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Nord Stream Blast Suspect Arrested in Croatia: Will Pula Surrender Volodymyr Z. to Germany After Poland Refused? What France Would Test

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Nord Stream Blast Suspect Arrested in Croatia: Will Pula Surrender Volodymyr Z. to Germany After Poland Refused? What France Would Test

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On 19 August 2026, Croatian police walked into a tourist facility in Pula, a resort town on the Istrian coast, and arrested a Ukrainian scuba diver wanted by Germany for the most spectacular act of infrastructure sabotage in recent European history: the September 2022 blasts that tore apart the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea. Federal prosecutors in Karlsruhe accuse the man, identified only as Vladimir Z., of belonging to the dive team led by Serhii K. that allegedly planted subsea explosives on the pipelines. There is a twist that makes this arrest a textbook case for every extradition lawyer in Europe. Vladimir Z. is the same man whom the Regional Court in Warsaw refused to surrender to Germany in October 2025, after which the Polish prime minister declared the matter closed. Now a court in Pula must decide the same request a second time. Meanwhile the first suspect, Serhii K. himself, arrested in Italy in August 2025 and surrendered to Germany that November, was charged in July 2026 before a Hamburg court as the co-perpetrator of a war crime committed, prosecutors say, on behalf of Ukrainian state entities. He denies everything. So Europe now has two courts that answered the same European Arrest Warrant in opposite ways, a third court about to rule, and a war-crimes indictment built on a surrender first granted for sabotage. For an international audience watching from London, New York or Dubai, the question is simple: how can the same warrant produce a refusal in Warsaw, a surrender in Bologna and a fresh arrest in Pula? The answer lies in the fault lines of the European Arrest Warrant system itself, and a French extradition lawyer reading these rulings sees exactly where the next battle will be fought.

I. Will the Pula court surrender Volodymyr Z. to Germany after Poland said no?

A. Does the Polish refusal bar a second surrender, or is ne bis in idem a trap for the defence?

The defence argument writes itself. Volodymyr Z. already faced the German warrant in Warsaw. The Regional Court in Warsaw refused surrender on 17 October 2025 and lifted his pre-trial detention. His Polish lawyer, Tymoteusz Paprocki, confirmed to the Polish press agency PAP after the Pula arrest that the man detained in Croatia is the same client he represented in the Polish proceedings. Same person, same German warrant, same facts. Surely, the argument goes, a second arrest for the same case in Croatia violates the ne bis in idem principle, the rule that nobody may be prosecuted or punished twice for the same acts. It is an attractive argument, and in the Pula courtroom it will almost certainly be raised. It should nevertheless fail, and understanding why is the first key to this case.

French law states the European rule with useful precision. Article 695-22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that execution of a European Arrest Warrant “is refused” where, and I quote the second ground verbatim: “Si la personne recherchée a fait l’objet, par les autorités judiciaires françaises ou par celles d’un autre Etat membre que l’Etat d’émission, d’une décision définitive pour les mêmes faits que ceux faisant l’objet du mandat d’arrêt européen à condition, en cas de condamnation, que la peine ait été exécutée ou soit en cours d’exécution ou ne puisse plus être ramenée à exécution selon les lois de l’Etat de condamnation”. The operative words are “décision définitive pour les mêmes faits”, a final decision on the same facts. A refusal to surrender is not that. The Warsaw court never tried Volodymyr Z., never acquitted him, never convicted him. It ruled that Germany’s request could not be executed, for reasons of its own about double criminality and jurisdiction which I examine below. That is a decision about surrender, not a decision on guilt. It therefore does not meet the threshold of a final decision on the merits, and it cannot, by itself, oblige the Croatian judge to refuse.

