On 10 September 2026, one hundred and twenty-two members of the European Parliament signed a letter demanding that the European Union finally unlock more than 200 billion euros in frozen Russian assets to finance Ukraine’s defence. The letter, launched by liberal MEPs Karin Karlsbro, Nathalie Loiseau and Petras Austrevicius and signed across groups from the European People’s Party to The Left, revives a fight Brussels thought it had settled: a December plan to convert the immobilised billions into a zero-interest reparations loan collapsed at a leaders’ summit, and the bloc fell back on a 90 billion euro support loan instead. With four member states renewing the push at the end of August and Ukraine’s documented destruction now estimated above 600 billion euros, the signatories want the Commission to come back with a new proposal that overcomes the objections of Belgium, Italy, Bulgaria and Malta. This article explains, from a French litigator’s desk in Paris, the two court battles this fight has already produced and the three questions every creditor, bank and sanctioned person must answer before touching Russian state money on French soil: can Brussels lawfully convert a freeze into a seizure, what is Moscow’s 220 billion euro counter-claim worth in a European courtroom, and where exactly does French enforcement law draw the line.
I. Can Brussels Turn Russia’s Frozen Billions Into a Ukraine Loan?
A. Why the September 2026 Push to Unlock the Money Keeps Hitting the Same Legal Wall
The arithmetic behind the 10 September letter is simple and brutal. The European Union holds more than 200 billion euros in Russian central bank assets, most of it sitting with the Brussels-based custodian Euroclear in Belgium. Last December, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen put forward a plan to convert those immobilised reserves into a zero-interest loan that would finance Ukraine’s defence against the full-scale invasion. EU leaders failed to agree: several capitals feared the legal exposure, and the plan fell apart at the Brussels summit. Earlier this year the bloc approved a 90 billion euro support loan for Ukraine instead, paid from its own resources. The MEPs now warn that this is not enough, pointing to destruction costs above 600 billion euros and a Ukrainian budget crunch, and they ask the Commission to design a new instrument that would transfer the assets into an EU vehicle assuming the legal obligations toward Russia’s central bank, so that Ukraine gets the money while pressure on Moscow is maintained.
The letter is addressed to Commission President von der Leyen, foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, economy Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis, European Council President Antonio Costa and Irish Taoiseach Micheal Martin, who currently holds the rotating Council presidency. Its political message is blunt: in the blunt political message Euronews reports from the letter, namely that Moscow must bear the financial consequences of its war of aggression. It follows a renewed push started at the end of August by four EU countries to unlock the 210 billion euros in immobilised assets, and it directly targets the objections of Belgium, whose Prime Minister Bart De Wever has feared from the outset that hosting Euroclear leaves his country exposed to Russian litigation, alongside reservations expressed by Italy, Bulgaria and Malta.
Moscow, however, has not waited for Brussels to make up its mind. In a statement published in early March 2026, the Bank of Russia announced that it had filed suit in the General Court in Luxembourg against the European Union over the decision taken on 12 December 2025 to freeze roughly 230 billion dollars of its reserves for an indefinite period, until the war ends and Russia pays reparations to Ukraine. The central bank’s grievance, in its own words, is that the European decision breaches what the bank calls the basic and inalienable rights to access justice and to inviolability of property, together with the sovereign immunity of states and their central banks. Three legal arrows are aimed at the Council: first, that the 27 national leaders bypassed the usual unanimity requirement by voting the freeze through by majority; second, that an indefinite freeze coupled and not release them even against the enforcement of court decisions or arbitration awards amounts to a confiscation dressed as a freeze; third, that sovereign state property, and central bank reserves above all, enjoys immunity from seizure by other states. The Commission’s answer, delivered at a Brussels briefing by spokesman Balazs Ujvari, was equally blunt, saying Brussels is fully confident the regulation is lawful and compatible with EU law.
That exchange frames the entire European debate. A freeze is a temporary restrictive measure; a loan built on someone else’s reserves, repayable only if Moscow pays reparations it refuses to pay, starts to look like a permanent deprivation. European lawyers advising banks have watched a parallel signal from Luxembourg in the windfall-profits litigation, where Hungary challenged the allocation of profits generated by the frozen assets to military support for Ukraine and the General Court dismissed the action. The message for practitioners is that Luxembourg currently upholds the architecture of the freeze and the use of its extraordinary revenues, while the direct frontal assault by the reserves’ owner, the Bank of Russia itself, is still pending before the General Court. Anyone structuring transactions around these assets, from Euroclear participants to Ukrainian financing vehicles, must therefore work with two timelines at once: the political timeline of a Commission proposal the Parliament is demanding within weeks, and the judicial timeline of an annulment action that could take a year or more and whose outcome would retroactively poison every structure built in the meantime.
