On 4 September 2026, a county court in Pula, Croatia, postponed the extradition hearing of Volodymyr Zhuravlev, the Ukrainian diving instructor wanted by Germany over the September 2022 sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines, after Berlin updated its European arrest warrant with a new classification of the facts as a war crime. The suspect stays in pre-trial detention in Pula while the court treats the file as urgent. The twist is remarkable for one reason: eleven months earlier, a Warsaw court had refused to surrender the same man to Germany for the same pipeline blasts, calling the attack a military action in a just war, and ordered his immediate release. Rearrested in Croatia while advising on a feature film about the very sabotage he is accused of joining, Zhuravlev now faces a second executing judge, a rewritten warrant, and charges that already sent his alleged accomplice to a German courtroom. For readers in France, the episode raises two precise questions that French courts answer every month: can a refusal in one Member State be circumvented by a fresh arrest in another, and what would a Paris chambre de l’instruction do with a German warrant of this kind? This analysis reconstructs the verified timeline, explains Berlin’s war-crime reclassification, and sets out the French European-arrest-warrant procedure, defence by defence, on the basis of five recent Criminal Chamber rulings.
I. Why Did the Croatian Court Delay the Nord Stream Suspect’s Extradition Hearing?
A. From the Warsaw Just-War Refusal to the Pula Postponement: What Happened to Volodymyr Zhuravlev?
The underlying facts are no longer disputed in their broad lines. On 26 September 2022, underwater explosions severely damaged three of the four Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines near the Danish island of Bornholm, sending gas leaking into the Baltic Sea. Germany, Denmark and Sweden each opened investigations into what was treated from the start as deliberate sabotage. Denmark and Sweden eventually closed their files, while Germany pressed on with a hypothesis built around a chartered yacht, the Andromeda, reportedly rented in Rostock and sailed to the Bornholm area by a small group travelling on forged passports, carrying military-grade explosives with timed detonators. German prosecutors later identified several Ukrainian nationals as suspects and described at least one of them as a licensed scuba diver, a profile that matches Volodymyr Zhuravlev.
The first act of the judicial saga played out in Poland. Zhuravlev was arrested near Warsaw on 30 September 2025 on a German warrant, with Berlin describing him as a trained diver and alleging that he belonged to the group that placed the charges on the pipelines. On 17 October 2025, the Warsaw District Court rejected extradition and ordered his immediate release. Reporting by the Associated Press records two striking holdings from Judge Dariusz Lubowski: the attack should be understood as a military action in a just war, and therefore not subject to individual criminal responsibility, and German jurisdiction was doubtful for several reasons, including the fact that the explosions occurred in international waters. His lawyer, Tymoteusz Paprocki, had argued ahead of the hearing that his client denied committing any crime against Germany and did not understand the basis of the German charges. The ruling was publicly welcomed by Poland’s prime minister, and Zhuravlev walked free. As the German weekly-turned-European record shows, that same autumn an Italian court took the opposite path with the other main suspect, Serhii Kuznetsov, arrested in Rimini in August 2025 on a German warrant and subsequently surrendered to Germany, where federal prosecutors filed charges on 1 July 2026, as German media reported at the time including complicity in a war crime, causing an explosion, disrupting public services and destroying critical infrastructure. Kuznetsov denies any role. The contrast noted by the European criminal-law press is sharp: as the European criminal-law press observed in January 2026, EU courts have ruled differently on the German warrants arising from the same blasts.
The second act opened in Croatia in August 2026. Zhuravlev was detained in Pula, where, in a detail that propelled the story around the world, he had reportedly been working as an expert consultant on diving sequences for Snake Island, a political thriller about the Nord Stream sabotage directed by Doug Liman and starring Sean Penn and Adrien Brody, filmed partly on Croatian locations. The Associated Press reported on 20 August 2026 that a Croatian judge had ordered the detention of the Ukrainian pending extradition proceedings, on a European warrant executed in Pula, and confirmed through the German prosecutor’s office that the detainee was the same man Poland had refused to surrender the previous year. Then came the September turn documented by the Kyiv Post on 4 September 2026: the Pula county court postponed the extradition hearing that had been scheduled for Friday 4 September, because Germany had updated the European arrest warrant with a new classification of the facts as a war crime. Zhuravlev remains in pre-trial detention, the court has classified the case as urgent according to Croatian public broadcaster HRT, and his Kyiv law firm, Katerynchuk, Moor and Partners, described the updated warrant as opening a new stage in the defence of the Ukrainian citizen. In short, the same man, freed in Warsaw on a theory of just war, is now detained in Pula under a warrant rewritten to allege a war crime. Everything that follows turns on whether that rewrite changes the legal equation.
