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Nord Stream Sabotage: Croatia Approves Extradition to Germany While Poland Refused — What a French Court Would Do With the European Arrest Warrant

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Nord Stream Sabotage: Croatia Approves Extradition to Germany While Poland Refused — What a French Court Would Do With the European Arrest Warrant

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On 18 September 2026, a Croatian court approved the extradition to Germany of a Ukrainian national arrested in August in the northern town of Pula on a German European Arrest Warrant for the underwater explosions that ripped through the Nord Stream 1 and 2 gas pipelines on 26 September 2022. The ruling is not final: according to his lawyer, it will be appealed, so nobody knows when, or whether, the surrender will actually happen. That single pending appeal is the latest chapter of the most instructive extradition saga in today’s Europe. The same German investigation has now received three different answers from three European Union courts. In October 2025, a regional court in Warsaw refused to surrender a suspect, with Poland’s prime minister declaring the case closed. In Italy, the courts authorised surrender after a dramatic double ruling by the Court of Cassation, and the suspect was handed over to Germany on 27 November 2025. In January 2026, Germany’s Federal Court of Justice confirmed that German courts have jurisdiction because the pipelines’ destruction produced its effects on German territory, and it rejected immunity and combatant-privilege defences. Now Croatia has said yes, subject to appeal. For an international reader, and especially for anyone who could be arrested in France on a European warrant, the question that matters is practical: what would a French court do with a German warrant like this one? This article reconstructs what each court actually decided, then applies the French European Arrest Warrant litigation playbook step by step, with the exact statutory levers a defence team in Paris would pull.

I. Why Did Poland Refuse the Nord Stream Warrant While Italy and Croatia Approved It?

The Nord Stream file is a laboratory for the European Arrest Warrant system because the facts are identical everywhere: the same German Federal Prosecutor General investigation, the same legal characterisation under sections 88, 305 and 308 of the German Criminal Code, covering anti-constitutional sabotage committed together with causing an explosion and destroying structures, and the same mechanism, a European Arrest Warrant circulated for Ukrainian nationals suspected of having chartered a yacht and planted explosives on the pipelines in the Baltic Sea. Yet the executing courts diverged. Understanding why they diverged is the only way to predict what France would do.

A. What Each European Court Actually Decided on the German Warrants

The story starts in the Baltic Sea in September 2022, when several explosions damaged Nord Stream 1 and 2 so badly that gas could no longer flow from Russia to Europe. Because the acts were capable of undermining the internal security of Germany and because of the exceptional importance of the case, the investigation was taken over by the Federal Public Prosecutor General, the Generalbundesanwalt, which is Germany’s highest federal prosecution office for state-security offences. Seven Ukrainian nationals came under investigation, and European Arrest Warrants followed.

Poland answered first, and its answer was no. On 17 October 2025, the Regional Court in Warsaw refused the surrender of a suspect wanted by Germany. The political echo was immediate: Poland’s prime minister publicly indicated that the case was closed and that it was not in his country’s interest to prosecute or extradite the man. Behind the politics sits a genuine legal fault line that any extradition lawyer recognises at once. When an issuing state asks for surrender for acts committed outside its own territory, in international waters, the executing court examines whether the issuing state genuinely has jurisdiction and whether the territoriality exceptions of the Framework Decision apply. A refusal on that basis is not an act of rebellion against European cooperation; it is the system working as designed, with the executing judge acting as a check on the reach of the issuing state’s criminal law.

Italy answered yes, but only after a procedural battle that exposed the narrowest point of the whole European Arrest Warrant edifice: what the executing judge is allowed to verify. The Bologna Court of Appeal had authorised the surrender of the man German investigators regard as the mastermind, identified in the press only as Serhij K. On 15 October 2025, the Italian Supreme Court overturned that decision, not on the substance of guilt or innocence, but on a point of executing-state authority: the Bologna court had reclassified the offence described in the German warrant so as to apply the tighter procedural rules reserved for terrorism cases in surrender proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the executing authority cannot rewrite the issuing authority’s legal characterisation to trigger a harsher procedural track. After remittal, on 23 October 2025, the Bologna Court of Appeal ordered the surrender again, this time curing the procedural defect but without substantively revisiting the defence’s heavy arguments: functional immunity, ne bis in idem, and the risk of violations of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. A second appeal was dismissed by the Italian Supreme Court on 19 November 2025, confirming the surrender order and narrowing the space for fundamental-rights review in warrant proceedings. The handover took place on 27 November 2025.