The French Court of Cassation confirmed this logic in action only weeks before the Pula arrest. On 16 July 2026, in case 26-83.852, the criminal chamber partly quashed a surrender order concerning a man wanted by Spain for leading the terrorist organisation ETA between his flight in 2002 and his arrest in France in 2019. The person concerned objected that the Spanish warrant overlapped with a final French acquittal and with prosecutions still pending before French courts, and he asked the chambre de l’instruction to order supplementary information from the issuing authority so that the material and territorial scope of the alleged facts could be pinned down. The appellate court refused that request and granted surrender, reasoning that the general terrorist context was identical but “ni la matérialité des faits, ni leur date, ni le lieu, ni les circonstances concrètes ne sont identiques”. The Court of Cassation partly quashed that ruling. The lesson for Pula is twofold and cuts both ways. First, ne bis in idem protects against a second judgment for the same material acts, and courts must verify the material identity of the facts with precision, seeking clarification from the issuing state where needed. Second, a prior judicial decision only bars surrender where it actually decided the same facts on the merits. The Warsaw refusal decided nothing on the merits of the pipeline blasts. It cannot shield Volodymyr Z. in Croatia the way a genuine acquittal would.

The same reasoning disposes of a second, related defence: that the Polish decision should circulate across the Union as a binding precedent. It does not. A European Arrest Warrant is defined by Article 695-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as follows: “Le mandat d’arrêt européen est une décision judiciaire émise par un Etat membre de l’Union européenne, appelé Etat membre d’émission, en vue de l’arrestation et de la remise par un autre Etat membre, appelé Etat membre d’exécution, d’une personne recherchée pour l’exercice de poursuites pénales ou pour l’exécution d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté privative de liberté.” Each executing state rules on execution on its own territory. A German warrant refused in Warsaw remains fully alive in Zagreb, in Paris, in every other executing state. That is precisely why German prosecutors could lawfully keep the warrant in the system and why Croatian police, acting on it, could arrest Vladimir Z. in Pula eleven months after the Polish refusal. Forum differences are a feature of the system, not a malfunction, however uncomfortable that looks.

There remains the double-criminality front, where Warsaw fired its heaviest shot. The Polish court held that acts committed in the framework of a just defensive war on behalf of Ukraine are not a crime under Polish law, so double criminality was not established, citing Article 607r of the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure. France applies the opposite default. Article 695-23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states the rule plainly: “L’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen peut également être refusée si le fait faisant l’objet dudit mandat d’arrêt ne constitue pas une infraction au regard de la loi française.” But it immediately adds the exception that does most of the work in serious cases: “Par dérogation au premier alinéa, un mandat d’arrêt européen est exécuté sans contrôle de la double incrimination des faits reprochés lorsque les agissements considérés sont, aux termes de la loi de l’Etat membre d’émission, punis d’une peine privative de liberté d’une durée égale ou supérieure à trois ans d’emprisonnement ou d’une mesure de sûreté privative de liberté d’une durée similaire et entrent dans l’une des catégories d’infractions prévues par l’article 694-32.” And the list in Article 694-32 contains, at item 2, “Terrorisme”, and at item 32, “Sabotage”. Germany classifies the Nord Stream facts as sabotage, a listed category carrying heavy penalties under Sections 88, 305 and 308 of the German Criminal Code. Where the issuing state ticks a listed box with offences punishable by three years or more, the executing judge does not re-examine double criminality at all: “la qualification juridique des faits et la détermination de la peine encourue relèvent de l’appréciation exclusive de l’autorité judiciaire de l’Etat membre d’émission”. Warsaw conducted a full double-criminality review anyway. A Croatian court following the orthodox mutual-recognition reading, the reading the French Court of Cassation enforces, would decline to repeat that exercise. What matters is only a limited coherence check: whether calling the pipeline blasts “sabotage” is logically sustainable and not manifestly unreasonable, rather than a retrial of the German file.

That orthodoxy has a name in French case law. On 7 August 2024, in case 24-81.863, published in the Bulletin, the criminal chamber recalled: “conformément au principe de reconnaissance mutuelle, l’exécution du mandat d’arrêt européen constitue le principe et le refus d’exécution, qui n’est possible que pour des motifs de non-exécution obligatoire ou facultative procédant de la décision-cadre 2002/584/JAI, est conçu comme une exception, à interpréter strictement”. Surrender is the principle, refusal the strictly interpreted exception. Warsaw read the exceptions broadly. Pula is more likely to read them narrowly. This divergence is the honest heart of the Nord Stream saga: the Warrant system promises uniformity but delivers, in politically charged cases, as many answers as there are executing judges.