B. Why Did Germany Add a War-Crime Label to the European Arrest Warrant?
Berlin’s reclassification is best read as a procedural answer to Warsaw. The Polish refusal rested on two pillars, and each of them is vulnerable to a war-crime framing. First, the just-war theory treats the pipeline attack as a lawful act of war attributable to a belligerent rather than as an ordinary crime attributable to individuals. But war crimes are precisely the category of acts that remain punishable even when committed in wartime and even when ordered or authorised by a State: the allegation reported by the Ukrainian press is that Kuznetsov, Zhuravlev and six other accomplices acted on behalf of State authorities in Ukraine in order to cut Moscow’s energy revenues and slow the Russian war effort. If that allegation is taken at face value, it does not exonerate the suspects; in the logic of international criminal law, State sponsorship is what makes the war-crime lens available rather than what excludes responsibility. Second, the jurisdictional objection based on international waters loses much of its force once the conduct is characterised as sabotage of energy infrastructure protected during armed conflict, a characterisation that German prosecutors had already tested when they charged Kuznetsov with complicity in a war crime alongside causing an explosion, disrupting public services and destroying critical infrastructure. Whether the Pula court accepts that construction is a different matter, and the postponement suggests the Croatian judges want time to examine exactly that point, but the tactical purpose is transparent: give the executing judge a qualification that the Warsaw reasoning cannot absorb.
The reclassification also interacts with the machinery of the European arrest warrant itself. Under Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002, sabotage appears in the Article 2(2) list of offence categories for which the issuing State’s classification in principle dispenses with verification of double criminality, provided the penalty threshold is met. Adding a war-crime label therefore serves a double function: it hardens the political presentation of the file and it anchors the warrant in qualifications that travel well across borders, since few Member States treat war crimes as lightly as ordinary property damage. There is a further, quieter dimension that defence lawyers across Europe will have noticed. Once a person is surrendered, the speciality rule in Article 27 of the Framework Decision limits prosecution to the offences for which surrender was granted, unless the executing State consents otherwise or an exception applies. A warrant that initially described explosions and now describes war crimes narrows the room for a later dispute about what exactly Pula authorised, because the broader qualification is placed on the record before surrender rather than added afterwards. For Kuznetsov, already charged in Germany, the same logic runs in reverse: every additional charge must be measured against what Italy actually authorised. None of this prejudges guilt. It shows, however, that the Nord Stream files are no longer a simple story of divers and a yacht; they have become a laboratory for how far the language of international criminal law can be stretched to overcome a refusal grounded in the politics of war. That is the exact point on which French procedure has the most to say, because Paris has faced the mirror-image problem only weeks ago.
II. Could France Surrender a Nord Stream Suspect? How Paris Judges a European Arrest Warrant
A. Execution Is the Rule, Refusal the Strict Exception: How the Chambre de l’Instruction Decides
Suppose a German warrant of the Pula type lands in France tomorrow against a suspect living in Paris. The file goes to the prosecutor general, the person is arrested, and the chambre de l’instruction of the court of appeal decides on surrender. The starting point, restated by the Criminal Chamber on 7 August 2024, No. 24-81.863, is blunt: “conformément au principe de reconnaissance mutuelle, l’exécution du mandat d’arrêt européen constitue le principe et le refus d’exécution, qui n’est possible que pour des motifs de non-exécution obligatoire ou facultative procédant de la décision-cadre 2002/584/JAI, est conçu comme une exception, à interpréter strictement (CJUE, [GC], 6 juin 2023, O.G, C-700/21, § 33)”. A Polish-style just-war refusal has no equivalent in this scheme. Within the Union, the political-offence exception that bars classic extradition under Article 696-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that “L’extradition n’est pas accordée : 1° Lorsque la personne réclamée a la nationalité française, cette dernière étant appréciée à l’époque de l’infraction pour laquelle l’extradition est requise ; 2° Lorsque le crime ou le délit à un caractère politique ou lorsqu’il résulte des circonstances que l’extradition est demandée dans un but politique”, simply does not exist as a ground for refusing a European arrest warrant. The contrast is structural: outside the Union, as the Criminal Chamber recalled on 27 May 2026, No. 25-84.904, in an extradition to Algeria, the executing judge verifies the applicable convention, the absence of political character of the facts, double criminality, limitation, the completeness of the file and effective guarantees against arbitrary detention under Article 5 of the European Convention as well as life-imprisonment issues under Article 3. Inside the Union, the judge verifies identity, the boxes ticked on the warrant form, and the closed list of refusal grounds. Anyone who expects a French court to replay Judge Lubowski’s reasoning misunderstands the instrument: an executing judge in Paris does not try the war, does not rule on German jurisdiction over the Baltic Sea, and does not acquit or convict. It surrenders, unless a listed ground bites.