Germany itself then supplied the jurisdictional theory that holds the whole file together. On 15 January 2026, the Federal Court of Justice dismissed the complaint of the surrendered suspect against his arrest warrant. The court’s reasoning, summarised in its official press release, rested on three pillars. First, strong suspicion of an offence within the jurisdiction of the Federal Public Prosecutor General, plus a risk of flight, justified detention. Second, the immunity and combatant-privilege arguments failed: a covert sabotage operation against civilian energy infrastructure does not confer the protections of lawful combatancy. Third, and most important for the other pending cases, Germany has territorial jurisdiction because the result of the offence, the pipelines being rendered inoperable, also occurred on German territory, where the pipelines end. In German criminal law, as in French law, the effects doctrine extends jurisdiction to offences whose result materialises at home.

Croatia is the newest front. According to reporting by Al Jazeera, AFP, AP and Reuters, a Ukrainian man was arrested in August 2026 in Pula, in northern Croatia, reportedly while working on a Hollywood dramatisation of the attack. German prosecutors identified him only as Vladimir Z. and described him as a trained scuba diver who belonged to the team that allegedly planted explosives on both pipelines near the Danish island of Bornholm. His lawyer, Ljubo Pavasovic Viskovic, announced that the court approved extradition on 18 September 2026 and immediately added that the ruling is not final and will be appealed, so it remains unclear when or whether the extradition will take place. Meanwhile, German prosecutors have moved the file forward at home: in the summer of 2026 they formally charged a Ukrainian suspect over the explosions, which means the issuing authority’s case is no longer a pure investigation file but an accusation backed by an indictment. That upgrade matters for every executing court, because a charged case presents a denser file, fuller evidence and a harder double-criminality and proportionality fight.

Three answers, then: refusal in Warsaw, surrender after correction in Bologna, approval under appeal in Croatia. The divergence is not a bug. It reflects the questions the Framework Decision deliberately leaves to the executing judge: jurisdiction over extraterritorial acts, the scope of double-criminality review, immunity claims with a political and military background, and the intensity of fundamental-rights scrutiny. France, if it were seized, would have to answer each of those questions in its own way, under its own Code of Criminal Procedure.

B. Can Germany Prosecute a Pipeline Attack Committed in International Waters?

The jurisdictional question comes first because everything else depends on it: if Germany has no jurisdiction, there is nothing to surrender for. The explosions occurred in the Baltic Sea near Bornholm, in waters that are Danish or Swedish exclusive economic zones, not German territorial waters. The defence argument writes itself: the act was committed abroad, the suspects are Ukrainian nationals, the flag state of the yacht was foreign, and Germany is asserting jurisdiction over an attack on infrastructure co-owned by Russian interests. Why should Berlin prosecute?

The German answer, endorsed by the Federal Court of Justice in January 2026, is the effects doctrine. The pipelines were built to carry gas to Germany, they land in Germany, and rendering them inoperable produced a direct economic and energy-security result on German territory. When the result of the offence materialises at home, the offence is partly committed at home, and jurisdiction follows. French lawyers will recognise the mirror image of this reasoning in their own statute book. Article 113-2 of the French Criminal Code provides that French criminal law applies to offences committed on the territory of the Republic, and it adds the decisive sentence: “L’infraction est réputée commise sur le territoire de la République dès lors qu’un de ses faits constitutifs a eu lieu sur ce territoire.” An offence is deemed committed on French territory as soon as one of its constituent elements took place there. Had the pipelines landed in France rather than Germany, a French investigating judge could have built exactly the same jurisdictional bridge.

That symmetry cuts both ways, and it is precisely where a French executing court could bite. Under Article 695-24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, execution of a European Arrest Warrant may be refused on several territoriality-related grounds, and the statute lists them bluntly: “Si les faits pour lesquels il a été émis ont été commis, en tout ou en partie, sur le territoire français” as item 3, and “Si l’infraction a été commise hors du territoire de l’Etat membre d’émission et que la loi française n’autorise pas la poursuite de l’infraction lorsqu’elle est commise hors du territoire national” as item 4. The same article adds, as item 1, the situation where “la personne recherchée fait l’objet de poursuites devant les juridictions françaises ou si celles-ci ont décidé de ne pas engager les poursuites ou d’y mettre fin”. In plain terms: if France opened its own case over the sabotage, or decided after examination not to prosecute, or if French law would not allow prosecution of the same extraterritorial facts, surrender may be refused. The Polish refusal shows that this is not theoretical. A French chambre de l’instruction seized of a German warrant for underwater sabotage would have to ask, point by point, whether France could prosecute the same facts itself, and what follows from the answer.