B. Can Germany prosecute at all for explosions in international waters?

Before surrender comes a more basic question, and Warsaw put it at the centre of its refusal: what gives Germany the right to prosecute explosions that happened far from the German coast? The blasts occurred on 26 September 2022 in the Baltic Sea, south-east of the Danish island of Bornholm, in waters that are geographically distant from Germany though economically vital to it. The pipelines run through the exclusive economic zones of several states. Denmark and Sweden opened their own investigations into events near their maritime zones. Seven Ukrainians are now pursued by the Federal Prosecutor General in Karlsruhe, who took the case because the acts allegedly undermined the internal security of the Federal Republic and because of the exceptional importance of the file. According to the federal prosecution, the group chartered a yacht and fixed explosive devices to the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines, damaging them so badly that no more Russian gas could flow to Europe. The suspects face charges of anti-constitutional sabotage concurrently with causing an explosion and destroying buildings and structures. Jurisdiction is therefore not a technical footnote. It is the whole case.

Germany’s answer rests on two pillars. The first is the protection principle in Section 5 of the German Criminal Code, which allows prosecution of acts committed abroad where they attack the highest legal interests of the state, including its internal or external security. Critical energy infrastructure that supplied Germany falls, in Karlsruhe’s view, squarely within that shield. The second pillar was added by the Federal Court of Justice on 15 January 2026, when it dismissed Serhii K.’s complaint against the arrest order issued after his surrender from Italy. The court affirmed both the strong suspicion of an offence within the Federal Prosecutor General’s jurisdiction and the risk of flight, rejected the immunity and combatant-privilege arguments, and then stated the territorial point bluntly: Germany has territorial jurisdiction because the result of the offence, the pipelines being rendered inoperable, also occurred on German territory, where the pipelines end. In German doctrine this is the ubiquity principle: where the result lands, the law follows.

Warsaw answered no to both pillars. The Polish court held that German criminal law applies to acts on German territory or aboard ships and aircraft flying the German flag, that extraterritorial application is exceptional, and that it does not stretch to events in the Baltic Sea at a considerable distance from the German coast. Jurisdiction over the incident, the court suggested, would belong to an international tribunal for armed conflicts at sea or an ad hoc tribunal appointed by the United Nations. Prime Minister Donald Tusk then closed the political door with his statement that the case was over and that prosecuting or extraditing the man was not in Poland’s interest. As a matter of black-letter extradition law, the jurisdictional objection is a weak shield: within the Warrant system the executing state does not normally sit in judgment on whether the issuing state is entitled to prosecute, and jurisdiction doubts alone are not a listed ground for refusal. As a matter of political reality, the objection worked, because an executing judge willing to read the refusal grounds broadly can always find doctrinal cover.

A French judge seized of the same warrant would approach jurisdiction through a different door, and it is worth spelling out because it shows how Paris would test Karlsruhe’s claim. Article 695-24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lists the optional grounds on which an executing judge may refuse surrender. The fourth ground matches the Nord Stream configuration exactly: “Si l’infraction a été commise hors du territoire de l’Etat membre d’émission et que la loi française n’autorise pas la poursuite de l’infraction lorsqu’elle est commise hors du territoire national”. In other words, where the offence was committed outside the issuing state and French law itself would not allow prosecution for extraterritorial conduct of that kind, the French chambre de l’instruction may refuse. France would therefore ask the mirror question: if these pipeline blasts had targeted French infrastructure from international waters, could French courts prosecute? French criminal law answers yes where the result, or an essential connecting factor, touches national territory, and it punishes sabotage and destruction of property serving the nation severely. The mirror test would therefore likely be satisfied, and the jurisdictional objection would fail in Paris. Croatia’s judges will apply their own mirror, not France’s, but the structure of the test is the same everywhere in the Union: only a manifest absence of any jurisdictional link can justify refusal, and Germany’s protection-principle-plus-effects reasoning clears that low bar even if Warsaw pretended otherwise.

One final jurisdictional irony deserves attention. The defence presents the blasts as a legitimate act of war, and Warsaw half-accepted that framing. But the law-of-war framing actually strengthens Germany’s hand on jurisdiction rather than weakening it. If the sabotage was a military operation attributable to a state, then it was an attack on the energy lifeline of another state, committed covertly by operatives who entered Germany on forged passports and rented their yacht with forged papers, according to the July 2026 indictment. Covert operatives using false identities enjoy no combatant privilege, a point the Federal Court of Justice already made in January 2026. And an operation directed against German infrastructure is exactly what the protection principle was written for. The war narrative, pushed to its conclusion, makes Karlsruhe’s jurisdiction look stronger, not weaker.

