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€210 Billion Frozen, €3.3 Billion Unpaid: Can Russian Assets in France Pay Ukraine’s ECHR Awards After the 1 October 2026 PACE Vote?

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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€210 Billion Frozen, €3.3 Billion Unpaid: Can Russian Assets in France Pay Ukraine’s ECHR Awards After the 1 October 2026 PACE Vote?

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On 1 October 2026, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe told member states to do something no European institution had dared to put in writing so plainly: take frozen Russian state assets and use them to pay the compensation the European Court of Human Rights awards to Ukraine and to Ukrainian victims. The same day, renewed pressure built inside the European Union around a far larger figure, roughly €210 billion in immobilised Russian central bank assets, most of it sitting at Euroclear in Belgium, with 122 Members of the European Parliament and four member states pushing for a mechanism that would finally put that money to work for Ukraine. For anyone with funds, property or exposure in France, and for every Ukrainian victim holding an unpaid Strasbourg award, the question is suddenly concrete: can Russian money frozen in France be turned into compensation, who decides, and what are the legal locks that still hold the vault shut? This article gives a French lawyer’s insider view of the procedure as it stands on 2 October 2026, between the Strasbourg vote, the Brussels negotiations and the Paris enforcement judge.

I. Can Frozen Russian Money in France Be Turned Into Compensation for Ukraine?

A. What Did the 1 October 2026 PACE Vote Actually Decide on Frozen Russian Assets?

The starting point is the text itself, because much of the commentary published within hours of the vote already goes further than the resolution. According to the session report published on 1 October 2026, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe called on member and observer states to take concrete steps to address what it described as an unprecedented situation, including repurposing frozen Russian state assets to compensate Ukraine and Ukrainian victims once the Court delivers its judgments in the inter-State cases, and ensuring that national legal frameworks allow for the domestic enforcement of the Court’s awards. The resolution recalls that Russia owes over €3.3 billion in unpaid compensation awarded by the European Court of Human Rights, while refusing to comply with Strasbourg rulings and to cooperate with the Council of Europe’s supervisory mechanisms. The Assembly added three companion demands: targeted individual sanctions against the persons behind the most serious violations recorded in Strasbourg judgments, preservation of all case files relating to complaints against Russia, and protection of the personal data of illegally deported Ukrainian children with full information about them channelled through the appropriate international mechanism. Readers who want the primary source will find it under the Assembly’s official file for the October 2026 part-session, and the Ukrainian delegation had already announced, three days earlier, that it would use the plenary debates, committee meetings and bilateral contacts to press the compensation question alongside the humanitarian situation in occupied areas and Ukraine’s needs ahead of winter.

Three legal qualifications matter immediately, and a Paris practitioner would insist on each of them before any client builds a strategy on this vote. First, a PACE resolution does not freeze, seize or transfer a single euro. The Assembly is the deliberative organ of the Council of Europe; it recommends, it does not legislate, and its texts bind neither France nor the European Union. Second, the operative formula is conditional twice over: repurposing is envisaged once the Court delivers its judgments in the inter-State cases, and within national legal frameworks that must first be adapted to allow domestic enforcement of the awards. Neither condition is satisfied today. The inter-State cases brought by Ukraine against Russia remain pending before the Grand Chamber on the merits and on just satisfaction, and French law as it stands contains no procedure that converts a Strasbourg award against a foreign state into an enforceable attachment of that state’s frozen central bank reserves. Third, the €3.3 billion figure concerns just satisfaction already awarded, mostly in individual cases, which Russia refuses to pay and which the Committee of Ministers continues to supervise; it must not be confused with the far larger war-damage claims that dominate the political debate. In short, Strasbourg has designated the destination, but neither the vehicle nor the road yet exists in French law.

The European Convention supplies the legal anchor the Assembly relies on, and its wording deserves to be read exactly. Article 41 of the Convention provides: If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party. Article 46, paragraph 1, adds: The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties. Paragraph 2 entrusts supervision of execution to the Committee of Ministers. These provisions explain both the strength and the limit of the PACE logic. The strength is that Russia’s obligation to pay is a treaty obligation, confirmed by final judgments, supervised multilaterally, and unaffected by its expulsion from the Council of Europe in March 2022 for judgments concerning violations committed while it was still a party. The limit is that the Convention organises payment by the condemned state, not confiscation of its assets by third states; moving from one mechanism to the other requires new legislation, in Brussels and in Paris, that survives review by the Court of Justice of the European Union and by the European Court of Human Rights itself, including under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 protecting property. Anyone announcing that the vote has unlocked the funds is therefore confusing a political instruction with an enforcement title, and in a Paris courtroom that confusion would end the argument before it begins.

