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Nicaragua v. Germany at the ICJ: What the 7-10 September 2026 Hearings Mean — and What France Must Watch

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Nicaragua v. Germany at the ICJ: What the 7-10 September 2026 Hearings Mean — and What France Must Watch

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From 7 to 10 September 2026, the International Court of Justice held public hearings at the Peace Palace on the preliminary objections raised by Germany in the case concerning Alleged Breaches of Certain International Obligations in respect of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Nicaragua v. Germany). The Court, President Iwasawa presiding, heard four days of oral argument devoted entirely to procedure: whether the Court has jurisdiction and whether Nicaragua’s claims are admissible. Nothing on the merits was decided, and nothing will be until the Court delivers its order in the coming months. Yet the week mattered far beyond The Hague. The objections Germany raised — no genuine legal dispute, a temporal limit on its acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction, the absence of Israel from the proceedings, and the exclusion of corporate-conduct claims — will shape every future case in which a State is sued for helping another State accused of mass atrocities. For France, the stakes are concrete: the same questions arise in French arms-export licensing, in French universal-jurisdiction prosecutions, and in the compliance departments of French defence companies. This analysis explains what The Hague just heard, decodes each German objection, and sets out exactly what victims, companies and counsel can do in France while the judges deliberate.

I. Nicaragua v. Germany: what did the Court hear from 7 to 10 September 2026?

A. From the 1 March 2024 application to the September 2026 hearings: what happened so far?

Nicaragua instituted proceedings against Germany on 1 March 2024, asking the Court to rule that Germany had breached its own international obligations in connection with the situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly the Gaza Strip, through military assistance to Israel and other forms of material support. The case never accused Germany of committing genocide itself. It accused Germany of failing to prevent it and of assisting conduct Nicaragua characterises as genocidal and as contrary to international humanitarian law — a case about Germany’s own conduct, not a proxy trial of Israel. That distinction, as will be seen, sits at the heart of the September 2026 hearings.

The first act played out within weeks. Nicaragua asked the Court to indicate provisional measures, hearings were held on 8 and 9 April 2024, and on 30 April 2024 the Court delivered its Order declining to indicate provisional measures, finding that the circumstances did not call for them. The refusal was not a judgment on the merits. It meant only that, at that stage and on the evidence before it, the Court saw no need for emergency orders. Nicaragua’s principal claims survived intact, and the case moved to written proceedings on the merits: Nicaragua filed its Memorial on 21 July 2025, setting out its evidence and legal arguments in full.

Germany answered on 21 October 2025 with preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court and to the admissibility of certain claims — exactly three months after the Memorial. That timing is not coincidence. Article 79bis of the Rules of Court requires objections of this kind to be filed in writing as soon as possible, and no later than three months after delivery of the Memorial. Nicaragua replied with its written statement of observations and submissions on 23 February 2026. The Court then fixed public hearings for 7 to 10 September 2026, announced in a press release of 31 July 2026, and both sides pleaded jurisdiction and admissibility across four sittings. The written pleadings — Memorial, objections, observations — are all public on the Court’s case page. The judges now deliberate, and the order on preliminary objections is expected in the coming months. If some or all of Nicaragua’s claims survive, the case proceeds to the merits; if Germany prevails on every point, the case ends here.

The legal foundations invoked are worth stating precisely, because every French practitioner reasoning about State responsibility will meet them again. The Court’s jurisdiction in contentious cases rests on State consent. Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute lets States accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court over legal disputes, a category that covers the interpretation of treaties and questions of international law. Nicaragua relies on compromissory clauses and declarations of this kind. Article 38, paragraph 1, defines the law the Court applies: disputes decided in accordance with international law, with international conventions establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting States as the first source. Front and centre stands the 1948 Genocide Convention, whose Article I confirms that genocide, whether committed in peacetime or in wartime, is a crime under international law which the contracting parties undertake to prevent and punish. Its Article IX sends disputes about the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Convention, including State responsibility for genocide, to the International Court of Justice at the request of any party to the dispute. Two words in Article I do heavy lifting for the whole case: “prevent” and “punish”. Nicaragua’s thesis is that the duty to prevent binds every party, including a State far from the battlefield that supplies weapons, and that breaching it engages State responsibility even where the supplier never fired a shot.

B. What are Germany’s preliminary objections and can they stop the case?

Four lines of defence emerged from the written objections and the September hearings. Each is procedural, each could end the case, and each carries a lesson for future litigation — including litigation in France.