II. What France would test if the German warrant landed in Paris

A. Specialty, consent and the Italian lesson: the warrant must say exactly what it means

Suppose the German warrant against Vladimir Z. surfaced in France tomorrow. The Paris chambre de l’instruction would run a checklist forged by decades of Court of Cassation rulings, and the Nord Stream file would be stress-tested at every line. The first line is specialty, the rule that a surrendered person may only be prosecuted for the offences named in the warrant. This is not academic in the Nord Stream complex. Serhii K. was surrendered by Italy for sabotage-related charges and now stands charged in Hamburg as the co-perpetrator of a war crime, accused of acting on behalf of Ukrainian state entities. If the war-crime qualification goes beyond what Bologna authorised, Germany needs Italy’s consent to the extension. French law watches this frontier closely.

On 5 October 2021, in case 21-84.194, published in the Bulletin, the criminal chamber quashed a detention order against a man surrendered by Portugal and then held in France, holding: “Il s’ensuit qu’une personne remise à la France en exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen et qui n’a pas renoncé au principe de spécialité ne peut faire l’objet d’une mesure de détention provisoire pour une infraction autre que celle qui a motivé sa remise, avant que son consentement ait été obtenu, sauf si cette mesure privative de liberté est légalement justifiée par les autres chefs d’accusation figurant dans le mandat d’arrêt européen.”. Five years later the court applied the same shield to a milder measure. On 10 February 2026, in case 25-87.769, also published in the Bulletin, it held: “La Cour de cassation en déduit qu’une personne remise à la France en exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen et qui n’a pas renoncé au principe de spécialité ne peut faire l’objet d’une mesure de détention provisoire pour une infraction autre que celle qui a motivé sa remise, avant que son consentement ait été obtenu” and that “Le principe de spécialité commande que la même règle reçoive application en matière de contrôle judiciaire, sauf si cette mesure restrictive de liberté est légalement justifiée par les autres chefs d’accusation figurant dans le mandat d’arrêt européen.”. Even judicial supervision, not only detention, requires the executing state’s consent where specialty was not waived. And on 29 May 2024, in case 24-82.747, published in the Bulletin, the court set the consent test for extensions: “le consentement de l’autorité judiciaire d’exécution à l’extension des effets du mandat d’arrêt européen, en vertu duquel elle a précédemment ordonné la remise de la personne recherchée, est donné lorsque l’infraction pour laquelle il est demandé entraîne elle-même l’obligation de remise.” Transposed to Nord Stream: if the Hamburg war-crimes indictment qualifies as an offence that would itself have required surrender, Italy’s consent follows as a matter of course; if the defence can show the new charges to be a different factual universe from the sabotage described in the warrant, the extension can be fought. French defence lawyers would already be drafting that motion, and the Croatian judge in Pula should be asking Karlsruhe to clarify now, before surrender, exactly which qualifications the prosecution intends to pursue, so that specialty disputes do not explode after the fact.

The second line on the Paris checklist is the physical content of the warrant. Article 695-13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure demands that every warrant contain a full dossier of information: “Tout mandat d’arrêt européen contient les renseignements suivants : -l’identité et la nationalité de la personne recherchée ; -la désignation précise et les coordonnées complètes de l’autorité judiciaire dont il émane ;”, plus the underlying judicial decision, the legal classification of the offence, the date, place and circumstances of commission, the degree of participation of the person concerned, and the penalties provided by the issuing state’s law. Warsaw complained precisely about this: the German warrant was formally correct but its substance, in the Polish court’s famous phrase, fit on a single A4 page with no source references allowing any assessment of the merits. A French chambre de l’instruction faced with a one-page warrant would not refuse outright. It would do what the Court of Cassation keeps telling it to do: ask for more. The 16 July 2026 ETA ruling, 26-83.852, partly quashed a surrender precisely where the appellate court had refused to seek clarification of the material and territorial facts from Madrid despite a serious ne bis in idem objection. And less than a year earlier, on 29 October 2025, in case 25-86.591, the criminal chamber examined at length a pourvoi attacking a deferred surrender to Romania on specialty and ne bis in idem grounds, testing each plea against the record before rejecting the appeal. The message is consistent: the executing judge must actively verify, through supplementary information where needed, rather than surrender blindly or refuse lazily. Pula should send Karlsruhe a detailed request for the underlying evidence summary now. If Berlin hides behind intelligence confidentiality, as the federal government has done before, that silence will itself become the defence’s best exhibit.

