By Hassan Kohen, lawyer at the Paris Bar.
“NHS staff accessing patient records” is being searched in the United Kingdom. Behind the query sits a question that any patient may ask: when may someone who works for the health service open my record, at what point does looking become a breach of the law, and what can I do if I think a member of staff read my file without any reason connected with my care? This article answers that question under the law that applies in England. The core rules are United Kingdom-wide: the Data Protection Act 2018, the Computer Misuse Act 1990 and the Human Rights Act 1998. The complaint procedure described in Part II is the one that governs the NHS in England; Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland have their own procedures, which are not analysed here.
The method set out here is of general scope. It describes no particular hospital, practice or member of staff, and draws no conclusion about any reported case. In each file, the decisive facts still have to be established: who opened the record, on which date, from which role and system, and whether the organisation’s rules allowed that access. This is information on the law of England, written by a lawyer who practises in France and not in the United Kingdom. The texts discussed are the revised versions published on the official legislation website of the United Kingdom, as consulted on 20 November 2026.
I. When opening a patient record becomes unlawful
A. Access for care and access without a reason: where the law draws the line
A health record is not the personal property of the clinician who writes in it. In data protection terms, the organisation that provides the care, such as an NHS trust or a general practice, decides why and how the record is processed, and usually acts as the “controller”. The rules that bind that controller are those of the UK GDPR, as defined in section 3 of the 2018 Act, together with the Act itself. Staff do not hold the record in their own right: they reach it through the systems and permissions that their employer grants for the purpose of their work. That point drives everything that follows, because the main offence in this area is built around the consent of the controller, not around the curiosity or good faith of the person who looks.
Data protection law does not prevent health professionals from reading records. A nurse who checks a medication chart, a doctor who reviews a test result, or an administrator who books a follow-up appointment all access personal data, and all do so as part of the care the organisation provides. The legal difficulty begins when the access has no connection with that work: a member of staff who looks up a neighbour, a former partner, a colleague, a relative or a person in the news, simply because the system lets them in. In such a case, the question is not whether the person had a login, but whether the organisation, as controller, had consented to that particular use of the data.
Section 170 of the 2018 Act makes it an offence for a person, knowingly or recklessly, “to obtain or disclose personal data without the consent of the controller”.
The same subsection extends the offence to procuring the disclosure of personal data to another person without the controller’s consent, and to retaining personal data, after obtaining it, without the consent of the person who was the controller when it was obtained. Three practical consequences follow from that wording. First, the mental element is knowledge or recklessness: an accidental click on the wrong patient is not the same as a deliberate search. Second, passing information on to someone else, for example a family member or a journalist, falls within the second limb even if the person who passed it on had a legitimate reason to see it in the first place. Third, keeping a copy, a screenshot or notes taken from the record after leaving the role can fall within the third limb. The section does not define “obtain” in its own text, so whether a given way of viewing a record on screen amounts to obtaining it is a matter of interpretation in each case.
Where more than one controller is involved, section 170(7) provides that the references to the consent of a controller are references to the consent of one or more of them, and it excludes the consent of a processor that is only treated as a controller in certain circumstances. In the health setting, this matters where a record sits in a shared system used by several organisations: the analysis then looks at which organisation, if any, authorised the access in question.
Section 170 also provides defences, and the person charged has to prove them. Under subsection (2), it is a defence to prove that the obtaining, disclosing, procuring or retaining was necessary for preventing, investigating or detecting crime, that it was required or authorised by an enactment, by a rule of law or by a court or tribunal order, or that it was justified as being in the public interest in the particular circumstances. The word “investigating” was added on 5 February 2026 by the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025, according to the annotations on the official page. Under subsection (3), a person may also prove a reasonable belief that they had a legal right to act as they did, or that the controller would have consented if it had known of the access and its circumstances, or, for journalistic, academic, artistic or literary purposes, a reasonable belief that the action was justified in the public interest.
The second of those defences is worded with precision in section 170(3)(b): the person must have acted in the reasonable belief that they “would have had the consent of the controller if the controller had known about the obtaining, disclosing, procuring or retaining and the circumstances of it”.
That defence explains why the organisation’s internal rules carry so much weight. If a trust allows staff to check a record to answer a patient’s own query at reception, a receptionist who does so has a strong answer. If the same trust has told every member of staff, in writing and in training, that they must never open the records of people they know personally unless they are directly involved in that person’s care, a belief that the trust would have consented to a look at a neighbour’s file is much harder to describe as reasonable. Smartcard role profiles, written access policies, confidentiality clauses, training records and the system’s own audit trail are therefore the core evidence, on both sides.