B. Where Does the €210 Billion Sit and Why Can France Not Simply Seize It?

The second figure dominating the news cycle is of a different magnitude and a different legal nature. According to reporting published on 1 October 2026 relaying agency dispatches, Europe holds roughly €210 billion in frozen Russian assets, and a group of 122 Members of the European Parliament together with four member states is pressing to use them for Ukraine. A policy analysis published on 29 September 2026 precises the geography: around €210 billion of immobilised Russian sovereign assets are held in the European Union, about €185 billion of which sits at Euroclear in Belgium. A further report recalls that, after difficult overnight negotiations at a Brussels summit covered on 10 September 2026, European Union leaders rejected the European Commission’s proposal to provide Ukraine with a reparations loan linked to frozen Russian assets. The picture on 2 October 2026 is therefore a three-way tension: a Strasbourg assembly voting to repurpose, a Commission loan design struggling to find unanimity, and a depository structure concentrated in one Belgian institution under Belgian law, with only a fraction of the total actually booked in France. French exposure exists, through accounts, securities and real estate frozen by the Directorate General of the Treasury, but Paris is not where the bulk of the central bank reserves sleeps, and no French authority can dispose of assets held in Brussels.

French domestic law explains why a freeze is not a confiscation, and the distinction governs everything that follows. The national freeze regime sits in the Monetary and Financial Code. Article L. 562-2 of that Code, in force, states: Le ministre chargé de l’économie et le ministre de l’intérieur peuvent décider, conjointement, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques : 1° Qui appartiennent à, sont possédés, détenus ou contrôlés par des personnes physiques ou morales, ou toute autre entité qui commettent, tentent de commettre, facilitent ou financent des actes de terrorisme, y incitent ou y participent ; 2° Qui appartiennent à, sont possédés, détenus ou contrôlés par des personnes morales ou toute autre entité elles-mêmes détenues ou contrôlées par les personnes mentionnées au 1° ou agissant sciemment pour le compte ou sur instructions de celles-ci. The companion provision for international sanctions, Article L. 562-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code, provides: Le ministre chargé de l’économie peut décider, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques : 1° Qui appartiennent à, sont possédés, détenus ou contrôlés par des personnes physiques ou morales, ou toute autre entité qui commettent, tentent de commettre, facilitent ou financent des actions sanctionnées ou prohibées par les résolutions adoptées dans le cadre du chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations unies ou par les actes pris en application de l’article 15 du traité sur l’Union européenne. The mechanism is administrative, preventive and renewable; it renders assets unavailable without transferring ownership, and any movement in breach of it is a criminal matter, as the Cour de cassation confirmed when it ruled on evasion of asset-freeze measures, noting that the Douai court had, and I quote, pour soustraction aux mesures de gel des avoirs dans le cadre de la lutte contre le terrorisme, a condamné, le premier, à trois mois d’emprisonnement avec sursis probatoire, une amende douanière et une confiscation, le second, à deux mois d’emprisonnement avec sursis, une amende douanière et une confiscation (Cass. crim., 29 Nov. 2023, No. 22-85.867). Parallel to this, Article L. 151-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code states: Sont soumis à autorisation préalable du ministre chargé de l’économie les investissements étrangers dans une activité en France qui, même à titre occasionnel, participe à l’exercice de l’autorité publique ou relève de l’un des domaines suivants : a) Activités de nature à porter atteinte à l’ordre public, à la sécurité publique ou aux intérêts de la défense nationale. None of these texts authorises the French executive to vest itself with ownership of frozen Russian state property or to hand it to Ukraine; confiscation in France remains a judicial penalty pronounced case by case, and the European Union regulations that organise the Russia sanctions, principally Council Regulation (EU) No. 269/2014 on individual listings and Council Regulation (EU) No. 833/2014 on sectoral restrictions as amended, freeze without expropriating. The 2024 European legislation allocating extraordinary revenues from immobilised assets to Ukraine touches only the windfall profits, not the principal, and even that construction is defended as a tax-like measure precisely to avoid characterisation as confiscation.

