The European Union’s 21st Russia sanctions package creates a compliance deadline that French crypto businesses cannot treat as a routine customer-screening update. From 25 August 2026, the prohibition on Russian nationals or persons residing in Russia directly or indirectly owning or controlling an EU-incorporated crypto-asset service provider, or holding a position on its governing body, extends beyond wallet, account and custody services to the other crypto-asset services defined by MiCA. The rule is already in force as European legislation; its practical effect is the date written into the amended provision.
That does not mean that every Russian customer of a French platform is automatically sanctioned, that every Russian passport holder must be refused, or that every transaction involving a Russian-speaking counterparty must be frozen. The legal question is narrower and more demanding: who owns or controls the regulated provider, where those persons reside, what services the provider supplies, and whether a governance arrangement is genuine or merely designed to defeat the restriction.
For a French platform, the answer requires a combined reading of Regulation (EU) 2026/1848, the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation, and the French Monetary and Financial Code. The immediate work is therefore an ownership and governance audit, not a mass exit from Russian clients. The following analysis sets out what changes on 25 August, how French sanctions controls interact with the new rule, and the evidence management should preserve before taking a decision that may affect licensing, banking and cross-border operations.
I. What changes in France on 25 August 2026?
A. Is every Russian national barred, or is the rule about control of a CASP?
The starting point is the text of the amended EU sanctions regulation, not a headline describing a “crypto ban”. Regulation (EU) 2026/1848, adopted as part of the Union’s 21st package, amended the Russia measures in Regulation (EU) No 833/2014. The complete instrument is available in the Official Journal text of Regulation (EU) 2026/1848. It is directly applicable in Member States, and its final provision states that the regulation enters into force on the day after publication, subject to the dates written into its substantive provisions.
The decisive change is in Article 5b(2a). The rule originally concerned an EU-incorporated legal person, entity or body providing crypto-asset wallet, account or custody services. The new wording keeps that prohibition and adds the wider service perimeter from 25 August 2026. The operative passage states: As from 25 August 2026, that prohibition shall also apply to the case of a legal person, entity or body which is incorporated or constituted under the law of a Member State and is providing any other crypto-asset services, as defined in Regulation (EU) 2023/1114.
The reference is to the Union’s Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation, commonly known as MiCA.
The personal scope is equally important. The provision addresses Russian nationals and natural persons residing in Russia. It prohibits allowing them to directly or indirectly own or control the relevant EU provider, or to hold posts in its governing bodies. A Russian national who merely holds an account on a French platform is not, by that fact alone, the prohibited owner of the platform. Conversely, a structure in which the registered shareholder is European but voting rights, financing, contractual instructions, board influence or beneficial ownership remain with a Russian national may fall within the rule even when the corporate chart looks formally European.
The distinction matters for communications with customers and correspondent institutions. A platform must not turn a control restriction into an unexplained nationality policy. Its file should identify the legal trigger: the person, the provider, the service category, the ownership or control mechanism, and the date on which the wider prohibition becomes applicable. A customer-level review may still be required for other sanctions, anti-money-laundering or source-of-funds reasons, but those are separate grounds and should not be conflated with Article 5b(2a).
French law supplies the domestic regulatory vocabulary. Article L. 54-10-1 of the Code monétaire et financier defines the crypto-assets within the MiCA framework; the current text is available on Légifrance, Article L. 54-10-1. Article L. 54-10-4 states that L’exercice de la profession de prestataire de services sur crypto-actifs est interdit à toute personne n’ayant pas été autorisée
under the applicable regime. The provision is reproduced on Légifrance, Article L. 54-10-4. The licensing perimeter and the sanctions perimeter are not identical, but a platform that cannot explain who controls it may face both questions at once.
There is a second EU provision that requires careful wording. New Article 5bc addresses transactions with certain crypto-asset service providers or exchange platforms established in a third country listed in Annex LVII. Its text begins: It shall be prohibited to engage, directly or indirectly, in any transaction with a legal person, entity or body that is an entity providing crypto-asset services or is a platform enabling the exchange or transfer of crypto-assets and is established in a third country listed in Annex LVII.
This is a conditional country-list mechanism. The existence of Article 5bc does not by itself create a blanket prohibition on all transactions with every non-EU crypto platform. Compliance teams must check the current annex and the relevant transaction rather than announce a wider rule than the legislation provides.