Subsections (4) to (6) of the same section deal with the most serious form of misuse. It is a separate offence to sell personal data obtained in circumstances in which an offence under subsection (1) was committed, and to offer to sell such data, whether it has already been obtained or will be obtained in such circumstances. An advertisement indicating that personal data is or may be for sale counts as an offer to sell it. These provisions are relevant where information from a record is passed on in exchange for money, for instance to a third party interested in a person’s health.
The organisation itself is not a mere bystander. Providers registered for regulated activities in England are subject to the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014. Regulation 17, headed “Good governance”, requires systems or processes that enable the registered person to “maintain securely an accurate, complete and contemporaneous record in respect of each service user”.
That duty to keep records securely sits alongside the controller’s own obligations under data protection law, and it frames what a patient can reasonably expect: access controls that limit who can open a record, monitoring that can show who did, and a response when something goes wrong. For the regulations, “the Commission” means the Care Quality Commission, which should not be confused with the data protection regulator discussed in Part II.
B. What the person who looked risks under criminal law
The penalty for the section 170 offence is set by section 196 of the 2018 Act. A person who commits that offence is liable, on summary conviction in England and Wales, to a fine, and, on conviction on indictment, to a fine. In Scotland and Northern Ireland, summary conviction carries a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum. The 2018 Act does not provide a custodial sentence for this offence. Section 196(4) adds a specific power for cases under section 170: the court may order a document or other material to be forfeited, destroyed or erased if it has been used in connection with the processing of personal data and appears to the court to be connected with the commission of the offence. Under section 196(5), a person other than the offender who claims to own the material, or to have an interest in it, must be given an opportunity to be heard before such an order is made.
Who brings the case is also fixed by statute. Under section 197 of the 2018 Act, proceedings for an offence under the Act may be instituted in England and Wales only by the Commission or by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions. A patient therefore cannot launch a criminal case under section 170 on their own initiative without that consent. The patient’s role is to report the facts and to supply what they know; the decision to prosecute rests with the prosecutor.
The word “Commission” in section 197 reflects a recent institutional change. Section 114A of the 2018 Act, inserted on 20 August 2025, establishes a body corporate called the Information Commission. The annotations on the official pages show that, from 30 September 2026, the provisions of the Act discussed in this article refer to the Commission where they previously referred to the Information Commissioner. Readers who come across older guidance that mentions the Commissioner should read it with that change in mind.
A second offence can be engaged by the same facts. Section 1 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 makes it an offence to cause a computer to perform any function with intent to secure access to any program or data held in any computer, where the access intended is unauthorised and the person knows at that time that it is. Unlike the data protection offence, this one can lead to a custodial sentence. Under section 1(3), a person found guilty is liable, on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both, and, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, to a fine, or to both.
Everything then turns on the meaning of “unauthorised”, which the Act defines in section 17(5). Access of any kind by any person to a program or data held in a computer is unauthorised if “he is not himself entitled to control access of the kind in question to the program or data” and he does not have consent to access of that kind from a person who is so entitled.
The wording focuses on the kind of access, not only on whether the person had a password. A member of staff who logs in with valid credentials and then opens a record outside their duties may or may not have gone beyond the kind of access permitted: the answer depends on how the organisation, as the person entitled to control access, actually framed the permission it gave. Where the permission was expressly limited to records of patients under the staff member’s care, the case for unauthorised access is stronger than where the system and the policies left everyone free to browse. The prosecution must also prove that the person knew the access was unauthorised, which brings the training records and written warnings back into play.
The criminal route has limits that patients should understand from the start. A prosecution decides whether a person committed an offence; it does not, by itself, compensate the patient or correct the organisation’s security. The data protection offence leads to a fine, not to a payment to the person whose record was opened. A conviction under either Act may support a civil claim, but the two processes are separate, follow different rules of evidence, and run on different timetables. Any consequences for the member of staff in their employment, or before the regulator of their profession, are separate questions again, governed by the contract of employment and by each profession’s own rules, and are not analysed here.
II. What a patient can do when a record may have been opened without reason
A. Finding out and complaining: access requests, the organisation, the NHS procedure and the regulator
The first step is usually to find out what happened. The UK GDPR gives every person a right of access to the personal data that a controller holds about them, set out in Article 15. That right was clarified by section 78 of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025, which inserted a new paragraph 1A into Article 15, treated as having come into force on 1 January 2024. Under that paragraph, the person is entitled only to such confirmation, personal data and other information as the controller is able to provide “based on a reasonable and proportionate search for the personal data and other information described in that paragraph”.
In practice, a request that names the record, the period and, where possible, the system concerned is easier to answer in full and harder to limit on proportionality grounds than a general request for “everything”. A patient who suspects improper access may ask for a copy of the record and for the information the organisation holds about the access to it during the relevant period. Whether the organisation will disclose the names of individual members of staff is not guaranteed by the texts discussed here; the request at least obliges the organisation to look and to answer within the statutory time.