For readers in France, one institutional detail matters immediately. European regulations imposing freezes are directly applicable in all member states, but each state designates its own competent authority for implementation and authorisations. In France, that authority is the Treasury department of the economy ministry, the Direction generale du Tresor, a point a Nanterre enforcement judge restated in plain terms in May 2026 when refusing to let private litigants stretch the sanctions freeze beyond its listed targets. Any request to release funds, to derogate from a freeze, or to confirm that a transaction does not breach it goes through that administrative channel first, not through a civil court. A Paris file therefore always opens with two parallel questions: what does Luxembourg say about the validity of the measure, and what does the Tresor say about its concrete application to your funds.
B. What Moscow’s 220 Billion Euro Counter-Shot Against Euroclear Is Really Worth
The second front opened in Moscow, and it mirrors the first with the symmetry of a retaliation strategy. In December 2025, the Bank of Russia sued Euroclear itself before the Moscow Arbitration Court, arguing that the Belgian custodian acted unlawfully in freezing the assets and claiming around 232 billion dollars covering both the immobilised funds and compensation for lost returns. A preliminary hearing was held behind closed doors in January 2026 at the bank’s request. Euroclear, which has said it is fighting more than one hundred related claims in Russia, considers that it merely complied with European Union law and does not regard itself as subject to Russian jurisdiction. In July 2026 a Moscow court rejected Euroclear’s appeal in the case, and Russian state media subsequently reported an award ordering Euroclear to pay approximately 220 billion euros in compensation. Private Russian investors caught in the wider freeze on foreign securities have reportedly sought to join the central bank’s action, which means the Moscow docket could keep growing even as the Luxembourg docket moves at its own pace.
Two legal theories underpin the Russian position, and both deserve a sober reading rather than a dismissal. The first is treaty-based: Moscow argues that freezing its sovereign funds breaches a 1989 investment-protection agreement concluded by the Soviet Union with Belgium and Luxembourg, the two countries where the reserves are custodied. The second is the classic shield of sovereign immunity, the principle that one state’s property is protected from seizure by another state’s courts, as outlined in the 2004 United Nations convention on jurisdictional immunities of states and their property. The difficulty, acknowledged even by Moscow-based sanctions counsel, is that not enough countries have ratified that convention to make it binding treaty law, so Russia must rely on customary international law instead. As one Moscow sanctions lawyer told the press, Moscow is likely to treat any use of Russian sovereign assets as a breach of international law entitling it to countermeasures, adding that the central bank understands perfectly well that a Moscow judgment cannot simply be enforced inside the European Union and is weighing both further European legal options and retaliatory measures inside Russia.
That assessment is the correct starting point for any French analysis, because it separates the political noise from the enforcement reality. A Moscow arbitrazh award against Euroclear, however large, is a foreign judgment like any other when it crosses the French border: to produce effects against assets located in France, it would need exequatur from a French court, and it would then collide with three successive walls. First, the European sanctions regime itself, which a French judge applies as directly effective Union law and which prohibits making funds available in breach of the freeze. Second, the French law of state immunity from enforcement, which since the Sapin II statute of 9 December 2016 subjects any coercive measure against foreign state property to prior judicial authorisation and strict substantive conditions. Third, the ordinary French requirements for recognising foreign judgments, including compatibility with international public policy at a time when the issuing court’s state is under comprehensive European sanctions. None of this means the Moscow award is legally meaningless: inside Russia it grounds seizures of Euroclear-linked assets and Western companies’ property, which is precisely the retaliation dynamic European custodians price into their risk models. But as a tool for reaching assets in Paris, Brussels or Luxembourg, it currently travels without an enforcement engine.