The immunity and combatant-privilege arguments deserve a clear-eyed assessment because they will be raised again wherever the next suspect is arrested. The claim runs as follows: the sabotage was an act of war by a Ukrainian team against Russian military-logistics infrastructure, covered by combatant immunity, or at least shielded by the functional immunity of persons acting for a state. The German Federal Court of Justice rejected both limbs: covert operatives who plant explosives on civilian pipelines in peacetime waters are not lawful combatants, and no functional immunity covers this type of operation. A French court would reason in the same direction. Nothing in the French Code of Criminal Procedure creates an immunity exception inside the European Arrest Warrant chapter, and the executing judge is not the court that decides guilt. But the political background does not vanish: it resurfaces, transformed, in the fundamental-rights review and in the debate over the legal characterisation, terrorism or ordinary sabotage, which determines which procedural track and which sentence exposure apply.

II. What Would Happen If the German Warrant Landed Before a French Court?

Imagine the practical scenario. A Ukrainian national is stopped in Paris, Lyon or Marseille. The fingerprint check returns a hit: a German European Arrest Warrant for sabotage, explosions and destruction of structures over the Nord Stream blasts. He is brought before the French authorities, and the surrender litigation begins. French law defines the instrument in Article 695-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: “Le mandat d’arrêt européen est une décision judiciaire émise par un Etat membre de l’Union européenne, appelé Etat membre d’émission, en vue de l’arrestation et de la remise par un autre Etat membre, appelé Etat membre d’exécution, d’une personne recherchée pour l’exercice de poursuites pénales ou pour l’exécution d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté privative de liberté.” The issuing state is Germany; the executing state would be France; the decision-maker is the chambre de l’instruction of the court of appeal, with review by the Cour de cassation. Two recent rulings of the criminal chamber, from February and August 2026, show exactly how that review works, and they map directly onto the Nord Stream defences. Readers facing a comparable situation in France can usefully compare with the step-by-step extradition checks described in this analysis of an extradition appeal fought from France, which covers the same reflexes: blocking surrender, testing the file, and forcing the court to verify each condition.

A. Would France Check Double Criminality for Underwater Sabotage?

Double criminality is the first substantive wall, and the statute states the principle in one sentence. Article 695-23, first paragraph, of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: “L’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen peut également être refusée si le fait faisant l’objet dudit mandat d’arrêt ne constitue pas une infraction au regard de la loi française.” Execution may be refused if the facts in the warrant are not an offence under French law. The same article then creates the well-known exception: for serious conduct punishable in the issuing state by at least three years of imprisonment and falling within the listed categories, surrender proceeds without verification of double criminality. The German charges here, anti-constitutional sabotage with explosives and destruction of structures, carry penalties far above that threshold, so the opening battle in Paris would be fought over characterisation: does the German description fall inside the no-verification list, or does France verify?

If France verifies, the mapping onto French offences is straightforward but tactically rich. The natural equivalent is Article 322-6 of the Criminal Code: “La destruction, la dégradation ou la détérioration d’un bien appartenant à autrui par l’effet d’une substance explosive, d’un incendie ou de tout autre moyen de nature à créer un danger pour les personnes est punie de dix ans d’emprisonnement et de 150 000 euros d’amende.” Destruction of another person’s property by explosives, punished by ten years. The German file would have no difficulty meeting that description: pipelines destroyed by planted explosive charges. The alternative mapping, and the one the defence would fight hardest, is terrorism. Article 421-1 of the Criminal Code defines terrorist acts as offences intentionally connected with an individual or collective enterprise aimed at seriously disturbing public order through intimidation or terror: “Constituent des actes de terrorisme, lorsqu’elles sont intentionnellement en relation avec une entreprise individuelle ou collective ayant pour but de troubler gravement l’ordre public par l’intimidation ou la terreur, les infractions suivantes”, including, at item 2, “Les vols, les extorsions, les destructions, dégradations et détériorations, ainsi que les infractions en matière informatique définis par le livre III du présent code”. Whether underwater sabotage of energy infrastructure in the context of an armed conflict qualifies as terrorism or as ordinary aggravated destruction changes the sentence exposure, the detention regime and the political colour of the trial. The Italian episode shows why the label matters: the executing judge reclassified the conduct to trigger the terrorism procedural track, and the Court of Cassation struck that down. A French chambre de l’instruction would face the identical temptation and the identical prohibition.