The hearing itself follows a strict choreography that the Criminal Chamber polices closely. Under Article 695-30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, “Lors de la comparution de la personne recherchée, la chambre de l’instruction constate son identité et recueille ses déclarations, dont il est dressé procès-verbal.” On 29 July 2026, No. 26-84.072, the Court specified the function of that appearance: “L’audition de la personne recherchée en vertu d’un mandat d’arrêt européen par la chambre de l’instruction, en application de l’article 695-30 du code de procédure pénale, ne vise qu’à constater son identité, à recevoir ses observations sur le déroulement de la procédure dont elle fait l’objet et à lui permettre de consentir ou non à sa remise, de sorte que cette formalité est préliminaire à tout débat.” Two practical consequences flow from this. First, consent is the great accelerator: a person who consents is surrendered within days, while refusal opens the full examination of refusal grounds and a possible appeal to the Court of Cassation. Second, the specialty waiver is decided at the same moment. As the Court held on 1 June 2021, No. 21-82.663: “Selon ces textes, la personne recherchée doit comparaître devant la chambre de l’instruction, afin qu’elle lui demande s’il consent à sa remise aux autorités requérantes et s’il renonce à la règle de spécialité.” And a detained person who boycotts the hearing gains nothing: “Lorsque l’intéressé est détenu et que, sans motif légitime, il refuse son extraction, il est réputé avoir comparu, avoir refusé de consentir à sa remise aux autorités requérantes et ne pas avoir renoncé à la règle de spécialité.” For a suspect of Zhuravlev’s profile, the specialty point is anything but theoretical: consenting to surrender for explosions while preserving specialty keeps the war-crime count outside the German prosecutor’s reach unless Croatia or France later consents, whereas waiving specialty hands Berlin the broader file at once. The detailed mechanics of that protection are set out in our analysis of the speciality rule in extradition and European arrest warrant proceedings.
The refusal grounds themselves, listed in Article 695-24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, are the only doors out, and each of them is narrow. They include concurrent French prosecution or a French decision not to prosecute, the French-national-or-resident clause for sentence execution, partial commission of the facts on French territory, extraterritorial offences France could not itself prosecute abroad, a final judgment for the same facts by a third State, and limitation. The resident clause deserves attention because the Criminal Chamber reads it as a social-reintegration measure: in the 7 August 2024 ruling, the Court recalled that “L’objectif de ce texte est d’accroître les chances de réinsertion sociale de la personne recherchée” (Criminal Chamber, 7 August 2024, No. 24-81.863), while adding that “Il s’ensuit qu’en l’absence de moyen tiré du motif facultatif de refus de remise prévu à l’article 695-24, 2°, du code de procédure pénale, les juges ne peuvent solliciter des informations complémentaires afin de vérifier si les conditions d’application dudit article sont réunies.” In plain terms, the court will not build the defence’s case on its own: residence, family ties, stable work and integration must be documented by the requested person from the first hearing. Two further refinements from recent months complete the picture. Surrender can be deferred rather than refused when French proceedings or a French sentence take priority, a mechanism the Court reviewed on 29 October 2025, No. 25-86.591, in a case of deferred surrender to Romania, where it also restated the in-absentia safeguard: “selon l’alinéa premier de l’article 695-22-1 précité, ce n’est que lorsque l’intéressé n’a pas comparu en personne lors du procès à l’issue duquel la mesure de sûreté a été prononcée que peut s’appliquer le 3° de ce texte.” And none of the French territorial hooks obviously fits a Baltic Sea sabotage, which leaves a Paris judge with a short menu: documented French residence with an enforceable sentence-transfer request, a genuine limitation issue, a competing final judgment from a third State, or a demonstrated fundamental-rights obstacle. None of these resembles a just war.
B. A Polish-Style Refusal Would Not Shield Anyone in France: Re-Arrest, New Warrants and the Limits of Ne Bis in Idem
The most consequential lesson of the Pula postponement is also the least intuitive for non-lawyers: a refusal in one Member State does not immunise the suspect anywhere else. France learned this the hard way in the very ruling that headlines this analysis. In the case decided on 29 July 2026, No. 26-84.072, the Paris chambre de l’instruction had definitively refused, on 29 November 2023, to surrender a man to Romania for the enforcement of a three-year-and-four-month sentence, over irregularities in the composition of the Romanian sentencing court. Romania issued a new warrant for the same sentence on 30 January 2025, the man was rearrested in France on 7 April 2025, and Paris this time ordered surrender. The Criminal Chamber upheld that outcome with three holdings that map directly onto Zhuravlev’s trajectory. First, following the Court of Justice’s Breian judgment of 29 July 2024 (C-318/24), “qu’une décision définitive de refus de remise en exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen rendue par l’autorité judiciaire d’un Etat membre ne prive pas l’autorité judiciaire d’émission de la possibilité de maintenir sa demande de remise, dès lors que les conditions exigées par le droit de l’Union européenne sont réunies”. Second, the authority of the earlier refusal does not cross from one warrant to another: “l’arrêt susmentionné en date du 29 novembre 2023 portait sur un mandat d’arrêt européen distinct, de sorte que, faute d’objet identique, son autorité ne peut être opposée à l’examen du mandat d’arrêt européen objet de la présente instance”. Third, ne bis in idem does not apply to surrender proceedings at all: “la procédure relative à l’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen émis en vue de l’exécution d’une décision de condamnation ne constitue pas une poursuite nouvelle pour les faits objet de cette condamnation, de sorte que le principe ne bis in idem ne lui est pas applicable.” Replace Paris with Warsaw, Romania with Germany, and the 2023 refusal with the October 2025 just-war ruling, and the Croatian detention becomes legally legible: Warsaw’s refusal bound no court outside Poland, the updated warrant is a distinct instrument, and no second prosecution exists because surrender proceedings prosecute nothing. The Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA confirms the narrowness of the ne bis in idem door: its Article 3(2) bars execution only where the requested person has already been finally judged in a Member State for the same acts, with any resulting sentence served, currently being served, or no longer capable of execution under the law of the sentencing State. A refusal of surrender is not a final judgment on the acts. An acquittal in Berlin would be; a non-lieu in Warsaw is not.