The symmetrical risk sits on the European side and explains Belgium’s anxiety. If the Union moves from freezing to using the principal, whether through the reparations loan or through the new instrument the MEPs propose, it will face the Bank of Russia’s annulment action in Luxembourg and, very likely, investment-treaty claims invoking the 1989 Soviet-era agreement. The General Court’s dismissal of Hungary’s windfall-profits challenge shows that judges will defend the existing revenue-use mechanism, but using the capital itself crosses a different legal threshold, and the judges who dismissed the Hungarian action have not yet ruled on the central bank’s direct claim. For counsel advising clients with exposure on either side, the practical conclusion is uncomfortable but clear: both the Brussels track and the Moscow track are live, both timelines stretch into 2027, and any irreversible step taken in 2026 must be documented as reversible, authorised and compliant on the day it is taken, because the court that reviews it later may apply a law as it stands after one of these two cases is decided.
II. What a Paris Lawyer Tests Before Anyone Touches Russian State Money in France
A. Can a Creditor Seize Russian State Property in France? The Immunity Wall Holds
France has one of the most creditor-friendly enforcement systems in Europe, and simultaneously one of the strictest state-immunity regimes. The combination matters enormously for Russian assets, because it means the question is never whether a bailiff can move fast; it is whether a judge will authorise the bailiff to move at all. Since the statute of 9 December 2016, usually called Sapin II, the rule is written in the Code of Civil Enforcement Proceedings in terms that leave no room for improvisation: “Des mesures conservatoires ou des mesures d’exécution forcée ne peuvent être mises en œuvre sur un bien appartenant à un Etat étranger que sur autorisation préalable du juge par ordonnance rendue sur requête.” Read the full text on Legifrance, article L111-1-1 of the enforcement code. No conservatory attachment, no forced execution against foreign state property without a prior court order issued on petition. A creditor holding even a final judgment who skips this step seizes nothing enforceable.
The order is not a formality. The same code provides that “Des mesures conservatoires ou des mesures d’exécution forcée visant un bien appartenant à un Etat étranger ne peuvent être autorisées par le juge que si l’une des conditions suivantes est remplie : 1° L’Etat concerné a expressément consenti à l’application d’une telle mesure ; 2° L’Etat concerné a réservé ou affecté ce bien à la satisfaction de la demande qui fait l’objet de la procédure ;” with a third door where a judgment or arbitral award has been rendered against the state and the targeted asset is specifically used or intended for use by that state for other than non-commercial public service purposes, with a link to the entity against which the proceedings were brought. See Legifrance, article L111-1-2 of the enforcement code. Central bank reserves held for monetary sovereignty sit at the very core of what this text protects: they are the textbook example of assets devoted to public, non-commercial purposes, and no French enforcement judge will treat them as commercial property available to satisfy a private claim without an express waiver or a precise judicial finding under the third condition.
Diplomatic and consular property enjoys an even higher wall. The code states that “Des mesures conservatoires ou des mesures d’exécution forcée ne peuvent être mises en œuvre sur les biens, y compris les comptes bancaires, utilisés ou destinés à être utilisés dans l’exercice des fonctions de la mission diplomatique des Etats étrangers ou de leurs postes consulaires, de leurs missions spéciales ou de leurs missions auprès des organisations internationales qu’en cas de renonciation expresse et spéciale des Etats concernés.” See Legifrance, article L111-1-3 of the enforcement code. The Cour de cassation has given these words their full weight. In a leading 10 January 2018 ruling against the Republic of Congo, the First Civil Chamber held that the 2016 provisions “subordonnent la validité de la renonciation par un Etat étranger à son immunité d’exécution, à la double condition que cette renonciation soit expresse et spéciale,” expressly endorsing its earlier landmark line of 28 September 2011 and 28 March 2013 in the Argentine debt cases. Read the Cour de cassation decision of 10 January 2018, appeal 16-22.494. A generic waiver clause buried in a financing contract, however sweeping its language, does not open the door to diplomatic accounts.
The same court refined the boundary again on 13 March 2024, and the refinement cuts both ways. The case concerned the seizure of an aircraft assigned to the presidency of the Republic of Congo. The court recalled that “selon l’article 22, § 3 de la Convention de Vienne sur les relations diplomatiques du 18 avril 1961, les locaux de la mission, leur ameublement et les autres objets qui s’y trouvent, ainsi que les moyens de transport de la mission, ne peuvent faire l’objet d’aucune saisie ou mesure d’exécution.” The court then approved the Paris court’s finding that the functions of a diplomatic mission are distinct from diplomatic activity conducted by a head of state, so that an express waiver of immunity from execution was enough for the presidential asset without an additional special waiver. Read the Cour de cassation decision of 13 March 2024, appeal 21-17.599. The lesson for Russian-asset files is precise: waiver language must be mapped asset by asset, and anything genuinely serving the diplomatic mission in Paris remains practically untouchable, while assets linked to other state functions face the three-condition test of article L111-1-2 rather than automatic protection.