The 25 August date therefore marks a widening of the prohibited ownership and governance relationship for EU crypto providers. It is not a general declaration that Russian nationals may not use European technology, hold lawful property, or communicate with a French company. It is also not a safe harbour for a European nominee. The relevant question is whether the economic and decision-making reality leaves the Russian person in direct or indirect control.
B. Why must a French platform read the rule through ownership, governance and sanctions law?
A French CASP cannot isolate the new EU provision from its existing risk system. MiCA determines the service perimeter and the authorization framework. French law determines how a regulated actor documents its organization, applies restrictive measures and responds to supervision. Article L. 54-10-7 of the Code monétaire et financier should be read alongside the French authorization provisions and the relevant AMF and ACPR guidance. The platform’s first task is to map each activity: custody, exchange, execution, reception and transmission of orders, advice, portfolio management, transfer services, or another service covered by MiCA. A business that previously classified itself as a wallet provider may now fall into the wider date-sensitive rule because it provides another regulated service to the same customer base.
The French anti-money-laundering framework adds an organizational obligation. Article L. 561-32 of the Code monétaire et financier provides that the persons subject to the code must establish internal organization and procedures, and that Elles mettent en place un dispositif de gestion des risques
. The full provision is available on Légifrance, Article L. 561-32. The phrase is short, but its practical effect is substantial: the platform should be able to show who made the ownership assessment, which evidence was reviewed, how uncertainty was escalated, and why the final decision was proportionate to the legal risk.
The restrictive-measures provisions define the concepts that are often mishandled in operational files. Article L. 562-1 includes the French definitions of “détention et contrôle”, “gel des fonds” and “gel des ressources économiques”; the official text is at Légifrance, Article L. 562-1. The difference between ownership, control and an asset freeze is not semantic. A person may be unable to control a platform even where no personal bank account has been frozen. A platform may also have to freeze a designated person’s funds even though the ownership prohibition does not apply to the provider’s governance.
Article L. 562-4 imposes an immediate operational duty on the persons within its scope. The statutory wording requires them to appliquer sans délai les mesures de gel
and to inform the Minister responsible for the economy. The complete article, including the scope covering persons on French territory, legal persons governed by French law and transactions carried out in France, is published on Légifrance, Article L. 562-4. A French platform cannot defer a confirmed freeze while waiting for a quarterly committee meeting. It should, however, distinguish a confirmed legal measure from an unresolved ownership signal and record the reason for each interim action.
The internal control requirement is stated expressly in Article L. 562-4-1. The text requires covered persons to establish internal organization and procedures for implementing asset-freeze measures arising from French law and directly applicable European restrictive-measures regulations, as well as the prohibition on circumvention. The official wording is available on Légifrance, Article L. 562-4-1. That provision is the bridge between the European deadline and the French compliance file. The platform’s policy should identify the new Article 5b(2a) trigger, the data needed to test it, the decision maker, the escalation route and the retention period for the evidence.
Supervision is not limited to the formal act of freezing. Article L. 561-36 of the code addresses supervision of compliance with directly applicable European provisions, including restrictive-measures regulations, and the sanctioning powers of the relevant authorities. Its current text is on Légifrance, Article L. 561-36. In practice, this means that a platform should assume its governance analysis may be reviewed after the event. An undocumented conclusion that “the investor is no longer involved” is weak. A signed resignation, an enforceable transfer of rights, a verified change in voting arrangements, updated beneficial-owner information and proof that no side agreement preserves influence are materially stronger.
This combined framework also explains why a French company should not rely on a single screening hit. Name matching identifies designated persons, but it does not reveal indirect control. Corporate registries may omit private voting agreements. A board title may conceal a veto right. An investor may have lost shares while retaining a convertible instrument or contractual power over capital allocation. The Article 5b(2a) assessment must therefore combine sanctions screening, beneficial-owner work, corporate-law review, residence evidence and a functional analysis of decision-making power.
II. What should a French crypto company do before the deadline?
A. Which records, controls and decisions should be assembled?
The safest deadline process is a documented review of the provider rather than a generic message sent to all customers. Management should open a matter file that identifies every legal entity providing crypto-asset services in France or another Member State, its authorization or registration status, the services actually delivered, and the precise provision relied on. The file should state that the 25 August extension concerns Russian nationals and persons residing in Russia who directly or indirectly own or control the EU-incorporated provider, or hold a post in its governing bodies. It should also state whether another sanctions designation or a separate transaction prohibition creates an additional reason to act.