The third lock is the hardest, and it is the one most press commentaries skip: the immunity of the foreign state from enforcement. French statute law states the principle without ambiguity. Article L. 111-1 of the Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures provides: Tout créancier peut, dans les conditions prévues par la loi, contraindre son débiteur défaillant à exécuter ses obligations à son égard. Tout créancier peut pratiquer une mesure conservatoire pour assurer la sauvegarde de ses droits. L’exécution forcée et les mesures conservatoires ne sont pas applicables aux personnes qui bénéficient d’une immunité d’exécution. Article L. 111-2 of the same Code adds: Le créancier muni d’un titre exécutoire constatant une créance liquide et exigible peut en poursuivre l’exécution forcée sur les biens de son débiteur dans les conditions propres à chaque mesure d’exécution. And Article L. 111-1-3 of the Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures states: Des mesures conservatoires ou des mesures d’exécution forcée ne peuvent être mises en œuvre sur les biens, y compris les comptes bancaires, utilisés ou destinés à être utilisés dans l’exercice des fonctions de la mission diplomatique des Etats étrangers ou de leurs postes consulaires, de leurs missions spéciales ou de leurs missions auprès des organisations internationales. Central bank reserves held abroad for sovereign monetary purposes sit at the very core of this protection under customary international law, reflected in the 2004 United Nations Convention on state immunity, and the Cour de cassation polices the boundary strictly. In its 13 March 2024 ruling on the Congolese presidential aircraft, the First Civil Chamber held, and I quote the official summary: Il résulte des principes du droit international coutumier reflétés par la Convention des Nations Unies du 2 décembre 2004 sur les immunités des Etats et de leurs biens et de l’article 22, § 3 de la Convention de Vienne sur les relations diplomatiques du 18 avril 1961, que les dispositions de l’article L. 111-1-3 du code des procédures civiles d’exécution, selon lesquelles les biens, y compris les comptes bancaires, utilisés ou destinés à être utilisés dans l’exercice des fonctions de la mission diplomatique des Etats étrangers ou de leurs postes consulaires, de leurs missions spéciales ou de leurs missions auprès des organisations internationales ne peuvent faire l’objet de mesures conservatoires ou de mesures d’exécution forcée qu’en cas de renonciation expresse et spéciale des Etats concernés, doivent être interprétées strictement (Cass. 1re civ., 13 Mar. 2024, No. 21-17.599). Three years earlier, the same chamber had recalled the mirror presumption protecting the other side of the ledger, and I quote: il est de principe que les comptes bancaires ouverts par une ambassade sont présumés affectés à l’exercice de la mission diplomatique de celle-ci (Cass. 1re civ., 3 Feb. 2021, No. 19-10.669). Applied to Russian sovereign reserves, the lesson is stark: even with a Strasbourg award in hand, a creditor approaching a Paris enforcement judge today faces a wall of immunity that only an express waiver by Russia, which will never come, or a new legislative act creating a targeted exception, which does not yet exist, could remove. The PACE call to ensure that national legal frameworks allow domestic enforcement of the awards is precisely an invitation to legislate around this wall, and the debate over whether such an exception would survive review in Luxembourg and Strasbourg will define the next phase.