First, Germany disputes that a genuine legal dispute existed between the two States when Nicaragua filed. The Court can only hear “legal disputes”, and its case law requires that the applicant’s claim was positively opposed by the respondent before seisin — typically through diplomatic exchanges showing Nicaragua accused Germany of specific breaches and Germany rejected the accusation. Germany argues that, at 1 March 2024, there was no crystallised dispute falling within the Court’s jurisdiction: political criticism in multilateral forums is not a legal claim, and a Note Verbale sent on the eve of filing cannot manufacture retrospectively the opposition the Statute requires. Nicaragua answers that it protested through diplomatic channels and that Germany’s continued military transfers after being put on notice demonstrate the positive opposition. Why this matters beyond The Hague: any State contemplating a similar case — and any counsel advising victims who want their government to act — must build the paper trail first. Notes Verbales, summonses, formal legal characterisation of the alleged breaches, reasonable time to respond: jurisdiction is prepared in foreign-ministry correspondence long before it is pleaded in the Great Hall of Justice.

Second, Germany invokes the temporal limit in its own declaration accepting the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction, which covers only situations or facts arising after 2008. Germany argues that several of Nicaragua’s claims are rooted in a long-standing situation whose origin predates that cut-off, so the Court cannot hear them; the background (occupation, blockade, successive Gaza conflicts) is being repackaged, in Berlin’s submission, as fresh claims to evade the reservation. Nicaragua replies that Germany confuses background with claims: the claims concern Germany’s own post-2023 conduct — authorisations, deliveries, support decisions taken after October 2023 — and each transfer is a new fact engaging responsibility anew. The Court’s answer will clarify how temporal reservations interact with continuing conduct, a point of direct interest to France: optional-clause declarations across Europe are laced with temporal, territorial and subject-matter reservations, and every future applicant will draft around this ruling. For practitioners, the practical moral is already clear — anchor each claim to dated, attributable State decisions, not to a general historical narrative.

Third, and most watched, Germany plays the Monetary Gold card: the Court cannot decide the case without first ruling on the responsibility of Israel, which is not a party and has not consented. Under the Monetary Gold principle, the Court declines jurisdiction where deciding would necessarily require it to determine the legal responsibility of an absent third State as a prerequisite. Germany contends that Nicaragua’s claims — failure to prevent genocide, complicity through arms supplies, breach of the Geneva Conventions’ duty to ensure respect — logically presuppose a finding that Israel committed genocide or grave breaches of humanitarian law. Nicaragua rejects the framing: the case, it says, concerns Germany’s own obligations and Germany’s own conduct, which the Court can assess (risk assessments at the time of licensing, knowledge of the situation, diligence exercised) without pronouncing Israel’s responsibility. The Court has navigated this strait before — in Nauru, in East Timor it refused to proceed, in later cases it distinguished conduct attributable to the respondent from conduct of the absent State — and the September pleadings revisited that whole lineage. The ruling will effectively set the conditions under which any arms-supplying State can be sued without the recipient on the bench. If the objection fails, every European capital that licenses defence exports faces a new litigation horizon; if it succeeds, applicants will need the recipient State’s consent or a different jurisdictional route.

Fourth, Germany challenges the admissibility of the more novel claims: responsibility for failing to prevent and condemn racial discrimination, segregation and apartheid in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and responsibility for failing to stop companies domiciled in Germany from exploiting and pillaging the territory. On the first limb, the question is whether the compromissory clauses Nicaragua invokes actually cover those allegations — jurisdiction must be found claim by claim, treaty by treaty, and a clause in the Genocide Convention does not open the door to an apartheid claim. On the corporate limb, Germany disputes that international law, as it stands, imposes on a home State a justiciable ICJ-level duty to police its companies’ activities in occupied territory, or that such a duty can ground State responsibility before this Court. Nicaragua points to due-diligence obligations and to the Geneva Conventions’ common undertaking to respect and ensure respect. Whatever the outcome, the corporate limb is the one French compliance officers should read twice: it previews a world in which a company’s operations in a conflict zone become the factual basis for proceedings against its home State — and, by ricochet, for pressure on the company itself through export-licence reviews, financing conditions and procurement exclusions.

Taken together, the four objections ask the Court to police the boundary between law and politics, between the responsibility of the actor and that of the assistant, and between the State and the corporation. None of them questions whether atrocities occurred; all of them question whether this Court, in this configuration, against this respondent, may judge them. That is precisely what preliminary objections are for, and precisely why the order — expected in the coming months — will be dissected in every foreign ministry legal department in Europe, including on the banks of the Seine.