The ownership review should go beyond the first shareholder register. The platform should collect the current cap table, beneficial-owner declarations, voting agreements, shareholders’ agreements, options, warrants, convertible instruments, pledges, financing covenants and board appointment rights. It should identify who can appoint or remove directors, veto a material decision, approve a budget, direct a compliance function, control a bank account, or require the company to transact with a particular counterparty. A minority interest can still carry decisive control. A person can also control a company through a chain of entities even when the person’s name is absent from the French company’s immediate share register.
Residence and nationality evidence should be handled with a clear purpose. The rule refers to Russian nationals and natural persons residing in Russia; a platform should not treat a language, place of birth or Russian-sounding name as proof. It should use reliable corporate and identity documents, record the date on which they were checked, and explain any unresolved contradiction. The same file should separate nationality or residence from designation status, sanctions exposure, source-of-funds risk and the customer relationship. That separation reduces both false positives and the risk that a lawful customer receives a decision that cannot be explained.
The service map is the next control. A platform may provide custody for one product, exchange for another, execution through a group entity, and transfer services through a shared technology stack. The team should map the legal entity that performs each service and the entity whose governance is affected. The 25 August rule is not satisfied by saying that the group “is not a wallet”. The question is whether the relevant EU legal person, entity or body provides another crypto-asset service as defined in MiCA. The MiCA text should be used to classify the activity, with the French authorization provisions checked against the actual operating model.
Article L. 562-4-1 makes the control design itself part of the legal response. A useful internal procedure should have at least five stages:
- an initial ownership, control and governance questionnaire signed by the responsible officer;
- independent evidence for every person capable of exercising direct or indirect influence;
- a legal classification distinguishing Article 5b(2a), an asset freeze, a listed third-country transaction prohibition, and an ordinary risk-based refusal;
- an escalation to the compliance officer, legal function and senior management where a contractual or governance right is ambiguous; and
- a written decision that states the action, its legal basis, its scope, its duration and the evidence that would justify lifting or changing it.
The platform should also decide what happens to a person who holds a governing-body position. If the prohibition applies, simply changing the person’s public title while leaving board access, veto rights, information rights or instructions intact is not a solution. A genuine change may require a resignation, replacement, amendment of the relevant agreements, transfer of economic rights and verification that the former office holder no longer exercises influence. The company should preserve board minutes and corporate filings showing the sequence. If the business chooses to suspend a service while the review is pending, it should explain whether the measure is precautionary, required by a confirmed restriction, or based on a separate contractual policy.
When an asset freeze is actually engaged, Article L. 562-5 is direct: Il est interdit aux personnes mentionnées à l’article L. 562-4 de mettre à disposition directement ou indirectement, ou d’utiliser des fonds ou ressources économiques au profit des personnes dont les fonds et ressources économiques font l’objet d’une mesure de gel
. The provision is available on Légifrance, Article L. 562-5. The platform must then control releases, fee payments, withdrawals, collateral movements and indirect benefits. A deadline review must not be used as a pretext to apply this rule to an unlisted customer without a legal basis.
Article L. 562-6 separately prohibits participation in circumvention. The official text is at Légifrance, Article L. 562-6, and it refers to the prohibition on participer, sciemment et volontairement, à des activités ayant pour objet ou pour effet de contourner les mesures
. That is why a hurried nominee arrangement is dangerous. A provider cannot make the legal risk disappear by inserting an unconnected shareholder while preserving the same practical instructions, financing, board influence or proceeds. Any restructuring should be reviewed as a real transfer of control and documented as such, not presented as a paper exercise.
The audit should finish with a management decision tree. If the provider is not EU-incorporated, Article 5b(2a) may not be the relevant provision, although other rules can apply. If it is EU-incorporated and a covered Russian person controls it or sits on its governing body, the company should obtain urgent legal and regulatory advice before the effective date. If the evidence is inconclusive, the platform should identify the temporary measure and the additional document needed. If no prohibited relationship exists, the file should still record the analysis. That record may be more valuable than an overbroad refusal when a bank, auditor, supervisor or commercial counterparty asks why the platform changed its policy.
B. How can management challenge overreach without creating circumvention risk?
The first safeguard is precision. A management team should not announce that “Russian nationals are banned from French crypto”. That formulation is wider than the ownership and governance restriction and may create avoidable disputes with customers, employees, investors and counterparties. The correct notice should identify the affected provider, the relevant service, the ownership or governance relationship, the effective date, and any separate basis for a customer-level measure. It should use neutral language and explain what evidence is needed to correct an inaccurate file.
