance, and on appeal the criminal chamber of the Cour de cassation decides within two months of receiving the file. Once the decision is final, surrender must occur within one month under article 627-10, failing which the president of the chambre de l’instruction orders immediate release absent insurmountable circumstances. The ruling, the place and date of surrender and the length of detention are notified to the Court by any means.

This is not theory. France has already run the machine to its conclusion. In the Mbarushimana file, the chambre de l’instruction of the Paris Court of Appeal ordered surrender to the ICC on November 3, 2010, in execution of an arrest warrant issued by the Court’s Pre-Trial Chamber, and the Cour de cassation rejected the appeal on January 4, 2011, in case number 10-87.760. The criminal chamber approved a reasoning that international lawyers still cite: the chamber was entitled to order surrender where there was no manifest error as to the person, where the French courts had no jurisdiction to try him under the universal-jurisdiction provisions, and where it required guarantees that the person would under no circumstances be expelled, returned or extradited to Rwanda. The Court added that the file transmitted by The Hague, the original of the arrest warrant, the relevant articles of the Statute, the photograph, the Registrar-signed surrender request and the Pre-Trial Chamber’s reasoned decision satisfied articles 89, 91 and 92 of the Statute and article 627-7 of the French code, establishing both the Court’s jurisdiction and the legitimacy of its requests. Crucially, the Cour de cassation confirmed that the custodial state’s court seized with an arrest-and-surrender request is not seized with an extradition request and does not apply extradition tests. Surrender to the ICC is its own legal animal: faster, narrower, and almost entirely insulated from political defences.

Alongside surrender, France executes the Court’s support measures. Requests for legal assistance from the ICC go to the article 87 authorities under article 627-1 with all supporting documents and are passed to the anti-terrorism prosecutor, who takes all appropriate steps, including in emergencies by direct transmission. Protective measures ordered by the Court are executed on French soil under article 627-3 at the Treasury’s advanced expense under the procedures of the French code, for a maximum of two years, renewable at the Court’s request, with any difficulty reported back for the consultations the Statute provides. A suspect’s French bank accounts, property and companies can therefore be frozen or preserved while the surrender case moves through Paris. For a high-profile file, the financial flank would be handled in parallel with the arrest, not after it.

B. Do Immunities Protect a Sitting Prime Minister on French Soil?

The hardest question in the Netanyahu file is immunity. Heads of state and government in office enjoy personal immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction under customary international law, as the International Court of Justice confirmed in the Arrest Warrant case between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Belgium. That dispute concerned an international arrest warrant issued on April 11, 2000, by a Belgian investigating judge against the acting Congolese foreign minister, seeking his detention and subsequent extradition to Belgium for alleged grave violations of humanitarian law, a warrant transmitted to all states. The ICJ’s 2002 judgment upheld the immunity of an incumbent foreign minister from foreign prosecution. Sitting leaders travel under that shield, and French courts apply it: a foreign head of state in office cannot simply be prosecuted by French judges for official acts as if immunity did not exist.

But the ICC system was built precisely to pierce that shield in one direction. Article 27 of the Rome Statute removes official-capacity immunity before the Court itself, and article 89 obliges States Parties to arrest and surrender regardless of the office held. When France receives an ICC request, its courts do not put the suspect on trial and do not rule on guilt; they verify identity, check for manifest error, and hand the person to The Hague, where immunity cannot be pleaded. The Mbarushimana ruling illustrates the division of labour: all substantive defences, all disputes about the facts, all competing-proceedings arguments go to the ICC, while Paris decides almost nothing except that the right person stands before it. A sitting prime minister landing at Roissy with an ICC warrant in force would therefore face a procedure in which his strongest political arguments are legally inadmissible and must be addressed to the judges in The Hague, not to the chambre de l’instruction.

French courts have simultaneously sharpened their own substantive grip on international crimes, which matters for everything surrounding a surrender file: associates, financiers, intermediaries and territorial complicity. Under article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, outside the ICC-cooperation track, French courts may try any person habitually resident in France suspected of having committed abroad genocide, other crimes against humanity, or war crimes as defined by the French code, with habitual residence understood as a sufficient connecting link with France. And on July 25, 2025, the Assemblee pleniere of the Cour de cassation, the Court’s highest formation, ruled in appeal number C 24-84.393 on the annulment of investigative acts in a prosecution for complicity in crimes against humanity and war crimes, confirming that the French judiciary takes such cases to the highest level rather than deflecting them. The message for networks around a suspect is clear: France is not only a transit corridor to The Hague, it is a prosecuting jurisdiction in its own right for anyone who settles on its soil.

Two practical consequences follow for a file like Netanyahu’s in the French scenario. First, there would be no equivalent of the New York outcome. No mayor would need to opine, because the procureur general, the liberty-and-custody judge and the chambre de l’instruction would be seized by operation of law, on timetables counted in hours and days, with Court of Cassation review in two months and surrender within one month of a final order. The executive could not quietly waive the procedure away; the Mbarushimana precedent shows the courts treat the ICC request as self-executing once formal regularity is established. Second, the only serious legal battle would move to The Hague: admissibility, complementarity, gravity, and the article 27 immunity question as framed before the ICC itself. France has already answered, through its courts, the only question addressed to it: when the Court asks, Paris verifies the person and hands him over. That is why the 24-hour New York timetable has a mirror image that Israeli planners understand perfectly. A 24-hour visit to Paris is not a viable concept for a person under ICC warrant.

Conclusion

The week of September 22, 2026, displayed both faces of international criminal justice. In New York, a sitting prime minister under ICC warrant addressed the General Assembly while delegates walked out, traded accusations with the city’s mayor, and left within a day, because the host state stands outside the Rome Statute and sanctions the very Court that indicted him. In Paris, the same warrant would meet an entirely different machine: a prosecutor notified within hours, a first appearance within twenty-four hours, a transfer to the capital within five days, a public hearing within eight, surrender on a finding of no manifest error, Cassation review in two months, and handover within one month of finality. The contrast is not a matter of political sympathy; it is a matter of treaty obligation, transposed article by article into French law and validated by the Cour de cassation from Mbarushimana to the Assemblee pleniere’s 2025 ruling. For anyone exposed to an ICC warrant, an Interpol red notice or a cross-border prosecution touching France, the practical lesson is identical: check the travel map before boarding, because some airports lead to a speech and others lead to a cell. And once the procedure starts in Paris, it moves too fast for improvisation. Counsel must be in place before the plane lands, not after the doors open.

📄 Official circular