Applied to the 200 billion euros at the heart of this article, the French position is therefore straightforward and sobering for anyone hoping Paris might move faster than Brussels. Central bank reserves custodied at Euroclear in Belgium are not even within French enforcement jurisdiction, so a French seizure file would first need assets located in France. If such assets were identified, the creditor would need prior judicial authorisation, would have to fit one of the three statutory doors, and would have to survive the European freeze, which prohibits releasing funds to listed owners regardless of what domestic enforcement law might otherwise permit. Conversely, anyone asked to enforce the Moscow 220 billion euro award in France should understand that the same wall faces the other direction: the award needs exequatur, the exequatur judge applies European sanctions as directly effective law, and the immunity screen of articles L111-1-1 to L111-1-3 stands in front of every coercive measure. France is not a shortcut around either Luxembourg or Moscow; it is a jurisdiction where both sides’ paper must pass through some of the toughest filters in Europe.
B. Can a Sanctioned Person Hide Behind the Freeze to Defeat Creditors? The Nanterre Answer Is No
The most instructive French decision of 2026 for practitioners does not concern the central bank’s billions at all. It concerns a private enforcement dispute in which a sanctioned person tried to turn the European freeze into a shield against an ordinary creditor, and a Nanterre enforcement judge dismantled the attempt piece by piece. On 12 May 2026, the enforcement judge of the Nanterre judicial court ruled on a challenge to an attachment-of-debt order served on 6 October 2025 at the initiative of a Dutch company, Inter Jet BV, against assets linked to a sanctioned network. The sanctioned debtor argued that the seizure violated Council Regulation 269 of 17 March 2014 on restrictive measures against actions undermining Ukraine’s territorial integrity, because the ultimate controller of the creditor chain was a listed Russian national, and asked the judge to annul the attachment and declare the enforcement abusive. The judge rejected every claim on both sides and left the enforcement standing. Read the Nanterre enforcement judgment of 12 May 2026, docket 25/09492.
The reasoning is a masterclass in how French courts handle the intersection of sanctions and private enforcement, and it deserves to be quoted exactly. The court recalled that article 2 of the regulation provides that “1. Sont gelés tous les fonds et ressources économiques appartenant aux personnes physiques ou à des personnes physiques ou morales, entités ou organismes qui leurs sont associés énumérés à l’annexe I, de même que tous les fonds et ressources économiques que ces personnes physiques ou que ces personnes physiques ou morales, entités ou organismes qui leurs sont associés possèdent, détiennent ou contrôlent. 2. Aucuns fonds ni ressources économiques ne sont mis, directement ou indirectement, à la disposition des personnes physiques ou des personnes physiques ou morales, des entités ou des organismes qui leurs sont associés énumérés à l’annexe I, ni dégagés à leur profit.” Full text of the Nanterre judgment The freeze therefore attaches to listed persons and listed entities, not to everyone connected to them by shareholding or influence. The creditor companies in the chain were not named in Annex I, and the court held that “aucune disposition de ce réglement ne confère aux juridictions nationales la faculté d’exercer un contrôle afin de déterminer si une entité qui n’est pas mentionnée dans cette annexe doit faire l’objet d’un gel de ses avoirs.” Full text of the Nanterre judgment A French civil judge, even as the ordinary judge of Union law on national territory, has no power to extend the freeze list by judicial construction.
Two further holdings from the same judgment shape everyday practice in Paris. First, on competence: article 16 of the regulation leaves member states free to designate the authorities responsible for monitoring compliance, “le service désigné par la République Française est la Direction générale du Trésor relevant du ministère de l’économie et des finances.” Arguments about whether an entity should be treated as frozen belong before the Treasury, not before the enforcement judge. Second, on territoriality: “l’ensemble normatif suisse, qu’il s’agisse de sa législation, de sa réglementation ou de ses décisions de justice, ne dispose d’absolument aucune autorité et ne produit aucun effet sur le territoire de la République Française.” Full text of the Nanterre judgment Foreign sanctions designations, foreign court orders and foreign legal theories change nothing in a French enforcement file unless French or European law gives them effect. The operative part is equally clear: the court “DEBOUTE la société [O] European Groupe Se de l’intégralité de ses demandes” and dismissed all of Inter Jet BV’s claims as well, and ordered the sanctioned claimant to pay costs Full text of the Nanterre judgment The court then condemned the sanctioned claimant to costs. The freeze protects listed assets from being moved; it does not immunise listed persons from their creditors, and it certainly does not allow them to dictate who may enforce what in France.