The second safeguard is a genuine governance remedy. Where a Russian national has a prohibited role or control right, the business may need to change the board, voting rights, shareholder arrangements or economic interest. That change should be effective in substance, not merely in a press release. The company should test whether the former controller still receives confidential information, appoints staff, approves transactions, directs a group treasury, controls a service company or can compel the new shareholder to vote. If any of those links remain, the analysis has not ended. The file should also explain whether the change affects the entity’s authorization, fit-and-proper assessment, beneficial-owner records or notification duties.
The third safeguard is communication with the French authorities. A platform facing a genuine interpretive question should prepare a concise factual memorandum for the relevant supervisory or sanctions channel, identifying the entities, services, ownership chain, disputed right, proposed remedy and supporting documents. A request for clarification is not a substitute for complying with a confirmed restriction, but it is preferable to a private assumption where the control analysis will affect a regulated license. The platform should keep proof of the request, the answer received and the date on which the internal policy was updated.
Management should keep the asset-freeze procedure separate from the ownership procedure. Article L. 562-10 states: Les mesures prises en vertu du présent chapitre sont opposables à tout tiers qui peut invoquer un droit sur les fonds ou ressources économiques faisant l’objet d’une mesure de gel, y compris lorsque ce droit est né antérieurement auxdites mesures
. The official article is available on Légifrance, Article L. 562-10. That rule concerns the effect of a freeze on third-party rights. It does not transform every ownership concern into a freeze, and the company should state which legal mechanism it is applying in each decision.
There is a corresponding enforcement risk. Article L. 574-3 of the code makes non-compliance with the relevant freeze obligations an offence, including conduct by persons, directors or employees that evades or obstructs implementation. The official text is on Légifrance, Article L. 574-3. Internal notes should therefore avoid casual language such as “we will route the funds through another group company” or “we can leave the director in place informally”. Such statements can be read as evidence of a circumvention plan. Decisions should instead identify the legal question, the information gap and the approved protective measure.
The third-country rule also deserves a separate control. Article 5bc of Regulation (EU) 2026/1848 refers to a third country listed in Annex LVII and contains conditions concerning crypto-asset services and platforms established there. A French business should monitor the annex and the Council’s implementing acts, but it should not treat every third-country service as prohibited solely because the provider is outside the EU. The correct workflow is to check the current list, determine whether the counterparty is within the defined category, test any exception or transitional rule, and record the transaction-specific conclusion.
Finally, a company that is refused service or whose governance arrangement is challenged should receive a reason that is legally intelligible without disclosing confidential detection methods. The decision can state that the provider cannot maintain a prohibited ownership or governing-body relationship after the specified date, identify the documents needed for reconsideration, and explain whether funds are frozen or merely subject to a temporary operational hold. If the factual basis is wrong, the company should have a review route. If the facts are correct, an appeal cannot be used as a device to continue the prohibited relationship while the review is pending.
The practical message for French management is simple but demanding: finish the ownership and control map before 25 August, classify the service under MiCA, separate direct sanctions from governance restrictions, and preserve evidence for every conclusion. A platform that refuses all Russian customers may still miss the real issue; a platform that accepts a nominal European shareholder may create a circumvention problem. The defensible position is the one that can show the legal trigger, the factual proof, the proportionate action and the date of each decision.
Conclusion
From 25 August 2026, the EU restriction on Russian ownership or control of EU-incorporated crypto-asset service providers reaches services beyond wallets, accounts and custody. French platforms should read that deadline as a governance and control test. It concerns who can own, direct or sit on the governing body of the provider; it is not an automatic ban on every Russian customer or every transaction with a Russian counterparty.
The immediate priority is a documented audit of ownership chains, voting and appointment rights, residence and nationality evidence, actual MiCA services, and any separate designation or freeze. Article L. 562-4-1 requires internal procedures, while Articles L. 562-5 and L. 562-6 make indirect availability and circumvention central risks. The third-country mechanism in Article 5bc must be checked against the current annex rather than expanded into a headline rule.
A French crypto company that acts before the deadline can choose a genuine governance remedy, obtain clarification on a difficult factual pattern, and communicate a narrow decision to the affected parties. A company that waits for a bank or supervisor to discover the relationship may have to explain not only the ownership structure, but also why its controls did not identify the issue earlier.