Two rulings handed down by the Cour de cassation in 2026 fix the framework the Paris judges would apply, and both are directly quotable because they state the method. On 12 August 2026, in a case about a Cypriot warrant for property-fraud conspiracy, the criminal chamber rejected the appeal against surrender and restated the double-criminality test in terms every practitioner should memorise: the condition of double criminality does not require the offences to be identical in the issuing and executing states, since the Court held that “la condition de la double incrimination n’exige pas que les infractions soient identiques dans l’État membre d’émission et dans l’État membre d’exécution” (Cass. crim., 12 August 2026, No. 26-84.479). The same ruling confirms the philosophy of the whole chapter: “l’article 695-23, alinéa 1er, du code de procédure pénale, dans sa rédaction issue de la loi n° 2021-1729 du 22 décembre 2021, laisse au juge le pouvoir d’apprécier l’opportunité de la remise”, meaning the judge retains the power to assess whether surrender is appropriate. Applied to Nord Stream, the lesson is double-edged. The defence cannot win by pointing to differences between German sabotage provisions and French destruction provisions; inexact correspondence is enough. But the court cannot rubber-stamp either: it must genuinely assess, and a serious argument that the German warrant stretches jurisdiction over international waters, or that the file targets conduct France would characterise differently, must be answered with reasons, failing which the Cour de cassation quashes.

The mandatory refusal grounds would also be screened systematically. Article 695-22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure commands refusal where prosecution in France is extinguished by amnesty, or where the person has already been finally judged for the same facts in France or in another Member State, subject to sentence execution. The ne bis in idem argument raised in Italy would be tested here against that provision: has any court, in Denmark, Sweden or Germany, already finally judged this suspect for these blasts? If the German summer-2026 indictment concerns the same man for the same facts, there is no double jeopardy yet, only parallel proceedings. But if Sweden or Denmark closed their own Nord Stream investigations with decisions that count as final, the defence would have a genuine ne bis in idem file to build, and the chambre de l’instruction would have to examine it rather than wave it away.

B. How Can the Defence Fight Surrender From France: Territory, Specialty and Human Rights?

Assume double criminality is satisfied. The defence still holds three families of weapons, and the Nord Stream history shows each of them being fired somewhere in Europe.

The first is territoriality and competing French proceedings, under Article 695-24 quoted above. If the sabotage damaged French interests, if a French prosecutor opened a file, or if French courts decided not to prosecute after examination, surrender may be refused. The provision also covers prescription: item 6 allows refusal where the French limitation period has run on facts that French courts could have tried. For 2022 blasts, limitation is not yet an issue, but the structure matters. More subtly, item 4 invites the court to ask whether French law would even permit prosecuting these extraterritorial facts. If the answer is no, the German warrant loses part of its moral force in the eyes of the executing judge, even though refusal remains optional rather than mandatory. The Polish refusal is the proof of concept that optional grounds are real grounds: a court that is not convinced by the issuing state’s jurisdictional reach can say no, and the system absorbs that no.

The second weapon is the political-offence argument, and here France presents a striking contrast that the defence must handle with precision. In classic extradition outside the European Union, the political exception is alive and absolute. Article 696-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states: “L’extradition n’est pas accordée : 1° Lorsque la personne réclamée a la nationalité française, cette dernière étant appréciée à l’époque de l’infraction pour laquelle l’extradition est requise ; 2° Lorsque le crime ou le délit à un caractère politique ou lorsqu’il résulte des circonstances que l’extradition est demandée dans un but politique”. No extradition for political offences, no extradition where the request pursues a political goal. But the European Arrest Warrant deliberately abolished the political-offence ground between Member States: mutual trust replaced political screening. A Paris lawyer who simply pleads the political character of the Nord Stream sabotage, an attack carried out in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war, would lose on that ground alone. The competent move is translation: convert the political background into arguments the warrant system recognises, which are discriminatory prosecution risks under fundamental rights, the precise legal characterisation of the facts, and the proportionality of surrender. The Italian file illustrates the cost of getting this wrong: grand arguments about immunity and the laws of war, raised without a procedural hook the executing judge can grip, were noted but not substantively revisited.