II. How Do You Challenge or Enforce a Freeze From Paris?

A. How Can a Listed Person or Company Contest an EU Freeze Affecting France?

While states argue over the principal, thousands of individual files follow the ordinary sanctions litigation track, and Paris plays a central role in it. Any person, company or entity whose funds are frozen in France under the European Union Russia regime has two distinct battlefields, and confusing them loses cases. The first is Luxembourg: annulment of the listing itself before the General Court of the European Union, on the basis of the right to be heard, the duty to state reasons, manifest error of assessment and proportionality. The listing acts adopted under Council Regulation (EU) No. 269/2014 must be individually reasoned, supported by evidence the Council can defend before the judge, and reviewed at regular intervals; the wave of delistings and partial annulments obtained since 2022 shows that the Court exercises a real control, and recent coverage of high-profile removals from the list confirms that a well-documented file, demonstrating severed links, resignation from functions or manifest error in the statement of reasons, can succeed. The Assembly’s plenary session itself illustrated the movement in both directions: while calling for frozen assets to be repurposed, it simultaneously urged member states and the European Union to impose targeted individual sanctions on the persons behind the most serious violations recorded in Strasbourg rulings, which means new listings will continue to arrive even as old ones fall. A French resident targeted by such a measure should therefore treat the Luxembourg deadline as the emergency: two months from notification or publication, plus ten days on account of distance, with a simultaneous suspension application where urgency and a prima facie case can be shown, because the freeze bites from day one on bank accounts, dividends, rents and disposal of property.

The second battlefield is Paris, and it concerns the concrete effects of the freeze on French territory. Banks operating in France apply the European regulations directly, backed by the national freeze orders of the Directorate General of the Treasury, and they tend to over-block: accounts of non-listed family members, operating companies with a distant listed shareholder, or transactions merely transiting through a frozen counterparty. The French response runs through the administrative judge for the national measure and the civil courts for its private-law consequences, with the European regulation invoked as the higher norm. Here the Cour de cassation’s sanctions case law, built in the Iranian Bank Sepah litigation, remains the essential compass. The Assemblée plénière recalled how the freeze mechanism is constructed in European law, and I quote: le gel des fonds et des ressources économiques des personnes, des entités et des organismes qui participent, sont directement associés ou apportent un soutien aux activités de l’Iran liées à l’enrichissement, au retraitement ou à l’eau lourde, ou à la mise au point par l’Iran de vecteurs d’armes nucléaires. Ces mesures ont été mises en œuvre dans la Communauté européenne par le règlement (CE) n° 423/2007 du Conseil du 19 avril 2007 (Cass., Ass. plén., 10 July 2020, Nos. 18-18.542 and 18-21.814). The same transposition logic governs the Russia regulations today: United Nations or European political decision, European regulation with direct effect, national implementing freeze, judicial review at each level. Practically, a person frozen in France should commission, from the first week, a complete mapping of the measures affecting them, European listing acts with their statements of reasons, Treasury notices, bank blocking letters, and file the Luxembourg annulment within the time limit while seeking, in parallel, humanitarian or basic-needs authorisations from the competent authority, which the regulations expressly provide for. For businesses, the audit extends to ownership chains, voting rights and control presumptions, because the freezing of a company held or controlled by a listed person follows automatically, and counterparties performing enhanced due diligence will ask for the chart before releasing any payment. Readers facing this situation will find the firm’s broader analysis of delisting strategy from Paris, with its step-by-step account of evidence bundles and timing, in the earlier study of how EU delistings are won and how frozen accounts are released from France.

One warning specific to France must be given plainly, because it traps foreign clients every month. Attempting to empty, move or interpose screen structures around frozen assets is not a clever interim measure; it is a criminal offence prosecuted as evasion of the freeze, alongside customs and confiscation consequences, exactly as the 2023 criminal ruling cited above illustrates. The lawful path is authorisation, derogation or annulment, documented in writing, never self-help. Conversely, creditors of Russia, including Ukrainian victims holding Strasbourg awards, should inventory from now the attachable footprint in France: non-sovereign commercial assets of the Russian state used for private purposes, receivables of state-owned companies acting in a commercial capacity, and real estate manifestly unrelated to diplomatic or central banking functions, each assessed against the immunity wall described in the first part. The distinction between the frozen mass, which is unavailable but still owned, and the attachable mass, which a judge might one day allow a creditor to seize, will decide which files move first if the legislator creates the exception PACE requests.