II. Arms exports, universal jurisdiction, companies: what does the case change in France?

A. Can a French court block an arms export licence?

France is not a party to Nicaragua v. Germany, and no French licence is before the Court. But the French licensing system is built on the same international obligations Nicaragua invokes, and French judges have already been asked — twice, at the highest level — to police it. Understanding what they decided tells victims, associations and companies what a French challenge can and cannot achieve while the ICJ deliberates.

The statutory architecture is strict on paper. Article L.2335-2 of the Code de la défense provides: “L’exportation sans autorisation préalable de matériels de guerre et matériels assimilés vers des Etats non membres de l’Union européenne ainsi que des territoires exclus du territoire douanier de l’Union européenne est prohibée.” The same article adds: “L’autorité administrative définit la liste de ces matériels de guerre et matériels assimilés soumis à autorisation préalable ainsi que les dérogations à cette autorisation.” Article L.2335-3 continues: “L’autorisation préalable d’exportation, dénommée licence d’exportation, est accordée par l’autorité administrative, sous l’une des formes suivantes”, namely general export licences, global export licences notified to the exporter, and individual export licences. In practice, each significant file passes through the interministerial commission for the study of war-material exports (CIEEMG) and ends with a Prime Minister-level decision, taken after assessment of the recipient, the end use, and France’s international commitments — including the Genocide Convention’s undertaking “to prevent and to punish”, the Geneva Conventions, and the European Union’s arms-export criteria. That assessment, made licence by licence and date by date, is exactly the kind of attributable State conduct Nicaragua asks the ICJ to scrutinise in Germany’s case — and exactly what a French litigant would put before a French judge.

The Conseil d’État has now ruled, and its answer is sobering for challengers. Seized by associations over licences for States in the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, the administrative courts were asked to order the Prime Minister to declassify and produce all licences granted to coalition members from 26 March 2015 onwards, together with the deliberations and opinions of the interministerial commission, so the court could review their compatibility with France’s international commitments. By its decision of 27 January 2023 (Nos. 436098 and 436099), the Conseil d’État closed that path: “Les pourvois de l’association ACAT et de l’association ASER et autres sont rejetés.” The associations — ACAT, ASER and others, with Sherpa withdrawing — obtained neither the documents nor the annulments sought. Defence secrecy, the structure of the licensing file, and the limits of the administrative judge’s office combined to make the licences effectively unreviewable on that evidentiary basis.

Three practical consequences follow for anyone acting in France today. First, a frontal challenge to a French export licence remains extremely difficult: without access to the classified file, proving that a specific authorisation breached a specific international obligation is an uphill evidentiary battle, and the 2023 ruling shows the Conseil d’État will not order the State to build the claimant’s case. Second, the viable angles are indirect — criminal complaints for complicity where French law allows, civil liability of intermediaries, customs and financial-flow reporting, parliamentary and media pressure that forces the executive to suspend or condition a licence politically rather than judicially. Third, the ICJ case changes the executive’s risk calculus even without a French judgment: if the Court holds that a licensing State’s responsibility can be judged at The Hague, French authorities know that each new licence for a controversial destination could become an exhibit in someone’s Memorial — whether before the ICJ, where France would need to have consented to jurisdiction, or in the court of international public opinion, where no consent is needed. Defence companies should therefore treat the licensing file as potentially discoverable in future litigation: contemporaneous risk assessments, end-use documentation, and written records of diligence are no longer bureaucratic formalities but the evidence on which State — and corporate — responsibility will stand or fall.

Concretely, a company exporting from France should today: map every destination against current conflict and atrocity-risk reporting; keep a dated, reasoned export-risk memo for each licence file, updated when the situation on the ground changes; secure end-use and re-export assurances in writing; and prepare a suspension protocol that can be triggered within days if international proceedings or UN findings escalate. A victim or association, symmetrically, should: identify the exact licences or categories of equipment at issue rather than attacking “exports” in general; assemble open-source evidence of use (UN reports, reputable press investigations, export-data disclosures); file targeted criminal complaints where French universal jurisdiction or complicity provisions bite; and coordinate with proceedings abroad, because a finding in one forum increasingly feeds the others.

B. Can French courts prosecute atrocity crimes committed abroad?

While the ICJ judges State responsibility, French criminal courts judge individuals — and on this terrain France is among the most active jurisdictions in Europe. Two parallel regimes exist, and confusing them is the most common error in public commentary. The first is treaty-based universal jurisdiction: Article 689-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that “En application des conventions internationales visées aux articles suivants, peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises, si elle se trouve en France, toute personne qui s’est rendue coupable hors du territoire de la République de l’une des infractions énumérées par ces articles.” Article 689-2 applies this to torture: “Pour l’application de la convention contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants, adoptée à New York le 10 décembre 1984, peut être poursuivie et jugée dans les conditions prévues à l’article 689-1 toute personne coupable de tortures au sens de l’article 1er de la convention.” Presence on French soil plus a treaty-listed offence: that is the gateway.