The third line is the Italian lesson, and it is the most instructive episode of the whole saga for any executing judge. The Bologna Court of Appeal authorised Serhii K.’s surrender but reclassified the German “sabotage” into an Italian terrorism framework so as to apply the stricter high-security detention regime to him. Defence counsel Nicola Canestrini challenged the move, and on 15 October 2025 the Italian Court of Cassation overturned the surrender order: the executing court may not rewrite, or nationalise, the issuing state’s legal classification in order to trigger tougher domestic procedural rules. After remittal, Bologna reordered surrender on 23 October 2025 without revisiting the substantive defences of functional immunity, ne bis in idem and Article 3 risks, a second appeal was dismissed on 19 November 2025, and K. was physically handed over on 27 November 2025. The episode vindicates the French position recalled above: classification belongs exclusively to the issuing authority, subject only to a limited coherence review. A Paris court would therefore accept Germany’s “sabotage” label without translating it into French terrorism provisions, and it would equally refuse to let Germany benefit from any reclassification upwards. The warrant must say exactly what it means, and it must then live with what it said. For Vladimir Z., whose file mirrors his alleged commander’s, that cuts in favour of surrender on the sabotage counts, and against any later attempt to stretch the warrant silently toward war crimes without fresh consent.

B. Political offence, combatant immunity and detention conditions: the defences that remain

Strip away ne bis in idem and jurisdiction, and three classical defences remain on the table in Pula, as they would in Paris. Each looks weaker than it sounds, but each must be argued properly because executing judges have shown they will listen.

First, the political-offence exception. French extradition law outside the Union keeps it alive in ringing terms. Article 696-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: “L’extradition n’est pas accordée : 1° Lorsque la personne réclamée a la nationalité française, cette dernière étant appréciée à l’époque de l’infraction pour laquelle l’extradition est requise”, and second “Lorsque le crime ou le délit à un caractère politique ou lorsqu’il résulte des circonstances que l’extradition est demandée dans un but politique”. Warsaw reasoned in that spirit: a defensive operation in a just war is political, and politics defeats surrender. But inside the European Arrest Warrant system that exception does not exist. The Framework Decision lists refusal grounds exhaustively, and the political-offence exception was deliberately left out of the instrument. The Court of Cassation’s 7 August 2024 ruling recalls why: surrender is the principle and refusal a strictly interpreted exception. A French chambre de l’instruction could not therefore refuse a German sabotage warrant on the ground that the blasts served Ukraine’s war effort, however sympathetic the context. Only the discrimination clause offers a narrow adjacent path: Article 695-22 also commands refusal where “il est établi que ledit mandat d’arrêt a été émis dans le but de poursuivre ou de condamner une personne en raison de son sexe, de sa race, de sa religion, de son origine ethnique, de sa nationalité, de sa langue, de ses opinions politiques ou de son orientation sexuelle ou identité de genre”. That targets persecution by the issuing state, not the political motive of the offence, and Germany is plainly not persecuting Ukrainians for their opinions. The political defence, dressed in EAW clothing, does not fit. Warsaw wore it anyway. Pula should not.

Second, functional immunity and combatant privilege. The defence argues that pipeline sabotage ordered by a belligerent state is a sovereign military operation covered by the Geneva Conventions, so its executors enjoy immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction. The Federal Court of Justice rejected that claim in January 2026, and rightly so on the known facts. Combatant privilege protects lawful combatants for lawful acts of war against military objectives; it does not cover covert operatives travelling on forged passports who rent civilian yachts under false identities to destroy civilian energy infrastructure far from any battlefield, nor does it convert an attack on civilian objects into a lawful operation. Note the symmetry with the Hamburg indictment: German prosecutors now allege precisely that Serhii K. committed a war crime by attacking civilian objects, which is the opposite of claiming his conduct was a privileged act of war. A French court would treat immunity exactly as Karlsruhe did: as a question for the trial court on the merits, not as a ground for refusing surrender. The executing judge does not decide whether the blasts were a war crime, a privileged operation or plain sabotage. She decides only whether the warrant is formally valid and no refusal ground applies. Immunity pleas at the surrender stage are therefore premature, and French chambers of investigation routinely say so.