That time is now set by Article 12A of the UK GDPR, inserted by section 76 of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025, in force since 5 February 2026 according to the official page. The controller must answer before the end of “the applicable time period”, which is one month beginning with the relevant time. The relevant time is the latest of three moments: when the controller receives the request, when it receives any information it asked for to confirm the requester’s identity, and when any fee charged is paid. The controller may extend the period by two further months where that is necessary because of the complexity or the number of the person’s requests, but only by a notice given within the first month and stating the reasons for the delay. Where the controller reasonably requires further information to identify the information or processing activities a request relates to, the time between its question and the person’s answer does not count, and the Act gives as an example the case of a controller that processes a large amount of information about the person.
Where the person whose record was opened has died, the data protection right of access is not the relevant tool. Section 3 of the Access to Health Records Act 1990 allows an application for access to a health record to be made, where the patient has died, by the patient’s personal representative and by any person who may have a claim arising out of the patient’s death. Under section 3(5), the holder must give access within 21 days where the application relates to a record, or part of a record, none of which was made before the 40 days preceding the application, and within 40 days in any other case.
The second step is the complaint to the organisation. Since 19 June 2026, the 2018 Act has contained an express right to complain to the controller. Under section 164A of the 2018 Act, a data subject may complain to the controller if they consider that, in connection with personal data relating to them, there is an infringement of the UK GDPR. The controller must facilitate such complaints, for example by providing a form that can be completed electronically and by other means.
The same section 164A sets a first deadline: the controller must “acknowledge receipt of the complaint within the period of 30 days beginning when the complaint is received”.
It must then, without undue delay, take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint and inform the complainant of the outcome. Section 164A(5) states that appropriate steps include making enquiries into the subject matter of the complaint, to the extent appropriate, and informing the complainant about progress. For a suspected improper access, the natural enquiry is a review of the audit trail for the record, followed by questions to the staff member concerned and their manager.
In England, the same facts can also be raised under the NHS complaints procedure set by the Local Authority Social Services and National Health Service Complaints (England) Regulations 2009. Regulation 6 applies these rules to complaints made to an NHS body about the exercise of its functions, and to complaints made to primary care and independent providers about services provided under arrangements with an NHS body. Under regulation 12, a complaint must be made not later than 12 months after the date on which the matter complained of occurred or, if later, the date on which it came to the complainant’s notice. That time limit does not apply if the responsible body is satisfied that the complainant had good reasons for not complaining in time and that it is still possible to investigate the complaint effectively and fairly. For improper access, which a patient often discovers long after it happened, the second limb of regulation 12(1) matters: time runs from the date the patient learned of the access, if that is later.
Regulation 13 allows a complaint to be made orally, in writing or electronically, requires a written record of an oral complaint, and, subject to exceptions, requires the responsible body to acknowledge the complaint not later than three working days after receiving it. Regulation 14 requires the body to investigate in a manner appropriate to resolve the complaint speedily and efficiently, to keep the complainant informed, and, as soon as reasonably practicable after the investigation, to send a written response signed by the responsible person. That response must explain how the complaint was considered, set out the conclusions, confirm whether the action needed has been taken or is proposed, and give details of the complainant’s right to take the complaint to the Health Service Commissioner. Regulation 14(3) refers to a six-month “relevant period” beginning on the day the complaint was received, which may be extended by agreement before it expires.
The third step is the complaint to the regulator. Section 165 of the 2018 Act allows a data subject to complain to the Commission if they consider that, in connection with personal data relating to them, there is an infringement of the UK GDPR. The Commission must facilitate complaints, take appropriate steps to respond, inform the complainant of the outcome and of the rights under section 166, and, on request, give further information about how to pursue the complaint. Appropriate steps include investigating the subject matter to the extent appropriate and informing the complainant about progress.
If nothing happens, section 166 of the 2018 Act offers a remedy. It applies where the Commission fails to take appropriate steps to respond, or fails to inform the complainant of progress or of the outcome before the end of three months from receipt of the complaint, or, if its consideration continues beyond that, during each subsequent three-month period. The Tribunal may then, on the data subject’s application, order the Commission to take appropriate steps or to inform the complainant within a period specified in the order, and the order may require specific steps or the conclusion of an investigation within a set period. Section 166 is a remedy against delay and inaction: it does not ask the Tribunal to decide whether the patient’s complaint is well founded.
A sensible order of steps, which the texts allow but do not impose, is therefore the following:
- send a written access request naming the record, the period and the system, and note the date it was received;
- complain in writing to the organisation, under section 164A and, in England, under the 2009 Regulations, keeping the acknowledgement and every reply;
- if the answer is unsatisfactory or late, complain to the Commission under section 165, attaching the organisation’s correspondence;
- where the facts suggest deliberate misuse, report them to the Commission as the prosecuting authority for the section 170 offence, or to the police where unauthorised computer access is suspected;
- keep a dated note of when and how the patient first learned of the access, since several time limits depend on it.