The third weapon is the specialty rule, and it is the one the Cour de cassation sharpened most recently. Specialty means Germany may only prosecute, sentence or detain the surrendered person for the offences that motivated the surrender, unless exceptions apply. French procedure organises consent at two moments. At the hearing, Article 695-31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “Si, lors de sa comparution, la personne recherchée déclare consentir à sa remise, la chambre de l’instruction l’informe des conséquences juridiques de son consentement et de son caractère irrévocable”, so consent is informed and irrevocable. After surrender, Article 695-46 tasks the same chambre de l’instruction with ruling on German requests to prosecute other pre-surrender offences: “La chambre de l’instruction devant laquelle la personne recherchée a comparu est saisie de toute demande émanant des autorités compétentes de l’Etat membre d’émission en vue de consentir à des poursuites ou à la mise à exécution d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté prononcées pour d’autres infractions que celles ayant motivé la remise et commises antérieurement à celle-ci.” On 10 February 2026, the criminal chamber gave this architecture teeth in a case about a man surrendered by Spain to France. It held: “La Cour de cassation en déduit qu’une personne remise à la France en exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen et qui n’a pas renoncé au principe de spécialité ne peut faire l’objet d’une mesure de détention provisoire pour une infraction autre que celle qui a motivé sa remise, avant que son consentement ait été obtenu (Crim., 5 octobre 2021, pourvoi n° 21-84.194, publié au Bulletin).” And it extended the logic: “Le principe de spécialité commande que la même règle reçoive application en matière de contrôle judiciaire, sauf si cette mesure restrictive de liberté est légalement justifiée par les autres chefs d’accusation figurant dans le mandat d’arrêt européen” (Cass. crim., 10 February 2026, No. 25-87.769). The headnote states the rule in its general form: specialty follows from Article 27 of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA and Article 695-18 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and where the defence contests compliance, the court seized must verify it. For a Nord Stream suspect, the practical consequence is immediate: if Germany surrendered him for sabotage and then wanted to add espionage, terrorism or treason charges built on the same underwater operation, it would need fresh consent, and any detention imposed for the new charges without that consent would be unlawful. Defence teams in Paris know this ruling by heart, and they raise specialty from day one, demanding that the surrender decision in the file state exactly which facts and which charges it covers.

Finally, the human-rights layer overlays everything. The Italian defence invoked the risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Bologna court after remittal did not substantively revisit the point. In France, the chambre de l’instruction cannot decline to examine a serious, fact-backed Article 3 or fair-trial claim: systemic or individual risks of inhuman detention conditions, or a real risk of a flagrant denial of justice in the issuing state, can suspend surrender pending assurances. Germany is not a state whose prisons routinely trigger such findings, so this argument would be an uphill battle in a Franco-German case, and honesty requires saying so. But the method stands: documented evidence first, assurances procedure second, refusal only if the risk is established and unremedied. The same discipline applies to the ne bis in idem and immunity claims. Courts do not reward atmosphere; they reward files, dates, final decisions and exact concordances between the facts judged and the facts requested.

Conclusion

The Croatian approval of 18 September 2026, still under appeal, does not settle the Nord Stream extradition saga; it confirms its structure. One German investigation, one set of underwater explosions, and as many judicial answers as there are executing courts: refusal in Warsaw on jurisdictional and political grounds, surrender in Bologna after the Supreme Court policed the limits of reclassification, approval under appeal in Croatia for the diver arrested in Pula. The Federal Court of Justice supplied the jurisdictional key with the effects doctrine, and German prosecutors raised the stakes by bringing formal charges in the summer of 2026. If the next arrest happens in France, the chambre de l’instruction will walk the same path the Italian, Polish and Croatian judges walked, but with French tools: double-criminality review under Article 695-23 with the flexible correspondence test restated by the Cour de cassation on 12 August 2026, optional refusal for territoriality and competing proceedings under Article 695-24, no political-offence bar inside the warrant system unlike classic extradition, and a specialty shield reinforced on 10 February 2026 that follows the surrendered person all the way to the detention judge. The lesson for anyone exposed to a European Arrest Warrant is the one this saga teaches on every page: surrender litigation is won in the first weeks, by fixing the exact scope of the facts, the exact charges, and the exact conditions of the file, before the executing court rules. Once surrender is ordered and executed, only specialty remains, and it protects solely what was carefully placed inside it.

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