B. How Would a Strasbourg Award Against Russia Reach a French Enforcement Judge?

Assume now the favourable scenario for the victims: the Grand Chamber delivers its inter-State judgments with just satisfaction, the Committee of Ministers supervises execution, Russia does not pay, and France adopts the enforcement framework PACE calls for. How would the award travel from Strasbourg to a Paris courtroom? The route has four stations, and each one is a potential failure point that counsel must prepare. First, the award itself. Just satisfaction under Article 41 is awarded to the injured party, which in inter-State cases is the applicant state for the benefit of identified victims; the Court quantifies sums per head or per category of violation, and the judgment becomes final under Article 44. Second, supervision. Under Article 46, paragraph 2, the final judgment is transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which supervises execution, and the Assembly’s resolution explicitly builds on this mechanism by asking states to act once the Court has delivered its inter-State judgments. Third, domestication. Unlike a foreign arbitral award, a Strasbourg judgment is not subject to exequatur in the classical sense; it is a binding international judgment whose execution depends on the respondent state’s compliance, monitored multilaterally. France has no standing procedure by which a private victim converts a Strasbourg award against a third state into a French enforcement title permitting attachment of that state’s property in France, and creating one is exactly what the resolution invites. The legislative design would need to answer, at a minimum, who holds the claim, the state of Ukraine by subrogation, individual victims by direct right, or a compensation mechanism such as the international Register of Damage, how the quantum is certified, and which judge, the Paris enforcement judge or a specialised chamber, authorises the attachment.

Fourth, attachment against immunity, which returns to the wall analysed in the first part. Any French enforcement statute that permits seizure of Russian central bank reserves, or of Euroclear cash balances representing them to the extent they touch France, would amount to a unilateral exception to immunity from execution for a defined class of judgments, and it would immediately face three courts: the French Constitutional Council on property rights and the separation of powers, the Court of Justice on the coherence of the European sanctions and free movement of capital framework, and the European Court of Human Rights itself on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, under which deprivation of possessions requires a legal basis, a legitimate aim and proportionality with compensation. The Commission’s reparations loan design was crafted precisely to sidestep this minefield by using the assets as backing for a loan rather than confiscating them, and the September 2026 rejection of that design at summit level shows how narrow the political path is. A Paris enforcement strategy built today must therefore be staged: secure and preserve the award, register the claim with every existing mechanism, map attachable commercial assets that fall outside sovereign immunity even under current law, and prepare the attachment file so that it can be filed the day the new statute enters into force, rather than betting the entire recovery on a confiscation that no judge can currently order. The companion question of closed cases against Russia, restoration to the list and the fate of frozen assets in that context, is examined in the firm’s study of what a Paris court can still do when a Strasbourg case against Russia was closed, which completes this analysis on the procedural side.

Two practical checklists close this part, one for victims and one for holders of frozen funds. Victims holding or awaiting a Strasbourg award should keep the complete judgment with its certified translation, proof of non-payment, Committee of Ministers supervision documents, and an inventory of the debtor footprint in France with, for each asset, the evidence of its commercial rather than sovereign use; limitation and procedural time limits must be diarised, because enforcement measures in France remain subject to strict deadlines and the immunity regime rewards the creditor who moves first once the legal window opens. Holders of funds frozen in France should keep every listing act with its statement of reasons, every Treasury and bank document, a control chart proving or disproving ownership and control links, and a diary of Luxembourg and French time limits, while applying for basic-needs and legal-fees derogations through counsel rather than moving funds informally. In both postures, the Paris Bar rule is the same: document, authorise, challenge in the competent court, and never confuse a political vote, however historic, with an enforcement title.

Conclusion

The 1 October 2026 vote matters, but for the opposite reason to the one circulating on social networks. It does not unlock €210 billion; it certifies that the Council of Europe’s parliamentary organ now openly demands what was unsayable two years ago, the use of frozen Russian state assets to satisfy Strasbourg awards, and it puts France on notice to build the domestic enforcement framework that would make such satisfaction possible. Between that horizon and today’s courtroom stand three locks this article has described exactly as a Paris judge would apply them: a freeze that renders unavailable without transferring ownership, under European regulations and national orders reviewable in Luxembourg and Paris; an immunity from execution that protects sovereign and diplomatic property and presumes embassy accounts devoted to the mission; and a missing statute, the one PACE calls for, that would convert a Strasbourg award into an attachable French title. Victims should prepare their files as if that statute will come, and holders of frozen assets should challenge their listings as if it will come with safeguards they will need to invoke. On both sides, the files that win will be the ones documented before the law moves, because when the vault finally opens, whether by reparations loan, extraordinary revenues or direct enforcement, only complete, dated and court-ready files will pass through the door.

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