B. Compensation and human rights claims in the civil courts
A complaint can establish what happened and lead to corrective action, but it does not by itself pay compensation. Compensation is a matter for the civil courts of England and Wales. The main statutory basis is Article 82 of the UK GDPR, which section 168 of the 2018 Act describes as the right to compensation for material or non-material damage. Section 168(1) settles one point of particular importance for improper access to health records: for the purposes of Article 82, “non-material damage” includes distress. A patient whose record was opened without reason does not, therefore, have to show a financial loss in order to bring a claim, although they still have to establish the infringement, the damage and the link between them.
Section 168(2) and (3) deal with collective situations. Where, in accordance with rules of court, proceedings under Article 82 are brought by a representative body on behalf of a person, and the court orders compensation, the court may order the compensation to be paid on the person’s behalf to the representative body or to such other person as it thinks fit. That mechanism can matter where the same member of staff, or the same weakness in access controls, affected many patients at once.
The organisation is the natural defendant to a claim under Article 82, because it is the controller. Whether the organisation also answers, under the general law of England, for the act of a member of staff who opened a record for purely personal reasons is a separate common law question that turns closely on the facts, and it is not analysed here. What a patient can do, in every case, is gather the evidence that the organisation’s own systems produce: the audit trail, the outcome of the internal investigation, and the correspondence showing what the organisation knew and when.
Where the record is held by a public body, the Human Rights Act 1998 adds a further route. Section 6 of the 1998 Act makes it unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right. A public authority includes any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature, but, under section 6(5), such a person is not a public authority in relation to a particular act if the nature of that act is private. The status of a private provider delivering services under arrangements with the NHS therefore has to be checked case by case.
The Convention right engaged by improper access to a health record is Article 8, reproduced in Schedule 1 to the Human Rights Act 1998: “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”
Article 8(2) allows an interference by a public authority only where it is in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society for one of the purposes listed, which include the protection of health and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Looking at a record for curiosity serves none of those purposes. The question in a claim is usually whether the public authority itself is responsible for the interference, for example because its access controls, monitoring or response were inadequate.
The procedural rules for such a claim are in section 7 of the 1998 Act. Proceedings may be brought only by a person who is, or would be, a victim of the unlawful act. The time limit is short, and it is the one most likely to catch a patient out: proceedings must be brought before the end of “the period of one year beginning with the date on which the act complained of took place”.
The court or tribunal may allow a longer period that it considers equitable having regard to all the circumstances, but that is subject to any rule imposing a stricter time limit for the procedure in question. A patient who learns of an access many months after it happened should therefore not assume that an internal complaint stops time running for this route. The one-year period runs from the act complained of, not from the end of the complaint process, and the extension depends on the court’s assessment.
Several practical points follow for anyone considering a civil claim. First, the strength of the case depends less on outrage than on records: an audit trail showing the date, time and user, and a written finding by the organisation, are worth more than any description of how the patient felt. Second, the type of information matters, because a record containing mental health, sexual health or fertility information is likely to cause more distress if seen by someone known to the patient than an appointment list. Third, the patient’s own conduct after discovery matters: prompt complaints, preserved correspondence and a clear chronology make it easier to show the link between the access and the distress. Fourth, the costs and the forum of any claim depend on its value and on the procedural rules in force at the time it is brought, which the texts discussed here do not set out.
This analysis concerns the law of England and, for the data protection and computer misuse rules, of the United Kingdom as a whole. The author’s English-language legal practice in Paris operates under French law, in a different jurisdiction. A file involving an NHS record needs to be assessed under the British texts that govern it, on the basis of the actual records, dates and correspondence described above.
Conclusion
Whether a look at a patient record is lawful depends less on the person who looks than on the organisation that controls the record. The Data Protection Act 2018 makes it an offence to obtain or disclose personal data, knowingly or recklessly, without the consent of the controller, and it punishes that offence with a fine; the Computer Misuse Act 1990 adds an offence of unauthorised access that can lead to a custodial sentence of up to two years on indictment. In both cases, the outcome turns on the access rules the organisation actually set, communicated and enforced, and only the Information Commission, or a prosecutor acting with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions, can bring a case under the 2018 Act.
For the patient, the useful steps are documentary and time-bound: an access request answered within one month unless validly extended, a complaint to the organisation that must be acknowledged within 30 days, an NHS complaint made within 12 months of learning of the matter, a complaint to the Information Commission with a remedy before the Tribunal if it stalls, and, where a claim is considered, Article 82 compensation that covers distress and a one-year time limit for human rights proceedings. In each case, the facts that remain to be established are the same: who opened the record, when, under which permission, and what the organisation did once it knew.