France holds one more card that Germany’s reclassification inadvertently highlights. If a Nord Stream suspect took up habitual residence in France, French courts could claim jurisdiction themselves over war crimes committed abroad. Article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “Hors les cas prévus au sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre IV pour l’application de la convention portant statut de la Cour pénale internationale, ouverte à la signature à Rome le 18 juillet 1998, peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes : 1° Le crime de génocide défini au chapitre Ier du sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre II du code pénal ; 2° Les autres crimes contre l’humanité définis au chapitre II du même sous-titre Ier ; 3° Les crimes et les délits de guerre définis aux articles 461-1 à 461-31 du même code.” But the locks are formidable: “La personne soupçonnée doit avoir une résidence habituelle sur le territoire français”, prosecution requires action by the anti-terrorism prosecutor, and subsidiarity applies where another court claims the person, since “La poursuite de ces crimes ne peut être exercée qu’à la requête du procureur de la République antiterroriste et si aucune juridiction internationale ou nationale ne demande la remise ou l’extradition de la personne.” In other words, the war-crime label that helps Berlin in Pula could, for a suspect settled in France, open a competing French investigation, which in turn feeds the Article 695-24 optional refusal based on concurrent French proceedings. That is not a just-war defence; it is a jurisdictional counterclaim, and it is the only kind Paris listens to. For defence teams, the operational checklist follows from the rulings above: decide on consent and on the specialty waiver with full knowledge that both are practically irreversible; document French residence, family, work and integration from day one rather than hoping the court will investigate on its own; dissect limitation under both French and issuing-State law; inventory any final third-State judgment on the same acts; challenge the warrant’s factual boxes without expecting the executing judge to retry the merits; and, where detention conditions or trial fairness in the issuing State are genuinely at stake, build that file with evidence rather than rhetoric, because the executing judge examines what is pleaded and proved, not what is proclaimed. Zhuravlev’s Croatian judges have given themselves time by postponing the hearing; in Paris, that time is measured in weeks, and it is the defence that must fill it.
Conclusion
The Pula postponement of 4 September 2026 condenses the entire Nord Stream judicial saga into a single hearing that did not happen. A suspect freed in Warsaw on a theory of just war sits in Croatian detention under a German warrant rewritten to allege a war crime, while his alleged accomplice already faces trial in Germany on the same expanded qualification. The Croatian judges were right to take time: the reclassification changes the double-criminality analysis, the speciality perimeter and the political readability of the file all at once. But no one should mistake this pause for protection. As the French Criminal Chamber confirmed on 29 July 2026, a definitive refusal in one Member State neither kills the issuing State’s case nor binds the next executing judge, and surrender proceedings trigger no ne bis in idem shield because they prosecute nothing. In Paris, the same file would move faster and colder: identity checked, consent and specialty waiver recorded, the closed list of refusal grounds examined, and surrender ordered unless residence, limitation, a competing French case or a proven rights obstacle dictates otherwise. The just-war argument would not survive the first hearing, because within the Union it does not exist. The next date that matters is the rescheduled Pula hearing, still unannounced, with Zhuravlev in detention and Berlin’s new qualification on the table. If Croatia surrenders him, Germany will hold two defendants and the trial will test whether sabotage of a pipeline in wartime is a war crime or an act of war that criminal law cannot reach. If Croatia refuses, the file will travel to the next border crossing, as it already did from Warsaw to Pula. For anyone living in France under a European arrest warrant, the practical moral is immediate: a victory in one country is a local event, the warrant is a European object, and only a defence built for the executing judge’s closed list of questions can stop the next arrest.