The same file connects directly to the wider sanctions jurisprudence our readers follow. The creditor chain in Nanterre ran through Inter Rao entities, the very group whose listing the Court of Justice annulled on 3 September 2026 in the Inter Rao Lietuva ruling analysed in our analysis of the CJEU Inter Rao Lietuva judgment. Listings can fall in Luxembourg while enforcement proceeds in Nanterre, and each forum applies its own test: Luxembourg reviews the validity of the designation, the French enforcement judge verifies the enforceable title and the regularity of the seizure, and the Treasury decides on freeze derogations. A litigant who confuses the three forums loses in all of them.
Alongside the European regulations, France maintains its own national freeze regime in the Monetary and Financial Code, and its scope is worth stating precisely because it differs from the Russia regulations. The code opens its definitions by providing that “Pour l’application du présent chapitre, on entend par” a counter-terrorism anchor, with the defined term covering terrorist acts by reference to the EU regulation of 27 December 2001. See Legifrance, article L562-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code. The operative national power provides that “Le ministre chargé de l’économie et le ministre de l’intérieur peuvent décider, conjointement, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques” in the terrorism context. See Legifrance, article L562-2 of the Monetary and Financial Code. A parallel provision allows that “Le ministre chargé de l’économie peut décider, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques” on its own statutory grounds. See Legifrance, article L562-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code. Russian sovereign reserves in Europe are frozen under European regulations, not under these national terrorism provisions, but the architecture is the same everywhere in French practice: a time-limited administrative freeze, renewable, implemented by the executive, reviewable by the administrative courts, and entirely distinct from a judicial seizure or a transfer of ownership.
That distinction produces a practical checklist for anyone with a live file in France this autumn. First, identify the exact legal basis of the freeze affecting your counterparty: European regulation with an Annex I listing, national ministerial order, or mere contractual over-compliance by a bank. Second, never ask a civil judge to do the Treasury’s job: requests for release, derogation or confirmation go to the Direction generale du Tresor with a documented compliance file. Third, if you are a creditor, build the enforcement title first and the authorisation second: an enforceable title plus a petition for prior authorisation under article L111-1-1, fitted expressly into one of the three doors of article L111-1-2, with asset-by-asset evidence on diplomatic use under article L111-1-3. Fourth, if you are targeted, understand that the freeze is not a defence to enforcement: Nanterre shows that invoking sanctions to annul a creditor’s seizure fails when your entity is not the listed one, and that abusive-resistance arguments can cost you an article 700 award on top of your own expenses. Fifth, calendar both Luxembourg and Moscow: a General Court annulment or a new Commission instrument in the coming months can change the status of the very funds your file concerns, in either direction.
Conclusion
The September 2026 push to convert Russia’s frozen reserves into Ukrainian financing is the most serious attempt yet to cross the line between freezing and taking, and the 122-signature parliamentary letter makes it a live political file rather than an academic debate. But the legal map has not changed: the Bank of Russia’s annulment action sits before the General Court in Luxembourg, Moscow’s 220 billion euro award against Euroclear has no enforcement engine inside the Union, and France applies both regimes through its own demanding filters. In Paris, state property is seized only with prior judicial authorisation under article L111-1-1, only through one of the three doors of article L111-1-2, and never from diplomatic assets without an express and special waiver under article L111-1-3, as the Cour de cassation confirmed in 2018 and refined in 2024. Meanwhile the Nanterre enforcement court has closed the most cynical shortcut of all: sanctions do not shield debtors from their creditors, and only the listed are frozen. Whether Brussels invents a new instrument this autumn or Luxembourg rules first, the files that survive will be the ones built early, documented asset by asset, and cleared with the Treasury before any bailiff moves. That discipline, more than any headline figure, is what separates a frozen fortune from a recoverable one.