The second regime, broader and more litigated, is Article 689-11, created by the Law of 9 August 2010 adapting French criminal law to the International Criminal Court. In its current wording it provides that “peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes”: genocide as defined in the Penal Code, other crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Three locks condition this jurisdiction: “La personne soupçonnée doit avoir une résidence habituelle sur le territoire français, celle-ci se définissant par un lien de rattachement suffisant avec la France”; “La poursuite de ces crimes ne peut être exercée qu’à la requête du procureur de la République antiterroriste et si aucune juridiction internationale ou nationale ne demande la remise ou l’extradition de la personne”; and the prosecution service must verify that the International Criminal Court is not already seized and that no other State seeks extradition. The crimes themselves are defined in French law in the broadest terms: Article 212-1 of the Penal Code states that “Constitue également un crime contre l’humanité et est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité l’un des actes ci-après commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique”, followed by eleven categories from wilful killing to torture, persecution, enforced disappearance and — echoing the apartheid claims debated at The Hague — “Les actes de ségrégation commis dans le cadre d’un régime institutionnalisé d’oppression systématique et de domination d’un groupe racial sur tout autre groupe racial ou tous autres groupes raciaux et dans l’intention de maintenir ce régime”.

The landmark interpretation came from the highest formation of the Court of Cassation. On 12 May 2023, the Assemblée plénière (Appeal No. 22-82.468) ruled on Syrian cases combining torture, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and settled the most disputed lock: dual criminality. The Court recalled that “Cet article exige que les faits poursuivis en France sous la qualification de crimes contre l’humanité, autres que le génocide, ou de crimes et délits de guerre, soient punis par la législation de l’État où ils ont été commis” — but held, after reviewing the 2010 parliamentary debates, “que la condition de double incrimination, telle qu’énoncée dans ledit article, ne requiert pas une identité de qualification et d’incrimination.” It suffices that the underlying acts were punishable where committed; the foreign State need not criminalise them as crimes against humanity or war crimes with their contextual element. The ruling opened French investigating judges’ offices to Syrian cases — and, by the same logic, to any atrocity file where the suspect develops a sufficient link with France — while recalling that universal jurisdiction “relève de la souveraineté de l’État en matière pénale”, a sovereign choice France makes on its own conditions.

For victims present in France, the roadmap is therefore practical, not theoretical. A complaint with constitution de partie civile can be filed with the Paris judicial court, crimes-against-humanity and war-crimes pole, provided the suspect’s habitual residence or sufficient connecting link with France can be documented (travel, family, assets, repeated presence) and no international court or foreign State claims priority. Evidence must be preserved to French standards: medical certificates, authenticated digital material with chain of custody, witness statements taken by counsel, and — decisive in recent practice — open-source intelligence reports cross-checked by reputable organisations. For suspects and their counsel, the defences run in the reverse order: contest the habitual-residence link first, invoke a competing ICC or foreign prosecution second, and challenge the contextual element of the charges third. And for companies, the message of the combined The Hague–Paris picture is that individual criminal risk now sits alongside State and corporate risk: executives involved in transfers later characterised as assistance to atrocities may face not only corporate sanctions but personal prosecution where universal jurisdiction reaches them.

Conclusion

The Peace Palace has fallen silent after four days of procedure, and the hardest part begins: the judges’ deliberation. If the Court upholds jurisdiction over all or part of Nicaragua’s claims, the case moves to the merits and every arms-supplying State will have to litigate its licensing diligence before the world court; if Germany’s objections prevail, the judgment will still define, for a generation, how far a State can be sued for another State’s alleged atrocities. Either way, the September 2026 hearings mark the moment third-State responsibility moved from academic commentary to active docket — and the French implications are immediate. Export licences are judged, if at all, through a narrow administrative keyhole, but criminal complaints under universal jurisdiction offer victims a real Paris forum, and companies can no longer treat conflict-zone business as routine compliance. Victims should organise evidence now, while traces are fresh; companies should audit their licences and files now, while corrections are still voluntary; and counsel should calendar the coming ICJ order, because the morning it is delivered, every pending file will need re-pleading. International justice moves slowly, then suddenly — the sudden part is what preparation is for.

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