Third, fundamental rights: detention conditions and fair trial. Here the defence stands on firmer European ground, though Germany is a difficult target. Since the Court of Justice’s case law on Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and detention conditions, an executing judge must refuse or postpone surrender where there is a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment in the issuing state, assessed in two steps: systemic deficiencies, then individual risk. Invoking that machinery against Germany, whose prisons generally meet Convention standards, is an uphill climb, and Canestrini’s team in Bologna notably declined to push it to the end. Translation and defence rights offer a sharper tool at the surrender stage itself. Counsel complained of wholly inadequate interpretation at the Bologna hearings, impairing effective defence, and the Italian proceedings also drew criticism over the high-security detention imposed through the reclassification manoeuvre. A French court would examine such procedural complaints under its own procedural law, as the Court of Cassation requires, and serious violations can delay or condition surrender. In Pula, the practical advice writes itself: demand full translation of the German file into a language the person understands, challenge any pre-surrender detention conditions before the Croatian constitutional jurisdictions, and build the Article 3 record now rather than hoping for leniency later. None of this bars surrender by itself. All of it shapes the conditions under which surrender happens, and conditions are where extradition cases are often quietly won or lost.

Stepping back, the three defences map the real geography of the Nord Stream litigation. Warsaw won on politics dressed as law. Bologna surrendered on mutual recognition dressed as procedure. Karlsruhe prosecutes on protection dressed as territory. None of these courts is obviously wrong within its own frame, which is exactly why the Pula ruling, expected in the coming weeks, will be read far beyond Croatia. If the court surrenders Vladimir Z., the message is that Warrant shopping by the defence has limits and that a refusal in one executing state changes nothing elsewhere. If it refuses, the message is that the Polish precedent is contagious and that Germany’s Baltic prosecution is slowly being boxed in by the very mutual-recognition system it invokes. On 4 September 2026 the Pula court postponed its hearing after receiving new German documentation, a procedural twist analysed in our companion piece Nord Stream Arrest Warrant Rewritten: What Germany’s War Crime Classification Changes Before Croatia Decides. Either way, Serhii K.’s Hamburg trial, with its unprecedented war-crimes framing of pipeline sabotage, will force every executing judge in Europe to decide what this case really is: terrorism, sabotage, a war crime, or an act of war that criminal courts should never have touched.

Conclusion

The arrest in Pula on 19 August 2026 reopened a file that Warsaw thought it had closed. Vladimir Z., the diver Poland would not surrender, now faces the same German warrant before a Croatian judge, while his alleged commander awaits trial in Hamburg on war-crimes charges built from the same Baltic explosions. The legal analysis points in a clear direction. The Polish refusal is not a final decision on the merits and cannot trigger ne bis in idem in Croatia. Sabotage is a listed offence that neutralises double-criminality review. Germany’s jurisdiction, through the protection principle and the effects doctrine confirmed by the Federal Court of Justice in January 2026, clears the low threshold an executing judge may apply. And the remaining defences, from the political-offence exception to combatant immunity, belong to the trial court in Hamburg, not to the surrender judge in Pula. That is what French law would conclude, through Articles 695-22 to 695-24, the specialty rulings of the Court of Cassation from 2021 to 2026, and the strict mutual-recognition orthodoxy of the 7 August 2024 Bulletin ruling. Whether Croatia follows that orthodoxy or follows Poland into resistance is now the most instructive pending decision in European surrender law. International clients watching from abroad should draw the operational lesson today: in multi-state sabotage and sanctions cases, the executing forum is everything, the first refusal decides nothing, and the defence must be built simultaneously in the issuing state and in every state where an arrest could happen. When the next warrant lands, and it will, the file must already be ready.

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